Greatest aviation related Blunders of WWII

[Shortround6]

The Germans did have a strategic bomber in 1939. It was called the He 111. Britain's best strategic bomber at the time was the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley. The French had a few dozen strategic bombers in service. These:

http://www.avionslegendaires.net/Images/Gf222.jpg

German's problem was not the lack of a 4 engined big bomber, it was the the size of their industry in relation to what they were trying to do. Every 4 engined bomber in 1939-40 was TWO He 111s not built. No real increase in bombs on target or in targets that could be hit with any worthwhile tonnage of bombs.

The Germans could bomb Belfast from bases in France so even without France "Falling" a good deal of eastern England was in range even if France didn't fall.

 

[tyrodtom]

But doesn't that count as a blunder?

They knew, for some time, that an invasion was coming in the west.

Why then did they build fixed installations, rather than the mobile launchers they used later? If they had been set up to use mobile launchers from the start they would have provided a more flexible system, and may have proved more valuable - especially if targetted at the invasion beachs and the temporary harbour the Allies had set up.

They knew the invasion was coming, but not where.

Things are developed as they are developed. The long ramps were developed first, the aerial launches and portable ramps were developed as the need come about.

If you look at the V1 and V2 bombardment of Antwerp, which is an example of a closer target. I think it shows neither system was accurate enough to hit the invasion beaches.

Though i'm sure someone will post that they were just a few weeks from developing a missile to do just that with 100% accuracy.

 

[Gixxerman]

Though i'm sure someone will post that they were just a few weeks from developing a missile to do just that with 100% accuracy.

What?
You have doubts?
Didn't you know 'final victory' was imminent ......before everything unfairly stopped that little bit too early denying the world the sight of the true magnificence sheer élan of the technical wonder that was German arms in WW2.

They had bases in the Antartic, flying saucers, a time machine and everything you know......there's a doumentary about the moon bases and the coming return of the Herrenvolk.

(well 'they' hide it in plain sight calling it 'just a film' or 'based on a novel' but some of us know the real truth, the special secrets....)


Honest, it's all true, I read it in a book.

 

[Siegfried]

They knew the invasion was coming, but not where.

Things are developed as they are developed. The long ramps were developed first, the aerial launches and portable ramps were developed as the need come about.

If you look at the V1 and V2 bombardment of Antwerp, which is an example of a closer target. I think it shows neither system was accurate enough to hit the invasion beaches.

Though i'm sure someone will post that they were just a few weeks from developing a missile to do just that with 100% accuracy.

Speak of the devil, and here I am.

The V1 guidence system that was about to become opperational was called Ewald II - Sauekirsche. Ewald-II was the pulse transmitter on the missile. Saurkirsche (Sauer Cherry) the receivers in the ground stations. The ground stations were under construction with one completed. I can find the name of the location of the Station in Holland when I get home to my books.


Ewald-II worked by the V1 sending out a single coded pulse on a pre determined frequency at an predetermined time. Three ground stations received this pulse, and transmitted the resultant time of arrivals to one of the three stations. The Three time differences formed the parameters of a simultaneous equation that was used to solve for the exact position of the V1. This technique is called trilateration. Modern GPS works much the same way, though in reverse.

A course correction was transmitted as a single burst to the receiver "Mosel" which was an endless loop magnetic tape (a German invention) which had 5 heads, this decoded the instructions to provide both control and further jam resistance. Ewald-II was a midcouse correction system designed to be resistant to jamming, however if the V1 was used at short ranges and the course correction applied only a short distance, say 10km, before the impact point it would be capable of considerable accuracy. Drift of the V1 using its dead reckoning odometer system seems to have been about 2% so a course correct 10km before target should produce an error of about 200m on top of the 100m or so of radar instruments.

Hence an accuracy of about 300m or so seems achievable iin this situation (short range attack against beachead)

In addition there was the "Radischien" passive radar homming receiver which could home on to Chain Home, Chain Home Low, SCR-270 and Loran stations as well as MAX-P which could home on to allied centrimetric radars. (Originally designed for SAM attacks on to H2S) Radischien was tested against dummy radar targets and got to within 5 m via BV-246 glide bimb

An earlier V1 system "Ewald - Minerva" only used two ground stations, which tracked the Ewald transmitter as it begand broadcasting at various points of the flight via triangulation/durection finding. Initially about 5% of missiles had this system. The idea was to correct for the wind drift of subsequent missiles. Towards the end of the war nearly 50% were equiped with this kit suggesting the Germans were increasingly suspicious of the information they were getting from their agents.

The A to E versions of the V1 had a cruise speed of only 580km/h (361 mph). F version, launched first in march 1945 had a cruise speed of 630km/h (390 mph). These speeds were already at the limits of what a piston engined aircraft running on 100/150 could achive at low altitude.

in the same month, an experimental v1 reached 815km/h using a modified engine with improved fuel injection. such fast missiles would be very hard to intercept, even by jets.

The V1 was about to become a new and potently effective weapon.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".. Speak of the devil, and here I am.. "

On cue,

MM

 

[johnbr]

Siegfried good post on the V-1 on the V-1.I would have air launch it from day one.On a second jen one put fuel in the wings and and the pabst ramjet engine.

 

[tomo pauk]

Wonder if any of the belligerents was messing with passive radio homing, to produce anti-radiation missile?

 

[Gixxerman]

Siegfried good post on the V-1 on the V-1.I would have air launch it from day one.On a second jen one put fuel in the wings and and the pabst ramjet engine.

Obviously I have to rely on what I've read but I have seen it said that airlaunching a V1 at night was a very dangerous prospect for the launching crew.
Apparantly the exhaust flame was highly visible at night patrolling Mossies (also having good radar by this stage - along with the RAF taking the first steps in AWACS) would have been savage against any He111 caught doing so (even if it was a late He 111 H22 model with the Jumo 213's a heap of armour on it).
I'm sure I've also read that the final section of the pulse jet engine glowed a nice cherry red at night after running a while.

The V1 concept as a weapons system is perfectly valid (it is afterall the great grandfather of the modern cruise missile) but the tech of the day left the execution desperately lacking.

 

[Siegfried]

Wonder if any of the belligerents was messing with passive radio homing, to produce anti-radiation missile?

" The BV 246 glide bomb was revived in early 1945 to use the "Radieschen" (Radish) ultra-short wave passive homing device which would home into enemy radars. The new BV 246 had a modified nose to house the "Radieschen", and it acted on the gyroscopic control equipment for the rudders and elevator. Ten of the modified BV 246 "Radieschen" equipped glide bombs were tested on the Unterlüss test range, but due to the new equipment being under development, eight of the tests failed, although two of the tests were successful, landing within two meters (6 feet) of the target. Although over 1000 BV 246 glide bombs were produced, none were used operationally."

Radieschien was targeted at radars or navigation aids such as CH, CHL, SCR-270, Loran. It was orginally developed for the Fritz-X fall bomb. There was a radar homming head called MAX-P by Blaupunkt for homming on to the centrimetric H2S/H2X emissions of Allied ground mapping radars and night fighters. Although designed for installation on SAM missiles such as Wasserfall and the HS 297 Schmeterling I see no reason it could not have been adapted to home onto ground based radars.

The BV-246 glide bomb was originally intended to work via radio guidance, presumably a system the same as the Ewald-II system being readied for the V1 but was suspended while guidance work was completed. It was a very elegant looking missile reminiscent of a high performance sail plane. It's glide ratio of 25:1 suggests a luanch from a FW 190 at 8000m (26500ft) would achieve a range of 200km (120 miles). There was also MAX-A (A for Active) which was a version of MAX-P with a transmitter for terminal homming for SAM missiles, it used an 8 segment continious wave magnetron at 5.8cm. MAX-A was complete as a gound based test system. I'd also come across references to an active radar homming anti shipping missile called "Pirat", likely only a projection.

There were also a number of infrared systems such as Kiel and Hamburg which were tested in the nose of aircraft against various targets and in some versions were to be capable of passive infrared homming against ships or blast furnances. In general it was found these system required the complication of gyro-stabalisatio of the seeker head and the more complicated rossette scanning patterns as opposed to conical scanning.

A similar sstem was the USN "BAT" active radar homming glide bomb, used after the European war was over, against Japanese shipping.

The same circuitry used to achieve range gate lock on and then subsquent azimuth/elevation lock on for AAA gunnery radars would have been adapted for use against sea targets. The German Mannheim FuSE 64 radar was capable or range gate lock on by early 1944 so the Germans should have been capable of this type of technology. Having said that, the idea of making a device with nearly 100 vacuum tubes reliable and affordable in war time Germany suggests this would have remained a US weapon only.

 

[syscom3]

IMO the abundant quantities of P-38s in late 1942 would've had much more impact to the war than a P-38 of really great performance, in late 1943.

In 1939, if the ONLY P38 made wouldn't have been crashed and development was continued, there would have been an outside chance for a combat ready version to be in production by mid 1940.

Wouldn't the air war in Europe and Africa look different if the long legged P38 was flying over Germany in those years of the war.

 

[tomo pauk]

Sys, I'm on the same ship with you re. good numbers of P-39s early up, but 'my year' is 1942, not 1940. That was also the time 1st drop tanks were installed, since the idea was to ship them way above Axis subs.
Within the 2 months after the XP-38 crashed, Lockheed received an order for 13 YP-38s, indicating that people at AAC were confident, if not impressed with plane's abilities. In the book about P-38 by Bodie, it's clearly stated that neither B. Kelsey nor K. Johnson did not feel that crash messed with P-38 programme. If we want P-38s to make anything important in 1940, it's good to remember that both Lockheed Allison were pretty small companies prior 1940, compared with eg. Douglas, Curtiss-Wright P&W. Lockheed was employing as much as 500 people a day, but that's 1941 we are talking. Allison was shipping under 10 engines per month prior May 1940, and in 1940-41 most of them were allocated for P-39 P-40.
So I do not see that really big number of P-38s could've been made prior mid 1941, unless we want to waive 2 of those fighters for each P-38.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Tomo, I think the case for earlier P-38's (without the crash) is one wherein production of a war ready bird benefits from earlier experiments that are hoped would have brought to light the compessibilty problem and accelerated earlier fixes no matter how temporary. (I guess I mean an earlier P38F)

 

[tomo pauk]

Your idea has merit, since it was not until Oct 1940 the 1st YP-38 was flying. That leaves ample time for flying tests (20 months) for the XP-38, of course without the crash. So the compressibility heater issues can be identified taken care of even prior US entrance in war?
(P-38F was not equiped with dive flaps, nor with boosted ailerons, and the heater was troublesome even in 1944 - but then, perhaps someone could share some info how the Alaska P-38's pilots fared?)

 

[Siegfried]

Heinkel He 177 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

But I strongly doubt that it would be that advantage for German. I don't see how a single He 177 can do the same job much better than two Ju 88s or He 111.. you do not get but about half the number of heavy strategic bomber than a twin bomber. If France had not fallen, the He 177 would have importance, because basis from England for example would be further. But in practice, the only difference was that He 177s bombing England could do it even from taking off from Germany, just as He 111s could do the same in 1940 by taking off from France bases..

The Heinkel He 177 could carry 3 times of the load of the He 111, about twice the distance. It could so so with the same number of crew members. Morover it could so so with much more armament notably in the form of a 20mm tail gun, potentially a twin 20mm power driven turret.

The RAF managed to get the Lancaster and Halifax opperational by Jan 1941. The Stirling and Manchester way before then.

The Luftwaffe took nearly 2 maybe 3 year longer to get hold of a somewhat debugged He 177. It was a poor performance. Ernst Heinkel begged for a 4 seperate engined version (He 177B) to be built concurrently. He was no less prescient than AVRO's Chadwick in this regard.

Had they achieve the same deadlines as the RAF did with Halifax/Lancaster then the Heinkel's first mission could have been a medium altitude attack on Nelson, Rodney and KGV. As the Japanese showed a year latter when they sank KGV sister the PoW hits can be obtained this way. The aircraft would be too concerned twisting to avoid the bombs than the be attack Bismark.

It's clear that with 4 seperate DB601, Jumo 211J or DB605 they would have a very good aircraft. The BMW 801D could easily have been fitted to produce a 330mph aircraft immune to Martlets/Wildcats, Sea Hurricanes and Coastal Command Beaufighters due to its speed.

While I can't see the point in producing a massive strategic bomber force equal to the RAF Halfix/Lancaster and USAAF B-24/B-17 but I do see 2000 or so being used in the maritime reconaisance bomber role, thus freeing up several hundred FW 200 for transport duties. They could also being employed in occaisional night raids and raids into Soviet Territory, using Fritz-X to wreck havoc on factories, Dams, Power station thus somewhat compensating for their small numbers.

 

[Vincenzo]

The RAF managed to get the Lancaster and Halifax opperational by Jan 1941. The Stirling and Manchester way before then.
.

the first mission of lancaster was on the night 3/4 march 1942, in january 1941 get the first flight. Halifax first mission was on night 11/12 march 1941, Stirling on 10/11 february 41, Manchester on 24/25 february 41

 

[Siegfried]

the first mission of lancaster was on the night 3/4 march 1942, in january 1941 get the first flight. Halifax first mission was on night 11/12 march 1941, Stirling on 10/11 february 41, Manchester on 24/25 february 41

Whoops, it's obvious I drooped a year in my dates, however with the RAF achieving Manchester and Stirling opperations by early 1941 the Luftwaffe could have achieved opperation of the Ju 89, by then powered by DB601 engines of adaquet power. I beleive it could easily have matched the He 177B with the Lancasters entry into service as a 4 engined aircraft.

 

[Elmas]

By my personal point of view, one of the blunders was the stubborness of Sir W. Churchill and Sir A. Harris in willing to send everything that had more than one engine and could fly to bomb Germany instead to patrol the Bay of Biscay....

.........................
German's problem was not the lack of a 4 engined big bomber, it was the the size of their industry in relation to what they were trying to do. Every 4 engined bomber in 1939-40 was TWO He 111s not built. No real increase in bombs on target or in targets that could be hit with any worthwhile tonnage of bombs.
......................

What?
You have doubts?
Didn't you know 'final victory' was imminent ......before everything unfairly stopped that little bit too early denying the world the sight of the true magnificence sheer élan of the technical wonder that was German arms in WW2.
................
Honest, it's all true, I read it in a book.

I agree. Some Gentlemen here seem to underestimate rather lightly some other aspects that are rather important to win a war....

In 1944 a Squadron Leader with his wingman of a Spitfire Unit, very short of juice, landed in a 8th Air Force Base, and stopped not far from a bowser that was refuelling a B-17.
They asked to refuel the Spits and the responsible Petty Officer asked of much fuel was required.
When the P.O. had the figure, he searched briefly in his pocket " If you are in a hurry take this, here there's more than enough gas for your plane...." said to the British Pilot giving him his Zippo.......
I'm sure that in some Geschwader, first of all the Training Units, even one half of the content of that Zippo would have been more than welcome.....

 

[renrich]

Actually, as far as the US was concerned a successful development and deployment of drop tanks for all AAF and USN fighters pre war would have made a huge difference.

 

[tomo pauk]

Indeed; the P-47 was suffering in that particular field for more than half a year.

 

[renrich]

The short range of the F4F was a real handicap for the Pacific Fleet. Drop tanks eventually helped a great deal.