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Hi,
The weight of the P51B, without droptanks and rear fuel tank, so the weight after dropping the tanks was 9300lb, thats often the weight when combat started.
Also the 109´s had in most cases close to full fuel, cause they also most had drop tanks.
Equally loaded is the weight after dropping the tanks.
The clean 109G-1, adjusted for fighter combat would have had GM-1.
But if we compare datas, we should use the same for all.
Hi,
the battle of Munich was a rare case and the german forces was around munich, like so often they came one after the next and their main target was the bombers.
250 fighters - yes, 125-175 not so rare Knegel - look to march 6 and 8, march 16 for three examples of 150+ LW fighters in same area just in early March, March 29, April 8, April 29, May 12, July 7, Sept 11 and Sept 12, Nov 2, Nov 21 and 25 and 26, and Dec 5. The November 1944 mission had several engtagements when 200 German fighters were directed to a specific area as well as December 5 near Berlin.
The defending fighter groups still in the same general volume of space, ditto the concentration of bombers
No they couldnt flee, they had the order to attack them, what brought them into a tactical disadvantage to the escorting fighters, as such the bombers count as oponent, taking part in the combat. The need/order to attack the Bombers made the german fighters heavy, often they took damages whilethe attack, the need to evade the defensive fire of the bombers destroyed the german formations, so they had problems to fight as a unit.
Knegel - you wiggle arond the point. a.) local superiority of German fighter strength existed many times to the US fighter strength in the battle for German airspace, b.) frequently superiority of German fighters to both the bombers they specifically attacked plus the US Fighters existed, and c.) it was tactics and skill that defeated the Germans - not the US superiority in numbers.
Attrition over time made the LW problem worse because of the leadership losses, which on the US side were both far less and also more easily replaced.
For the escorting fighters the bombers was more worth than the same number of fighters.
Nowhere close in the attrition of the LW fighter strength - as 1943 proved very well before escorts were available all the way to far german targets.
Greetings,
Knegel
I bet the use of 150 octane fuel was specified in a "TCTO." I believe they were used during WW2.No bobbysocks. I have gone through Mike's site. I could find no TOs or POH notes on the use of 150 fuel.
I bet the use of 150 octane fuel was specified in a "TCTO." I believe they were used during WW2.
TCTO = Time Compliance Technical Order ??
If so, can you explain how this works.
It was numbers and bad tactics of their own that defeated the germans .
On 15/9/40 Lw lost 60 aircraft and Hitler was forced to cancel the invansion of Enland. On 17/8/43 Ussaf lost 60 viernots (10 crew) plus 128 damaged and two days later struck again 17/10/43 lost another 60 bombers and next day was buisness as usual .
Ah, No - not 'business as usual' - it was in this timeframe after Oct 14 (not 16) 1943 that the 8th AF fully realized that the Germans had full control fo the air. The next several months were characterized by middle range missions to Hamburg or Bremen or Frankfurt to conserve strength and build up 8th FC and introduce the P-38s and P-51s. The P-38s were disappointing and judged better for 9th AF, in return for Mustangs.
By February there were a couple of Mustang Groups available for Big Week and the 8th AF was determined to destroy the Luftwaffe - bombers in fact, were 'bait' to draw the LW into battle with the escorts
During the Big week lost almost 300 viernots and had no problen. 6/3/44 lost 69 10-crew bombers and came again in 8/3 and 9/3 . Many times lost dozens of bombers with hundrends of crew with no reduction of fighting strength. Which other air force could sustain such losses?How succesful is the escort that allows the loss of 69 bombers? Only if you have unlimited idustrial capability like US had.
The escors for Berlin were NOT adequate in numbers or reliability in March and the lW was very successful at attacking at several points. Where the escorts were available, they were very successful and the beginning of the end of the usefulness of the Me 110 started here.
Escort fighters were also P47 s(that scored heavily during that time too), P38s( killed oesau), and sort range fighters that took the early stage of bomber trips.German had to face all of them.Actually there are people who believe that P47 did the dirty work and P51 took the glory.
The P-47s were successful against JG 2, JG 11 and JG26, as they were in Holland and France and Western Germany - but the LW engaged when they had an advantage and the larger forces remained in reserve - out of range of P-47's. The Mustangs killed the Luftwaffe east of Munster and Frankfurt and Stuttgart - where LuftFlotte Reich waited out of range of the dominantly equipped 8th AF P-47s
German fighters pilots were ordered ta attack the bombers no matter what.Goering threatened with court martial the failure to attack the bombers if neven weather was the reason. In 1943 was sugested that some gruppen should attack the escorts during the transit flights in order to force them eject the drop tanks .The idea was rejacted by the high command. Also the inability to of the varius wings to comunicate meant that could not co ordinate thei attacks even when they were in the same area.
Escorts were never targeted , were enganged only in self defence by the german fighters.Bombers attracted the attention of german fighters. So the escorts always could choose when ,where and how engage the bomber interceptors. So even in the few cases that-localy-did not outnumbered the interceptors had always height and energy advantage,and most of the time surprise advantage .
We agree stupid LW tactics - we disagree local superiority - we disagree that 'escorts could choose when and where to attack' as that was dictated only by local prescence of LW interceptors - except when one FG would Sweep in front. The escorts were severly reprimanded when they left the bombers unprotected so always had to hold some in reserve for follow on attacks.
We can not compare the tactics because had diferent aim. We can not only say thatUS tactics proved adequate given the poor german tactics. . About the skills we should compare them with equal numbers of planes,entering in the same level, both in frei jagd ,. US pilots never fought in equal terms with their opponents.
You may be right through 1943 and until June 1944 - as the LW almost always had superior numbers over German targets.
In WWi had number advantage, in WW2 numbers and during some periods technological advantage, in Korea both, in Vietnam both ,(still suffered casualties in air to air combat by aircraft two generations older)in Iraq both (still did not dare to engage the few Mig29s in close combat) So their true skills is an unknown quantity ,but obviously are good given the oceans of fuel that are available to them for training. Perhaps we should ask Indian Su-30 pilots ...
Still - an enjoyable and civil discussion!
Didn't see the tirade, but since it was edited and came out with pineapple abuse, I can imagine.
Thanks for being mods.