German Gibraltar?

[parsifal]

imho for the italian armed forces more easy a amphibious operation (not in large scale as a invasion) that win the desert war, i think for all the armed forces are so

Hi Vincenzo

How is it easier for the italians to pull off an amphibious invasion than to conduct a land offensive? The allies found amphib operations to be the most difficult of operations to plan prepare and execute. The Italians did plan an amphib, for Corfu, Crete and Malta. All three were called off for various reasons.

I can assure you that planning and preparing for an amphibious operation is far from easy, far from quick, and it is questionable that the Italians possessed the expertise, the equipment, or even the will to undertake an operation such as that being discussed.

Some may use the Falklands as an example of an operation carried out in rapid time. Not quite true. It still took two months to prepare for, and whats more the studies that led to such rapid execution were planned and allowed for, in years of pre-operation planning. The RN had been preparing for this contingency for more than 10 years before it happened that I know of, possibly more. There were no such plans or preprations in the italian navy for Gib..... they would be starting from nothing basically

 

[Freebird]

Well let''s review the options. Using the assumption that the attack takes place in Jan/Feb 1941, and is a combined German/Italian operation. It's hard to see how it could have taken place earlier, as the Germans didn't start thinking about it until after Sealion failed -it would take at least 2 months to plan.

The options:

1.) Germany/Italy try an airborne/amphib operation with no French or Spanish help
2.) Spain allows the Axis to invade from Spanish territory
3.) The Axis have the assistance of the French, but Spain remains neutral



I will re-post the maps from last page

 

[Freebird]

I think the Axis attempting an attack without any nearby bases would be just pure suicide.
While the fortress was vulnerable to an attack from Spain, it would be near impregnable to an air/amphip assault, considering the British naval strength.

VB, you can't point to Eban Emal as an example, because it was mainly a huge oversight of the Belgians that allowed it to happen. That's like saying "Capturing bridges was easy in WWII" and then point to Remagen as an example. If the Belgians had even 2 or 3 machine gun crews on the roof it would have been a totally different matter. A vigorous defence in wartime is a world different from a surprise attack against an unsuspecting/ neutral power.

I think you have to look at the contemporary operations for examples.

1. US para drop on St Mere Eglise
2. German para drop on Crete
3. Canadian amphib assault on a defended port.

In every case that I can think of, paratroops dropping directly on an alert, defended target took very heavy casualties, and failed the objective.

1.) The US para's dropping on D Day took huge casualties, and it was only the forces that arrived OFF-SITE that were able to re-group and push the Germans out of the town.

The early landings, at about 0140 directly on the town, resulted in heavy casualties for the paratroopers. Some buildings in town were on fire that night, and they illuminated the sky, making easy targets of the descending men.

2. On Crete, the German troops landing directly on top of the airfield were massacred, it was only the paras that landed off site that were able to function, pushing the Allies off of the airfield

At 8:00 am on 20 May, German paratroopers landed near Maleme airfield and the town of Chania. The 21st, 22nd, and 23rd New Zealand Battalions defended Maleme airfield and its direct surrounding area. The Germans suffered heavy casualties within the first hours of the invasion. One company of the III Battalion, 1st Assault Regiment, lost 112 killed out of 126; 400 of the battalion's 600 men were killed before the end of the first day.

Of the initial forces, the majority were mauled by New Zealand forces defending the airfield and Greek forces near Chania. Many of the gliders following the paratroops were hit by mortar fire within seconds of landing. Those who did land were wiped out almost to a man by the New Zealand and Greek defenders.

3.) As for an amphib landing, consider the disaster suffered by the Axis on Crete, and a similar heavy defeat at Dieppe for the Canadians.

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The difference between Crete Gibraltar:

1.) Both had about 25,000 - 30,000 active defenders, but on Crete they were protecting a huge territory, at Gibraltar concentrated.
2.) After the retreat from Greece, the Allies had lost most of their heavy weapons, and all of their transport. On Gibraltar there was a huge arsenal of all kinds of guns, and a tunnel network (complete with trucks) to move troops around.
3.) On Crete they were very short of AA, having just a single battery of light AA for the whole island, while on Gibraltar there over 80 AA positions.
4.) On Crete the defenders of the airfield did not have the advantage of the elevated positions on Gibraltar.
5.) Most of Gibraltar is a very steep slope unsuited for para landings, otherwise the paras landing risk falling in the sea, or onto the runway
6.) Crete was assaulted with the help of over 1,000 Axis aircraft, yet Gibraltar is out of range except for very long-range bombers






Some more pics of Gibraltar:

A. From Spain, looking south across the runway
B. The Spanish town (La Linea) that borders Gibraltar
C. The East (Seaward side)
D. The view from O'Hara's mount ( 9.2" gun mount)
E. WWII AA mount

 

[syscom3]

Lets do a reality check here .... the Germans and Italians did not have any capability to have a forced amphib landing on a defensive nugget like Gibraltar. And I don't think the USN had that capability either even in 1945.

Want to know what will happen to infantry when it tries to do something like that against even moderately dug in field fortifications? Look at what happened to the IJA with General Kobayashi's brigade attack on the marine perimeter at Alligator Creek at Guadalcanal in Aug 1942. They were slaughtered. Slaughtered almost to the man.

Any invasion will have to be done on land from the Spanish side. And even then, there's going to a bloodbath with the attackers. Whats the normal assumptions of a forced landing on a beach ... something like the attacker needs a 3-1 ratio to have a possibility of success? Well I wouldn't be surprised to see the a ratio of 5 or 6 to one to be needed for Gibraltar.

And forget about having subs land men. I would think that rubber boats are not the epitome of protection. A couple of rifle caliber bullets would make it problematic for anyone to get ashore with eqmt and in the mood to have a fight.

And think of that .... a multi-divisional attack with little direct sea gunnery, no air support, no true amphib landing craft and it being performed by two countries who have no amphib experience against a modern well equipped army in heavily fortified positions.

 

[parsifal]

From those photos, there dont appear to be too many suitable landing areas either, for either airborne or marine troops. Its a tough nut to crack.......

 

[Vincenzo]

Not necessarily. The allies were reading a good deal of Axis signal traffic from April 1940, including the Italian Supermarina coded messages. The security of the italian high commands signals were notoriously bad from the very beginning of hostilities. So the likley outcome is that the Rock would be reinforced prior to any undertaking of an operation of this magnitude.

Moreover, it takes time to plan and prepare for an operation of this magnitude. The planning and preparation for Normandy, for example took over a year, Sicily was being planned and prerpred for for more than 3 months. Given that the Italians would be starting from a point very far behind, an operation of this kind would take more than 6 months to prepre for. The planning for Hercules (the invasion of Malta) was begun in 1941, and could not be undertaken until after July 1942, according to the Italian High Command. Even thenn they were not quite ready.

Given the lethargy the italian High Command displayed in all their other major operations, a realistic estimate to undertake an operation of this type might be March or April 1941. They could start planning in 1939, but then we are starting to leave the realm of possibility, and relying on fantasy and conjacture.

the plan can be prepared before of war in all the 30s, if we back in real word no german gibraltar and this is a useless discussion, no italian will to do. afaik the italian code was not knew from allied.

 

[parsifal]

QUOTE=Vincenzo;554217]the plan can be prepared before of war in all the 30s, if we back in real word no german gibraltar and this is a useless discussion, no italian will to do. afaik the italian code was not knew from allied.[/QUOTE]

Vincenzo

I detect from this post that you want to make three main points:

1) The italians could prepare their plans from pre-war.

This is true, but then if you accept this, then you must accept the various quid pro quos that go with an early italian Belligerency. For a start nearly all of the italian Batleships were not available. The Littorio classes were not ready until october, and all but two of the Cavour/Doria class were also unready for action until the latter part of 1940. And if the the Italians are making preparations for war, why would the allies not also make ready for war. As you will see in the following posts, your assumption that the italian naval codes were secure is a false premise, n fact the italian security had been breached as early as 1937. So, if the italians start to make their plans for an invasion of Gibraltar, from prewar, they are only going to spur the allies into even greater prewar preparations

2) We need to depart from history to allow the issue to be explored

I agree, but having partaken in many staff studies during my naval career, there is a difference between legitimate discussiuon/exploration of what might be possible, and sheer navel gazing to promote a biased national agenda.

During the preprations for the Occupation of Midway, the IJN wargamed the operation extensively, and were dismayed to find their navy was being sunk most of the time. So they changed the parameters, and the assumptions underpinning their operation, until they got the result they wanted (in the simulation). They managed to win the wargame, and then lost the battle. i believe they introduced unrelaistic assumptions into their simulation. I believe we are starting to do that here as well, to promote vested national agendas, and preconceptions. The discussion is not producing the result that is desired, so new parameters are introduced, each one more outlandish than the last, in order to try and achieve the result that is wanted. Maybe it might be time to concede the original supposition was at fault rather than trying endlessly to alter the sceanario parameters to try and make a dead horse gallop.......

3) The Italian signal traffic was secure

Sorry but you are definately, and fundamentally mistaken here. Italian naval codes were broken from 1937. This happened during the Civil war. There was a time when they were allowed to lapse, but from April 1940 the codes were broken once again. It is one of the reasons Italians losses at sea were so heavy.

Wiki has this to say regarding Italian Naval security:

"During the Spanish Civil War, Italy, was on the side of Francisco Franco's Nationalists. The Italian Navy used a version of Enigma that did not have a plugboard. In 1937 Dillwyn 'Dilly' Knox, a gifted British cryptanalyst veteran of World War I and the cryptanalytical activities of Room 40, managed to break this cipher, using a technique that he called 'buttoning up' to discover the rotor wirings and another that he called rodding to break messages. This relied heavily on cribs and on crossword expertise in Italian, as it yielded a limited number of spaced-out letters at a time.

When in 1940 Dilly Knox wanted to establish whether the Italian Navy were still using the same machine, he instructed his assistants to use rodding to see whether the crib PERX (per being Italian for 'for' and X being used to indicate a space between words) worked for the first part of the message. After three months there was no success, when Mavis Laver, a 19-year-old student, found that rodding produced PERS for the first four letters. She then (against orders) tried beyond this and obtained PERSONALE (Italian for 'personal'). This confirmed that the Italians were indeed using the same machines and procedures.

The subsequent breaking of Italian Naval Enigma ciphers led to substantial Allied successes. The cipher-breaking was disguised by sending a reconnaissance aircraft to the known location before attacking the warship, so that the Italians assumed that this was how they had been discovered. The British Royal Navy's victory at the Battle of Matapan (March 1941) was considerably helped by Ultra intelligence obtained from Italian Naval-Enigma signals."

The Italians were a notoriously leaky command, and this showed in the losses they sustained, particularly at sea. To be fair, the italians as the war progressed were also very successful in penetrating Allied security. They alone predicted the torcjh landings, whereas the Germans were caught napping.

 

[Vincenzo]

for the codes only the 0,76% (37800 msgs) of all RM signal traffic was cleared from the british, only the 10% of traffic was on C-38 machine. Many of trouble in war was that the british cleared the german code that give many info also on italian navy movement.

 

[Freebird]

I think most of us agree that the chances for a para/amphib operation without Spanish help looks very bleak at best.

Also that an operation from Spain is doable, a "Sevastopol" type operation.


Parsifal, what about the third option, if Germany Italy have access to French N Africa bases, but that Spain is strictly neutral?

1.) Germany/Italy try an airborne/amphib operation with no French or Spanish help
2.) Spain allows the Axis to invade from Spanish territory
3.) The Axis have the assistance of the French, but Spain remains neutral

Assuming that the Germans try the operation in Jan/Feb 1941, is there any chance of success?

Assume that they could break out with Bismarck, 2 x BC's 2 CA's to bring down to Gibraltar.
Could they force a landing somewhere on Gibraltar?

(Assumes that a powerful Luftwaffe based in Algeria has driven off the RN)

 

[parsifal]

I think most of us agree that the chances for a para/amphib operation without Spanish help looks very bleak at best.

Also that an operation from Spain is doable, a "Sevastopol" type operation.


Parsifal, what about the third option, if Germany Italy have access to French N Africa bases, but that Spain is strictly neutral?

1.) Germany/Italy try an airborne/amphib operation with no French or Spanish help
2.) Spain allows the Axis to invade from Spanish territory
3.) The Axis have the assistance of the French, but Spain remains neutral

Assuming that the Germans try the operation in Jan/Feb 1941, is there any chance of success?

Assume that they could break out with Bismarck, 2 x BC's 2 CA's to bring down to Gibraltar.
Could they force a landing somewhere on Gibraltar?

(Assumes that a powerful Luftwaffe based in Algeria has driven off the RN)

I think the French North African option has problems. Ive commented on this at length previously, but essentially the issue is this....the ability of the Axis to support troops in North Africa is limited. For an operation in North Africa, they could support perhaps another 4-6 Divs and maybe 200-300 aircraft, but would be resisted by more than 15 French Divisions, the entire re3sources of the French and British Fleets, plus the additional resources that the British could put into defence. I think it just hastens the demise of the Axis in North Africa.

There are also huge diplomatic implications with this approach. Because the Germans would be forced to euthenase a creation of their own making (namely the Vichy regime) only months afters its formation, it would demonstrate conclusively that the Axis could not be trusted. This, at a time when the US presidential elections are being run, and every neutral is considering whether the Germans could be trusted at all. This act of duplicity would show that they could not be trusted....

 

[syscom3]

.... it would demonstrate conclusively that the Axis could not be trusted. This, at a time when the US presidential elections are being run, and every neutral is considering whether the Germans could be trusted at all. This act of duplicity would show that they could not be trusted....

I think that it was a given by Oct 1939 that the Germans could not be trusted in any circumstance.

 

[parsifal]

for the codes only the 0,76% (37800 msgs) of all RM signal traffic was cleared from the british, only the 10% of traffic was on C-38 machine. Many of trouble in war was that the british cleared the german code that give many info also on italian navy movement.

So let me get this straight. You are attempting to claim, that despite the fact that the Italians were using, prewar, a commercial version of Enigma, known as enigma "D", which was even less secure than the version used by the japanese (prewar, Enigma "E"), that this version of the system had been cracked as early as 1932, and that close to 100% of signal traffic was being read by other countries using this system (eg Switzerland"), that by some miracle of divine fate, the British could only read less than 1% of Italian signal traffic.

Sorry, but without good proof to support that, your claim is just too fantastic to be given any semblance of credibility at all.

The Germans, incidentally were using a military grade of Enigma (Enigma "F") from the outbreak of the war, which was upgraded by the addition of additional rotors to the system. It was an inherently more secure version than that used by the Italians.

Lastly, like all cryptoanalysis, the amount of traffic varied greatly as codes were changed. It fluctuated on an almost daily basis, so giving precise numbers on the amount of traffic being read is almost meaningless, and highly suspect as a statistic to quote.

In any event its academic and irrelevant as a statisitc. Whatever the amount of traffic being read, or the source of that traffic, it was enough to give the Allies absolute surety as to Italian intentions plans and movements.

Whilst I am very sceptical about these percentages you are quoting, even if they are true, statistically that means that it would only take somewhere between 35 and 50 days for the allies to find out about the operation. And this does not take into account such variables as reconnaisance and espionage....how long do you suppose the italians could keep secret the fact they were building landing craft and the other engines of war needed to pull this off?????

If the Italians had planned an early move on Gibraltar, it would have been found out.

 

[parsifal]

I think that it was a given by Oct 1939 that the Germans could not be trusted in any circumstance.

As a general comment you are right, but what about countries like the USSR, and turkey. I think even Japan would think twice about trusting the Germans if they pulled a stunt like that

 

[Freebird]

I think the French North African option has problems. Ive commented on this at length previously, but essentially the issue is this....the ability of the Axis to support troops in North Africa is limited. For an operation in North Africa, they could support perhaps another 4-6 Divs and maybe 200-300 aircraft, but would be resisted by more than 15 French Divisions.

No, what I meant was if the French allowed Germany access, similar to the arrangement with the Japanese.

From the French point of view:

1. The British double-crossed a former ally by attacking the French fleet.
2. The Allies are slowly chewing off bits of the Vichy Empire, like Central Africa, Tahiti, New Caledonoa etc.
3. If they give the Axis access to Algeria, with the guarantee that they keep all French sovereign territory
4. The French have a similar arrangement in the Levant in spring 41, as the Germans are basing there.
5. The French realize that this might be opening hostilities with Britain, but since the attack on Dakar has failed, they are confidant that they can keep control of West Africa, Martinique, the Levant and perhaps Madagascar, everything else is already gone over to deGualle


If France did allow Germany to use French African territory, what else could the British do to retaliate, that they were not doing already?

 

[parsifal]

France agreeable to the entry of German troops to their territory tips the military balance completely in favour of the Axis. Gibraltar under those circumstances becomes all but untenabl.

However, as a scenario it was never going to happen. The whole raison detre of Vichy was to protect what was left of France and her empire from a German occupation. They adhered to that idea, despite some overtly unfriendly acts by the British. The British were able to get away with things like Dakar, invasion of Levant and Mers El Kebir because no matter what, the Vichy were even more distrustful of of the Germans than they were of the british.

If Laval and his cronies had made declarations to join the Axis or even allow Axis military access, they would have faced a revolt by the military governors in Vichy, particularly Darlan.

 

[syscom3]

BTW, how weer the axis fleets going to handle the RN sub threat? If the allied ASW capabilities at this time of the war were "poor" at best, the axis capabilities were even worse.

Any invasion force off of Gibraltar had better be ready for some big time, possibly crippling losses, even before the attack starts in earnest.

 

[Juha]

Hello Vincenzo
9.2 in BLs had a max range of 26200m, some on the Rock being some 400m above the SL got sone extra range because of that height difference.So the gun had fairly long reach.

Juha

 

[Freebird]

BTW, how weer the axis fleets going to handle the RN sub threat? If the allied ASW capabilities at this time of the war were "poor" at best, the axis capabilities were even worse.

Any invasion force off of Gibraltar had better be ready for some big time, possibly crippling losses, even before the attack starts in earnest.

That's some of the uestions that I was wondering,
Ok, suppose the Germans had been able to break out from the Baltic with their small fleet, ie 1 BB, 2 BC, 2 CA, and perhaps 4 or 5 DD, but no minor assets.

What minor asssets did the Italians have (DD, FF, TB) that could be used for ASW? Could they bring enough to Gibraltar?

France agreeable to the entry of German troops to their territory tips the military balance completely in favour of the Axis. Gibraltar under those circumstances becomes all but untenabl.

However, as a scenario it was never going to happen. The whole raison detre of Vichy was to protect what was left of France and her empire from a German occupation. They adhered to that idea, despite some overtly unfriendly acts by the British. The British were able to get away with things like Dakar, invasion of Levant and Mers El Kebir because no matter what, the Vichy were even more distrustful of of the Germans than they were of the british.

If Laval and his cronies had made declarations to join the Axis or even allow Axis military access, they would have faced a revolt by the military governors in Vichy, particularly Darlan.

I think I would disagree with that assesment somewhat, Darlan hated the British, so he wouldn't be that put out. Consider that the Vichy had this exact similar arrangement in Syria, allowing the Axis to use bases to support a Fascist revolt in Iraq.

From the Vichy point of view, the Allied cause is a no-win situation, as they will continue to lose colonies to the Free French, and should Britain win they will install DeGualle as leader of France, and probably put the Vichy leaders on trial. (Which is what actually happened.

On the other hand, they expect Germany to win (Britain's neck wrung like a Chicken,, remember?) so if Germany promisises to honour all French colonial posessions, and to return French Equatorial Africa to the Vichy (Lost to the Free French in 1940/1941), it might sound like a good deal, especially if they can extract some consessions from Berlin, ie a relaxing of some terms of the Armictice.



In any event Parsifal, humour me if you would, suppose that the Axis DID have French bases available, but Spain is strictly neutral. Does the invasion of Gibraltar become realisticly possible?

I still have some doubts, (as does Syscom) of the Axis ability to make an amphibious invasion, even if it's from only 50 - 100 miles away. Where would they land? Try to capture the harbour? land on the southern beaches?

Do we have anyone here with para training? The slope of the rock seems to be 30 - 40 deg, I would think that's too steep for a para landing, but I could be wrong.

 

[Shortround6]

Trying to co-ordinate a combined German-Italian attack might be difficult.

German ships coming from Brest at a best case, Italian ships coming from the east. there is no mutual support until they are in gun range of Gibraltar.

Staging out of French territories makes things both easier and harder. Easier in the actual attack but you have to get the attack forces to Oran and Algiers in the first place. Given the lack of axis shipping in the Med a greatly increased number of sailing to/from these ports would surely have been noticed along with increase air traffic. These may give the British warning and time to do something about the gathering forces.

Increased submarine patorls of the ports

Air strikes.

Bombardment missions by surface ships on the French Harbors.

reinforcements sent from Britian.

 

[Juha]

9.2 in Mk X on Mk VIII mounting from Spur Battery, Gibraltar. Nowadays in Duxford IIRC

Juha