Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
I`ve certainly never seen any.
SOURCE: US Air Force Historical Research Agency Microfilm. Reel A1128, Frame 269 of:
Last edited:
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Thunderbolts all the way to Berlin in June of 1943? Man I'd have to see some hard data/source material for that first.
Archive source + quotations and ORIGINAL data please: >
In minute 4.06 of this video the document showing Happ Arnold banning drop tanks is reproduced
Now you have to ask if they were obsessive enough to actually proactively ban drop tanks perhaps they were lackadaisical, indifferent and suppressive about developing wing tanks and enlarged fuselage tanks for the P47. With these men in charge of fighter development is it any surprise that their belief that fighters couldn't intercept bombers became a self fulfilling prophecy eg P39,P40 being the main USAAF types posted of inadequate altitude performance. Moreover despite seeing the fate of theLuftwaffe over Britain and being given advice from the RAF they didn't take that advice.
Thunderbolts all the way to Berlin in June of 1943? Man I'd have to see some hard data/source material for that first.
Well down FUBAR. I have a request in to AFHRA even as I type this, Korean War air combat related. Where did you get your data??
Those pics dont look like 1943 P-47s, it only started to be introduced in late 1942, any thing new takes 3 months from factory in USA to flying in UK, if they all make it the Battle of the Atlantic was still going on in 1943. As others have suggested, a long range tank helps get you there, it is internal fuel gets you back after combat, that big ole engine had a thirst on her.In minute 4.06 of this video the document showing Happ Arnold banning drop tanks is reproduced
Now you have to ask if they were obsessive enough to actually proactively ban drop tanks perhaps they were lackadaisical, indifferent and suppressive about developing wing tanks and enlarged fuselage tanks for the P47. With these men in charge of fighter development is it any surprise that their belief that fighters couldn't intercept bombers became a self fulfilling prophecy eg P39,P40 being the main USAAF types posted of inadequate altitude performance. Moreover despite seeing the fate of theLuftwaffe over Britain and being given advice from the RAF they didn't take that advice.
It wasnt just the bomber mafia ideology that was the problem it was the "panacea target" ideology too. The idea that one raid could end or massively shorten the war led people to think huge losses would be justified. The RAF battle of Berlin, dambusters raid and Schweinfurt were all examples of it.
I think the Thunderbolts to Berlin in 1943 may be backwards projection.
I remember reading about the Schweinfurt raid and "ball bearing theory". The theory was wiping out Schweinfurt and destroying ball bearing production would cripple Germany. In fact it wouldn't, there were of course stocks of ball bearings all over, some other made ball bearings and re starting would start immediately. As was proved by many sides, if people want to continue fighting they will and Germany had no real means to give up. The idea that someone would say to Adolf "we have no ball bearings" and Adolf says "hand out white flags then" takes no account of him being a madman. Same with the dambusters raid, if they had breached all the dams it may have justified the losses, but they had no hope of breaching the Sorpe dam, which was by far the biggest.That was an example of prewar theory running up against real-world testing. It turned out that one raid was not enough knock out a target; rather, it had to be hit, repeatedly, to keep it out of action. Everyone pretty much underestimated the degree to which industrial facilities could be brought back into operation by a large, industrialized nation-state. And to keep hitting targets in that fashion required a larger bomber force than most anticipated. The Allies were also led astray by bomb damage assessment — recon photos from 30,000 feet looked impressive, showing a bomb-scarred landscape. Only at ground level, the damage was frequently far less than such high-altitude photos implied.
Nevertheless, the Oil and Transportation Plans proved highly detrimental to the Germany war economy — its armaments production index peaked in July 1944 and fell off rapidly after that. Bomber Command's effort against the Ruhr in 1943 also had a big impact, effectively flat-lining German production for about seven months. (Adam Tooze covers this in his book The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy.)
Moreover, there were critical target types not attacked, e.g. the German electrical supply. A sustained campaign against that could have had a huge impact. But for various reasons it was left off the target lists.
I think he was talking about their vulnerability to ground-fire, not for bombing cities.Honestly, what are you talking about. You are trying to hijack this thread with your politics the same way you did with Barbarossa?
A dive bomber is a precision weapon that can usually hit within 20ft hence its use by the RN, USN and IJN against ships.
It's of little use in killing civilians are causing broad damage to a factory because while its precision is good its lift is not high.
I remember reading about the Schweinfurt raid and "ball bearing theory". The theory was wiping out Schweinfurt and destroying ball bearing production would cripple Germany. In fact it wouldn't, there were of course stocks of ball bearings all over, some other made ball bearings and re starting would start immediately.
Same with the dambusters raid, if they had breached all the dams it may have justified the losses, but they had no hope of breaching the Sorpe dam, which was by far the biggest.
I think he was talking about their vulnerability to ground-fire, not for bombing cities.
I am talking about using twin engine bombers in general and "developing twin engine dive bombers" in particular. The early RAF twin engine bombers suffered massive losses in daylight raids, some squadrons were wiped out in a day without dive bombing. German losses up to the fall of France in twin engine bombers were actually unsustainable but it was only a campaign lasting 5-6 weeks. Dive bombers cannot be escorted, you can escort them until they start the dive and when they have re formed after a dive but not in between. The Ju 87 was quickly removed from the battle of Britain because it was very vulnerable, you cannot make an argument for a twin engine aircraft ding the same thing being less vulnerable, it is much bigger and it is massively more expensive in men and material. The last month of the BoB was mainly Bf-109s dropping bombs from high altitude, the twins had been withdrawn and they hadn't even tried dive bombing. How were most German ships attacked from the air? Tirpitz was sunk by Lancasters, Bismarck was hit by a torpedo most others were hit in port by level bombing. The B-26 was a twin engined bomber fast, reasonable defensive armament, on a raid against a power station at IJmuiden in Netherlands all 11 unescorted B-26s were lost to AA and Fw-190s. Last pot a dive bomber is only a precision bomber when it can see the target, frequently they couldnt because of smoke haze or cloud but during a raid only the first few can see the target, once the first bombs drop the dust and smoke obscure the target for anyone coming in later.Honestly, what are you talking about. You are trying to hijack this thread with your politics the same way you did with Barbarossa?
A dive bomber is a precision weapon that can usually hit within 20ft hence its use by the RN, USN and IJN against ships.
.
Would British dive bombers of any type, fared any better in attacking the Bridges over the Meuse given the same concentration of German AA guns, German fighters and the lack of proper and timely escort by British fighters?
I remember reading about the Schweinfurt raid and "ball bearing theory". The theory was wiping out Schweinfurt and destroying ball bearing production would cripple Germany. In fact it wouldn't, there were of course stocks of ball bearings all over, some other made ball bearings and re starting would start immediately. As was proved by many sides, if people want to continue fighting they will and Germany had no real means to give up. The idea that someone would say to Adolf "we have no ball bearings" and Adolf says "hand out white flags then" takes no account of him being a madman. Same with the dambusters raid, if they had breached all the dams it may have justified the losses, but they had no hope of breaching the Sorpe dam, which was by far the biggest.
Well, Ju 87s didn't fare too well over Britain during that battle. I wouldn't expect RAF dive bombers to fare much better in similar circumstances.
The Ju 87s losses in the BoB are a kind of received wisdom but I know little of what actually happened first hand. It appears they lost 20 Ju 87 (whose numbers?) in attacks on 3 radar stations. The usual story is they were lost when the Ju 87 were stripped of their escorts after they entered their dives.