German Gibraltar? (1 Viewer)

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Look at the reasons behind each case, rather than trying to generalize. And then from those specific cases, try and draw the parrallel with Gibraltar.

Firstly, the example you cited originally. Facts are it fell easily, but for what reason. As you say, it fell to new techniques and weapons, specifically airborne troops and hollow charge explosives. Neither weapon had been anticipated in th original design, and the 1300 defenders were thoroughly demoralised from the very beginning

I'm not sure what you base the defenders being thoroughly demoralised on but IMHO the most important factor in the attack was the simple fact nobody thought it was possible.

The Fall of Eben Emael by Annand states that the fort was considered the strongest in the world.

In regards to the other forts you keep bringing up (not me), you commented in post #9:

True, but forts also have had their success. Brest Litovsk, Sevastopol, Hango, Corregidor, Maginot, Tobruk, all had some success. Eban Emmanuel was one case, a special case, and a rather thin case to make against a 300 year old fortress

If the purpose of this thread is to debate whether Gb could have been taken by the Germans or not (unless I have gone out on a tangent which I'll admit I've been known to do) I'm not sure how bringing up some of the other major fortresses that were taken by the enemy is relevant. The fact it took longer for some of them to fall doesn't matter unless we are talking about Germany taking Gb within a time frame. The fact is those that were labeled as "impossible to take" were taken.



Your logic is very akin to the attitude taken by the French in the opening days of WWI. They disdained the need to entrench, to dig in, preferring to rely on the elan of the troops to carry them forward and win the battle. The french army soon abandoned that disastrous policy and were digging in cowering in their increasingly sophisticated fortresses as the war progressed

Please explain to me how you derived this about by my statement:

"They also said the same thing about Fort Eben Emael and it was knocked it in less then an hour.

If man can build it, he can also conquer it."

I challenge you to find any post I have ever made that stated fortresses were usless or digging in a waste of time.

I could continue, but you get the drift I think The reasons for a probable defeat need to be examined and put forward, rather than just mouthing dogma that is essentially unsupported. Tell people why you think Gibraltar would fall, or why forts are not of any use to a defence, rather than making generalised statements about how all forts can be taken.

You can't be serious. You got all of this from my statement:

"They also said the same thing about Fort Eben Emael and it was knocked it in less then an hour.

If man can build it, he can also conquer it."



I agree that given the right conditions, a fort can be taken, but can those conditions be realistically generated in 1941? I cant see how they could.

So you blast me for making a statement that "If man can build, he can also conquer it", but then go to state that you agree if given the right conditions a fort can be taken. Huh?

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But I'm willing to be an armchair general and take a whack at it.

The axis powers for 2 straight weeks day and night use incendiaries and heavy ordinance to bomb Gb to try and deprive the defenders of sleep. On the final day a German captured allied ship filled with fuel docks in the main harbor.

A few hours later at dusk an emergency message is sent from 2 twin-engine cargo aircraft that they are under attack and need to make an emergency landing – one of them visibly has an engine on fire. They are Jewish scientists (or somebody else) who have escaped with their wives and families from Vichy France. Pursuers turn around and the aircraft land on the runway. Out step German soldiers discussed as women and old men. At that point, the "allied ship" is detonated and either explodes or at least burns fiercely hopefully blinding AA gunners and lighting the way for the Germans. Soldiers from the 2 cargo aircraft pour out and secure the airport/runway. Paratroopers start to land and reinforce the troops already there (I've seen Gb and I do think it's possible to land paratroopers there). Then Gliders proceed to land. What's left of the harbor is now secured. Additional troops are landed via cargo U-Boats filled with men and equipment. The main German troop ships that were waiting nearby in Spanish harbors disguised as neutrals now set sail and arrive within a half hour.


I would prefer to have used the Fa 223 (helicopter transport) for surprise but it would not have been available at best until 42.
 
Regarding my earlier comments. My line of thinking was that early in the war, Germany would have had the resources to execute such a plan. Of course, they didn't have the naval power that the U.S. had at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, but they did have considerable resources that would have contributed to such an attack in 1940 before they went to war with the Soviet Union in 1941. Perhaps had they committed to an all out assault like that, it would have kept the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union intact, at least for a little while...

Morocco and Algeria were technically considered Axis holdings, due to being mostly Vichy French, so I don't think that they would have had too much difficulty in securing a staging area for air strikes.

Had they focused on securing Gibraltar, perhaps they could have hampered the Allied supply effort to the North African campaigns.
 
The French problem is this.....the peace treaty they had signed in June 1940 had guranteed the territorial integrity of the remainder of france and her overseas empire, and allowed for the continued existence of the French Fleet as an independant force (not good enough in British eyes). But in order to bring in Spain, who demanded the handover of large proportion of french North Africa, the Germans would be forced to to renege on that agreement. The french demonstrated in November 1942 what their reaction to any inroads into their territory by the Germans would be. Despite the fact that the occupation of Vichy was touted as a security measure in response to the allied landings in North Africa, the French rejected this for the charade that it was, and to a man went over to the Allied side almost immediately. Now, in 1941, if the Germans tried that, they would firstly have to get the co-operation of the Italians. The Italians, despite the reverses they had suffered in Cyrenaica and Egypt, were still hopeful of maintaining their separate identities, something Mussolini called "parrallel war". There is no gurantee that they would allow a German adventure into Tunisia and beyond except with some whacko terms like "we want Tunisia" or something similar. Botom line is that the entire Vichy resources would go over to the allies in a shot.

Now, the French had the best part of 15 divisions in 1940, and over 400 aircraft. To this the british were prepred to commit a full army and two corps, plus it is likely that the Canadians would put into the field I Canadian Corps. So, against what, maybe 2 German Divs, and say 4 Italian colonial Divs (5th army based at Tripoli) the Germans are going to face the better part of 20 allied divisions, in mostly mountain territory against what were probably the best mountain troops in the world at that time.

If the Germans tried to take a shortcut and land somehow in French North Africa closer to Gibraltar, they run the real risk of running foul of the RN as they attempted the crossing. And this wasnt Norway, the French were fully alerted and mobilized.

What would have to happen in order to make this plan work would be to eliminate the RN as a threat in the eastern basin. The only way to do that is to drive them out of their base at Gibraltar, and the only way to do that is to take the place. We've come full circle, and are back where we started.

If I were tasked with assaulting the fortress, I would firstly move the Luftwaffe into southern spain and impose as tight a blockade as I could. I would dismantle the superheavy artillery park into transportable chunks, and move them about 40 miles from the fortress. I would start to re-assemble the guns at that point, whilst at the same time constructing/improving the rail lines as far forward as was required to bring those big rail guns into action. I would build up the airfields as well, and use Italian MAS boats to harass and undertake an intensive minelaying operation in the straits. All of this would be designed to increase the pressure on the supply lines to the fortress. Finally, by about June 1941, I would commence the bombardment. Using the experiences of Sevastopol as a guide, I estimate the time taken to reduce the fortress defences to a level able to be tackled would be two months. Finally the place is beginning to look assaultable. I would send in my 30000 men via the isthmus, and supported by say about 10000 men in rubber boats and Caiques to undertakew flanking attack across the bay. Finally, even though the site was unsuitable to Gliders, I would risk an airborne assault by paratroopers. The paras are unlikley to survive, but at least they would keep the British busy whilst the main force crosses no mans land. The advancing Infantry would be supported all the way to the enemy lines by the lighter guns unable to make any effect on the Fortress defences.

This might improve the chances of success, but it is only a might. And I think it comes at the cost of not invading the USSR. The strain on the LW, the engineering services, the artillery would be very high.
 
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I agree...the right conditions will allow the Germans to take the place, but are those conditions achievable. What are the conditions.

I see the necessary conditions as being a sustained artillery bombardment, and a total blockade, and interdiction strategy to prevent seaward interdiction and re-supply by the RN. To do this, I think the germans would need to occupy and hold both sides of the straits, and that probably means taking out the Vichy in North Africa.

Once the geographical conditions have been achieved, the Germans would have to maintain a solid blockade for many months, whilst maintaining a continuous barrrage of the fortress.

None of this was solvable in the terms available in 1940-41. The taking of this place would have been very difficult. This is why the French never attempted it 140 years before .

I agree and without Spain these are not going to happen. The British in Gibraltar were dug in very well. Look at what it took to conquer Crete. Not really the same thing, but it kind of can give a pretty good idea.

Does anyone know if Gibraltar was ever shelled or bombed? I can not recall if it ever was.
 
I agree and without Spain these are not going to happen. The British in Gibraltar were dug in very well. Look at what it took to conquer Crete. Not really the same thing, but it kind of can give a pretty good idea.

Does anyone know if Gibraltar was ever shelled or bombed? I can not recall if it ever was.
IIRC correctly the Italians bombed Gib with the Piaggiao P108's
 
I'm a bit surprised by this discussion. I was even under the impression that the Italians could have conquered Gibraltar if they had set their mind (and complete navy) to it...


Kris
 
I'm a bit surprised by this discussion. I was even under the impression that the Italians could have conquered Gibraltar if they had set their mind (and complete navy) to it...
Kris

Early in the war, the Germans did have the tools to mount such an attack. As far as the naval aspect, just about all the battlehsips and cruisers Germany would build, were already in service and available.

Think this would have been a possibility?


Not even close. Consider the situation in late Oct 1940 at the time of the first Hitler/Franco conference.
Naval power was still measured at this time by Battleships, and the British had 14 BB/BC, + 2 King George launched and almoste complete. The Italians had 6. The Germans had not completed the Bismarck yet, and both of the Scharnhorst Battlecruisers was severely damaged by torpedoes and out of action.

The war between the UK and Germany had been describes as a battle between a Lion a Shark, very apt description. While Germany was running roughshod over all of Europe, they were getting their asses kicked in the Naval war (sorry Adler :))

Germany started the war with 2 Battlecruisers, 6 light cruisers and 3 heavy cruisers + 3 "Pocket" BB's

By the fall of 1940, they have both Battlecruisers out of action, 1 pocket BB sunk, 1 Pocket BB out of action, 1 CA sunk, 2 CL sunk and 1 heavily damaged by torpedo, + about 60% of their DD's sunk .

TheGermans therefore have less than half of their starting naval assets left, in exchange for sinking the the British BB Royal Oak, and 2 carriers lost (out of 8 ) The British also have a total of 23 CA (of 9,000 tons+) and 44 CL remaining by Oct 1940, and have lost only 1 CA (Effingham) and 2 CL. This does not even include the ships of the Allied navies, Dutch, Australian, Canadian, etc

I have seen mention of German artillery being used in a scenario (if the Spanish had allowed the Germans access), but what about a concerted attack using the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe.

Early in the war, the Germans did have the tools to mount such an attack. Although they lacked carriers, the Germans did have quite a bit of North African territory they could have used as staging bases for thier air support. Regarding my earlier comments. My line of thinking was that early in the war, Germany would have had the resources to execute such a plan.

Had they focused on securing Gibraltar, perhaps they could have hampered the Allied supply effort to the North African campaigns.

Actually the North African campaign was not supplied through the Med, but from the Indian Ocean, so that would not have been a factor.



I agree and without Spain these are not going to happen. The British in Gibraltar were dug in very well.

Quite correct.

Here are the key considerations that everyone seems to have missed: After the Spanish civil war, Franco was not prepared for any major campaigns, in addition being quite concerned that the Allies might ressurect the Republican cause should he get involved in the war.

Franco would certainly not be adverse to grabbing some "low hanging fruit" if the British were faltering, but the failure of the Luftwaffe to destroy the RAF, and the heavy KM losses vs. the Royal Navy gave Franco something to think about. I believe that he made such onerous demands because he didn't want the operation to go ahead.

The Spanish would not be terribly worried about the attack itself, as that would be left to the Germans. Gibraltar was not nearly as critical to Britain in 1940 as it was in 1941, because they still had control of the Eastern Med (as Crete was not yet in Axis hands)


Here is the one overriding factor: Franco would have known that should he allow a German attack against Gibraltar, that Spain would certainly lose the Canary Islands in retaliation, as the Axis had no Naval assets that could protect it. The capture of the Canary Islands (and possibley Madeira as well) would provide a substitute base at the Western end of the Med, and in some ways the British would be better off in this position.

In addition, Spain would risk losing it's African colonies as well.


Within 3 months of the Hitler/Franco conference a string of Axis defeats around the Med made it even more unlikely that Franco woulkd risk entering the war.

1.) 11 Nov 1940 the RN carrier "Illustrious" launches an airstrike on the Italian fleet, sinking 3 Battleships and forcing the Italian Navy to retreat from the central Med.

2.) Dec 1940 The British operation "Compass" destroys the Italian army in Libya, and advances towards Tripoli

3.) The Italian attack against Greece is repulsed, and the Italian army is pushed back into Albania.
 
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Great Post FB. One small correction, the Germans had lost 13 of the 22 DDs they started the war with in '39. 10 were lost at Narvik, and 3 in the North Sea, one from mines and two from the Luftwaffe bombing them by mistake. There may have been others, I will check when I get home
 
I was under the impression that the Bismark was commissioned and put to sea during the summer of 1940, the Tirpitz following a year later...

It was an interesting thought, seeing if there was a way to assault the fortress by any other means than by land. I think parsifal covered it pretty well though, in a land assault.

Regarding the Spanish rail system, with some improvements, it probably could have handled the K5 (283mm) traffic, but if a Schwerer (80cm) were to be used, it would almost have to be rebuilt in order to accomodate that artillery (which wasn't available until 1942 anyway).

:)
 
Great Post FB. One small correction, the Germans had lost 13 of the 22 DDs they started the war with in '39. 10 were lost at Narvik, and 3 in the North Sea, one from mines and two from the Luftwaffe bombing them by mistake. There may have been others, I will check when I get home

I guess I didn't explain that very well, they had lost 3/5 (ie 60%) of their DD's, not that they had lost 3 ships from 5...

I was under the impression that the Bismark was commissioned and put to sea during the summer of 1940, the Tirpitz following a year later...

It was an interesting thought, seeing if there was a way to assault the fortress by any other means than by land. I think parsifal covered it pretty well though, in a land assault.
:)

No, Bismarck had finished her training/"work up" by the spring of 1941, and was sunk on her first mission in May 1941. Keep in mind that capital ships of the era typically required 6 - 9 months of work-up after comissioning. So while Tirpitz was comissioned Mar 1941, it wasn't ready for operations until Jan 1942. If a ship did not have this period of training/work-up done, it would lead to problems later, as seen by the Prince of Wales which was rushed into sevice before it was properly ready, and had 2 turrets fail or jam during it's first battle (vs Bismarck)

. The Germans had quite some trouble keeping their capital ships operational, the 2 Battlecruisers had participated in the Norway operations and made 1 six week cruise in Feb Mar 1941, but apart from that were almost constantly under repair until the Scharnhorst was finally available in 1943. (Gneisnau never made it back into operational staus)

1940

On 4-9 June both ships operated against British forces on the Norwegian coast, engaging and sinking the carrier Glorious and her two screening destroyers, Ardent and Acasta on 8 June. But a torpedo from the latter destroyer hit Scharnhorst and badly damaged her abreast 'C turret, so the German squadron put into Trondheim. Leaving the crippled ship there, Gneisenau sailed with a cruiser and destroyer escort for another sortie but this was soon abandoned. By June Scharnhorst was ready to sail for repairs in Germany; Gneisenau was preparing for a sortie into Icelandic waters but on 20 June was hit by a torpedo from the British submarine Clyde and badly damaged. Neither ship was operational again until the end of 1940

1941
The 2 ships made a six week cruise Feb/Mar 1941, sank 115,000 tons of Allied shipping, arrived in Brest 22 Mar 1941. Here they remained trapped until February 1942, becoming in the meantime regular targets for the RAF Bomber and Coastal Command. Both ships were given refits during this period, but on 6 April 1941 Gneisenau was hit by an aircraft torpedo and heavily damaged, then on 10/11 April was struck by four bombs and remained under repair until the Christmas 1941. Scharnhorst had completed her refit by 21 July 1941, and was moved to La Pallice for trials and training. Here she was attacked by the RAF on 24 July and hit by five bombs, resulting in very serious damage, some 3,000 tons of water flooding the ship. She limped back to Brest on 27 July and began new repairs, which also took until about the end of the 1941.



1942
Both ships, with the cruiser Prinz Eugen, escorted by destroyers and torpedo boats left Brest on 11 February 1942, to return to Germany via the Channel. En route they evaded British attacks but first Scharnhorst then Gneisenau hit mines before the former was mined a second time. Gneisenau bombed 26-27
February 1942 while in drydock repairing mine damage. Bow completely
destroyed by explosion of munitions, #1 turret also destroyed.

Scharnhorst was under repair until June 1942 and then also moved east to Gotenhafen for trials and work-up until January 1943 when she was ordered to the Arctic
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Should the attack on Gibraltar ever have been done I would expect that it would be alot like Sevastopol, and take several months at least.

But I suspect that even if Franco had agreed to participate at the first conference, the events of the winter 40/41 would have made him change his mind (Compass, Taranto, Greece etc)

Keep in mind the dynamics of the situation, Gibraltar is only 2 square miles, and the Canaries are 2,800 sq. miles, so Spain would certainly not risk losing them unless Germany could guarantee their protection. (Which they could not) In addition, going to war with Britain would also result in the RN blockading Spain as well, which would cause shortages and cut off Spain's remaining colonies.

To be honest, the Britain would probably have preferred that Germany attack Gibraltar, as it would tie up a huge chunk of German assets, especially Luftwaffe artillery, which would have made a world of difference in Greece, Libya Malta in the spring of '41 as these assets would not be available. The British would also be in a better position off west Africa with a base on the Canaries, during the mid-war years the Bristol-Freetown route was quite dangerous, as there was no British base available between Gibraltar and Bathhurst (Gambia)
 
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I think it's somewhat misleading comparing the Royal Navy in strength of ships versus German and Italian. Yes, they had a much bigger Navy, but they were also spread out over a much bigger area then the Germans/Italians.

You also don't have to control the entire ocean, you only need to control the battle area.

Bismark was actually commissioned on Aug 1940, she went a further 8 months of training in the Baltic before making her first and only sortie.
The Encyclopedia of Weapons of WWII page 150

Also, the Spanish were not exactly 100% neutral. They sent "volunteers" to the Eastern Front, they allowed U-Boats to refuel, and they turned a blind eye to the Italians lunching attacks from Spanish ports.
 
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Bismark was actually commissioned on Aug 1940, she went a further 8 months of training in the Baltic before making her first and only sortie.
The Encyclopedia of Weapons of WWII page 150

Correct, but see my previous post for the difference between "comissioned" and "available for operations"

I think it's somewhat misleading comparing the Royal Navy in strength of ships versus German and Italian. Yes, they had a much bigger Navy, but they were also spread out over a much bigger area then the Germans/Italians.

You also don't have to control the entire ocean, you only need to control the battle area.

Also, the Spanish were not exactly 100% neutral. They sent "volunteers" to the Eastern Front, they allowed U-Boats to refuel, and they turned a blind eye to the Italians lunching attacks from Spanish ports.

True, and the Spanish pushed it about as far as they could without risking some serious retaliation by the British.

The British had 3 Battleships + a carrier in the Med for most of 1941, all the rest of the capital ships are available in the Atlantic. The Japanese are not a factor until the end of 1941 as they are being watched by the US Pacific fleet. The 3 remaining Italian ships cannot leave the Med, as this would allow the British complete control, and able to interdict the Axis shipping link with Africa.

So if the Germans were to promise Spain a naval force to protect the Canaries, they would be looking at the Bismarck, 2 Battlecruisers, Scheer + 2 CA 3 CL. The German 11" guns are no match for the British 15" guns, and could expect to face 10 - 12 British Battleships in such a major operation.


There is no reasonable hope for success, which is probably why Franco would demand Vichy African territories to compensate for the expected loss of the Canaries. And this has been covered earlier by Parsifal, with the Spanish demands of French territory would likely push the French (and especially the French Navy) back into conflict with Germany.


Bottom line:
1.) The operation is not feasable without Spanish help
2.) What possible benefits could be offered to the Spanish to compensate for the loss of the Canaries and for Spanish colonies in Central Africa? {Rio Muni, Fernando Po, Santa Isabel etc}
 
I still fail to see the absulute requirement that Spain must join in on this. Would it be easier with them, sure. Would it make it impossible to do without them, IMO no.
 
Without Spain you are talking about an entiely sea and air operation. And the air is doubtful. 900km directly over Spain from the French border? Over 1200km if you skirt the Spanish coast.

Sea might not look to good either. 1900km from Brest? over 40hrs at full speed for a pocket battleship if it doesn't break down.
Only 1300km or so from Marsielle but then you are depending on the Italian navy to take out the English ships and for gunfire support.
 
without Spain in the war, the naval option becomes pretty much impossible. If the Axis attack the Vichy assets, then the remains of the french fleet, and the French North African garrisons become allied assets, which makes the defence of gibraltar very easy.

The only way that the italians and the germans could approach the issue, without Spain in the war, is to risk a Naval assault from distant bases. For Italy that means Naples or at best Cagliari. For the Germans it initialy means Kiel, assuming a succesful breakout it then means a sortie from one of the French Ports (Brest, Lorient or St Nazaire....Bordeaux is not suitable as a port of departure).

For both Navies (Italian and German) a long ocean crossing is fraught with danger, to which the addition of the Luftwaffe has very limited compensations. For most of their respective voyages they will be without effective aircover, during which time both would be subjected to the full force of the RN, including carrier based airstrikes. The italians in particular had no stomach for this, and the Germans had also demonstrated that without effective aircover or supporting screen, their fleet was very vulnerable.

On those occasions that the Italians had been run down to a fight, they had demonstrated no stomach for close action with the RN. They consistently refused to risk charging smoke screens, and tended lose command and control at the slightest levels of damage inflicted on them. On the few occasions that their heavy ships had closed for action, their gunnery had been shown to be totally inneffective. It is no exaggeration to say that the entire Italian fleet could be contained by a force half its size. But the Italians could not call upon their entire fleet....they had other committments to attend to, like North Africa and the actions occurring in Greece (Matapan).

An whilst it might be possible to undertae a sea denial strategy (tip and run tactics, high speed bombardments perhaps), this is not the strategy that would be needed to take Gib. Sea Control is what is needed, that is, to move to an area, ensure total control of that sea area, and then undertake a prolonged assault bombardment, before sending in the amphibious forces. Something akin to Iwo or Okinawa in other words. This was totally beyond the ability of either axis Navy to achieve. They lacked the strength to eject the RN presence for a start, and even lacked the necessary skills training and doctrine, or know how to undertake such a complicated naval strategy. We are taliking 16000 defenders in heavily fortified positions here......at Iwo it took 110000 of the best Marines in the world 25 days to subdue 18000 defenders, how on earth are the Axis going to get that many men to the target safely, hold off what can only be assumed as ferocious attacks by the RN and get their people safely ashore only after having dealt with the coastal guns first.

It is just totally unfeasible to consider an attack on the fortress without Spanish assistance.
 
I would do an amphibious/airborne attack on Gibraltar. The French, Italians and Germans had been bombing them so range IMO is not critical
 

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