Has anyone got any evidence to support the often repeated contention that it was Goering that ordered the Bf 109s of the various Jagdgeschwader on the Channel front to fly close escort for the bombers during what we Brits call the BoB?
I can find evidence that he was concerned about mounting bomber losses and wanted the bombers preserved for what he and everyone else fondly imagined would be post BoB operations, but not that he ever ordered the single seat fighters to fly close escort. Even in the infamous 'give me Spitfires for my wing' conference with Galland et alter the decision as to how escort would be performed was left to the various Kommodoren.
Galland, ideally, liked to use three fighter Gruppen to escort each bomber Gruppe, one flying a 'freijagd' ahead, one as top cover and only one unlucky Gruppe flying close to the bombers. Goering never stopped him or anyone else from doing so as far as I can tell. These tactics would be familiar to Allied commanders a few years later. It was a fact not lost on the Germans that if all the escorts flew close escort, then the Spitfires and Hurricanes invariably reached the bombers which was precisely they were trying to prevent. It also meant that more fighter pilots and fewer bomber crews were lost, something that caused tension within the Luftwaffe. Goering was not the only one that felt that many of his sore throated experten were more concerned with their scores than with preventing Dorniers being shot down into the Channel.
If anyone has some firm evidence to the contrary I'd be interested. I feel the Goering/close escort issue might be just another of the many myths emanating from this period.
Cheers
Steve
I can find evidence that he was concerned about mounting bomber losses and wanted the bombers preserved for what he and everyone else fondly imagined would be post BoB operations, but not that he ever ordered the single seat fighters to fly close escort. Even in the infamous 'give me Spitfires for my wing' conference with Galland et alter the decision as to how escort would be performed was left to the various Kommodoren.
Galland, ideally, liked to use three fighter Gruppen to escort each bomber Gruppe, one flying a 'freijagd' ahead, one as top cover and only one unlucky Gruppe flying close to the bombers. Goering never stopped him or anyone else from doing so as far as I can tell. These tactics would be familiar to Allied commanders a few years later. It was a fact not lost on the Germans that if all the escorts flew close escort, then the Spitfires and Hurricanes invariably reached the bombers which was precisely they were trying to prevent. It also meant that more fighter pilots and fewer bomber crews were lost, something that caused tension within the Luftwaffe. Goering was not the only one that felt that many of his sore throated experten were more concerned with their scores than with preventing Dorniers being shot down into the Channel.
If anyone has some firm evidence to the contrary I'd be interested. I feel the Goering/close escort issue might be just another of the many myths emanating from this period.
Cheers
Steve