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Not only the RAF but also the Army which the French claim retreated opening their flank to German assault.
One of the greatest blunders was put into action by the War Materiel Board in the U.S.A.
They elected tor emove the turbocharger from both the P039 and P-40, relegating them to medium altitudes for their lifetimes, and removing the Allison's high-altiitude abilities except in teh P-38 Lightning. Had they left the turbos in those two fighters, we well might have seena different history of same.
They had, in fact, been issued with an ultimatum, to disable, or position, their ships, so that the Germans couldn't use them. Some ships were sailed off to be interred, while those that didn't, due to their senior officers' intransigence, were hit. Gentlemanly behaviour rarely survives, in war.I thought they were more pissed off by, you know, getting shot in the back in their naval bases...
Not targeting the German power generating plants. There was only a handful that generated most of the power for Germany. Knocking these out would have brought Germany industry to an abrupt stop.
The V-2 program took a lot of money and resources for not a lot of results. How many guided and unguided anti-aircraft missiles could have been procured using the same effort? And what effect could they have had on the Alied bombing efforts?
One of the greatest blunders was put into action by the War Materiel Board in the U.S.A.
They elected tor emove the turbocharger from both the P039 and P-40, relegating them to medium altitudes for their lifetimes, and removing the Allison's high-altiitude abilities except in teh P-38 Lightning. Had they left the turbos in those two fighters, we well might have seena different history of same.
They had, in fact, been issued with an ultimatum, to disable, or position, their ships, so that the Germans couldn't use them. Some ships were sailed off to be interred, while those that didn't, due to their senior officers' intransigence, were hit. Gentlemanly behaviour rarely survives, in war.
I mean, first you desert them and then you shoot them? Thats simply low
The French had promised not to allow Germany to use their ships and the Germans had agreed to that.
Also, you haven't answered my question about what would you have Britain do regarding the French ships falling into German hands. They most certainly would have used them against British merchant shipping and you're dreaming to think otherwise. Between January and March 1940, four German heavy units (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Admiral Sheer and Hipper) sank a combined total of 43 ships totalling 261,661 grt. That figure doesn't take into account losses from U-boats or armed marchant cruisers.
Germany could not use easily the French ships, for several reasons.
The first is political. Hitler didn't have a great interest in navy. If he tried to catch the fleet, France would not surrender. That means more looses for German armed forces, and more troops to garrison France after the conquest.
It would have been very difficult to size the fleet by force, as the scutling of november 1942 proves.
Germany didn't have the spares and industrial basis for operating a larger, foreign fleet. It would take years before ships could be operationnal (I assume that the French Navy would destroy spares, ammunitions, bases, etc.).
Germany didn't have either the manpower to man ships. Where would Germany find 50.000 trained men to man French ships ?
Germany didn't have enough oil to operate a large fleet.
French ships didn't fit well German's needs. Most ships have close range and couldn't be used as raiders. Old battleships were really obsolete with poor guns, armor and fire control. Submarines were by far inferior to U-boats. Destroyers were poor escorts with weak AA and ASW armament. Richelieu and Jean-Bart were not finished yet and would need a lot of time before they get ready for operation. Only Dunkerque and Strasbourg could be used as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were. The problem is that these ships were in the Mediterranean and could not exit in the Atlantic.
Best regards,
Francis Marliere
Germany could not use easily the French ships, for several reasons.
The first is political. Hitler didn't have a great interest in navy. If he tried to catch the fleet, France would not surrender. That means more looses for German armed forces, and more troops to garrison France after the conquest.
It would have been very difficult to size the fleet by force, as the scutling of november 1942 proves.
Germany didn't have the spares and industrial basis for operating a larger, foreign fleet. It would take years before ships could be operationnal (I assume that the French Navy would destroy spares, ammunitions, bases, etc.).
Germany didn't have either the manpower to man ships. Where would Germany find 50.000 trained men to man French ships ?
Germany didn't have enough oil to operate a large fleet.
French ships didn't fit well German's needs. Most ships have close range and couldn't be used as raiders. Old battleships were really obsolete with poor guns, armor and fire control. Submarines were by far inferior to U-boats. Destroyers were poor escorts with weak AA and ASW armament. Richelieu and Jean-Bart were not finished yet and would need a lot of time before they get ready for operation. Only Dunkerque and Strasbourg could be used as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were. The problem is that these ships were in the Mediterranean and could not exit in the Atlantic.
Best regards,
Francis Marliere
This is a big assumptionGermany could not use easily the French ships, for several reasons.
The first is political. Hitler didn't have a great interest in navy. If he tried to catch the fleet, France would not surrender. That means more looses for German armed forces, and more troops to garrison France after the conquest.
This I do agree with but for the purposes of this we are assuming that the Germans had they wanted to could have captured some of the shipsIt would have been very difficult to size the fleet by force, as the scutling of november 1942 proves.
This I doubt as althought the ships were scuttled the shore facilities were untouched and I see no reason why that would change.Germany didn't have the spares and industrial basis for operating a larger, foreign fleet. It would take years before ships could be operationnal (I assume that the French Navy would destroy spares, ammunitions, bases, etc.).
That I agree but it is quite possible that enought French seaman would have continued the fight for the Germans. There were French units in the German army and I see as an extension of that.Germany didn't have either the manpower to man ships. Where would Germany find 50.000 trained men to man French ships ?
Germany didn't have enough oil to operate a large fleet.
Again I agree with a lot of this but one or both of the Battle Cruisers, 2-3 cruisers and 5-6 of the modern destroyers could easily have made the difference in the Med.French ships didn't fit well German's needs. Most ships have close range and couldn't be used as raiders. Old battleships were really obsolete with poor guns, armor and fire control. Submarines were by far inferior to U-boats. Destroyers were poor escorts with weak AA and ASW armament. Richelieu and Jean-Bart were not finished yet and would need a lot of time before they get ready for operation. Only Dunkerque and Strasbourg could be used as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were. The problem is that these ships were in the Mediterranean and could not exit in the Atlantic.
Good grief,this beggars belief.
It was only very late in the war that a clear majority of the French decided to back the allies,it had become obvious who was going to win.
Steve
I seriously don't know what I would have done, had I been there at that time. Ask yourself, would you?
A little earlier you said that the French scuttled their remaining ships, when the Germans tried to grab them; rather shows how much value could be placed on German promises, doesn't it?The French had promised not to allow Germany to use their ships and the Germans had agreed to that..
The BEF numbered 316,000, of whom 68,974 were killed, wounded or missing; 198,229 were evacuated (not "withdrawn") from Dunkirk, together with 139,997 French soldiers. After Dunkirk, a further 100,000+ force of the BEF continued fighting in France, until they had to be evacuated in an operation similar to Dunkirk. The RAF lost 931 aircraft, plus 1,526 airmen, in France. You have a strange idea of what constitutes a desertion.In any case? What is what didn't happen? The desertion? The British did not commit their full strength to the battle and withdrew after Dunkirk, France kept on fighting so they did have a reason to feel deserted.