German commando attack on the US, Canada Alaska

No you can't Parsifal. Why ? Because from Feb 42 till late Nov 42 the Enigma was fully kryptic. Hence why the operation should ideally take place at this time.
It wasnt fully cryptic. Professor Harry Hinsley describes the situation with regard to the Battle of the Atlantic

"The new system was one by which the christian name surname and address of an imaginary person indicated the table that was in use at any one time for encoding the large square di-graphs of the [standard North Atlantic]grid. By informing the U-Boats that a new address was in force, the U-Boat command could bring a new set of Di-Graph equivalents into use at once at frequent intervals. and since it did frequaentlychange addresses the problem of decoding the position given in the Enigma Signal was able to resist systemisation and require continous ad hoc research until a copy of the address book was captured."

This made it hard enough for Bletchely Park, but then inFebruary 1942 U-Boat Command added an additional wheel on their Enigma machines , that greatly restricted the ability of British Intelligence to pinpoint the exact position of U-Boats, until the latter part of 1942. So that part of your claim is basically correct, but in the context of what we are discussing, it misses or attempts to distort other important issues.

By February 1942 British Inteligence had built up such a comprehensive knowledge of U-Boat commands procedures and U-Boat operations, and could still draw on large amount of other source material, including the fully cracked Wehrmacht codes, the SIS codes (ie the abwehr) the Luftwaffe codes, the OKM Home waters code (which included U_boat movements in the Bay Of Biscay and to the ports in Norway, the CinC Norways codes, that the temporary success achieved by U-Boat command in February was far from complete. The defeat in february meant that convoys could no longer be routed around U-Boat concentrations (because the individua positions of U-Boats could no longer be pinpointed). However the overall level of security of German communications, in particular those outside U-Boat Command remained completely compromised. When you consider that an operation of the kind would need to be planned and discussed outside of U-Boat commands structure, then the chances of such a plan being discovered remained very high


Wrong again Parsifal. All the German agents in America were uncompromised until they turned themselves in.

What is your source for saying this. You have rejected the US reports into the matter, on the face of what appears to be simply that they dont serve your purpose. I'd like you to produce some evidence to support your claim please, otherwise i think most people reading this can safely conclude you are simply blowing off hot air.What other agents were there in addition to the eight mentioned in the FBI and ONI reports

Wrong once again. When the boat was commisioned it functioned perfectly. Like I said the period 15. April 1941 till 24. April 1942 was spent training the crew. Nothing was wrong with U-459.

Source material please. If the U-Boat was ready from the date of commissioning she must truly be an amazing boat. I know of NO instances where a boat of any navy was ready for operations from the date of her commissioning. Just as an example, Bismarck was commissioned 24-08-40, but was not declared "ready for operations" until the end of february 1941. Yes, of course some of that relates to training the crew, but without a properly trained crew how on earth is the boat going to operate properly. If you take an already trained crew, they are still going to spend several months in the work up process.

I suppose I should not get so excited , from someone who describes bunks as bedrooms, and periscopes as telescopes!!!

Once again you're wrong. I've been saying from the start that the operation should take place in early to mid 42.

Thats funny, your very last post said Mid to late 1942....so nominate a date please so we can all start responding to your claims properly

Oh almost forgot to mention that hundreds of Uboats went on patrols lasting for months, U-217 was for example made two 90+ day patrols



I will deal with these other examples as an when you mention them. The U-217 did indeed embark on two 90 day cruises, one beginning in November 1942, and the other in April 1943. there was a third deployment whilst attached to the U-Boat training command , which does not really qualify since she was in and out of Home ports the whole time.

Moreover it appears that most of the time she was operating as a torpedo re-supply vessel, with reduced crews, and extra torpedoes embarked. She is erroneously listed as a Type VIID, but in fact other sources indicate she was completed as a Type VIIF

Also, please read my post on this. I said that U-Boats prior to 1942......this example was a boat not ready until the end of 1942. The big tchnical achievement for the U-Boats was the greatly increased ranges and endurances that were achieved in what is generally referred to as Type VII/42 (for the Type VIIs) and Type IXD (for the Type IXs). The Type VIIs managed to achieve increases in endurance from about 4500 nm to about 7500-10500, depending on model. Similar improvements were achieved for the Type IXs, the longest legged being the Type IX D2 with an endurance of 15000 miles (just enough to make it from Bordeaux to Penang)

But for the period you are nominating (which admittedly keeps changing... a standard tactic by Soren) these LR boats were not really available....

Soren said:

Wrong again Parsifal. All the German agents in America were uncompromised until they turned themselves in.

Click to expand...

Soren
Where on earth do you get your information re German agents in the USA or anywhere else.

This again is so far from reality its almost unbelievable.

I have asked a number of times for your source re the Russians getting the majority of their intel from the allies without any response. Can I ask where your information is for this particular Gem.

Germany had a small number of spies pre war in the USA but they were picked up very quickly once the war started. They only had one who operated at a senior level for the first couple of years of the war and he was captured and shot. I assure you he didn't turn himself in.

So once again what are your sources?

That's a 1946 report of the mission I already mentioned, and ofcourse it doesn't mention how they were caught, god forbid that the Americans didn't notice them!

But how great of you to get such a truly unbiased report, cause we all know that by this time the Americans certainly weren't gloating with self confidence

It may be biased, but you need to refutte it by producing alternative evidence to back up your claim. Also, I am at a loss as to why a classified document would produce a "biased" report. Wouldnt the American just be trying to find out how they won. Who are they pandering to to produce a "biased report"

Oh and btw, the claim that the operation was such a failure that the German intelligence service were so shaken that no sabotage missions were ever attempted again is to no surprise false. In 1944 atleast two similar operations I know of were initiated, and two agents went to New York, where again one had second thoughts and turned himself in and sold out the other

Well, you know the Drill soren, produce the evidence to support your counterargument, and well have a look at that evidence

Well the historic fact is the German agents were turning themselves in.

I suspect his commando and spy teams would do the same.

Soren said:

Like I said the operation was to take place in early to mid 42. And no chances are not zero, they are very good. Infact mid to late 42 is the best period, so the operation should ideally take place in June or July 42.

Click to expand...

Soren I think you are wrong about the start date for the commando operations. You are mainly correct about Enigma in 1942, however the Axis did not know that there was any problem, they were sure that Enigma was impenatrable by the Allies from 1939 - 1945. The best time to start would be as soon as war is declared to gain maximum advantage. IMO

The problem is that we know about Enigma's weakness, but the Germans at the time did not, so they would not delay the operations for a vulnerability they did not think existed.

Soren said:

_________________________________________


Freebird,

The merchant idea is another possibility which I won't deny succeeding. However how will you get 25 men with equipment weapons past the dock inspectors ? You'd need trucks to hide it all in, and all your men must be able to speak either fluently english or Spanish, otherwise there's a great risk of getting caught.

Now if they could load all the equipment into trucks onboard the merchant vessel then they could perhaps just drive straight out with the men equipment in the back. But again what about the inspectors, how do you get past these ?

Click to expand...

The ship would have a "legitimate" cargo, and a smaller clandestine one. Again, I am assuming that the mission is done pre-war or as soon as possible after "Pearl" The port controls at this time were almost non-existant in the US, most ships would just come go as they pleased. The ship would have the material commandos loaded into a small cutter to put ashore in some isolated area on the east coast {in Chesapeake Bay, Pamlico Sound or Long Island Sound}. If by some chance the ship is stopped by the USN, it is carrying a cargo for Martinique or South America, and is just stopping in the US to take on supplies. Some of the crew would speak Spanish or French, the rest would be belowdecks.

Again, perhaps some of the teams would go via U-boat, but as Glider says a sub might only be able to take a 5 or 6 man team. Also I share his doubts about the ease of unloading from a sub into inflatables.

Something that has not been mentioned earlier, it may be easier to land the teams in Mexico and then go by land into the US! In 2008 the US with all modern technologies, can stop less than 20% of the illegals crossing through Arizona/N.M., so I would not think it would be too hard to do in 1941!

More on Mexico later.

Njaco said:

Can somebody explain how you even get a German sub anywhere near Alaska? By train across Central America? That in itself would defeat the operation

Click to expand...

pbfoot said:

Up the Mississippi then portage to the Mackenzie and boom your right their

Click to expand...

Damn pb! I never thought of that! You are a crafty one!

Soren, I really can't see any benefit in wasting 3 months chugging around N. S. America to land in Alaska. {unless you are trying to recruit the Sasquatch to the Axis cause?}

The Germans had a merchant vessel specifically for the transport of agents across the Atlantic.
What might be unexpected is that it was a 50ft sailing boat, called the Passim which was based in Le Havre. She had a crew of 4 captained by Lt Garbers a pre war sailor who had sailed the Atlantic solo in 1938. She made one trip to South Africa in 1942. In June 1943 she sailed for Brazil a journey that took two months, only to find when they arrived that the Brazilians were waiting for them. The two spies were arrested and the Passim was sent back, another two months.
In 1944 she tried again and this time made it to Buenos Aires with two spies.

Lt Garbers was awarded the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class, the German Cross in Gold and the Knights Cross making him the most highly decorated person in the entire German Intelligence effort.

parsifal said:

Freebird

In the next war, remind me to suggest that you be put in command of the future SOE division please

Click to expand...

Thank for the compliment!

Parsifal said:

Once again you're wrong. I've been saying from the start that the operation should take place in early to mid 42.

Thats funny, your very last post said Mid to late 1942....so nominate a date please so we can all start responding to your claims properly

Click to expand...

With Soren's permission {it's his thread} I will take a stab at the scenario.

I will start off at the beginning.

First off, it starts with the Axis leadership in Tokyo Berlin asking the planners "Can we win this war"? {Assuming that they are competent ones, like Manstien, Donitz, Yamamoto etc}

Both German Japanese military leaders identify that the best way to defeat the Allies is to strangle the shipping, and that some basic joint planning is needed. {we have gone into that in another thread}. The SOE offensive will assist in this effort

After the Imperial Japanese conference at the beginning of July, it is decided to go to war with the USA, if Japan cannot obtain oil resources from the Dutch East Indies. At this point Japan informes Germany of its intention to go to war in the beginning of Nov if negotiations fail, and askes if Germany will join in attacks against the US. Japan does not tell Germany about the planned attack on Pearl Harbour, nor of the exact date.

Germany promises to begin U-boat operations against the USA, and to plan prepare SOE {commando, "black ops" political manipulations etc.}

Germany will have to wait for the news of the Japanese attack against the USA to begin, otherwise they risk fighting the US alone if Japan changes it's mind.

There is no big danger of the intelligence leaking out, as the planned entry of Japan into the war is not something that would be sent out over Enigma to U-boats or to Generals in Europe. If the British detect more U-boats heading towards the US, it would be assumed that they are moving to begin attacks in Canadian or British Caribbean waters.

In any event, it was no secret that tensions with Japan are increasing, and both UK US expected attacks against their colonies in the Far East. The information that hostilities against US posts would shortly begin would be given to U-boat officers only, not broadcast. If some of the information does leak out, it is unlikely to affect US preparations, as the US is already worring about German moves into Brazil {which had a Fascist government in 1941, along with Argentina Bolivia}. Also there are enough in the US who would suspect this information is a British ploy to bring the US into the war.


The SOE attacks against the US should begin the day after Pearl Harbour, at the same time as the U-boat offensive begins.

The aims of the Commando offensive are:

1.) To influence public opinion in the USA

2.) To decieve the US about actual Axis war plans, and to divert US forces to theaters where they will not be effective, which lessens the amount sent to where they are really needed.

3.) To provide a "distraction" from the U-boat offensive, which is the main danger, but not as "headline grabbing" as commando attacks

4.) To provide US planners intelligence with some "busy work", if your enemy is busy trying to anticipate your plans, they have less time to make plans of there own.

5.) To stir up divisions in the Allied government military command

6.) To provoke tensions in the western hemisphere, a major worry of the USA in 1940 - 1942

I take fault with only one item.

Nearly all of the US Divisions wouldnt be diverted in any menaingfull way, as they were bound to stay in the US throughout 1942 as there wasnt any shipping capability to support them.

from Nazi Spies In America thehistorychannel.co.za

"The first group of four saboteurs left by submarine in May 1942 from the German base at Lorient, France, and on May 28, the next group of four departed the same base. Each was destined to land at points on the Atlantic Coast of the United States familiar to the leader of that group.

Four men, led by George John Dasch, age 39, landed on a beach near Long Island, New York on 13 June, 1942. Accompanying Dasch were Ernest Peter Burger, Heinrich Harm Heinck, and Richard Quirin.

On 17 June, 1942, the other group landed at Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. The leader was Edward John Kerling, with Werner Thiel, Herman Otto Neubauer, and Herbert Hans Haupt. Both groups landed wearing complete or partial German uniforms to ensure treatment as prisoners of war rather than as spies if they were caught.

The eight were tried before a Military Commission, appointed by President Roosevelt. They were all found guilty and sentenced to death. Appeals were made to President Roosevelt to commute the sentences of Dasch and Burger.

As a result, Dasch received a 30-year sentence, while Burger received a life sentence. The remaining six were executed by electric chair on 8 August, 1942.

The eight men had been born in Germany and each had lived in the United States for substantial periods. Burger had become a naturalised American in 1933. Haupt had entered the United States as a child, gaining citizenship when his father was naturalised in 1930.

Dasch had joined the Germany army at the age of 14 and served about 11 months as a clerk during the conclusion of World War I. He had enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1927, and received an honourable discharge after a little more than a year of service.

Quirin and Heinck had returned to Germany prior to the outbreak of World War II in Europe, and the six others subsequent to September 11, 1939, and before December 7, 1941, apparently feeling their first loyalty was to the country of their birth.

In April, 1948, President Truman granted executive clemency to Dasch and Burger on condition of deportation. They were transported to the American Zone of Germany, where they were freed."

from George John Dasch - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"On June 13, 1942, John C. Cullen, a Coast Guardsman from a station in Amagansett, New York noticed Colonel Dasch and three others posing as fisherman off the coast of Long Island with a raft. When the soldier investigated, he found that the men were armed and also noticed a submerged submarine. The men offered him a $260.00 bribe to keep the information of their whereabouts undisclosed. He took the bribe, then alerted his superiors. Investigations later found that the men had left explosives, timers, blasting caps, incendiary devices, cigarettes and German uniforms at the scene. The submarine, however, had since been removed.

It was then confirmed that Nazis had landed on American soil. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director, J. Edgar Hoover were immediately alerted, and the FBI went on a massive manhunt for the men. Hoover also ordered that all information remain undisclosed to avoid public panic and to not alert the German spies that there was investigation pending.

George John Dasch had been at odds with the Nazi regime. He eventually talked to one of his compatriots, a naturalized German citizen named Ernst Peter Burger, about defecting to the United States. Their original plan was to surrender immediately to the FBI; however, officials disregarded Dasch and Burger's stories. In order to prove collaboration with the Nazis, Dasch poured $84,000 cash on the office desk of D.M. Ladd, the director of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Dasch was arrested, and interrogated for eight days. Dasch immediately disclosed the whereabouts of all other men connected in the sabotage operation, including Burger. The two vital goals of the sabotage program were to disrupt war industries and to launch a wave of terror by planting bombs, grenades etc. into railway stations, department stores and public places."

For those interested in some of the special operations carried out by the Abwehr in America: uboat.net - U-boat Operations - Special Operations

As one can see the Germans continued to land agents in the US right up until late 1944, and obviously because they knew they could without the Allies knwoing about it. One of the agents again however sold out ther other and turned himself in after talking to a childhood friend.

The Abwehr
At the outbreak of World War II, Abwehr resumed operations similar to those carried out during World War I. The agency was in charge of tracking troops and munitions transports, tapping wires and intercepting radio messages, and infiltrating foreign intelligence and military units. Abwehr placed two operatives inside the British intelligence agency for two years, and developed a highly successful encryption device called the Enigma machine. Agents tracked and monitored various resistance movements in occupied Europe, and even sabotaged military and government strongholds behind Allied lines.

Canaris made the United States one of Abwehr's primary targets even before America's entry into the conflict. By 1942, German agents were operating from within all of America's top armaments manufacturers. Abwehr scored perhaps its greatest victories in the area of industrial espionage, as agents managed to steal the blueprint for every major American airplane produced for the war effort.

One of the Abwehr's responsibilities during World War II was the extraction of information from prisoners of war. While Abwehr agents remained largely in control of seeking strategic information from British, French, and American prisoners, the Nazi government issued a special directive to various branches of the military regarding Russian prisoners of war. The Commissar Order, as it became known, instructed the Army to handle Russian prisoners as harshly as they deemed necessary for the retrieval of military information. At one time, German concentration camps held more that 1.5 million Russian prisoners. Canaris himself raised several objections to this policy, largely on the grounds that it undermined the authority and efficacy of his agency and could cripple the German war effort.

In 1944, Heinrich Himmler, head of the Gestapo, the Nazi secret police, assumed control of Abwehr after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler and several other high ranking Nazi officials. Himmler suspected that the plot was the work of agents inside the government, most especially the Abwehr. The July Plot also exposed the work of those Abwehr agents who had intentionally leaked sensitive information to the Allies. Several agents, including Canaris, were charged with treason and executed. The Abwehr was then dissolved.

More:

Under Canaris the Abwehr expanded and proved relatively efficient during the early years of the war. Its most notable success was Operation Nordpol, which was an operation against the Dutch underground network, which at the time was supported by the British Special Operations Executive. In March 1941, the Germans forced a captured SOE radio operator to transmit messages to Britain in a code that the Germans had obtained. Even though the operator gave every indication that he was compromised, the receiver in Britain did not notice this. Thus the Germans had been able to penetrate the Dutch operation and maintained this state of affairs for two years, capturing agents that were sent and sending false intelligence and sabotage reports until the British caught on.

But it was ineffective overall for several reasons. Much of its intelligence was deemed politically unacceptable to the German leadership. Moreover, it was in direct competition/conflict with SS intelligence activities under Reinhard Heydrich and Walter Schellenberg. The animosity between the SS and Abwehr did not stop there. Many of the Abwehr's operatives — including Canaris himself — were in fact anti-Nazi and were involved in many assassination attempts against Hitler, including the most serious one on July 20, 1944. Canaris even employed Jews in the Abwehr and used the agency to help a small number of Jews to escape from Germany into Switzerland. But perhaps the biggest reason was that Canaris himself sought to undermine the Nazi cause, although not Germany's war effort itself.

Despite the Abwehr's many intelligence coups, its effectiveness was more than negated by agents who — with Canaris's blessing — aided the Allies in whatever covert means were necessary. He personally gave false information which discouraged Hitler from invading Switzerland (Operation Tannenbaum). He also persuaded Francisco Franco not to allow German forces to pass through Spain to invade Gibraltar (Operation Felix). He even provided intelligence to the Allies on German intentions as well.

The SS continually undermined the Abwehr by putting several Abwehr officers under investigation, believing them (correctly) to be involved in anti-Hitler plots. The SS also accused Canaris of being defeatist in his intelligence assessments, especially on the Russian campaign. One such briefing reportedly resulting in Hitler seizing Canaris by the lapels, and demanding to know whether the intelligence chief was insinuating that Germany would lose the war.

As for the Enigma machine, it was fully cryptic from Feb 42 until late Nov 42.

A great article: uboat.net - Technical pages - Enigma

As one can see the Germans continued to land agents in the US right up until late 1944, and obviously because they knew they could without the Allies knwoing about it. One of the agents again however sold out ther other and turned himself in after talking to a childhood friend.


As U-Boat net points out, however, with virtually no success, as nearly all the agents dropped were captured, or surrendered very shortly after the event. The point about the failure being related to its (ie abwehrs) poor choice of operatives is well supported by the source.

It is also not true that articles state that the allies did not know about it. On seversl occasions at least the articles state the exact opposite


[B]The Abwehr
At the outbreak of World War II, Abwehr resumed operations similar to those carried out during World War I. The agency was in charge of tracking troops and munitions transports, tapping wires and intercepting radio messages, and infiltrating foreign intelligence and military units. Abwehr placed two operatives inside the British intelligence agency for two years, and developed a highly successful encryption device called the Enigma machine. Agents tracked and monitored various resistance movements in occupied Europe, and even sabotaged military and government strongholds behind Allied lines.

Canaris made the United States one of Abwehr's primary targets even before America's entry into the conflict. By 1942, German agents were operating from within all of America's top armaments manufacturers. Abwehr scored perhaps its greatest victories in the area of industrial espionage, as agents managed to steal the blueprint for every major American airplane produced for the war effort.

One of the Abwehr's responsibilities during World War II was the extraction of information from prisoners of war. While Abwehr agents remained largely in control of seeking strategic information from British, French, and American prisoners, the Nazi government issued a special directive to various branches of the military regarding Russian prisoners of war. The Commissar Order, as it became known, instructed the Army to handle Russian prisoners as harshly as they deemed necessary for the retrieval of military information. At one time, German concentration camps held more that 1.5 million Russian prisoners. Canaris himself raised several objections to this policy, largely on the grounds that it undermined the authority and efficacy of his agency and could cripple the German war effort.

In 1944, Heinrich Himmler, head of the Gestapo, the Nazi secret police, assumed control of Abwehr after an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler and several other high ranking Nazi officials. Himmler suspected that the plot was the work of agents inside the government, most especially the Abwehr. The July Plot also exposed the work of those Abwehr agents who had intentionally leaked sensitive information to the Allies. Several agents, including Canaris, were charged with treason and executed. The Abwehr was then dissolved[/B].

Can you give the source of this material please. it does not seem to appear at the link that you have provided, and if it does, completely contradicts all of the other posts made on that site with respect to german special operations in north America.

This article seems to suggest that the germans introduced a device referred to as an Enigma machine. is this the same machine as is referred to as an Enigma machine by the Allies???. If so the material is immediately highly suspect as to its veracity. Why on earth would the germans give the Allies an Enigma machine????

As for the Enigma machine, it was fully cryptic from Feb 42 until late Nov 42.

A great article:

Your right that its a great article, but i suggest you read it agin. it definately does not support the assertion that all of enigma was cryptic for the period specified. It establishes th U_Boat commands cyphers were much more secure for that period, the average time tasken to decipher code being increased from an average of 17 hours, to 442 hours.

Also U-Boat command was but one arm of the armed forces that were using enigma. the other arms of the navy, and the armed forces, and diplomatic services continued to use forms of enigma that were fully compromised by Bletchely park.

That is not to say that the introduction of Shark and the additional rotor was not a problem, it was an enormous problem. but it falls well shy of the statement that you have made, namely that enigma was fully cryptic (implying that all of enigma operations were blinded....they werent)

Under Canaris the Abwehr expanded and proved relatively efficient during the early years of the war. Its most notable success was Operation Nordpol, which was an operation against the Dutch underground network, which at the time was supported by the British Special Operations Executive. In March 1941, the Germans forced a captured SOE radio operator to transmit messages to Britain in a code that the Germans had obtained. Even though the operator gave every indication that he was compromised, the receiver in Britain did not notice this. Thus the Germans had been able to penetrate the Dutch operation and maintained this state of affairs for two years, capturing agents that were sent and sending false intelligence and sabotage reports until the British caught on.

But it was ineffective overall for several reasons. Much of its intelligence was deemed politically unacceptable to the German leadership. Moreover, it was in direct competition/conflict with SS intelligence activities under Reinhard Heydrich and Walter Schellenberg. The animosity between the SS and Abwehr did not stop there. Many of the Abwehr's operatives — including Canaris himself — were in fact anti-Nazi and were involved in many assassination attempts against Hitler, including the most serious one on July 20, 1944. Canaris even employed Jews in the Abwehr and used the agency to help a small number of Jews to escape from Germany into Switzerland. But perhaps the biggest reason was that Canaris himself sought to undermine the Nazi cause, although not Germany's war effort itself.

Despite the Abwehr's many intelligence coups, its effectiveness was more than negated by agents who — with Canaris's blessing — aided the Allies in whatever covert means were necessary. He personally gave false information which discouraged Hitler from invading Switzerland (Operation Tannenbaum). He also persuaded Francisco Franco not to allow German forces to pass through Spain to invade Gibraltar (Operation Felix). He even provided intelligence to the Allies on German intentions as well.

The SS continually undermined the Abwehr by putting several Abwehr officers under investigation, believing them (correctly) to be involved in anti-Hitler plots. The SS also accused Canaris of being defeatist in his intelligence assessments, especially on the Russian campaign. One such briefing reportedly resulting in Hitler seizing Canaris by the lapels, and demanding to know whether the intelligence chief was insinuating that Germany would lose the war


This is still unsourced material, but it just happens that i have seen it before. this hardly supports the notion that the Abwehr was a professional outfit that achieved a high level of competency, or materially aided the german war effort, quite the opposite in fact

Soren said:

For those interested in some of the special operations carried out by the Abwehr in America: uboat.net - U-boat Operations - Special Operations

As one can see the Germans continued to land agents in the US right up until late 1944, and obviously because they knew they could without the Allies knwoing about it. One of the agents again however sold out ther other and turned himself in after talking to a childhood friend.

The Abwehr
At the outbreak of World War II, Abwehr resumed operations similar to those carried out during World War I. The agency was in charge of tracking troops and munitions transports, tapping wires and intercepting radio messages, and infiltrating foreign intelligence and military units. Abwehr placed two operatives inside the British intelligence agency for two years, and developed a highly successful encryption device called the Enigma machine. Agents tracked and monitored various resistance movements in occupied Europe, and even sabotaged military and government strongholds behind Allied lines.

Click to expand...

The Abwehr certainly were pretty good at counter intelligence but never got on top of the problem with the exception of the Dutch operations. However I do not agree with the statement that they sabotaged military or Goverments.

Canaris made the United States one of Abwehr's primary targets even before America's entry into the conflict. By 1942, German agents were operating from within all of America's top armaments manufacturers. Abwehr scored perhaps its greatest victories in the area of industrial espionage, as agents managed to steal the blueprint for every major American airplane produced for the war effort.

Click to expand...

It isn't often that I would disagree with U Boat Net but I do in this case. Germany certainly tried to do this but with little if any success. Its interesting that they say that the Germans had all the plans for American fighters which they didn't, but they don't mention the biggest secret that the Germans did obtain. By 1939 Germany had a complete working example of the Norden Bomb sight which was tested by the Luftwaffe. This was stolen by Hermann W Lang. What is interesting is that he wasn't a spy put in place by Germany but an American citizen with roots in the USA who offerred his services to Germany. This was the pattern for German spies in the USA they achieved nothing with their own spies but people who offered to help did bring some results. However they didn't last long and Lang did nothing more to assist the German war effort.[/QUOTE]

Soren said:

More:


Despite the Abwehr's many intelligence coups, .

Click to expand...

Would appreciate more on this topic as I don't know of many.

Guys it's not all from Uboat.net, only the special operations part.

Parsifal the article you've seen before is from Wiki.

The other is from Answers, which I found is incorrect after looking through my books. I don't see any mention of German agents infiltrating the US airplane industry at all in any of my books (Has anyone heard about this before?)

Anyway the point I was trying to stress is: The Germans could easily land spies in the US without any problems and without the US knowing squat about it, and they did it right up till late 44.

Remember the purpose of the spies to be landed before our little hypothetical operation aren't supposed to infiltrate any US organization or industry, just provide detailed maps of the target area, pick a landing site and make sure all is clear before the landing. Hence why we can be nearly 100% sure that they wont be compromised, seeing they won't be trying infiltrate any sensitive government area.

Soren, no doubt the Germans could land spies and commando's anywhere on the eastern seaboard and Gulf seacoasts.

But their capacity to influence the war was zero! There just was to much redundancy and production capacity in the economy and temporary interruptions wouldn't alter the outcome.

But .... I will grant you this. A commando attack on the Panama canal would impact operations to some degree.