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Yep, its just a "what if" discussion.
Btw, if there was just a few P51 fighters, but so high losses on the german side in Jan-June 44, why are there so few high scoring US Aces in the 8th airforce??
Afaik there was a lot of shared kills, what indicates that at least two planes was attacking one.
Good questions - My theories are: 1.) US rotated pilots home for 30 day (~2 months actual) after a 270 hour tour, permanently after 300 hours. For a Mustang ~ 60 missions. Of course more than a few US aces flew two tours - but for Mustangs that is VERY few missions cmpared to many LW experten. 2.) Additionally, the encounters (" a target rich environment") were few relatively speaking. My father had 5 encounters to shoot down 6 Me 109s and one miserable Ju 87 - all in his first 40 missions. Thereafter for the next 32 missions from October 1944 through April 21, 1945 - not one and he was a leader able to attack w/o permission.
Yes, there were shared kills - mostly because of flight integrity, in which a leader might make a high speed pass, over run the victim and the wingman sot it down (an example) - or shoot at a tough target like a D0 217 requiring more effort to shoot it down.
So, combine many fewer missions, a reluctance of the LW to engage, and few encounters even when LW engaged due to frequently only making one pass and the 'high scores' are not common.
By contrast if a German pilot wished to find a target he could do so almost every time he took off for an intercept.
A question for you to ponder - why were there so few 'bad days' for an 8th AF Fighter Group in air to air combat? or correspondingly why there were so few 'aces in a day for LW pilot vs 8th AF fighters. AFAIK there are 10 separate actions in which one 8th AF Group lost more than 6 fighters in one day. Two of those are owned by the 4th FG, several by the various P-38 groups and the rest by P-47 groups.
Contrast that experience to various LW Gruppen s 8th AF in contrast to LW vs RAF or VVS.
Afaik the fighters was sweeping in rather smal groups alongside the long bomber trail to have fighters every where to be able to disturb the initial attack, to prevent a mass attack to the bombers. But due to the perfect communication between the US bombers and fighters, in general the initial disadvanatge turned very fast into a advanatge, cause once the other squdrons could get called to help, and in most cases it was like that.
There is truth to the comment. But, bombers and fighters often 'mis communicated' regarding RV points and times due to weather and difficulties in manuevering heavy bombers all over England, forming up into Groups and bomb wings, positioning in the right place in the bomber stream and getting on course and on time - many missed escorts because bombers were late and off course or fighters were late and off course. May 12 was a perfect example where one ENTIRE bomb division was so late that the second one planned in trail actually became the lead..
In all cases the fighters were briefed to meet a certain 'box' identified by a 'certain tail code' in a certain position in the bomber stream at say Meppen @ 1240 - and the bombers weren't where they were supposed to be. With 30-36 Bomb groups in three separate Bomb divisions attacking (frequently) three separate targets after reachin a cetain point over germany as a grouping. Mix bad weather along the route and CHAOS - April 29, 1944 to Berlin a classic example.
Thats actually what many german pilots also wrote.
So already with two groups (70-100 planes) it was very fast a locat advantage. Seldom more than two german Groups got contact to the bombers at same time. In most cases they came one after the next, where the missing possibility to talk to each other was a real handy cap to organisate a concentrated mass attack. When this did happen, or when the escort realy wasnt there, the bomber groups in this area got rather high losses. But that wasnt normal.
Once the big attacking formation of the german group was splitted, the Bombers probably shot as many german fighters down as the escort.
This would be rare as in most cases the LW attackers rarely made a pass, turne, sought re-position and attack again - just for the reasons you mentioned - once long range escorts were going all the way to German targets.
Greetings,
Knegel
A question for you to ponder - why were there so few 'bad days' for an 8th AF Fighter Group in air to air combat? or correspondingly why there were so few 'aces in a day for LW pilot vs 8th AF fighters. AFAIK there are 10 separate actions in which one 8th AF Group lost more than 6 fighters in one day. Two of those are owned by the 4th FG, several by the various P-38 groups and the rest by P-47 groups.
Few 'aces in a day for LW is relative, compared to the allieds they still was many with high kill numbers.
Even Reschke had 26 kills.
Some reasons was, a way smaler number of missions in the west than in the east and more tough targets(bombers), missing tactics and overloaded planes(if it comes to fighter kills).
In the east they took off 2-4 times a day, in the west 2-4 times a week.
If your father dont saw many encounters, it still sounds like there was not that many german fighters in relation to the escort. Or was the 1st tour after mid 1944?
His first mission and first kill was D-Day and he had two more plus a probable two weeks later. There were many battles around Normandy Front but most 8th AF Mustangs were escorting deep into Germany and the controllers were fairly successful at putting LW where there were gaps in the escort coverage.
The low losses on the US escort side can get explained by missing clean german fighters with experienced pilots(for fighter combat). In a 109G6 + gunpods i wont be easy to catch any of the US fighters. And most was armned by this. Actually most in the west.
That is one possible explanation but many experten were flying the 'escort' 109s - and a great many opportunities.
Greetings,
Knegel
3)6/3/1944 Target berlin . 730 viernots, 943 fighter sorties in support by 8th , 9th ussaf and Raf. Additional missions by medium bombers and their escorts .LW flew 528 fighter sorties some against the mediums (eg III/JG26 attacking b26 over Poix) ,some against struglers.
Jim - this is an excellent mission to illustrate waht I was trying to say about numerical inferioriy at the point of attack. Of the 943 fighter sorties, only the 354FG (9thAF) and the 20th and 357th FG (8th AF) met the Luftwaffe from west of Hannover to Berlin and back to Dummer Lake...The 20th FG engaged w/P-38s around Oldenburg to shoot down one Fw 190. The Mustangs were about 2/3 strong because of aborts due to mechanical problems - so the number of Mustang sorties ~ 100, P-38s ~ 40. The three Mustang groups were credited with 46 destroyed. It was this force that largely took on LufFlotte Reich.
Luft 3 with JG2 and JG26 were engaged with the P-47s and Spits from the Channel/Holland (Spits) to Dummer Lake (P-47's)...Some units of the Luftwaffe DID engage near Dummer Lake with P-47s also but everything beyond that went to the Mustangs.
Jim - these questions regarding 'numbers of fighters' must be further parsed to ask 'where and how many near the targets where most of the defenses were co-ordinated
9/3/44 again againsr Berlin LW did not react at all ,exausted by the previus 3 days Ussaf had lost almost 80 bombers (800 crew) in 2 days and kept coming
All true..
9)Silly claim by Rescke? Hard words for the veteran. It was his immpressions and impressions of ground witnesses for the late 44 battles. Even if his memory is wrong lets not be hard on him.
Actually you are correct that 'silly' should not be applied to Reschke - he was a brave man.
Having said this Reschke's claims of 10 to one superiority are grossly exagerated for the reason I posed to you. If you (or Reschke, or the many witnesses) wish to claim such ratios and you include the bombers that the LW was charged to defend against, then the numbers in one 'sphere' of attack might be one or two combat wings in a volume plus one Fighter Group - say 90 bombers and 40-48 fighters. For the 10:1 to apply then the LW force must be 15 or less. If you talk about a Maximum Effort by all of LuftFlotte Reich and pose all of its fighter strength say, in April 1944, and are clever enough to attack ALL the bombers and target escort fighters at once - then 800-1200 bombers and 250 fighters versus 400-500 LW fighters over Leipzig..
An unlikely ratio of 1:2 or 1:3 - never close to 1:10 unless only a Staffel attacked two combat wings plus a fighter Group?
12) Lambert was a Schlachtflieger (116 eastern kills) Killed while was taking of to attack soviet ground forces. I mentioned the action as indicative of the enviroment that LW faced.
QUOTE]
Jim - As I think back on my personal experiences with the fighter pilots I have known - both the LW and American pilots have a lot in common. Brash, self confident - with LW pilots exhibiting more reserve and less boasting.
I sometimes believe that the feelings exhibited reflect on two main points - when falling back on such exaggerated ratios as the reason for defeat of the Luftwaffe.
One, Goering and Hitler berated very brave men for failing to achieve the impossible - namely stop US Strategic Daylight bombing (and they came very close in late 1943).
Two, the LW pilots were in fact defeated by 8th AF fighter pilots over Germany. The bombers didn't achieve this, the RAF didn't achieve this, the VVS didn't achieve this.
So, is it possible that great pride moved some of the veterans to explain away the lack of success to pure numbers? Many LW experten ranked the RAF pilots above all Allied pilots, many of those were survivors of the Battle of Britain and fought on the Ost front.
But the battle of Germany was the cauldron into which the LW poured resouces from East and South to attempt to stop the 8th AF - and failed.
Many valid reasons have been offered - endless resources of men and material to replace combat losses, increasing quality of pilot training entering the battle as the LW attrition grew.. all valid.
But here is a point you should consider. Small numbers of Mustang Groups were the executioners of LuftFlotte Reich from December 1943 through May 1944 - and enabled complete air superiority for the invasion, as well as the beginning of the end for German petroleum and chemical industry.
Bill
Will Reschkes point of the JG's being overwhelmed in numbers is true for 45 the LW was just not there when it came to Reich defense in comparison to late 43 and into spring of 44 with all aircraft types flown inclusion of twin engine day/night fighters on day ops. Again I do not discount his overall impressions and what he and his Kameraden remember, too many inexperienced boyz and of course he in his heavy III gruppe pressed to make bomber kilsl from the rear I can imagine what went though his head if 20 P-51's dove down through his wedge like formation and he witnessed several of his buds shot out of the skies during the rear attacks.
US fighter groups were "just there" at the right time for air protection the LW was not in it's defensive role.
What you quote is one plane low on fuel (around 3800kg) and the other is on WEP. for the -7 engine 67HG was WEP until mid 1944 and the still if no 150 octan fuel was available.
How much the weight influence the climb and speed, you can see in another P51B test on 67HG WEP, with 9200lb.
With WEP the plane had around 150PS more power at SL and 125 at rated alt.
A after burner could get used in a climb, with WEP the engine would overheat and you risk to damage it rather fast. Highspeed is needed to cool the engine, and even then the usage is only allowed for short period, unlike to MW50 or C3 injection.
Climbs were made to thirty thousand feet at the standard, and at the test war emergency ratings. Climbs at seventy-five inches Hg. required about one minute less than was required when climbing at sixty seven inches Hg. All engine temperatures were normal during climb at the increased power.
Thats not full rated power, thats WEP
Actually i dont see many people claiming the P51 wasnt a good fighter, but appart from its range it wasnt a outstanding super fighter. Without the Bombers and the stupid tactics of the Luftwaffe it would have had a real hard time. Like it was even the P38J or P47D with that range would have ruled the sky over germany. The heavy armned and tough 4-mots and the inability to find the right tactic vs them and its escort was the cause of the Luftwaffes downfall over the Reich.
The P51 was there when it was needed and its performence was good enough to be equal to the clean german fighters and better than that of the heavy armned fighters.
The best escort fighter of the war and when low on fuel even a good dogfighter.
...
I don't have any disagreement with this. My only comment would be that the range is the hard part. Making a point defense fighter with good performance for one to two hour endurance is not particularly difficult. To make a fighter with eight to ten hour endurance is not particularly difficult. To make a long range escort with good performance from SL to ceiling over target four to five hours away and return is difficult. When considering the mission, I think the Mustang's outstanding range coupled with very good combat performance over target in a way does make it an outstanding super fighter. In my opinion, the only real super fighter of the war was the Me-262.
drgondog,
do you have any T.O.s and POHs with regards to the use of 150 fuel by the 8th AF?
The actual fighter weight of the P-51B which includes 196 gallons of gas is 9000 lbs. To make the 8430 lbs the -3 plane flew at, it had to have only 85 gallons of gas. Since the Bf-106 carries 106 gallons of gas, the tested P-51B-3 aircraft was only 120 light compared to the equally configure Bf-109G, so the original numbers are quite fair for comparison with a slight correction of 100 ft/min reduction in climb for the P-51. And the P-51-7 is also overloaded for fuel by about 540 lbs in comparison to the Bf-109G. Correcting both for equivalent fuel weight of about 600 lbs making all three aircraft equal in load, adding a P-51B-7 at 62" and a clean BF-106G1 from your data, this is what I get. I also threw in performance at 75" (available post May, '44,) just for comparison:
Generally speaking, when equally loaded the P-51B is faster from SL to ceiling, at most altitudes significantly so, greater than 20 mph, and at 25k and up, greater than 30 mph.
The clean 109G-1, adjusted for fighter combat would have had GM-1.The Bf-109G1 had significant climb advantage to the mil powered P-51 up to about 20k ft where the advantage starts to shift to the P-51.
But, it must be noted, this is a toe to toe comparison at equal loads, i.e., fuel loads are 106 gallons. In reality the P-51, when escorting, would be closer to it design fighter weight with 196 gallons of fuel since it still had to go four hundred miles home and it certainly would have racks, which would have reduced speeds by 8-12 mph. So, it always seemed obvious to me that the Germans had the means to contest the sky against the P-51 but never seem to anticipate the threat the plane had against the homeland or prepare for it. I think the G1 needed better performance at altitude to really threaten the P-51s and maybe they did with GM-1. Without that the P-51s could just climb to 30-35k where their performance was significantly better than the G1 and pounce on any attacking formations from above and with their fast diving speed and overall top speed, should be very good at boom and zoom.
There are only estimations with a 109G-1 with WEP, based on the flight tests with the 109F-4.If you have charts on the Bf-109G1, I would love to have it for my data base if you don't mind sharing
Yes, but that goes for both sides, also the germans had WEP available in the 109G, even before it was official allowed to use it and same like the allied pilots they did use it when needed.AAF test and combat reports do not support your statement.
From Spitfireperformance copy of AAF test of 44-1 fuel.
Combat reports do not indicate a particular concern about pulling WEP, some reporting extended use, one for fifteen minutes, one for fifty miles.
That was authorized and was available to the pilot to use and they used it. Comparing maximum capability is valid in that that is what is often used when in combat.
..........- then 800-1200 bombers and 250 fighters versus 400-500 LW fighters over Leipzig..
400-500 LW fighters over Leipzig??
Where do you got such numbers from??
They would habe been happy, if they would have had such a number in one tight area.
400-500 was rather what they got up, splitted from the low lands to Leipzig and back.
"If you talk about a Maximum Effort by all of LuftFlotte Reich and pose all of its fighter strength say, in April 1944, and are clever enough to attack ALL the bombers and target escort fighters at once - then 800-1200 bombers and 250 fighters versus 400-500 LW fighters over Leipzig..
There was no such encounter - if you go back and re-read it, the basic premise is if all of 8th AF concentrated in one area are versus all of LuftFlotte Reich would yield those numbers - ands no that does not include JG26 and JG 2 in the 'lowlands. The point was that a.) 2/3 of 8th FC would be battling in the lowlands to Dummer Lake to Stuttgart are while only the long range escorts could go to 'Leipzig' (or Berlin or Stettin or Prague, etc)
Seldom more than 50-100 german fighters was at same time on the bombers. In most cases in was 1-2 Gruppen at same time. Due to communication problemsbetween the JG´s(no direct communication) very often there was a delay. So the pilots of the Gruppen that got in contact with fighters, very often was overwhelmed, specialy cause after a attack to the bombers, they was already thinned out, low on amo and splitted and anyway much to heavy loaded.
Go back and re-read your histories for the January through May 1944 timeframe. Here is just one sample of a big air battle on April 24 in which 225-250 German s/e and twin engine fighters engaged the 1st BD B-17s and the 355th and 357th FG all around Munich. As to 50-100, that would be concentrated in an area where perhaps 40-100 US fighters might be in the same area.
The Battle Over Munich – April 24, 1944
After the attack to the bombers the german unit wasnt able to fight as such anmore. They got splitted, where some could fly home without to see a fighter, others had many against them.
The topcover in most cases was outnumbered in big degrees.
If we take pure numbers, we always need to include the Bombers, or we need to exclude the fighters that did attack the bombers.
The bombers did not do anything except fly in formation, fighters had full autonomy to fight or flee. When confronted with US fighters most often the instinct was to flee, but in nearly all cases the units that broke up into smaller units were chased or fought by comparable sized US forces as they had a duty to stay with the bombers - so only, flights, sections and occasionally a squadron engaged
So even if we assume "800-1200 bombers and 250 fighters versus 400-500 LW" its 1:3. For the reason above, 1:10 its not that much overclaimed, from the point of view of the single pilot, though.
Greetings,
Knegel
The bombers did not do anything except fly in formation, fighters had full autonomy to fight or flee.