Flying Tigers (AVG) and no P-40

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Thank you, Rich. To me, if one is going to continually mention Thach it makes sense to spell his name correctly. As far as Thach or Flatley being responsible for the emphasis on gunnery after the war began, I quote again Lundstrom, "From the early 1920s on, the US Navy taught it's pilots the art of deflection shooting" page 459. I doubt Thach had too much influence in the 1920s.
For those who have not had the opportunity to read Lundstrom, IMO, he is the foremost author of well researched and objective books about WW2. I only wish he would finish and publish his next book on the Guadalcanal Campaign in late 1942 and 1943. For those interested, please get his books and enjoy.
 
Last edited:

Renrich,

You're undoubtedly correct that Thach didn't influence events in the 1920s but the USN wasn't the only force that practiced deflection shooting. Any air force that utilises air-towed drogues must employ deflection shooting and many air forces taught their pilots the art of deflection shooting without, necessarily, being "experts" in the field. And in the 1920s, as noted earlier, USN pilots were expected to be generalists who could fly pretty much any aircraft in the inventory rather than being specialised by type or role. Just 'cos Lundstrom said the USN pilots were taught deflection shooting doesn't mean they were proficient in that role and it may well have taken the operational experience of Thach and Flatley to appreciably raise standards at the front line, particularly as the USN and USMC air arms expanded in the run-up to WWII.
 
Last edited:
I can't envision any kind of aerial gunnery training of any air force not addressing deflection shooting. However, there might be a difference between teaching a pilot to execute low deflection gunnery runs and focusing strongly on full deflection(ninety degree) runs. The easiest full deflection run is the overhead which does not require as much precise maneuvering and as good a visibility over the nose. In addition to the two overhead runs, the USN taught the high side, flat side and low side runs.
 
deflection shooting was taught and practiced. most bases had a skeet range ( or access to one ) where airmen were encouraged to take a shotgun and go shoot to learn lead and marksmanship.
 

Renrich,

Those may be pertinent facts but you haven't answered the specific questions. Were these different deflection attacks all commenced in the 1920s? What was the impact of pilots being generalists on their air-to-air proficiency? Also, in the 1920s, the USN certainly was not flying aircraft that had 6-degree over-the-nose visibility. Even later on during WWII, the only aircraft where this was true was the F4F series and, perhaps, the F6F. It certainly was NOT true of the F4U.

Cheers,
BN
 
Last edited:
BN, with my limited typing skills I am about over quoting from Lundstrom. In his appendix about fixed aerial gunnery he makes a convincing argument about the USN's concentration on full deflection gunnery runs in comparison to other air forces. I am convinced and will remain so until someone else presents some authority with better credentials than Lundstrom that contradicts Lundstrom.

As far as Navy fighters are concerned, I have a book, " The Great Book of WW2 Airplanes" which has drawings of the profiles of the Spitfire, P51, P38, F4F, F6F, F8F, F4U, ME109, and FW190. The Grumman fighters all appear to have a pronounced slope from the bottom of the windshield to the end of the engine cowling. The F4U has a longer nose because of the fuel tank but it too has a rather pronounced slope from the windshield to the cowl and to add to that, after the early F4U1, the pilot's seat was raised 18 inches and the F4U pilot sat so high that I have read that on the ground, one F4U pilot could see the knees of another sitting next to him. The P51 and Spitfire appear to have very little slope, the ME109 none and the FW190 is hopeless because the windshield allowed the pilot only about 6 vertical inches of perspex to look dead ahead. Once again Lundstrom said that, in comparison to the USN fighters, the others had not enough visibility dead ahead for full deflection shooting. He apparently has studied all this and I doubt he would say something that is blatantly inaccurate for it would put in question his whole book"s credibility. That is good enough for me.
 
Lundstrom's comments that the F4F was a better platform for DS vs. the A6M should not be construed as an indication that other nations didn't train for it. For one thing, he cites more than one example within the pages of his book of Japanese pilots using full deflection shooting (and hitting) with their wing cannons.
 
Renrich,

Actually, I would ask whether Mr Lundstrom, experienced and qualified historian that he is, has studied in detail the training of fighter pilots in the air arms of all other WWII combatants. Just because Mr Lundstrom says the USN was the best doesn't make it true and to expect someone to cite a source that says, for example, that the RAF was the best doesn't help answer the question.

My comment about visibility over the nose was actually asking about designs prior to the F4F. You seem entirely wedded to the concept that the USN was always better than everyone else at deflection shooting because of training and visibility over the nose. I am asking whether visibility over the nose for the earlier Grumman biplanes was substantially better than that for any other aircraft, and also whether the USN's persistence in training pilots to fly all combat aircraft rather than specialising as fighters, dive bombers, torpedo bombers etc limited their proficiency in each role. Logic, and personal service experience, suggest that it would and hence it contradicts your view of the situation.

Cheers,
BN
 
I believe all the "Top Guns"from most Allied services including USN and USMC held a gun camp in Catfoss in the UK (1944?) to see how thet could improve gunnery. I like to see the results or conclusions drawn by these warriors.
 
1. Again Lundstrom does not say 'the USN was best'. However it's a simple fact that in the Pacific fighting of 1941-42 USN fighters were more successful against Japanese fighters than those of other air arms (usually by a lot), the exception being the AVG, but the AVG faced arguably considerably inferior Japanese opposition (though the same Japanese units the AVG faced did well against both USAAF and RAF units in other cases, for example the AVG's main opponent in later part of its career, JAAF 64th Sentai, flying basically the same Type 1, had a much better real kill ratio against RAF Hurricane units in 1943 than against the AVG in 1942, almost always having met the AVG alone in '42, so it's not some question of conflicting claims between AVG and RAF units in the same combats in 1942).

The question is *why* USN fighters were more effective against Japanese fighters in that theater and period than RAF and USAAF, not if. Was gunnery training *the* reason, or *a* significant reason or not?

2. The Grumman biplanes of the 30's had a similar fuselage shape to the F4F. But I don't really see the relevance of this point. Even if other air arms had a/c in the '30's more suitable for deflection shooting, if their long nosed planes of WWII severely limited (especially high) deflection shooting it would still reduce the rationale for emphasizing it in training. And just because their a/c of the 30's had been better suited to deflection shooting, still doesn't mean they emphasized it in formal training as much as the USN, even then. I think on this board (it might have been another) the profiles of Hurricane and F4F were overlaid and don't appear to differ all that much, but again the question is how much actual training in the technique. And it's not a binary where the USN knew of deflection shooting but nobody else had ever heard of it...it's a matter of degree.

3. The training syllabus adopted in February 1942 featured specialized advanced training in fighters for fighter pilots. The pre-war version had included a general course for all CV pilots at this stage, and a 1944 change also re-emphasized general combat skills (bombing, flak evasion, though also *more* gunnery training) for all CV pilots. But the point here (and others have brought it up already) is not to focus too much on the 'tree' of the training syllabus of a new pilot, but consider the 'forest' of training in a broader context. So for example, USN units of early 1942 had mostly guys who went through the pre-war style of training, which still was relatively a lot of hours compared to syllabi of war time air arms, and they'd also generally flown in their actual unit for up to sevearl years. A lot of the same type RAF guys, who graduated training in late 30's... had died in combat or were in Axis POW camps by the end of 1941, replaced by mass produced WWII pilots, albeit led by combat experienced pilots which the USN intially lacked.

Also, training continued in the unit, in all air arms of course, but subject to vastly different constraints in different cases. The RAF of '41-42 had a war to fight all the time in land theaters, usually losing more a/c and pilots than the Germans (fighting constantly at 1:several kill ratio's v German fighters in North Africa, for example), but still had to keep up numbers. The USAAF up to Dec '41 didn't have that situation, but still pressure to expand led them to field units less well prepared than USN ones. Again the value of Lundstrom isn't that he tells you about everything, but lots of detail of USN fighter units; compare it to the similar detail in Bartsch's books about USAAF units in PI and DEI and you can see there's a difference.

Again the fact from actual combat results in the early Pacific theater was pretty clear edge to US naval services in fighter effectiveness among Allied air arms v Japanese fighters. So even if we can correctly identify something about their training which 'limited their proficiency' (and I don't think you have, actually), something else must have helped it.

It's funny because in past debates some people have gotten pissed at me for persistently suggesting, not even firmly concluding, that the F4F itself was an underrated fighter combat machine and that's perhaps part of the explanation. The counter is always 'the F4F sucked, the stats say so, so it was training or tactics' (the 'it was tactical situations' argument is just historically incorrect, they did not differ systematically, and the F4F's relative success was achieved in a variety of situations). Now it's not training either it seems... But the F4F did achieve around 1:1 kill ratio v Zeroes in 1942, and Buffalo, Hurricane and Spitfire all achieved 1:several ratio's against Zero and Type 1, even in 1943 for the latter two a/c. Something caused that difference.

Joe
 
Last edited:
Joe,

My gripe is that Lundstrom is being quoted when his book provides no quantitative source data for his statement. I agree with you that the F4F was an underrated fighter. I suspect people tend to compare it's rather corpulent appearance to the "sleek" Spitfire and Me109 and assume that it was a worse performer. You and I have gone around before (and probably will do again) on the subject of relative aircraft performance (remember the seemingly never-ending Hurricane -vs- Mohawk discussion?). I hold to the line that, in addition to pilot proficiency and aircraft performance, local tactical conditions have a huge impact on the tactical and operational combat effectiveness of individual aircraft types. I suspect (but please correct me if I'm wrong - the SW Pacific isn't my strong suit) that the majority of USN combats during the early stages of the Pacific War in which both Allied and Japanese losses are known with precision come from the fighting over Guadalcanal. This was a very different tactical proposition (only 3 airfields, all close together, with opportunities for standing patrols, at altitude, to defend all 3 against incoming raids) compared to the vast distances involved in the fighting for Burma and defending India or the challenges of dislocated airfields and lack of early warning in Malaya. I also think your point about combat pilot losses in the British Commonwealth and German air arms has something to do with it. The USN and USMC (and USAAC for that matter) had major problems expanding for WWII but they had an extra 2 years to build up compared to the European combatants, and there were opportunities to learn from the mistakes made in that battle (or the successes, to whit Fuchida's interest in Taranto). Again, I'm not interested in making this a nationalistic rampage, I'm just tired of uncited statements being offered as evidence. As you know, I'm more than happy to delve into the detials, including primary sources, to come up with more justifiable conclusions.

Cheers,
B-N
 

Hi,

Having been bombarded over the past 5 years with highly charged arguments that have a basis along lines of national contention and yes....racism in some cases when it comes to comparing fighter plane performances, I embarked on a long study of this field using day by day ops within WWII to try to come up with some answers for myself.

What i concluded after 11 books by Shores alone, along with Lundstrom and a half dozen other others was that ratio exchanges, by which so much is argued over can be fairly predicted. Air combat is highly variable....influenced by a dozen+ factors in addition to plane stats and even pilot abilities. Taking all the variables into account, i concluded that unless one or more major variables are out of wack...one can expect a loss exchange close to 1:1 with a varience of up to 2:1 or 3:1.

One of the biggest factors why this is so is loss numbers themselves. A typical early to mid war skirmish has an average loss of 1-2 planes. Late war sees it rise to 3-5 planes per skirmish. Aircraft losses in general are not all that great despite the propensity of lead flying around. It mirrors the ground situation. Ground casualties can be massive but when you read about all the firepower flying around, including arty, its always amazed me that more men didn't die in any given battle. If loss totals are nto high...then its pretty hard to get a skewed result. Over time a skewed results can occur but unless one or more of those major variables are out of wack....the statistics tend to even out over time thus again leading one back to an exchange that is close to even.....allowing any sort of arguement to be forwarded.

Depending on whether one is trying to build up or discount the side in question determines the line of argument. For the buildup its simple.....win the exchange ratio and there's your proof of superiority. If attempting to discount the winning side, then a close exchange ratio is proof that there's a "myth" of superiority being fielded. I am sad to report that its the latter that one sees the most, especially in the Pacific area of WWII. My other main board supporting the wargame War in the pacific just experienced yet another racially charged thread involving this.

Citing an example....a poster (another board) asked what the exchange ratio was for the SRA ops with the A6M. I provided this info to him and at that point the thread devolved into a flame fest whereby the positive exchange ratio favoring the A6M was discounted away as being due to extenduating circumstances outside of plane and pilot. Take those factors away (it was explained) and the plane would do no better than 1:1 at the abosulte best.....and usually below 1:1 in other situations. "Lundstrom" was used as the "proof" with the rest typical Troll bluster.

This line of arguing embodies the old truth that there are three kinds of lies.......Lies, damned Lies and statistics. It also highlights the point i'm making however....that bereft of a major variable being out of wack (such as experience...plane performance....ground control....vectoring, etc etc) the expected ratio exchange will be close in the tactical and only a prolonged and consistant outlier in one or more of these variables (or air combat factors if you would) will show itself in a campaign total (exceeding 3:1 in any nation's favor)

On paper and in real life the F4F was not a performance winner and it was at a disadvantage "overall" to the A6M in this regards. (again...."overall", i'm aware through long exp with unpleasant trolling threads about the strengths of the F4F and other American fighters in certain situations). But the plane was good enough and had enough positive attributes (such as great firepower and durability) that when flown correctly and with mutual support, it could compete and did so....and the ratios show it.

Same thing with the Battle of Britian. Germany had a great fighter in the 109...and they had combat experience and good training to back it up....yet ultimately they lost the BoB with an exchange ratio that fell within 2:1 with enemy fighters.

The 5:1 exchang ratio in the SRA favoring Japanese fighters was due in part to factors outside the planes and the men...but unlike the trolled thread i alluded too (again....not on this board) to discount the men and machines was as wrong as attributing victory totally to the same men and machines. Its very similar to the Barbarossa campaign....outside variables heavily favored the German side and contributed to the similar 5:1 exchange vs. the VVS but in the end, the pilots and the planes remained a major part of that statistical victory.

When the IJN and USN carrier groups clashed in four carrier battles, there wasn't enough of a varience in the air combat factors to result in a lopsided exchange though even had it been it would still be hard to show it in the stats because unlike a campaign, a carrier battle is usually a single day affair.....that makes it much harder to build a lopsided exchange ratio. Still....Coral Sea saw a clean 2:1 ratio favoring the IJN vs. the USN VF's....but it was actually in what they did during the battle that was more signifigant. Fighter planes are not simply about shooting down enemy fighters. The one sustained campaign in 42 saw only one base being attacked, with numbers of planes far smaller than in other campaigns with multiple bases and targets to attack. The factors in which that one base was to be attacked also heavily favored one side over the other. Thus, IMO at least....the lackluster exchange ratio by itself doesn't do justice to the real campaign.

In conclusion...to me its no suprise the USN VF's....flying F4F's did what they did kill ratio wise. In actuality it was only to be expected. One can argue who was better than who but ultimately it's irrelevent because the planes and the pilots were both close enough in overall performance to be competetive and thus, produce exchange ratios under 3:1 with 1:1 being the most average in tactical combats.

I think the USN VF pilots could have produced similar results even with Hurricanes...despite that airframe's issues with the Japanese.

Hopefully this bluster will make sense. I think i now for example, understand why even when F4F naval pilots scored competetively or as at Midway "won" the vaunted ratio exchange vs. the A6M could still "urgently request a new better fighter" to replace their mounts and why some USN VF pilots did not like the F4F. Ratio exchanges by themselves never tell the whole story....only a piece of it. It was interesting to read "how" the victories were acheived and in the case of the F4F, many of the victories were scored while fighting defensively and/or due to mutually supporting tactics. What the pilots wanted was a plane that could dicate terms to the enemy, not just a plane that could allow the pilots to survive, fight back (and maybe score) and live to go through it again.

Main point summary again however.......most WWII air combat evens out over time....unless something is majorly out of wack....like on the Eastern Front where Soviet inexperience and rebuilding helped keep the Luftwaffe on till 43 with the exception of July 42 when they got a shock from the VVS and suffered near 1:1 losses initially.
 
JoeB said:
If you don't know Lundstrom has a bias, why suggest it?
Click to expand...

When it comes to writings I tend to be very cynical. My first instinct is to find out something about the author and determine if he might have some kind of bone to pick, or a point of view to present. In Lundstroms case, all his books appear to be about the Navy and particular, Naval aviation. Now that implies that he has a keen interest in Naval aviation that he does not have toward other types of aviation and a possible affinity towards Naval aviation and/or Naval aircrews. This certainly can breed a conscious or unconscious bias. Of course I realize that I may be completely wrong about any bias but I log that into "more research required". I just tended to write what is going on in my brain. This philosophy would also apply to anyone writing only about Air Force aviation.

The question in WWII wasn't whose well experienced peacetime pilots were better but who could rapidly expand and maintain (in spite of losses) the most effective *fighter units*, and the results were not anywhere near uniform.
Click to expand...

This seems just to explain why the Allies won the war. They could replace losses in materiel and manpower at a prodigious rate, the axis could not.


And this is unique to what war?


I agree with this. At the start of the war, the Navy had seven front line carriers, on each of these approx. 30 aircraft were fighters (in reality it would be less early on) so that makes 210 fighter pilot slots available. I suspect that all the pilots assigned to those slots had pretty good experience, both in the Navy and in the air. I have no idea how many Army fighter pilots were assigned to the Pacific, there were about 160 Army fighter planes in the Philippines. I suspect they too had pretty good experience. In the first year of the war the Navy fighter slots requirements started to decline due to carrier attrition (although the Essex was added), going to about 115 by the start of 1943. If you looked at these combat pilots, I think you would find all were well experienced and probably consisted of most of the pilots that started with the war in 1941. In 1943, there were only about 500 fighter slots available. These slots became available over the course of the year, allowing much training. Now if we look at the Army pilots, I am sure there were probably as many experienced pilot available at the start of the war, however, here is where the similarity ends. According to Wikipedia, the Army had sent 81 P-40s and 100 pilots to the Philippines prior to Dec. 7th, 1941. These pilots "all were fresh from pilot training schools and required further training". This would have been a major dilution of pilot experience that the Navy would not have experienced. If we continue on, I suspect that 1942 was a major build up of Army air force, some would be experienced aviators, especially the P-38 pilots (Richard Bong got his wings in January, '42 so had about six months flight experience before combat, but he was good) but many, maybe most, would be right out of pilot training and would probably pretty quickly be engaged in combat. Since the Navy could only accommodate fighter pilots on carriers, their build up could be much slower, probably allowing more training and flying experience before being committed to battle as you have stated. At the end of 1942, the Navy had roughly 1700 fighter aircraft built but only 115 fighter slots available. In 1943, the Navy had a total of roughly 8450 fighters available (minus some attrition), but only 500 fighter slots available. All the other aircraft were waiting on Carrier construction. I would expect that, except for instructors, the Navy would assign the best crews available for each new carrier. In 1942, the Army had 8431 fighters available (minus attrition and lend/lease) and in 1943 the Army had about 30,000 aircraft available (minus attrition and lend/lease). Many of these aircraft had combat squadrons slots available waiting on pilots and these were probably filled with what was available. It is obvious that the Navy aviator slots open up much more slowly than the AAF because of having to wait for carrier productions. This would allow much better training period and air time whereas Army combat slots were prodigious and demands required many pilots right out of flight training.
Sorry, this is kind of rambling.

Another possible issue here is that the war in Europe was an Army war and the war in the Pacific was a Navy war. It is likely the Army pilot priority would be Europe. The Army pilots would most likely have thought the Germans were more challenging and want to go where they thought the main action was.



I suspect the much smaller force as the Navy pilot community was would contribute to the better cohesion, as the Marines are more cohesive force than the Army is in general.
 
Last edited:
1. You are saying F4F v Zero engagements were all over Guadalcanal, Nickademus seems to focus just on the combats between the two types in carrier battles. It was both. And there was a good deal of variety in the Guadalcanal engagements as well, many were intercepts of high flying escorted bombers (seeking to bomb Henderson field) others of escorted Japanese anti-shipping strikes, F4F's escorting USN anti-shipping strikes, a couple of cases of Japanese carrier a/c striking Guadalcanal, and if extending past the Nov 15 cut off in Lundstrom's book to the actual end of G'canal campaign in Feb 1943, then also F4F escorted strikes against the new Japanese field at Munda, then past Feb 1943 F4F's still defending G'canal and also based further up the Solomons till the type was phased out of front line service later that year. It's not some small sample of combats that all look alike, but there was a strong central tendency toward an even exchange rate in fighter combat against JNAF fighter units (and JAAF ones in a few cases when JAAF operated in the Solomons for awhile in 1943 where results are known).

OTOH and as I already mentioned, the results for RAF units v 'modern' Japanese fighters (Type 1 and Zero) were also over a long period of time. The specific characteristics of the 1942 Malaya and Burma campaigns themselves, in tactical terms, don't appear to have been the determinant of the Hurricane units' success v Japanese fighters because the ratio was almost exactly the same in 1943 as 1942. And Allied bases in SEA in 1943 were a lot more secure than Henderson field. Even in 1942, Allied fields in the early campaigns didn't suffer naval and field artillery bombardment, for example. And the Spitfire v Zero episode over Darwin in 1943 quite resembled the set piece escorted bomber interception missions at Guadalcanal. The same Japanese fighter unit at Darwin in 1943 even saw action over Guadalcanal (3rd later 202nd AF, lost 8 men in a couple of months w/ part of the unit in the Solomons in late '42 as part of the JNAF fighter force there; lost 3 men over Darwin in the '43 raids with the whole unit there, only JNAF fighter unit there).

Unless two combat records of different fighter units were amassed under scientifically controlled identical conditions (which never happened), one can always point out any difference between the conditions, no matter how minor, to explain any difference in results, no matter how large, and not be categorically disproved. In this case the difference in result is quite large, and the difference in conditions a very unconvincing explanation, considering the variation in conditions among various RAF cases was pretty large but didn't seem to drastically impact results (eg. 'no warning hard pressed' 1942 Hurricane units in early '42 didn't do a lot differently than Hurricane or Spit units in '43 with ostensibly much more favorable set up). Likewise F4F situations varied, and individual combats came out differently of course, some in favor of Zeroes some in favor of F4F's, but it was a constant tit for tat back and forth, familiar pattern of evenly matched fighter opponents in many cases in WWII, including cases involving the RAF in other theaters and periods, but not v the Japanese in '42-43.

2. It seems to be contradictory to imply on one hand that 'tactical circumstances' differed too much to draw a conclusion about effectiveness, then go right into agreeing the RAF was a much harder pressed air arm in terms of producing quality fighter units, everywhere, than the USN was in 1942, which is one reason the USN did very noticeably better. And it wasn't that the USN had two extra years to build up, it's more like that it *didn't* (have to) build up, all that much, so the units still more resembled peacetime units. USN fighter units actually rotated a significant % of the most experienced pilots to training commands between Dec 41 and May 42, IOW when USN fighters had still seen very little air combat. But what remained was still a more even mix of higher flying experience than greatly expanded air arm that had suffered heavy losses, like the RAF. The Japanese situation combined the best aspects of both, a good deal of combat experience, but not enough losses to seriously thin out the ranks of relatively experienced pilots.

Of course, greatly expanding their air arms was eventually a huge plus for the Allies where Axis fighters often found themselves hopelessly inferior numerically in later campaigns, not so much in individual engagements as in the air forces accomplishing their overall goals. The fact that the Allies often deployed unprepared units early in the war could be viewed partly as payment then for a later gain. But again, as the chips actually fell USN units tended to be better better trained, in the overall view, even though not combat experienced, than other Allied air arms early in the Pacific War and it would seem this was a significant contributing factor to their better performance v Japanese fighters in 1942-43.

3. What 'uncited' statements?

Joe
 
Joe,

I'll post a more comprehensive reply once I've had chance to digest your comments. The uncited statements are those made by Lundstrom as quoted by Renrich, "According to him [Lundstrom], " Man for man, the Navy's pre war pilots had far more practical shooting practice than the pilots of other air forces." Page 460, "The First Team." Deflection shooting was a skill the USN sought to specialise in. Page 467, "The First Team" "The pilots of the U S Navy and Marine Corps were virtually the only fighter pilots trained from the beginning to utilize and regularly succeed in deflection shooting."" Lundstrom does not support these statements with references, citations or any other evidence.

Cheers,
B-N
 
To add fuel to the fire Page 467, Lundstrom, "The First Team"
"The pilots of the USN and Marines were virtually the only fighter pilots trained from the beginning to utilize and regularly succeed in deflection shooting. With the partial exception of the IJN, no other air forces during WW2 taught their pilots how to make full deflection shots. For the USAAF, the RAF, the LW, the Red Air Force, and all the rest, stern and head on approaches with their minimal deflection angles comprised the primary attacks. Only a tiny minority of their pilots realized the potential of deflection shooting and taught themselves the techniques, usually after extensive combat experience."

Very early in this thread, I made the statement that "it was no wonder that the AVG was effective because a lot of the pilots were USN trained" or something like that. That statement stirred up a whirlwind of discussion. It seems that my remark got the hair up on the back of advocates for all the other air forces and that is one of the beauties of this forum. With respect to all, I have enjoyed the many well thought out observations.

One of the collateral benefits of this discussion is that I have been led to go back and reread Lundstrom and "The First Team." One of the facts that jumps out at me is the fortitude, bravery and downright guts it took in early 1942 for those naval aviators to take off from carriers to seek out the enemy. Knowledge about weather conditions was scanty. Navigation over water, sometimes in instrument conditions must have been harrowing. There was not much intelligence either about the enemy and it's equipment. One of the first pilots to sight an A6M thought it was a VB because of the canopy. The Wildcats in some squadrons did not match in performance. They were very short ranged, the fuel gauges almost useless, the self sealing tanks sometimes caused fuel line stoppages. There were no survival kits and the pilots raided the galleys for knives and meat cleavers. Sometimes pilot armor was iron under the seats applied on board. Some of the planes had IFF and homing devices, some did not and sometimes the homing devices did not work and the radios were faulty. What a gift to us that one of the pilots who played a major role in that early goings has a son on this forum who shares with us. His father is mentioned often in Lundstrom with numerous photos and he was an accomplished deflection shooter.

Another interesting point, at least to me, relates to the many debates we have held about the efficacy of the M2 50 cal and how many were needed. In the prelude to the Battle of the Coral Sea a raid was mounted on the Japanese invasion of Tulagi. The F4F3s in the escort engaged some float planes and then strafed some naval vessels. Those F4F3s mounted 4-50 cals with 420 rounds for each gun. Two F4Fs strafed a Japanese DD, damaged her severely, killed and wounded many of her crew and put her out of action. So much for the debate about whether the 50 cal was lethal enough and whether the F4F4 with six guns and only 240 rounds per gun was a good idea.
 
Last edited:
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

WWI Aces Flying WWII Planes
Replies
17
Views
1K
Admiral Beez
A
Paper comparing the flight performance of the P-40E Warhawk and the A6M2 Zero
Replies
8
Views
875
Ivan1GFP
I
Flying Boeing P-26 Peashooter
Replies
10
Views
1K
GregP
How good a plane was the P-40, really?
23 24 25
Replies
493
Views
39K
Think Tanker
M
P-61 Performance
Replies
15
Views
925
Snautzer01
Menu
Log in
Register