German Gibraltar?

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Assuming that you meant something like this, there are alot of problems with this scenario

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But I'm willing to be an armchair general and take a whack at it.

The axis powers for 2 straight weeks day and night use incendiaries and heavy ordinance to bomb Gb to try and deprive the defenders of sleep.

How do they manage to bomb Gibraltar? There are very few Axis ultra-long range bombers, and it is about 900 - 1000 miles each way over water from Marseille south france. It is only about 600 miles from Bayonne in France, but this would involve violating Spanish neutrality. IIRC the range of a Ju88 is about 1300 miles?

In any event, there would be no escorting fighters, so the Axis bombers would be savaged by intercepting British night fighters, and Gibraltar was well equipped with Flak

On the final day a German captured allied ship filled with fuel docks in the main harbor.

All ships were searched by the RN blocade, and certainly not allowed to dock at Gibraltar. an unidentified ship attempting to dock would be fired on

A few hours later at dusk an emergency message is sent from 2 twin-engine cargo aircraft that they are under attack and need to make an emergency landing – one of them visibly has an engine on fire. They are Jewish scientists (or somebody else) who have escaped with their wives and families from Vichy France. Pursuers turn around and the aircraft land on the runway. Out step German soldiers discussed as women and old men.

Again, unidentified aircraft were not allowed to land, an aircraft in distress would be directed to Cadiz


At that point, the "allied ship" is detonated and either explodes or at least burns fiercely hopefully blinding AA gunners and lighting the way for the Germans. Soldiers from the 2 cargo aircraft pour out and secure the airport/runway.

I'm not sure how feasable this would be? But certainly would not blind gunners on the seaward side of Gibraltar.
As Parsifal has pointed out, the runway contained no cover, and was directly under the guns of the fortress, any troops in transport aircraft would be slaughtered. Besides, how many troops can you fit in a Ju52 for example?

Paratroopers start to land and reinforce the troops already there (I've seen Gb and I do think it's possible to land paratroopers there). Then Gliders proceed to land.

Paratroops Gliders landing on the runway would be wiped out by the guns. Are you suggesting that the paratroopers try to land on the rocky slopes?

What's left of the harbor is now secured. Additional troops are landed via cargo U-Boats filled with men and equipment.

How many troops can you land by U-boat? 300? 500? vs 20,000+ defenders?

The main German troop ships that were waiting nearby in Spanish harbors disguised as neutrals now set sail and arrive within a half hour.

They would still be unable to neutralize the seaward side fortress guns, which would have a field day with approaching cargo ships.

Where would these cargo ships come from, Germany or Italy?
 
without Spain in the war, the naval option becomes pretty much impossible. If the Axis attack the Vichy assets, then the remains of the french fleet, and the French North African garrisons become allied assets, which makes the defence of gibraltar very easy.

The Vichy have been attacking Gb themselves. what is the logic of Germany in turn attacking them?

The only way that the italians and the germans could approach the issue, without Spain in the war, is to risk a Naval assault from distant bases. For Italy that means Naples or at best Cagliari. For the Germans it initialy means Kiel, assuming a succesful breakout it then means a sortie from one of the French Ports (Brest, Lorient or St Nazaire....Bordeaux is not suitable as a port of departure).

This has been done successfully several times. The Falkland War comes to mind. However I would like to point what I had mentioned a few posts back that the axis were already using Spanish ports to launch attacks against Gb.

For both Navies (Italian and German) a long ocean crossing is fraught with danger, to which the addition of the Luftwaffe has very limited compensations. For most of their respective voyages they will be without effective aircover, during which time both would be subjected to the full force of the RN, including carrier based airstrikes. The italians in particular had no stomach for this, and the Germans had also demonstrated that without effective aircover or supporting screen, their fleet was very vulnerable.

Both had a fleet of subs that could be used for this as well.

An whilst it might be possible to undertake a sea denial strategy (tip and run tactics, high speed bombardments perhaps), this is not the strategy that would be needed to take Gib. Sea Control is what is needed, that is, to move to an area, ensure total control of that sea area, and then undertake a prolonged assault bombardment, before sending in the amphibious forces. Something akin to Iwo or Okinawa in other words. This was totally beyond the ability of either axis Navy to achieve. They lacked the strength to eject the RN presence for a start, and even lacked the necessary skills training and doctrine, or know how to undertake such a complicated naval strategy. We are taliking 16000 defenders in heavily fortified positions here......at Iwo it took 110000 of the best Marines in the world 25 days to subdue 18000 defenders, how on earth are the Axis going to get that many men to the target safely, hold off what can only be assumed as ferocious attacks by the RN and get their people safely ashore only after having dealt with the coastal guns first.

It is just totally unfeasible to consider an attack on the fortress without Spanish assistance.

THis is where I strongly disagree with you. I think tying a prolonged approach would be the worst thing to do. IMHO you need to strike fast and quickly before the British can react with additional assets.
 
I would do an amphibious/airborne attack on Gibraltar. The French, Italians and Germans had been bombing them so range IMO is not critical
IIRC correctly the Italians bombed Gib with the Piaggiao P108's

Yes it is. The French bombed Gibraltar from nearby bases in North Africa. The Italians used P 108's which have over 2,000 mile range, but are not in service until 1942.

It is about 900 miles to Gibraltar from Italian bases on Sardinia

also with S.M. 82

What is the range of an SM 82? When did this attack take place?

without Spain in the war, the naval option becomes pretty much impossible. If the Axis attack the Vichy assets, then the remains of the french fleet, and the French North African garrisons become allied assets, which makes the defence of gibraltar very easy.

The only way that the italians and the germans could approach the issue, without Spain in the war, is to risk a Naval assault from distant bases. For Italy that means Naples or at best Cagliari. For the Germans it initialy means Kiel, assuming a succesful breakout it then means a sortie from one of the French Ports (Brest, Lorient or St Nazaire....Bordeaux is not suitable as a port of departure).

For both Navies (Italian and German) a long ocean crossing is fraught with danger, to which the addition of the Luftwaffe has very limited compensations. For most of their respective voyages they will be without effective aircover, during which time both would be subjected to the full force of the RN, including carrier based airstrikes. The italians in particular had no stomach for this, and the Germans had also demonstrated that without effective aircover or supporting screen, their fleet was very vulnerable.

On those occasions that the Italians had been run down to a fight, they had demonstrated no stomach for close action with the RN. They consistently refused to risk charging smoke screens, and tended lose command and control at the slightest levels of damage inflicted on them. On the few occasions that their heavy ships had closed for action, their gunnery had been shown to be totally inneffective. It is no exaggeration to say that the entire Italian fleet could be contained by a force half its size. But the Italians could not call upon their entire fleet....they had other committments to attend to, like North Africa and the actions occurring in Greece (Matapan).

An whilst it might be possible to undertae a sea denial strategy (tip and run tactics, high speed bombardments perhaps), this is not the strategy that would be needed to take Gib. Sea Control is what is needed, that is, to move to an area, ensure total control of that sea area, and then undertake a prolonged assault bombardment, before sending in the amphibious forces. Something akin to Iwo or Okinawa in other words. This was totally beyond the ability of either axis Navy to achieve. They lacked the strength to eject the RN presence for a start, and even lacked the necessary skills training and doctrine, or know how to undertake such a complicated naval strategy. We are taliking 16000 defenders in heavily fortified positions here......at Iwo it took 110000 of the best Marines in the world 25 days to subdue 18000 defenders, how on earth are the Axis going to get that many men to the target safely, hold off what can only be assumed as ferocious attacks by the RN and get their people safely ashore only after having dealt with the coastal guns first.

It is just totally unfeasible to consider an attack on the fortress without Spanish assistance.

I'm afraid Parsifal is correct, I don't see how it can be done except overland through Spain
 
The Vichy have been attacking Gb themselves. what is the logic of Germany in turn attacking them?

The French launched a few "protest" attacks against Gibraltar in the summer of 1940, but by early 1941 are not at war with Britain. Again, the French are concerned with protecting overseas territories, so are trying to avoid total war with the UK


This has been done successfully several times. The Falkland War comes to mind. However I would like to point what I had mentioned a few posts back that the axis were already using Spanish ports to launch attacks against Gb.

What attacks are you talking about? There is a huge difference between turning a blind eye to a few frog-men attacks and supporting a full amphibious invasion. Any overt support by Spain would have the same result, an Allied retaliation against Spanish overseas assets.

There is also a huge difference between Falklands where the UK had total control of the seas except for coastal areas, and the Axis trying to break an Allied blockade. The Axis shipping had already taken a heavy beating in the early years of the war, there was not loads of it to spare.

Both had a fleet of subs that could be used for this as well.

How many subs would the KM allow to be used for this? How many men could they carry each? Where would they unload? In the harbour right under the fortress guns?

THis is where I strongly disagree with you. I think tying a prolonged approach would be the worst thing to do. IMHO you need to strike fast and quickly before the British can react with additional assets.

There are pros and cons for both, but I just don't see how the Axis can deliver the 30,000 to 40,000 troops needed.
 
How do they manage to bomb Gibraltar? There are very few Axis ultra-long range bombers, and it is about 900 - 1000 miles each way over water from Marseille south france. It is only about 600 miles from Bayonne in France, but this would involve violating Spanish neutrality. IIRC the range of a Ju88 is about 1300 miles?

The Vichy bombings that they were already doing were being launched from Algeria Morocco. I could not find the bases from which the Italian or Germans flew from- but obviously it was feasible.


In any event, there would be no escorting fighters, so the Axis bombers would be savaged by intercepting British night fighters, and Gibraltar was well equipped with Flak
For what ever reason, the Vichy aircraft were not intercepted by anything. I have to disagree with you about there being no escorting fighters.



All ships were searched by the RN blocade, and certainly not allowed to dock at Gibraltar. an unidentified ship attempting to dock would be fired on
Remember it's a captured allied ship so it's not unidentified.



Again, unidentified aircraft were not allowed to land, an aircraft in distress would be directed to Cadiz
This might be something as simple as a good sales job. - but in the 15 minutes I came up with this, it might need some more work.




I'm not sure how feasable this would be? But certainly would not blind gunners on the seaward side of Gibraltar.
That's fine, mainly trying to blind the AA gunners.


As Parsifal has pointed out, the runway contained no cover, and was directly under the guns of the fortress, any troops in transport aircraft would be slaughtered. Besides, how many troops can you fit in a Ju52 for example?
I tried to find if any of the guns could shot the run way itself, so I'm not sure. The C-47 I've heard of 50+ people being packed it.



Paratroops Gliders landing on the runway would be wiped out by the guns. Are you suggesting that the paratroopers try to land on the rocky slopes?
If it turns out the runway is not a good please, then another site will be found. I've been to Gb before and there are more features then 1 runway and cliffs.




How many troops can you land by U-boat? 300? 500? vs 20,000+ defenders?
Not sure, but if 10 large boats could drop off 5k troops, that would be great.



They would still be unable to neutralize the seaward side fortress guns, which would have a field day with approaching cargo ships.
That's something obviously that would need to be taken out. However you only need to open a channel wide enough to get the ships through safely.

Where would these cargo ships come from, Germany or Italy?
Originally yes, but they would be either in Spanish ports or anchored off the Spanish coast. Apparently it was not a big deal.

Like I said, I only spent 15 minuts on this brain storming.
 
Well, if we're going to explore scenarios, then why not invite the Japanese to the party?

With a little advance planning, the Japanese could have spared a group from the perhaps the Indian Ocean ops. In 1940, early '41, they weren't engaged like they would be in 18 month's time.

Now the Japanese definately had the sea and air assets to make something like this work. I know it's reaching a little, but I don't see why Germany and Japan couldn't have worked out some kind of deal.

At least something to ponder.
 
Well, lets take a look at the place then



gibraltar-port.jpg


The runway

Gibraltar051.jpg


Night view

rock-of-gibraltar.jpg


Tunnel/ firing portal

Gibraltar054.jpg



Map

gibraltar.jpg
 
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Physically, Gibraltar is a limestone mountain rising some 426 meters from sea level, dominating the Straits of Gibraltar, which are less than 16 miles across to Spanish Morocco. The entire territory is less than a kilometer wide and five kilometers long. Along its western side is Gibraltar Bay, where the Port of Gibraltar is located, with a breakwater and facilities almost 50% as large as the territory itself. The mountain itself is honeycombed with 34 miles of tunnels dug into the rock by the British over the years, providing cover for numerous gun emplacements, hangars, storage facilities, barracks, hospitals and thousands of troops.

Militarily, the fortress was used primarily as a naval base and air station, since its limited size allowed it to support a garrison of only 15,000 ground troops. The one airfield, running across the length of the peninsula at the northern extreme of the territory, was expanded into Gibraltar Bay starting in 1937 and completed by 1942. This allowed support for nearly 100 fighters and several squadrons of medium and heavy bombers, and allowed Gibraltar to act as a vital staging point for aircraft transferring into the Mediterranean theater. Anti-air defenses were substantially improved during the war. In 1940, there were some 20 3.7" guns, four 4" guns, 10 40-mm Bofors and two pom-poms, plus numerous searchlights. 1942, this complement had been increased to 30 3.7" guns and almost 20 Bofors.

The naval base at Gibraltar had been built before World War I as a response to German pretensions toward becoming a naval power. By 1939 it was one of the most important British naval facilities outside the home islands, providing a relatively secure anchorage and repair facility for the British Navy. This was the home port for Somerville's Force H, which gave the British Navy an extraordinary ability to project its power into the Western Mediterranean and successfully contest the Italian Navy's attempts to control the sea.


Making the Rock a hard place: British anti-aircraft gunners.

The seaward defenses of the fortress were quite varied but, while formidable, not quite the propaganda image of the Rock, bristling with guns. The primary batteries were a set of twin 9.2" naval guns guns at the southern end of the peninsula, which had sufficient range to interdict all surface naval traffic through the straits. Six more single-gun batteries of 9.2" naval guns were placed facing seaward to the east. Finally, a twin 9.2" howitzer battery faced the straits as well.

The secondary batteries were just as numerous, with eight 6" naval guns, although three of these faced northward, toward the border with Spain. A tertiary armament of four 4" guns in two batteries protected the eastward cliffs.

"Conquerable by No Enemy"

Despite these formidable assets, the Allies themselves considered the fortress highly vulnerable. They expected that any concerted Axis assault would cause the fall of the position in at best a two weeks, at worst a few days. Indeed, prior to the Operation Torch landings in North Africa in late 1942, the Allies worried that the Spanish garrison bordering Gibraltar — about 33,000 troops — could quickly be augmented by 20,000 German military personnel covertly placed inside Spain in anticipation of an attack on the fortress (some estimates placed this as high as 80,000). Allied planners greatly feared a Crete-style air assault, especially in conjunction with a determined ground assault.

Gibraltar was extremely exposed to artillery and air bombardment, with three major Spanish artillery batteries (one in North Africa at Mount Hacho, two near Algiceras — only five miles away from the port) positioned to blast the "Rock" into rubble, collapsing its tunnels and destroying its exposed heavy batteries, as the Japanese had done at Corregidor in 1942. Incidentally, one critical asset, water, was only available from collected rain water runoff, as there was no other natural source of potable water on the Rock itself.

Throughout the war, Italian airmen bombed Gibraltar with mixed success. Moreover, the all-important airfield was only a few hundred yards from the border with Spain, which left it extremely vulnerable to bombardment from Spanish-controlled positions, which could give the Axis control of the air until sufficient Allied aircraft carrier sources might (eventually) be brought to bear. Finally, while the port itself was very well protected, the bay — used as an anchorage for merchant shipping throughout the war — was infiltrated on numerous occasions by Italian frogmen operating from the battered Italian freighter Olterra docked on the Spanish side of the bay, successfully sinking some 42,000 tons over two years.

Given this apparent vulnerability, one wonders about the "invincible" status traditionally conferred on Gibraltar by historians and wargamers alike. The rather light gun batteries placed on the fortress do not appear to have been much of a threat to battleships. Even heavy cruisers would more than likely have been able to pass under Gibraltar's guns with only light damage, at worst.

In part the myth seems to have been perpetuated by the simple fact that using naval assets to bypass the "Rock" was apparently never seriously considered by Germany or Italy during the war. Certainly the Italians had no strategic reason for deploying their scant battlefleet (short on fuel, as always) beyond the Mediterranean — such an act would have been an unacceptable concession of sea control to the British, and ended definitively any pretensions of Italian Empire in Africa for Il Duce.

Likewise, the Germans would never have committed elements of their even smaller surface fleet to be potentially trapped in the Mediterranean. Had the Axis had greater forces at their disposal — say, through the successful seizure of the French battlecruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg — there might have been a reason for a deployment from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.



When looked at broadly, the greatest strength of Gibraltar was from its strategic position at the western mouth of the Mediterranean, and the well-developed naval and air facilities which the fortress protected. These combined attributes, rather than any physical "punch" from the fortifications themselves, provided the real deterrent. The narrowness of the straits contributed significantly to Gibraltar's strength, since there was little room for an opponent to avoid air or naval forces that could be easily concentrated to confront an intruder. The difficulties encountered by even German submarine forces attests to the risk of running past a station where strong ASW units are very near their base.

Throughout the war, Britain garrisoned Gibraltar with many of its most important naval assets: The Rodney, Hood, Ark Royal and Renown were variously stationed there. Most of the critical Malta resupply/reprovision convoys started from Gibraltar, and were able to enjoy the cover of its air umbrella for the first third of the journey. By late in the war, Allied air-based ASW patrols extended almost to the Azores, and severely curtailed Donitz's ability to threaten Allied shipping after 1943.

The images of Gibraltar in history, propaganda and wargames as an invincible fortress are thus probably overblown. It makes sense, for example, to allow an Axis naval unit to pass by Gibraltar unimpeded in a game like Third Reich should the Allies fail to sufficiently garrison it with air and naval units to block the enemy's way. Conversely, it makes no sense to allow an Allied player to stack whole armies in a territory less than four miles square!

The real-war concerns of the Allied military planners makes sense when one concedes that it can be (realistically) garrisoned with only three brigades. Indeed, had Gibraltar faced the same kind of assault its cousins like Singapore and Corregidor had to face in WWII, there is a very strong likelihood it would have faced a similar fate. As it was, Gibraltar was allowed to keep face, and its status as the invincible Rock.

By Kevin Canada 2007
 

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Good article GG.

That is pretty much what Parsifal had said earlier, the fortress is vulnerable to a concentrated attack from Spain.

But again, the British retalite by seizing the Canaries and blockading Spain, which leave the British in a better position and the Spanish in a worse one.
 
What I liked about the article, was it's detail about the defenses and it's comparison to Singapore and Corregidor...which leads me back to my wondering about Japanese involvement in such an assault.

A concerted attack by German and Japanese forces sounds a little far-fetched at first, but then again it would have been something the Allies in that area were not prepared to deal with. The Allies were banking on both the German's and the Italian's limited naval forces so perhaps the Japanese making a showing in that region would have been a tipping point.
 
What I liked about the article, was it's detail about the defenses and it's comparison to Singapore and Corregidor...which leads me back to my wondering about Japanese involvement in such an assault.

A concerted attack by German and Japanese forces sounds a little far-fetched at first, but then again it would have been something the Allies in that area were not prepared to deal with. The Allies were banking on both the German's and the Italian's limited naval forces so perhaps the Japanese making a showing in that region would have been a tipping point.

Problem is that they don't trust each other, so they didn't work together. There was actually an earlier thread about total Axis effort, and how they might have won the war. (mainly involving a full-throttle effort by all axis subs from Pearl +1)


But back to the task at hand.

1.) What would the Japanese gain from it?
2.) What benefit does Spain get vs. the cost
3.) What is the cost to the British.


The wild card in your calculations would be the US, they are hardly likely to allow Japan to run rampant all over the Indian Ocean


But I think we will get off-track if we start mixing Japan into this discussion, we should probably have a separate thread: "Could Japan have entered the war in 1940?"
 
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The Vichy have been attacking Gb themselves. what is the logic of Germany in turn attacking them?

These were small scale nuisance raids, designed as a political sop to the Germans after the British attacks at Mers el Kebir. The French never intended these attacks to do anything or hurt anybody.

The French particularly the leaders in North Africa, always viewed the Axis as their real enemy. They believed they had done enough to ensure that their military assets (particularly their fleet) did not end up in German hands. The British did not see it that way. This caused the unhappy situation of former friends turning on each other and attacking each other. This is an entirely diifferent situation to the Axis carving up the Vichy state to feed to the Spanish and the italians appetite for empire . And this is what germany would need to do to allow any action to take place in Vichy territory . And deployment into Vichy territory is one of the ways of putting into effect a proper blockade of the place. Unfortunately this becomes a rather circular argument...."we need Vichy territory to blockade Gibraltar" and " the destruction of Vichy is needed to get the italians and the Spanish into the equation" , but then "if we occupy Vichy territory we force the French into the Allied camp, thereby negating the effects of a blockade". The whole thing takes on a diabolical complexity that I cant see the solution to.



This has been done successfully several times. The Falkland War comes to mind. However I would like to point what I had mentioned a few posts back that the axis were already using Spanish ports to launch attacks against Gb.
Ah yes, in total secrecy, under the strictest conditions imaginable. These attacks (mostly by elements of the 10th Flotilla) are not equivalent or comparable to an overt strategy to taking the place. That would involve the overt deployment of thousands of aircraft, hundreds of thousands of troops, and surface units, none of which would be allowed by the Spanish, whilst they remained ostensibly neutral. The costs to spain, for laying down and prostituting themselves to the Axis in this way, for no benefit to their own situation was simply too high

And the Falklands was not a case of either the British or the Argentinians undertaking an assault by stealth. The argentinians attacked whilst they held naval supremacy, and without a declaration or war, whilst the British return was anything but stealthy. The former situation has no parallel to Felix....the British are fully alerted and ready. An attack by stealth is simply not going to happen

Both had a fleet of subs that could be used for this as well.

The British could deal with the italian sub fleet in these fleet support situation with ease. They were shown to be no threat to RN fleet movements (the italian subs did enjoy some success when deployed to the distant areas of the south and midAtlantic, but this is not comparable to attacks on heavily defended fleet TFs and military convoys). if the italians had tried to do this they would have beeen massacred.

Similar conclusions can be drawn about German subs operating in fleet support roles. They at least might be able to pick off the odd ship here or there, but at the cost of wrecking their mercantile campaign in the western approaches.

As a general rule, subs operating in a tactical role like that are not successful. And subs dont deliver the conditions of sea control needed to undertake an invasion......

THis is where I strongly disagree with you. I think tying a prolonged approach would be the worst thing to do. IMHO you need to strike fast and quickly before the British can react with additional assets.

Iam not saying they could undertake a long program of sea control.....quitee the contrary. I am saying that naval invasions demand this sort of exposure, but against heavily6 defended target like Gib there would be no choice other than to hang around to support the landing forces.

I agree that a prolonged approach is suicide for the Axis fleets, but how are you proposing to do this otherwise. The experiences at Sevastopol and Iwo, which are both comparable, indicate a clear need for a prolonged campaign. In the case of Sevastopol it took about three months to complete the prepration and several weeks to complete the assault. In the case of Iwo it took three days of bombardment by the navy (which proved insufficient anyway), and 25 days of support afloat as the ground forces inched their way ahead. Unless the Germans are supermen, how are they going to
A) get 100000+ men to the target
B) get those men safely ashore
C) provide the necessary support to prevent those men becoming guests of His Majesty?
without the fleet hanging around??????
 
"Could Japan have entered the war in 1940?" would make for an interesting thread!

If the Japanese sent a task force from the Indian Ocean over to support a German assault, I don't think the U.S. would have done anything more than they had already done during the initial phases of Japan's south-west Pacific conquest.

It's hard to say what could have been forged, as far as an agreement goes, but perhaps the prospect of the Axis bottling up the Med and thus hampering the Allied efforts based out of the middle-east and India would have seemed like an interesting prospect to the Japanese. There's also the issue of the Iron that Japan needed and the U.S. embargoed, so there too is an option that may have seemed lucrative to the Japanese and the Germans may have been willing to part with a certain amount to "sweeten the deal".

Now keep in mind that Japan would be only supplying the naval power needed to assault the fortress, not hold it. That would be the German's part. Once the operation concluded, they could resupply in Italian ports and either head back home...or they could stay in the Med and start a whole new thread for us! :lol:

And I couldn't see any need for Spanish involvement, since this would be an assault from the sea and the air.
 
I might take exception to the articles lack of faith in the 9.2 in guns. Shore batteries seldom had the number of guns that ships did. It was generally considered that the shore mounted guns were more accurate. They weren't moving, or rocking or rolling. they also knew where they were.
Since most treaty cruisers had trouble keeping out 8in shell fire I don't think that they are going to keep out 9.2in shells. While 9.2s might not be ship killers against battleships they might be able to "mission kill" a battleship. Knock out fIre control, flood bows or sterns. generally muck up anything not behind heavy armour.
THe extra 1.2 inches over an 8in shell actually means a 380lb shell vrs about a 260lb shell for most 8in guns (US excepted)


I really liked vikingBerserker's idea.

"Not sure, but if 10 large boats could drop off 5k troops, that would be great."

it sure would be great. 500 troops per submarine?

See:Makin Island raid - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

and:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Argonaut_(SS-166)
 
I seconded Shortround 6 on 9.2 in guns.
IIRC one RN CA was temporary disabled off Dakar by one French 9.2 in hit. And if one looked the list of CAs sunk or badly damaged by 8 in hits, it is difficult to believe that 9.2 in hits could not sink a CA.

Even battleships were not invulnerable to 9.2 in fire. One should only look the effects of clearly smaller 8 in hits on Hood, Hiei and South Dakota. They didn't sunk those but inflicted significant damage.

Juha
 
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I tried to find if any of the guns could shot the run way itself, so I'm not sure. .

Well, here's what I found. In 1941 these were the guns of 4" and above:

8 x 9.2" fixed gun
2 x 9.2" howitzer
8 x 6" fixed gun
1 x 6" howitzer
15 x 4" fixed gun
5 x 4.5" howitzer

Pictured on the map below.

I don't know how much 9.2" HE ammo there would be, but the 6" 4" guns would certainly have plenty of both HE AP ammo.

Note - 3.7" AA, 25 pdr, 75mm, 6 pdr, Bofors 20mm AA not shown on map.


There were six 75mm guns sited overlooking the runway, + at least one of the twin 6 pdr mounts on the harbour walls had a clear view of the entire runway


The lower picture is Queen Anne's mount, just to the north of Princess Caroline's mount. I belive this position in 1941 was a 75mm gun a 4" gun (the northernmost 4" gun) In 1942 the 75mm gun was upgraded to a 17 pdr, to provide anti-tank defence in event of attack from the north.

Later this position was upgraded to 3 x 5.25" DP
 

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the port defence it's good for light ship not versus battleship, not because the 233 mm sheel don't make damage but because the BS firing out of range of this old guns. in caming on enemy fleet for save the rock need a fleet and for stay it that moment there are not in other place for time, months? idk how many fleet the RN can left in defence on the Rock in '40.
imho the invasion of gibraltar was do early after french fall (and with spain allied i think and iread somethong years ago the in june/julliet Franco was not so negativa as in october
 
the port defence it's good for light ship not versus battleship, not because the 233 mm sheel don't make damage but because the BS firing out of range of this old guns. in caming on enemy fleet for save the rock need a fleet and for stay it that moment there are not in other place for time, months? idk how many fleet the RN can left in defence on the Rock in '40.
imho the invasion of gibraltar was do early after french fall (and with spain allied i think and iread somethong years ago the in june/julliet Franco was not so negativa as in october

Hi Vincenzo


THe harbour defences are unlikely to damage the Battleships, but that was not their intention. They are intended to to break up the co-ordination of the landing forces and lighter ships operating operating inshore. And the allied experiences later in the war showed that it was the lighter ships that provided the most effective gunfire support. During the landings at Sicily, for example it was the Destroyers that prevented the Axis from succeeding at places like Gela. DDs would manouvre to very close to the shore and pump 5in shells into the attacking formations, providing heavy and direct gunfire support on demand. Battleships were good at attacking fixed defences, but not as efficient at attacking mobile targets.

Now, the Allied experiences demonstrated that it took weeks to suppress and destroy seward defences that were comparable to those at gib. The defences at Normandy, Sicily and southern France were nowhere near as formidable those at Gibraltar Dieppe Sevastopol Okinawa and the like. And the allies had radar assisted gunnery, which made their accuracy much higher. Moreover the forces employed in all these operations were specially trrained for shore bombardment work, having spent several years perfecting the techniques needed.

In order to get the defences reduced to a level that assault forces could approach the fortress, you are looking at weeks or months of continuous bombardment. The best analogy would probably be either Sevastopol or Odessa. Sevastopol took over three weeks of continuous bombardment, by the heaviest German artillery concentration of the war. Odessa took about 2 months to do the same job.

With say 3 battleships available, the italians are going to need several months of continuous bombardment to destroy the port defences of the port. In that time the RN will have -plenty of time to intervene.

To give some idea of what the Italians themselves thought, it is interesting to look at their plans for the invasion of Malta, the so called Operation "C-3" . They were planning to support several divfision (some italian, some German) for several weeks to subdue the island.

The trouble with an amphib operation is that once you are committed to the landing, you must stay there, or abandon you troops to their fate. Marine forces are totally dependant on the support fleet until they get a permanent foothold.....for places like Malta or Gibraltar, that means getting control and subduing all resistance permanently
 

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