German Gibraltar? (1 Viewer)

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Another online history had this to say on Group 2s assault of trondheim:

"TRONDHEIM

Against Trondheim sailed Gruppe 2 of the German invasion fleet commanded by Kpt.z.S. Hellmuth Heye. Gruppe 2 was to land 1,700 men of the elite Gebirgs-Regiment 138/3.Gebirgs-Division. The ships of Gruppe 2 were as follows:

Schwere Kreuzer Admiral Hipper 17209
Zerstorer Paul Jacobi (Z5) 17474
Zerstorer Theodor Riedel (Z6) 01923
Zerstorer Bruno Heinemann (Z8) 13029
Zerstorer Friedrich Eckoldt (Z16) 03772

Two U-boats were also allocated to the attack Trondheim.

The last of the five main Norwegian naval fortification was located on the approaches to Trondheim at Agdenes on the bank opposite the Agdenes lighthouse. Here was located one battery of 2 x 210mm guns, 3 x 150mm guns, and 2 x 65mm guns. A second battery of 2 x 210mm guns, 2 x 150mm guns, and 3 x 65mm guns was also on this bank. On the other bank, just inland of the lighthouse, was located 2 x 150mm guns. During the German attack, a blocking position was established near the second battery listed above, with 35 men manning nine tripod-mounted Colt-Browning machineguns, which successfully withstood five attacks by a 500-man German landing force. In addition to these fortifications, the Norwegian Navy also had in the Trondheim Fjord a number of small vessels including the minelayer FROYA.

Despite damage received at sea April 8th, HIPPER engaged the Norwegian gunners while the four destroyers boldly ran the batteries, speeding through at 25 knots (equivalent to a land speed of 28 mph) on a course calculated to minimize the time they spent under the guns. A shell from HIPPER severed the electric cable which powered the two Norwegian searchlights, and the slow rate of fire of the old Norwegian guns-- three salvos every two minutes-- also helped the plan succeed. One destroyer was hit in the effort. Although the Norwegian Navy forts at the entrance to the Fjord held out for eleven hours, Trondheim itself was captured with little difficulty. In the fighting the Norwegian fortress garrisons lost only one man killed and two wounded. German troops who attacked the blocking position (35 men and 9 mgs, see above, Section C) established by Capt. Lange outside the fort he commanded suffered 22 casualties. Minelayer FROYA was captured
".

Source:

The Invasion of Norway



I guess if you count knocking out the electricity supply for the searchlights, then Hippers effort counts as knocking out the battery.....most people would not say that however
 
Hello
on Norway, not very good comparison, Norwegians were in peacetime mood, being citizens of a neutral country which was attacked without warning by a country which had been in a war over ½ year. The shock of surprise attack among unprepared victims is usually great. And if one read the German and Norwegian descriptions on the first day of the invasion, they show that Norwegians many times gave in when Germans threatened to bomb nearby cities. After the initial shock had been overcome Norwegians fought better. On Gibraltar British knew that they were at war.

Germans made some amphibious landings, for ex on the Estonian islands Saarenmaa, Hiidenmaa and Muhu, I recall only the English name of the last, Moon, in 1941. In Autumn 43 they took Leros and Kos by paratroopers and amphibious landings. They also tried to take Suursaari/Hogland from Finns in Autumn 44, but even if most of coastal batteries had been dismantled for transportation to mainland and Finns knew that they were to give up the island to Soviets they smashed the German attempt with heavy German losses. Germans suffered from bad coordination and part of the heavy fire support unit, for ex Prinz Eugen didn't participate because of communication breakdowns.

German and Italian Navies had at least some A/S capacity. Germans didn't have ASDIC but had technically very good hydrophones. And RN subs suffered heavy losses in Med.

Juha
 
Your first source i have not been able to locate a copy of, but I will.

The second source you are misquoting. I happen to have a copy of this report, and relevantly it says on Page 33 that

"The landings at Trondheim encountered less initial resistance than the Germans
experienced at Narvik. The shore batteries guarding the harbor managed only one volley

before the German assault ships dashed by at high speed. The warships of the group
disembarked their infantry at the docks with no interference. The Germans secured the
city by nightfall
."

The whole thrust of this article was that the Germans achieved their goals because of the level of unpreparedness and devotes considerable space in the article to the threats posed by the coastal batteries. According to Richardson, the Germans specifically aimed to capture the batteries intact, so as to prevent British penetrations of the ports. So, if Hipper did destroy the batteries in the manner you suggest, they were acting contrary to the operational plan.

If Ash does say that (and I note as a source it is very old) he is making assertions that are contrary to every other source I have ever seen. Hippers consorts ducked past the harbour defences, whilst Hipper engaged them. Hipper did not knock them out, however. They eventually surrendered to German troops from the landing force. .

Once I get a copy of the book in question, I am sure the issue will be cleared up. I am expecting another example of misquoting at this stage.....

I am not misquoting. What I quoted was on page 77 of that report and my apologies for forgetting to list the page number. I had it written down just forgot to type the dam thing.
 
Thankyou for the page numbers. It still does not say the hipper knocked out the forts. It does confirm that the forts were eventually surrendered to ground formations. Also, whilst the article does say that the hipper assisted in silencing the forts, it does not say the hipper knocked the forts out of action, or that even the hipper silenced the forts. What actually happened was that the hipper assisted in silencing the forts. I admit, i am not quite sure what that means, so at best it is unclear.

What I do know is that as the afternoon wore on, the forts at Agdenes were being assaulted by more than 500 men of the landing force, and the that some of the men in the gunpits were forced to go and assist the detachment of 35 men that had already been sent to block the germans advancing toward the gunpits. I strongly suspect that the guns went silent because there simply were not enough men able to man the guns, and defend against the advancing German mountain troops.

In any event the guns were not destroyed, and in fact were being manned by the 100 strong coastal artillery detachment sent to man them in the initial assault force. I know this, the guns were fully operatuional and in Germanhands by the following morning. For me, this is conclusive proof that the Hiper did not knock those guns out.....

Relating back to the topic, if the hipper did not knock out these batteries, then ther is not really any analogy with a fortress like Gibraltar. Because the fortress at gib is such a large fort, and possessing such integrated and interlocking defences, it would not be possible to rely on lucky shots to immobilise the forts defences. There really is not any correlation here.....
 
It specifically states: "Naval fire silenced the batteries by 1700." If it was not by the Hipper then it had to be by the destroyers.

The correlation I was drawing or was attempting to draw was an amphibious invasion of fortified areas. IMHO regardless if the troops landed directly in front of the fort and took it, or landed to the side and outflanked it. It still was an amphibious operation that took out forts.
 
It specifically states: "Naval fire silenced the batteries by 1700." If it was not by the Hipper then it had to be by the destroyers.

The correlation I was drawing or was attempting to draw was an amphibious invasion of fortified areas. IMHO regardless if the troops landed directly in front of the fort and took it, or landed to the side and outflanked it. It still was an amphibious operation that took out forts.

The Hipper did not knock out any guns. They assisted in the silencing of the guns, but what was happening at the same time as the Hipper was engaging them was an that elements of the assault forces were engaging the Norwegian blocking forces. What isnt in Richardsons article is that by nightfall additional Nowegian troops, (gunners from the pits), had been detached to assist the blocking forces, operating as Infantry. The reason the coastal batteries fell silent was because there was no-one to man them, everybody had been detached to fight the attacking German Infantry force overnight. This makes perfect sense, since earlier the German had knocked out their searchlight electricity supply.

Proof that the hipper or any other ship did not knock these batteries out is that the very next day, immediately after their capture, these batteries were operational, this time under german control.

There is a difference incidentally, between knocking out a battery, and the guns being silenced. Admittedly Richardson infers that they were knocked out, but this is inconsistent with his own subsequent narrative, namely that the guns were returned to service very quickly after their capture. I know from other sources that the reason they fell silent that night was because the gunners were busy fighting the Gebirgjagers, not because the guns were inoperative from naval gunfire

I still dont think this qualifies as a German amphibious assault of a defended beach. The landing sites at Trondheim port are more than 30 miles away the forts at Agdenes. The Germans movewd as quickly as they could to engage the defenders of these guns, but that was many hours after the actual landings. This kind of approach could not be undertaken at Gibaraltar
 
Hello

German and Italian Navies had at least some A/S capacity. Germans didn't have ASDIC but had technically very good hydrophones. And RN subs suffered heavy losses in Med.

Juha

Enough A/S to cover an Axis fleet from sub attack?

A few quick comments. With regard to the Luftwaffe versus the RAF, even though the RAF would be heavily outnumbered, it would still be a Malta like situation, but without Me 109 escort (I think its too far for 109s to reach, unless spanish Morocco is occupied or has its airspace violated...remeber Spain is supposed to be neutral in this scenario)

Just a note: Axis have access to French territory, but no French military participation, perhaps some merchant shipping in the central med only

Oran is 270 miles from Gibraltar, and Casablanca 200 miles, but the French territory west of Oran would be about 180 miles, while bases north of Casablanca could be about 125 miles away, so if the Germans were to improve some local airfields Me109's could be operational. (Distances measured over water only)

The problem is not so much the availability of heavy units, so much as the availability of sufficient merchant shipping to support the operation.

This would be an operation around half the size of Overlord, and would therefore require the attentions of about 3.5 million tons of shipping for the duration of the operation. The ground troops could be kept at their home stations for a while, but the Luftwaffe (and its supporting elements) will need logistic support. Very roughly, each 200 aircraft consumes approximately the same amount as a motorized Infantry Division. Thats about 1500 tons per day. If there are 1500 aircraft deployed forward, there are also the logistic support units to consider. Using the Axis expereince in Cyrenaica, every ton of supplied delivered to the front from Tripoli also required the consumption of a further ton of supplies in the rear area support elements....the transport companies, the flak formations, the policemen, the gardeners, and the like.

That means that the 1500 strong air striking force would require 25000 tons per day, just to remain supplied, thats approximately 150000 tons per week. The average displacement of the italiahn merchant fleet was under 3000 tons per hull, which roughly means that each ship can carry about 1000 tons of cargo (this is much smaller than the US and British fleets). This means that the ports of Oran and Algiers (and in a pinch, Tunis) would between them need to be able to handle at least 150 unloadings per week. I seriously doubt this is even possible to be honest. In terms of the merchant fleet, the minimum requirements, in deadweight tons, in order to maintain a continuous flow of supplies has to be placed at atleast 1000000 tons. The Italians only had 2 million tons available to them, and this was hard pressed to keep the units in Libya supplied. So where is the extra shipping going to be drawn from if the french are not co-operating????? And please note, we have not even put a single soldier into a transport, or buiult a single landing craft as yet

Logistically, the operation cannot be done without the French (or someone) providing a massive injection of shipping to the operation. There would need to be massive investments into the capacities of the ports undertaken, as the allies did in 1942. I just see the whole thing as completely impractical, given the constraints the Axis would be operating under. And we have not even started to look at the operational difficulties the two axis navies would be labouring under in this scenario.....


What about using Tunis nearby ports for shipping? It would be about 1/3 or 1/2 the distance Naples - Tunis instead of using Tripoli, and then the Axis units could be supplied by rail through Algeria -> Casablanca. (The railway would need improvements obviously)

Also, could they not use a smaller Axis air group if they had some KM/RM fleet support?

Say only 500 aircraft, not 1500. Perhaps 200 fighters, 100 DB and 200 Ju88/He111?

If the Axis had Bismarck 1 or 2 italian BB's, how well could they blast the Gibraltar guns?

Does anyone know how thick the turrets are for the 9.2" guns?

Has anyone been to see that one in ... Duxford was it?
 
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Enough A/S to cover an Axis fleet from sub attack?

Just a note: Axis have access to French territory, but no French military participation, perhaps some merchant shipping in the central med only

Oran is 270 miles from Gibraltar, and Casablanca 200 miles, but the French territory west of Oran would be about 180 miles, while bases north of Casablanca could be about 125 miles away, so if the Germans were to improve some local airfields Me109's could be operational. (Distances measured over water only)

What about using Tunis nearby ports for shipping? It would be about 1/3 or 1/2 the distance Naples - Tunis instead of using Tripoli, and then the Axis units could be supplied by rail through Algeria -> Casablanca. (The railway would need improvements obviously)

Also, could they not use a smaller Axis air group if they had some KM/RM fleet support?

Say only 500 aircraft, not 1500. Perhaps 200 fighters, 100 DB and 200 Ju88/He111?

If the Axis had Bismarck 1 or 2 italian BB's, how well could they blast the Gibraltar guns?

Does anyone know how thick the turrets are for the 9.2" guns?

Has anyone been to see that one in ... Duxford was it?



If the french provide merchant shipping, it will need escort. If they are provided with escort, it is either Axis or French. In any event, that simple statement escalates French collaboration way beyond anything they were prepared to do historically, and the reason for that was mostly because of the war aims of the Vichy government.....basically the surival of the french state, and to minimise antagonising the US in particular. They certainly did not want to align closer with the Germans, except for one or two utter sycophants. Even Darlan was more pro-allied in his predisposition than this situation assumes.

Tunis would be fine as a port, and would be far safer as a port of entry, but it is a long way from the front. Unless the rail line is more substantial than I think it was, basically every gallon of fuel or stores brought forward from that point will need another gallon or ton expended in transport and rear area support (guarding bridges, rear area AA and the like). The British are not going to leave this long supply line alone. If there are no ships to attack, they will attack the motor convoys (as they did in the western desert). In that theatre, from the very beginning, the Axis were forced to expend huge quantities of resources in these rear areas, and these in turn suck up vast amounts of supply.

The rail line is an obvious option, but my world railways atlas indicates that at that time, ther were only 123 carriages in the whole of French North Africa and 26 trains. Not nearly enogh, and an asset highly vulnerable to sabotage. The British Special Forces and French resistance would have had a field day against this link. It would have required huge investments to protect, upgrade, and maintain

As far as a smaller air component , I dont think that this is possible, because of the multiple tasks it has to undertake. The Air component needs to suppress the british fleet, protect against subs, provide recon and search/SAR services, suppress the airfield as well as reduce the harbour defences. This is several additional task over and above those undertaken by FliegerKorps X and other assets in the central basin. There, it required over 400 aircraft two months to suppress the harbour, and airfield. There was no attempt to destroys the coastal batteries....these were to be captured by the airborne forces, and then the Italians were to land the main force, in the final version of the herkules plan. Meanwhile more than 600 other Axis aircraft were intended to maintain the blockade, which were shown incapable of doing.

In this Gibraltar scenario, the airfields are further away (c200 miles, compared to 60 over malta). The SE assets in particular are going to be hard pressed to reach that far and maintain a constant air patrol.....Whereas about 150 Me 109s were found necessary to keep Malta suppressed, this extra range over Gib is going to demand a force two or three times that number. Unless the German Bombers are prepared to accept massive losses, they need a lot of escort with very long legs. Typically, if I were the british commander, I would time my re-supply convoys to arive just before dawn, which means that the air assets will need to travel a further 200 miles so as to attack in daylight. Do Me 109s have an effective range of 400 miles???? And assuming I have two or three carriers, I would use my Albacores, Fulmars and Swordfish to undertake hit and run attacks against the German airfields at night (which they were trained and experienced at....the only force in the world at that time capable of hitting pinpoint targets at night, as demonstrated by their strikes against Bismarck), That means to allow for the run in, the strike time and the retirement, they would typically be 300 miles from the target in daylight hours, and given the time needed to locate them and organize a strike, this figure is more like a 400 mile buffer....

I am not saying the Luftwaffe could not achieve a blockade, but it would be costly and difficult, and would require a lot of aircraft. I dont think 500 would be enough to be honest. And from the British perspective, neither the RM or the KM were ever much of a threat. Even when heavily outnumbered, against the Italians, there was never much fight in the Italians.

I doubt the Axis Battleships could get that close. British carriers and submarines, and minefileds would tend to sink them very effectively until the air blockade was well and truly biting
 
The batteries which were installed at Gibralter where but one part of the defence. The entire Rock of Gibralter is riddled with tunnels which were dug during the Napoleonic Wars with numerous portals for firing down at anything apporaching the island. Anything that landed would be shot to bits.
The batteries themselves are a formidable defence. The 9.2 in gun may be old but carried a significant punch and being mounted so high gave them two additional advantages:-
a) There range was increased significantly
b) Any hit would be plunging fire coming down almost vertically
Any Heavy Cruiser would be at significant risk of sinking as the armour would not be sufficient to protect it.

Re the ability of air support to subdue the batteries and other defensive fire. I doubt that the Germans would have sufficient firepower. Think of the massive firepower that the USN used to pour into the islands in the Pacific and the limited effect that it had.
Iwo Jima would be a walk in the park compared to Gibraltar, I say this for a number of reasons

a) Gibraltar had more heavy and light guns for the defense
b) There is more ammunition and larger infrastructure built into the rock than IwoJima including its own powerstations, remember the defences had been planned for centuries and continually updated
c) Gibraltar is a lot smaller, rifle fire would cover nearly all the possible usable ground leaving the Germans nowhere to form up or rest. The airfield would be one big killing ground
d) The fiepower available to the attackers is very limited, I do not see it subduing the defences
e) The RN would be sure to wade into the defence, submarines alone would suffice to but the attacking ships as significant risk
 
The 9.2 inch was a retired piece of Naval ordinance, that had both good and bad aspects. The mounts had a maximum elevation of 35 degrees, but could fire 5/10 crh shells which gave it a range of 32,600 yds. However in the elevated gun platforms at gibraltar, this was extended to a range in excess of 39000 yds. Muzzle velocity was 2,900 fps (884 mps) using a 144 lbs. (65.3 kg) charge. These projectiles were required to be able to penetrate 8.75 in (22.2 cm) of Krupp cemented (face hardened) armor at 7,650 yards (7,000 m). . With the supecharges carried as standard the muzzle velocity of these guns was exceptionally high, at over 2900 f/s. Rate of fire was a theoretical 2 rounds per minute. '

A cavour class battlecruiser had deck armour of 80mm over the machinery spaces, and 100mm over the magazines. They had a maximum armour thickness of 280mm on the turret faces. The maximum theoretical range of their 12.6 in guns were 31000 yds, but in relaity the limits of their optical rangefinders meant they could only engage out to 24000 yds. The ROF for the Italian guns was 2 rounds per minute as well
At 15-240000 yds (the likley engagement range) these ships would have been just targets for the heavy batteries on the rock.
 
Hello
I have seen the 9.2 in gun, years ago and IIRC it was at Duxford
Another photo, it isn't a proper turret the back is open.
 

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Gibraltar has always been a facination of mine.

As for Operation Felix, with Spanish complicity, holding Gibraltar was hopeless. In the west, if the Kreigsmarine had been able to station U-boat S-boat flotillas in Spanish ports, as they had done in France, they could have effectively neutralized the Royal Navy's otherwise overwhelming superiority. Additionally, while the airfiield at Gibraltar was under the protection of gun emplacements in the rock, if the Spanish cooperated with the attack, it could easily have been made untennable. In the east, the Italian Navy was certainly capable of keeping the RN's Mediteranian fleet bottled up east of Malta, the real question would have been how strongly they stuck to their guns against the Brits. With the Britain's naval forces kept at bay unable to resupply the garrison, and air supremacy probably in the hands of the Luftwaffe - again operating from Spanish bases - Gibraltar could not have been held. The cost to the German army would have been very high, and it would have degenerated into a battle of atrition, but they would eventually have been able to reduce the garison and take the penninsula.

Without Spanish help, I don't see that there would have been a way for the KM the Luftwaffe to secure the necessary preconditions for an assault launched from Italy, which would be the only viable staging area.
 
How would the Italian Navy "certainly keep the Med fleet bottled up". The British time and again demonstrated they had nothing to fear from the italians, even when hopelessly outnumbered. What is your source, or even historic trends to support your claim.

As for U-Boats containing the British on the western side of the rock, the Japanese experiences around Pearl in 1941 witrh their submarine fleet, demonstrates very clearly the inability of submarines to maintain a close blockade of the time you are suggesting. The axis tried to isloate Malta using S-Boats and subs, and could not hold the blockade. Subs are a weapon of strategic capability, but in tactical operations, they are pretty well useless

If the Germans were given air bases in Spain, the equation becomes more difficult, admittedly. however, i am inclined to agree with Franco's assessment......if the Germans were allowed into the Iberian peninsula, the british would react, most likley by occupying Spanish Morocco and the Canary islands. With Spanish Morocco in their hands, the British can fly single engined fighter cover over their miliatry convoys into and out of the Rock. The Germans are reduced to the same problem they have over England....how to to defeat the British fighters. They cant, as history shows.....unless they are willing to absorb enormous loses to their air force
 
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I wouldn't exactly say they had nothing to fear from the Italians. At night, that's true. But the real reason for Italian failure was their phobia of losing ships. They were not prepared to risk more than a few ships with only worsened the situation: they were destroyed by relatively small British detachments. In fact they played right in the cards of the British who were hopelessly overstretched, also in the Mediterranean, They forfeited the initiative and the British took full advantage.

One could even say that the Italians had nothing to fear from the British Royal Navy. They just had to dictate the place and time of the battle. That way they could have provided their ships with air cover and they could have won any daytime encounter.

A good example of that is in fact Malta. Staying clear of the larger coastal guns they could have steamed towards the islands and cut them off. The British would have had to engage them under unfavourable conditions.

Kris

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/italian-navy-outset-wwii-how-good-7774.html
http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/9226/ww2.html
 
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I cannot think of a single occasion that the italians came anywhere near to challenging the british supremacy with their main fleet. The British were always going to dictate terms for battle whilst they possessed a night capable carrier force, and the italians were relying on an unsympathetic air arm. On those occasion that the Italians were handed the opportunity to do something effective, they muffed it in a big way. As an example, at Cape Spada, the two Italian cruisers took on one Australian cruiser, and a few destroyers, and lost. At Spartivento, the Italains outnumbered the British in every category, in daylight, and lost because they refused to charge a smokescreen...

Whilst Taranto demonstrated what the British advantage was at night.....most of the italian battlefleet disabled for months, one never to return to service, at the hands of just 18 aircraft, Matapan (or more corectly the lead up to it) demonstrated the advantage the British enjoyed by day. Able to locate the Italians whailst the italians remained blind, the British were able to choose their time and place for attack at their own choosing.

Whilst ever the Italians lacked an effective fleet air arm (and by 1940 there was virtually no chance of that happening anytime soon), the British were never going to be caught in the trap you suggest, and consequently the conditions you describe were never going to be relaized. moreover, the Germans would not be able to deploy their single aeronavla unit at the time (Flieger Korps X) into the central basin because they would be needed in the western med. if the war taught one leson, it was that inproperly trained aircrew are next to useless in attacking ships. There are special skill required, which cannot nbe picked up as they go.

It is also untrue that the british were heavily outnumbered. The Italian and German fleets combined were not even half as strong as the Royal Navy. Neither italy or germany had even the slightest chance of putting to sea in fleets more powerful than the British....and thats even with the affects of raiders to contend with
 
Capo Spada 2 light cruiser ((in)famous for the light armour), acting as fast trasport, versus 1 light cruiser (sure best armoured) and 5 DD imho there is a british superiority

Capo Teulada 2 BB (1 new and 1 old), 6 CA, 14 DD, versus 2 BB (both old but both with 15'), 1 CA, 4 heavy CL, 1 old CL, 14 DD, 1 AA cruiser, 4 corvettes and the Ark Royal imho also here there is a british superiority

(anti ship guns: 9-15', 10-12.6', 48-8', 12-6', 68-4.7 versus 14-15', 8-8', 68-6', 60-4.7', 36-4.5')
 
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Twice at large in the Mediterranean ??

And I think the Italians often had the chance of having a decisive victory. But like I said before, they were too prudent!

The first clash between the two navies was at Point Stilo two squadrons escorting the respective convoys, Italian ships (under the command of Admiral Campioni) were Cesare, Cavour, 14 cruisers and numerous destroyers, British units were battleships Warspite, Malaya, and Royal Sovereign, aircraft carrier Eagle, five light cruisers, and 14 destroyers, commander was Admiral Cunningham.
The result of this match was that only Giulio Cesare was lightly damaged, but it demonstrated the inferiority of the Italian since they were in a more favorable position and they lost a good chance to beat the British more significantly. The battle was near the coasts of Italy and if the cooperation with the Air Force had work properly, Point Stilo would have been a great victory. In addition Veneto and Littorio were almost ready for combat, and his commander, Admiral Bergamini, asked the permission to join the battle, but it was denied by Supermarina.


Italian optical rangefinding equipment was also superior to that of the British.
Kris
 
Twice at large in the Mediterranean ??

And I think the Italians often had the chance of having a decisive victory. But like I said before, they were too prudent!

The first clash between the two navies was at Point Stilo two squadrons escorting the respective convoys, Italian ships (under the command of Admiral Campioni) were Cesare, Cavour, 14 cruisers and numerous destroyers, British units were battleships Warspite, Malaya, and Royal Sovereign, aircraft carrier Eagle, five light cruisers, and 14 destroyers, commander was Admiral Cunningham.
The result of this match was that only Giulio Cesare was lightly damaged, but it demonstrated the inferiority of the Italian since they were in a more favorable position and they lost a good chance to beat the British more significantly. The battle was near the coasts of Italy and if the cooperation with the Air Force had work properly, Point Stilo would have been a great victory. In addition Veneto and Littorio were almost ready for combat, and his commander, Admiral Bergamini, asked the permission to join the battle, but it was denied by Supermarina.


Italian optical rangefinding equipment was also superior to that of the British.
Kris
I agree with a lot of this apart from the last sentence. Italian fire control generally was quite poor
 
To take up the discussion -- it's hard for me to see conditions where the Germans might get their few heavy surface vessels to the arena of combat. Even without knowing their destination, increased radio traffic would indicate something was up, and recon based in Blighty would likely pick up the ships as they sortied, much like they did the Bismarck sortie in 1941.

The same would hold true for the Italians, although they'd have a much shorter and presumably easier run-in to the Rock.

In short, surprise is not going to be in the cards; whether discovered by sigint or by physical recon the preparations stand a good chance of discovery, and the Germans especially will have to sail past or around the Home Fleet. Also, with the Italians simultaneously showing signs of preparation for a big offensive, a locus of ops in the western or central Med becomes clearer -- and from there, guessing the Rock as the objective is made easier.

Additionally, it'd be pretty hard for the Axis fleets to both provide gunfire support and fight off the inevitable British naval attacks at the same time, especially given the nature of Gibraltar's defenses, dug into stone and with some heavy weaponry of its own. If you shield the invading force from the RN, you will need to sacrifice at least some naval-gunfire support, and I doubt air-support could pick up the slack.

It really boils down to whether the objective is worth the cost, and I don't think the Germans or Italians would find the potential costs acceptable for the benefits, without an overland arm bringing Spain in, which wasn't going to happen. Franco was canny and stalled Hitler out to his wit's end in the 1940 summit they had.

My two-cents' worth, and worth every penny you've paid for it.
 
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