Greatest aviation related Blunders of WWII

[oldcrowcv63]

The concept of self-defending bomber does seem like blunder.

And a concept that was given a thorough testing of its validity (or lack thereof) during the 8th Air Force YB-40 operations.

 

[tomo pauk]

IIRC the YB-40 was not able to carry any bombs, due to, perhaps, doubled defensive assets?

 

[oldcrowcv63]

IIRC the YB-40 was not able to carry any bombs, due to, perhaps, doubled defensive assets?

That's my understanding as well. I think they tried to fly two ship escorts at various positions in the bomber stream and nothing was found to be sufficiently effective to warrant futher development. I suppose it gets points for imaginative thinking much like the Boulton Paul Defiant?

Maybe it should be called thinking with your head in a box instead of thinking outside the box

 

[wuzak]

The big problem with the YB-40s was that they were as heavy as teh bombers going to target, but heavier returning from the target, and could not keep up. They could not do their role on the return journey and ended up isolated and vulnerable to attack.

 

[wuzak]

Jim - are you referring to Halpro - as a 'wake up call"? - I agree

Two of my other personal favorites include the IJN not launching the thrid strike at POL and Submarine base at Pearl as well as failing to go back to Scweinfurt until Ball Bearing production ceased... question of our resolve to incur the casualties but Speer says we 'shoulda taken the losses'

In regards to Schweinfurt, how long was it before the 8th were capable of returning? They lost a sizeable chunk of aircraft and, probably, more importantly a large number of aircrew.

Perhaps the mistake was not getting the RAF to follow up - they couldn't that night because they were pounding Peenemünde, but surely would have been able to do the job earlier than the 8th?

Alternatively, missions designed to disrupt repairs to the facilities could have been taken by 8th (or was it the 9th?) AF mediums or RAF Mosquitoes. Perhaps RAF Mossies could even have delivered as much damage in low level raids?

 

[tomo pauk]

One blunder is the the Combined bomber offensive was not that 'combined'? Ie. two daylight attacks at one target, followed by one night attack? In order to avoid predictability the targets would be 'randomized', and then again hit another target both during day night, several times.

 

[iron man]

Not targeting the German power generating plants. There was only a handful that generated most of the power for Germany. Knocking these out would have brought Germany industry to an abrupt stop.

This has been examined at some length in the past...iirc, Mierezejewski addresses the issue in "Collapse of the German War Economy" and comes to the conclusion that it was not the generating plants themselves that presented the best target, but the transmission stations which were located nearby.

Reason being?

At the heart of the generation plants proper, one found massive, sturdily constructed machinery; vulnerable...but only to direct hits from HC bombs of the 1000lb+ classes. OTOH, the transmission stations were filled with highly vulnerable systems that could be taken out of service by shrapnel damage from "near misses"...primarily the transformers and complex mechanical relay (switching) networks which controlled distribution to the German "grid". Wrecking this equipment would have caused a severe crisis. Production of such complex items required "special" resources (and highly skilled tradesmen); both were in very short supply. You can't just expand the production level of something that is only being manufactured on a "shoestring" budget (to meet the needs of ongoing maintenance and limited expansion) overnight, just because you suddenly need to replace a dozen relay stations and their attendant transformers.

This was a missed opportunity (to be sure) but it still would have required a (relatively speaking) precision delivery, one that would have "challenged" the "tech" of the times rather severely.

OTOH, the transportation/coal distribution attacks (which eventually stopped Germany's armamments production in it's tracks)? These could have been pursued much earlier by means of area attacks on the DRG's marshalling yards. Unfortunately, the "precision" component (which sealed the deal; killing the inland waterways and dropping viaducts/collapsing mainline railway tunnels...an exclusively RAF effort, BTW) required daylight air superiority, and thus would not be possible much earlier than historical.

Just my 2c, FWIW.

Cheers, Ron

 

[wuzak]

At the heart of the generation plants proper, one found massive, sturdily constructed machinery; vulnerable...but only to direct hits from HC bombs of the 1000lb+ classes.

HC bombs? Do you mean MC (Medium Capacity)/General Purpose bombs?

As for the actual High Capacity bombs, I'm not sure that the USAAF actually had any such bombs. The RAF had at their disposal 2,000lb, 4,000lb, 8,000lb and 12,000lb HC bombs.

At the heart of the generation plants proper, one found massive, sturdily constructed machinery; vulnerable...but only to direct hits from HC bombs of the 1000lb+ classes. OTOH, the transmission stations were filled with highly vulnerable systems that could be taken out of service by shrapnel damage from "near misses"...primarily the transformers and complex mechanical relay (switching) networks which controlled distribution to the German "grid". Wrecking this equipment would have caused a severe crisis. Production of such complex items required "special" resources (and highly skilled tradesmen); both were in very short supply. You can't just expand the production level of something that is only being manufactured on a "shoestring" budget (to meet the needs of ongoing maintenance and limited expansion) overnight, just because you suddenly need to replace a dozen relay stations and their attendant transformers.

This was a missed opportunity (to be sure) but it still would have required a (relatively speaking) precision delivery, one that would have "challenged" the "tech" of the times rather severely.

From the sounds of things, the generating plants would have been good targets for the heavy bombers - B-17s/B-24s and Lancasters - large targets with plenty of area to hit. The transmission station ssounds more like a target for smaller bombers or tactical bombers - such as the Mosquito. The advantage being that they can attack at low altitude and gain a better accuracy rate.

OTOH, the transportation/coal distribution attacks (which eventually stopped Germany's armamments production in it's tracks)? These could have been pursued much earlier by means of area attacks on the DRG's marshalling yards. Unfortunately, the "precision" component (which sealed the deal; killing the inland waterways and dropping viaducts/collapsing mainline railway tunnels...an exclusively RAF effort, BTW) required daylight air superiority, and thus would not be possible much earlier than historical.

The USAAF did their share of bombing against transportation - as they were directed. The 8th AF had decided to concentrate on oil during the first part of 1944, and had presented the plan to the command, but this was rejected in favour of the Transportation Plan (Portal's?). However, when transportation targets were discounted because of weather they were free to pursue their oil attacks.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

You guys reminded me that I believe the US (N A) failed to develop an AP bomb in either the 500 or 1,000 pound class.

Add to that the failure to develop a decent aerially launched torpedo. Wait! Why stop there? How about a decent torpdo of any type. Yes, I know the damned magnetic detonators...

 

[wuzak]

I wonder if the V-1 and V-2 program funding could have been better put to use in getting usable anti-aircraft missiles into service, especially the V-2 program.

The V-2 program took a lot of money and resources for not a lot of results. How many guided and unguided anti-aircraft missiles could have been procured using the same effort? And what effect could they have had on the Alied bombing efforts?

 

[Shortround6]

You guys reminded me that I believe the US (N A) failed to develop an AP bomb in either the 500 or 1,000 pound class.

US did have the 1600lb AP bomb, which, due to it's thicker walls and nose was actually smaller in diameter than a 1000lb GP bomb. If a plane could lift the weight the 1600lb AP could fit where ever a 1000lb GP could.

 

[iron man]

HC bombs? Do you mean MC (Medium Capacity)/General Purpose bombs?

As for the actual High Capacity bombs, I'm not sure that the USAAF actually had any such bombs. The RAF had at their disposal 2,000lb, 4,000lb, 8,000lb and 12,000lb HC bombs.

Yeah..my bad. GP of 1000+ lbs or HC. USSBS makes reference to this numerous times...smaller GP (the bulk of all bombs delivered) just didn't "get the job done" against heavy machinery unless a direct hit on the machine in question was realized. The proverbial "needle in a haystack" approach, in the studied cases



From the sounds of things, the generating plants would have been good targets for the heavy bombers - B-17s/B-24s and Lancasters - large targets with plenty of area to hit. The transmission station ssounds more like a target for smaller bombers or tactical bombers - such as the Mosquito. The advantage being that they can attack at low altitude and gain a better accuracy rate.

If they could achieve sufficient saturation to actually affect direct hits upon the machinery then this may have borne fruit.
The same "area bombing" effort against the relay stations stood a better chance of seriously f*cking things up, if Mierezjewski is to be believed here.

The USAAF did their share of bombing against transportation - as they were directed. The 8th AF had decided to concentrate on oil during the first part of 1944, and had presented the plan to the command, but this was rejected in favour of the Transportation Plan (Portal's?). However, when transportation targets were discounted because of weather they were free to pursue their oil attacks.

Wrong.

When WX "issues" reared up, 8th AF area bombed "marshalling yards" by radar (H2X) through the cloud cover...CAVOK, they prosecuted "precision" attacks. The prevailing weather conditions in the period (Sept '44>) dictated that the bulk of USAAF tonnage delivered in the last eight months of the war was dropped by radar on the "secondary targets" (marshalling yards). When the war ended, the USSBS quickly realized what had happened (total strangulation of coal distribution) but at the time? Nope...nada.

No disrespect intended; my (secondarily supported) hypotheticals are one thing...your last point is 100% at odds with the historical record.

 

[wuzak]

The Transport plan was one of the plans put up prior to the D-Day invasion, another being the Oil Plan proposed by Spaatz. The Transport Plan was chosen by the Allied High Command, and thus the RAF and the USAAF were required to attack the transport infrastructure - which included marshalling yards.

Why would they radar bomb a secondary target and not the primary target?

 

[pbfoot]

Was not the attcak on transportation carried out by 2TAF and 9th AF and not the heavies of BC and 8thAF, theoil plan had been a priority of BC since 1939 except the couldn't hit them and so switched to precision area bombing . Harris had to be pushed and shoved into bombing the POL

 

[Milosh]

iron man, the shock of the exploding bombs would play hell with the bearing of the generators as well as other nasty things to the generators.

 

[GrauGeist]

I believe that the RLM's insistance early on, that all aircraft should be "dive bomb" capable, hindered and delayed otherwise successful aircraft types that the Luftwaffe needed.

Another damaging decision by the RLM, was to ignore the He280's potential along with endorsing Jet Engine development at a time when Germany had ample resources to produce reliable jet engines that performed as intended.

 

[syscom3]

1) The USAACs criminally slow development of the P38 after Q1 of 1939. And losing the only flying P38 on a cross country publicity stunt was deserving of career ends for some generals.

2) The War Production Boards refusal to allow a 2nd P38 production facility to be built until late in the war when it meant nothing.

3) The USAAFs refusal to produce external drop tanks for use by the P47 and P38 until after heavy bomber losses were to severe to ignore.

 

[Freebird]

The concept of self-defending bomber does seem like blunder.

Perhaps the US needed to try fail before understanding this?

Can't beat this ,
"Less helpful was the continuing disposition to find ways to continue day bombing when there was only one way that could make it effective - the introduction of a true long range fighter to protect the bombers . Churchill had already percieved this necessity but Portal firmly set his face against it . A long range fighter could never hold its own against a short range fighter , it was this attitude that Churchill said "closed many doors"

Portal was still drinking the Trenchard Kool-aid


From the British side:
1.) After the Butte report in the summer of '41 found that bombing effectivness on German targets was next to useless,Bomber Command wasn't redeployed to where it could really make a useful part of the war effort.

2.) Leigh-Mallory's management of the 1941-1942 operations over France. The massive overclaiming (or fraud) was overlooked by the Top Brass, as they didn't want to admit that their plans were a failure.
Leigh-Mallory reported to Churchill the War Cabinet that they were winning the air battles with the Luftwaffe, when in fact they were losing 4x as many aircraft and at least 8x as many pilots.
Had he been honest enough about the massive disparity vs the Luftwaffe, cabinet might have used this valuable resource in other theaters, where it was desperately needed. (Malaya, Western Desert)

 

[oldcrowcv63]

US did have the 1600lb AP bomb, which, due to it's thicker walls and nose was actually smaller in diameter than a 1000lb GP bomb. If a plane could lift the weight the 1600lb AP could fit where ever a 1000lb GP could.

SR, Do you know when this AP Bomb was introduced? The orginal SBD variants would not have been able to carry it. However, the SBD-5 was upgraded to a 1,200 hp Wright 1820-60 engine with deliveries beginning in February 1943. It could apparently carry 2250 pounds with 1,600 # on the centerline station. Sounds like it as made to marry the AP bomb you mention!

 

[michaelmaltby]

Using bombers to flatten Stalingrad (Germans) and Caen (RAF) .... turning both cities into sniper paradise ...

MM