Greatest aviation related Blunders of WWII

[michaelmaltby]

From "B of B Turnaround Time" thread, h/t DaveBender:

"... Sortie Rate


Per "The Blitzkrieg Myth" by John Mosier.
During the invasion of France Luftwaffe aircraft averaged 3 sorties per day. RAF aircraft averaged 2. French aircraft averaged 1.

I have no other source for these sortie rates so I cannot confirm them..."

Speaks volumes ..

MM

 

[JAG88]

Not only the RAF but also the Army which the French claim retreated opening their flank to German assault.

I thought they were more pissed off by, you know, getting shot in the back in their naval bases...

They also seemed to have remembered that in WWI the French Army commander had to go stop the commander of the BEF since he was already heading back for England after the first engagements with the German Army. What was the phrase? "Monsieur le Marechal, the honour of England is at stake!"

Plus, there was the sentiment that England had been systematically undermining French policy regarding Germany.

In any case, put the entire RAF in France and the Luftwaffe would have simply destroyed it, no radar means no GCI, no channel means you will be overrun in short order anyways. The RAF didnt fare well in France either.

 

[Tankworks]

Don't know if this was mentioned before but I look to the obstruction of Harris to allowing diversion of some of the long range heavies to patrol for U-boats. Britain was being starved and the losses incurred in one night-bombing raid would have provided enough aircraft to make a real difference in the U-boat war. Instead the RAF had to wait for Liberators to become avialable, a delay which cost dearly in men and materiel.

 

[GregP]

One of the greatest blunders was put into action by the War Materiel Board in the U.S.A.

They elected tor emove the turbocharger from both the P039 and P-40, relegating them to medium altitudes for their lifetimes, and removing the Allison's high-altiitude abilities except in teh P-38 Lightning. Had they left the turbos in those two fighters, we well might have seena different history of same.

 

[wuzak]

One of the greatest blunders was put into action by the War Materiel Board in the U.S.A.

They elected tor emove the turbocharger from both the P039 and P-40, relegating them to medium altitudes for their lifetimes, and removing the Allison's high-altiitude abilities except in teh P-38 Lightning. Had they left the turbos in those two fighters, we well might have seena different history of same.

The P-40 never had a turbocharger to begin with.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

I thought they were more pissed off by, you know, getting shot in the back in their naval bases...

They had, in fact, been issued with an ultimatum, to disable, or position, their ships, so that the Germans couldn't use them. Some ships were sailed off to be interred, while those that didn't, due to their senior officers' intransigence, were hit. Gentlemanly behaviour rarely survives, in war.

 

[stona]

Not targeting the German power generating plants. There was only a handful that generated most of the power for Germany. Knocking these out would have brought Germany industry to an abrupt stop.

Operation Chastise ?

 

[stona]

The V-2 program took a lot of money and resources for not a lot of results. How many guided and unguided anti-aircraft missiles could have been procured using the same effort? And what effect could they have had on the Alied bombing efforts?

One of the unexpected bonuses of the RAF's Peenemunde raid was the death of Dr Thiel,the propulsion specialist also responsible for the Wasserfall anti aircraft rocket system. His killing caused delays and the system never made it into production.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

One of the greatest blunders was put into action by the War Materiel Board in the U.S.A.

They elected tor emove the turbocharger from both the P039 and P-40, relegating them to medium altitudes for their lifetimes, and removing the Allison's high-altiitude abilities except in teh P-38 Lightning. Had they left the turbos in those two fighters, we well might have seena different history of same.

This belongs in the Greatest myth section.

In the case of the P-39 the "claimed" performance was never proved and unless you think the NACA was a bunch of incompetent idiots ( like some writers and people on the internet) the P-39 had a lot of trouble accepting a turbo AND an inter cooler.

The at the time of the 1939 Army fighter trails had the XP-37 since 1937 and had ordered 13 YP-37s in 1938. As a result of the 1939 fighter trails the Army ordered the P-43 with turbo. Curtiss also had a radial engine P-36 with mechanical two stage R-1830 at the trails and Seversky had several airplanes with superchargers that were more than single speed-single stage. details are confusing and contradictory. The P-40s were ordered without turbos because with the world situation the USAAC needed some sort of fighters and needed them soon. The P-36 was obviously way behind the "world standard" ( Spitfires, Hurricanes and Bf 109s). I have mentioned this before. The army thought the turbo would delay production by at least a year over the normal time to get fighters into production. Adoption of the turbo "models" of the P-40 and P-39 might have meant better aircraft in 1942 but it would have meant 2000 fewer fighters available in the spring of 1942 and a lot fewer pilots trained in high performance aircraft.

 

[JAG88]

They had, in fact, been issued with an ultimatum, to disable, or position, their ships, so that the Germans couldn't use them. Some ships were sailed off to be interred, while those that didn't, due to their senior officers' intransigence, were hit. Gentlemanly behaviour rarely survives, in war.

They were already positioned in Africa... and I dont see why an ultimatum with a gun to your back makes it any better. The fact that when the day came the French did honor their previous commitments (in spite of the British actions) and sank their ships when the Germans did try to grab them does put the British actions under an even worse light.

I mean, first you desert them and then you shoot them? Thats simply low.

 

[nuuumannn]

I mean, first you desert them and then you shoot them? Thats simply low

That's also rubbish; as you read from previous pages, that's not what happened. The ultimatum at Oran was unfortune and sad and gave the British no pleasure, but what would you have them do? The Germans most certainly would have found use for those ships. It was either sink them there or risk their use as the Germans used their own heavy units - as commerce raiders. The consequences of that would have been devastating; with the small number of heavy ships the Kriegsmarine had created havoc among convoys from March 1941.

 

[JAG88]

Feeling bad about something bad that you do, does not exonerate you in any way. "I am sorry, I really felt bad when I stabbed her to death, but I was afraid she might run away with someone else..."

The French had promised not to allow Germany to use their ships and the Germans had agreed to that.

In any case? What is what didn't happen? The desertion? The British did not commit their full strength to the battle and withdrew after Dunkirk, France kept on fighting so they did have a reason to feel deserted.

Being shot in the back is not true? An ultimatum at gunpoint is just that, appearing ready for battle in front of moored ships, boarding/assaulting unsuspecting ships in port, mining the harbour even before said ultimatum expires... that is pretty low, I understand that an "alternative interpretation" of those facts has always been aggressively promoted in the anglo world, but that argument simply does not hold water.

"We had to do it and we felt bad about it." The first part is false, the second is irrelevant.

 

[nuuumannn]

The French had promised not to allow Germany to use their ships and the Germans had agreed to that.

D'ya really think the Germans would have honoured that? C'mon!

Why should Britain have had to commit their full strength to the Battle of France? Sure, France was an ally, but what were the French doing whilst the British were evacuating from Dunkirk? Capitulating, that's what. France did more harm to itself in its own attitude to the German invasion (and its own unpreparedness) than Britain evacuating could have done. The situation in France was untenable and another influx of troops and several more squadrons of Hurricanes from the UK was not going to make a difference. You also know about the looming Battle of Britain. If I were in Britain's shoes, I wouldn't have stayed either!

Also, you haven't answered my question about what would you have Britain do regarding the French ships falling into German hands. They most certainly would have used them against British merchant shipping and you're dreaming to think otherwise. Between January and March 1940, four German heavy units (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Admiral Sheer and Hipper) sank a combined total of 43 ships totalling 261,661 grt. That figure doesn't take into account losses from U-boats or armed marchant cruisers.

 

[Francis marliere]

Also, you haven't answered my question about what would you have Britain do regarding the French ships falling into German hands. They most certainly would have used them against British merchant shipping and you're dreaming to think otherwise. Between January and March 1940, four German heavy units (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Admiral Sheer and Hipper) sank a combined total of 43 ships totalling 261,661 grt. That figure doesn't take into account losses from U-boats or armed marchant cruisers.

Germany could not use easily the French ships, for several reasons.

The first is political. Hitler didn't have a great interest in navy. If he tried to catch the fleet, France would not surrender. That means more looses for German armed forces, and more troops to garrison France after the conquest.
It would have been very difficult to size the fleet by force, as the scutling of november 1942 proves.
Germany didn't have the spares and industrial basis for operating a larger, foreign fleet. It would take years before ships could be operationnal (I assume that the French Navy would destroy spares, ammunitions, bases, etc.).
Germany didn't have either the manpower to man ships. Where would Germany find 50.000 trained men to man French ships ?
Germany didn't have enough oil to operate a large fleet.
French ships didn't fit well German's needs. Most ships have close range and couldn't be used as raiders. Old battleships were really obsolete with poor guns, armor and fire control. Submarines were by far inferior to U-boats. Destroyers were poor escorts with weak AA and ASW armament. Richelieu and Jean-Bart were not finished yet and would need a lot of time before they get ready for operation. Only Dunkerque and Strasbourg could be used as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were. The problem is that these ships were in the Mediterranean and could not exit in the Atlantic.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere

 

[rank amateur]

Germany could not use easily the French ships, for several reasons.

The first is political. Hitler didn't have a great interest in navy. If he tried to catch the fleet, France would not surrender. That means more looses for German armed forces, and more troops to garrison France after the conquest.
It would have been very difficult to size the fleet by force, as the scutling of november 1942 proves.
Germany didn't have the spares and industrial basis for operating a larger, foreign fleet. It would take years before ships could be operationnal (I assume that the French Navy would destroy spares, ammunitions, bases, etc.).
Germany didn't have either the manpower to man ships. Where would Germany find 50.000 trained men to man French ships ?
Germany didn't have enough oil to operate a large fleet.
French ships didn't fit well German's needs. Most ships have close range and couldn't be used as raiders. Old battleships were really obsolete with poor guns, armor and fire control. Submarines were by far inferior to U-boats. Destroyers were poor escorts with weak AA and ASW armament. Richelieu and Jean-Bart were not finished yet and would need a lot of time before they get ready for operation. Only Dunkerque and Strasbourg could be used as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were. The problem is that these ships were in the Mediterranean and could not exit in the Atlantic.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere

This may all be very true but it is 20 20 hind sight. I don't think the Royal Navy was willing to take the risk.
.Furthermore, you don't need superior equipment to seriously damage the Allied merchant fleet.

 

[stona]

Germany could not use easily the French ships, for several reasons.

The first is political. Hitler didn't have a great interest in navy. If he tried to catch the fleet, France would not surrender. That means more looses for German armed forces, and more troops to garrison France after the conquest.
It would have been very difficult to size the fleet by force, as the scutling of november 1942 proves.
Germany didn't have the spares and industrial basis for operating a larger, foreign fleet. It would take years before ships could be operationnal (I assume that the French Navy would destroy spares, ammunitions, bases, etc.).
Germany didn't have either the manpower to man ships. Where would Germany find 50.000 trained men to man French ships ?
Germany didn't have enough oil to operate a large fleet.
French ships didn't fit well German's needs. Most ships have close range and couldn't be used as raiders. Old battleships were really obsolete with poor guns, armor and fire control. Submarines were by far inferior to U-boats. Destroyers were poor escorts with weak AA and ASW armament. Richelieu and Jean-Bart were not finished yet and would need a lot of time before they get ready for operation. Only Dunkerque and Strasbourg could be used as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were. The problem is that these ships were in the Mediterranean and could not exit in the Atlantic.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere

Good grief,this beggars belief.
Why would the Kriegsmarine have to operate or maintain these vessels?
As far as anyone knew at the time the French Navy would have operated them for the germans. the Vichy regime was effectively an ally of Germany (despite all the small print) and those ships would have made a big difference to the balance of naval forces in the Mediterranean.

We British remember the resistance put up by Governor General Armand Léon Annet and his forces on Madagascar in 1942 only too well. Operation "Torch" was not initially unopposed either. Vichy French Forces frequently demonstrated that didn't know whose side they were on and we weren't going to mess about taking a chance that could endanger our position in the Mediterranean.

It was only very late in the war that a clear majority of the French decided to back the allies,it had become obvious who was going to win.

The British government regretted at the time the loss of French lives at Oran. War is hell.

As for "abandoning the French" in the Battle of France you need to look at the numbers. France was considered the pre-eminent military power on mainland Europe in 1939/40. The number of British Forces in Europe at the time is tiny compared to the French. The Germans defeated both,but it was primarily a defeat for the French.

How many Frenchman were evacuated from the beaches?


Cheers
Steve

 

[Glider]

Germany could not use easily the French ships, for several reasons.

The first is political. Hitler didn't have a great interest in navy. If he tried to catch the fleet, France would not surrender. That means more looses for German armed forces, and more troops to garrison France after the conquest.

This is a big assumption

It would have been very difficult to size the fleet by force, as the scutling of november 1942 proves.

This I do agree with but for the purposes of this we are assuming that the Germans had they wanted to could have captured some of the ships

Germany didn't have the spares and industrial basis for operating a larger, foreign fleet. It would take years before ships could be operationnal (I assume that the French Navy would destroy spares, ammunitions, bases, etc.).

This I doubt as althought the ships were scuttled the shore facilities were untouched and I see no reason why that would change.

Germany didn't have either the manpower to man ships. Where would Germany find 50.000 trained men to man French ships ?
Germany didn't have enough oil to operate a large fleet.

That I agree but it is quite possible that enought French seaman would have continued the fight for the Germans. There were French units in the German army and I see as an extension of that.

French ships didn't fit well German's needs. Most ships have close range and couldn't be used as raiders. Old battleships were really obsolete with poor guns, armor and fire control. Submarines were by far inferior to U-boats. Destroyers were poor escorts with weak AA and ASW armament. Richelieu and Jean-Bart were not finished yet and would need a lot of time before they get ready for operation. Only Dunkerque and Strasbourg could be used as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were. The problem is that these ships were in the Mediterranean and could not exit in the Atlantic.

Again I agree with a lot of this but one or both of the Battle Cruisers, 2-3 cruisers and 5-6 of the modern destroyers could easily have made the difference in the Med.

 

[rank amateur]

Good grief,this beggars belief.
It was only very late in the war that a clear majority of the French decided to back the allies,it had become obvious who was going to win.

Steve

Steve, this too is 20 20 hindsight. I'm positive that a very large majority of the French couldn't stand the Germans and hated them for their victory. But they won and it didn't seem very likely to the average person that the British would ever retaliate. All the media were controlled by the Germans who were ofcourse flooding them with propaganda and how trustworthy were the BBC broadcast? And who was this De Gaulle they were talking about. So for the French it was back to normal, going to work and bringing bread on the table, hoping for better times. They didn't know about Stalingrad, they hardly knew about allied victories in Africa. So remembering with 1940, when the Brits suddenly appear in North Africa, it's understandable that they are not immediately wellcome.

Maybe after the landings in Sicily it might start to dawn that les Bouches were not so invincible.

I seriously don't know what I would have done, had I been there at that time. Ask yourself, would you?

 

[stona]

I seriously don't know what I would have done, had I been there at that time. Ask yourself, would you?

It has got nothing to do with what you,I,or any individual Frenchman would have done. It's about the politics and diplomacy of the Vichy government. It was that government which actively resisted many allied diplomatic and military operations. It argued that this was in the interests of France but all to often these Vichy French interests coincided with German ones.

To think that the French sailors on those ships would not have fought us,just as their brethren in North Africa and other areas did,is naive.

The invasion of North Africa was not a surprise to the Vichy French forces there. Diplomatic moves had been going on for months beforehand in an effort to prevent the landings being opposed. Ultimately they were successful. Resistance was short lived and minimal,there was,nonetheless,some.

I speak French fluently and have lived and worked in the country for several years of my life,anti -French I most certainly am not. I am anti -the rewriting of history to assuage the feelings of a nation which had to endure a very,very difficult period of its long history at this time.

Cheers
Steve

 

[Edgar Brooks]

The French had promised not to allow Germany to use their ships and the Germans had agreed to that..

A little earlier you said that the French scuttled their remaining ships, when the Germans tried to grab them; rather shows how much value could be placed on German promises, doesn't it?

In any case? What is what didn't happen? The desertion? The British did not commit their full strength to the battle and withdrew after Dunkirk, France kept on fighting so they did have a reason to feel deserted.

The BEF numbered 316,000, of whom 68,974 were killed, wounded or missing; 198,229 were evacuated (not "withdrawn") from Dunkirk, together with 139,997 French soldiers. After Dunkirk, a further 100,000+ force of the BEF continued fighting in France, until they had to be evacuated in an operation similar to Dunkirk. The RAF lost 931 aircraft, plus 1,526 airmen, in France. You have a strange idea of what constitutes a desertion.