Greatest military blunder of WWII

[jmf003]

Plan_D, you've made some interesting and informed points but I believe the facts run counter to some of your arguments.

I didn't blame the Ardennes Offensive on Eisenhower, I said his blunder was his reaction to it i.e not cutting the Germans off, but pushing the bulge out.

Eisenhower wanted to cut the Germans off. The plan called for the American First and Third Armies to collapse the pocket at Houffalize, well behind the German front. Anyone who looks at a map of the battle will see that capturing Houffalize quickly would have achieved that goal.

Ike pushed Montgomery to launch the attack on 1-Jan. Monty felt it imprudent to move that quickly and didn't launch his attack until 3-Jan.

Monty's two day delay wasn't the proximate cause in the German forces escaping the collapsing pocket. A well executed German retreat was. However Monty's slow reaction was much more a contributing factor than Ike's supposed lack of vision.

I must make some corrections for you, the offensive through the Ardennes in 1940 did not catch the British by surprise - they weren't there to be surprised.

It is true that the BEF wasn't defending at the point of attack. However the BEF's invasion of Belgium was based on an expectation that the French lines would hold. The French collapse left the BEF's flank exposed and directly led to the near disaster at Dunkirk.

Surely the successful German attack through the Ardennes was a surprise to the BEF in any reasonable definition of "surprise." If not the BEF were completely bonkers to have invaded Belgium while expecting the Germans to make that position untenable.

And the 1944 offensive was stopped by both the British and American forces, as the British were striking at the north of the bulge. Which led to the 6th Coldstream Guards capturing a fully functioning Panther G which had been abandoned because of lack of fuel.

This is more of a niggling point but most reports of the battle put the German troop count at 500,000, the American troop count at 600,000, the British troop count at 55,000, along with a smaller complement of Canadian, Belgian, and French troops.

With more than 90% of the Allied troops being American, it's not unreasonable for a person to suggest that the Americans stopped the Germans. Certainly 55,000 British troops on their own were not going to stop 500,000 Germans but 600,000 American troops on their own might have.

Stating that "the 1944 offensive was stopped by both the British and American forces" without mentioning the scale of British involvement is a bit misleading. And if it's a matter of honor to give Britain credit for its contributions in a minority role, why mention the British troops without mentioning the other nations?

And the U.S 3rd Army was used incorrectly in the counter-attack, Patton himself knew so and stated that he wanted his army to be used to cut the Germans off at their rear.

Yes, Patton wanted to cut off the Germans but, no, Patton did not feel that his Army was used incorrectly. If you have a quote of Patton saying something to that effect, that would be interesting to read.

Everything I've read indicates Patton was happy with the Houffalize target but frustrated with his rate of progress.

Best regards,

 

[plan_D]

Blunder - A gross, stupid or careless mistake.

It would be a matter of opinion if a mistake was small or great, but blunder doesn't have to change the course of the war. So, I don't believe I'm mixing anything up, syscom.

In my opinion Eisenhower made tactical and strategic mistakes which were serious; as the war could have been ended sooner. Market Garden was a serious mistake in the whole European campaign, it cost lives and time.

The German Ardennes Offensive was a mistake on the German side; I don't believe nor did I ever say that the U.S forces made a mistake. But what I do say is this; the U.S forces didn't show an overall great strength of defence (as has been stated) and the Allied (note: Not soley U.S) counter action was wrong.

"Now we have another Brit expert lecturing on the myriad deficiencies of the American soldier and commanders.

I have to sit back and ponder why Europe (and UK) is not speaking either German or Russian. From your point of view it certainly had nothing to do with US contribution.."

drgondog,

I can see that you are one of those people that believes the U.S can do no wrong. I advise not to take it personally if someone points out a fault in the U.S.

From my point of view, I see that you're being childish and turning this discussion into a British vs. American argument about World War II. There's plenty of your fellow Americans on this board that know what my point of view is and I'm not anti-American. I'm not like you, I can give credit to other nations.

The fact of the matter is; you couldn't reply to single one of my comments and had to resort to attacks. Stop being a child.

"Eisenhower wanted to cut the Germans off. The plan called for the American First and Third Armies to collapse the pocket at Houffalize, well behind the German front. Anyone who looks at a map of the battle will see that capturing Houffalize quickly would have achieved that goal.

Ike pushed Montgomery to launch the attack on 1-Jan. Monty felt it imprudent to move that quickly and didn't launch his attack until 3-Jan.

Monty's two day delay wasn't the proximate cause in the German forces escaping the collapsing pocket. A well executed German retreat was. However Monty's slow reaction was much more a contributing factor than Ike's supposed lack of vision."

jmf003,

Houffalize would have been a good target to ensure encirclement of a lot of the German forces but Eisenhower gave a target in the centre of the German bulge. His intention was to move to Houffalize from the front and sides which leads to the bulge being pushed out, not surrounded.

If Eisenhower truly wanted the bulge to be encircled the order would have been to take line from St. Vith - Wiltz. Montgomery shouldn't have delayed - you're certainly right and credit must be given to the German discipline in retreat. But Eisenhower should have given deeper targets than Houfalize but he knew it would lead to the bulge being pushed out.

"It is true that the BEF wasn't defending at the point of attack. However the BEF's invasion of Belgium was based on an expectation that the French lines would hold. The French collapse left the BEF's flank exposed and directly led to the near disaster at Dunkirk.

Surely the successful German attack through the Ardennes was a surprise to the BEF in any reasonable definition of "surprise." If not the BEF were completely bonkers to have invaded Belgium while expecting the Germans to make that position untenable."

The British were surprised to see the French collapse so quickly. But the BEF wasn't surprised to see an attack through that region; the fact that it succeeded was the surprise.


"This is more of a niggling point but most reports of the battle put the German troop count at 500,000, the American troop count at 600,000, the British troop count at 55,000, along with a smaller complement of Canadian, Belgian, and French troops.

With more than 90% of the Allied troops being American, it's not unreasonable for a person to suggest that the Americans stopped the Germans. Certainly 55,000 British troops on their own were not going to stop 500,000 Germans but 600,000 American troops on their own might have.

Stating that "the 1944 offensive was stopped by both the British and American forces" without mentioning the scale of British involvement is a bit misleading. And if it's a matter of honor to give Britain credit for its contributions in a minority role, why mention the British troops without mentioning the other nations?"

Fair enough statement, I should have mentioned the British in a minority role. As for mentioning every nationality involved in a fight, I'd rather spend my time doing other than things than listing almost every country in the world - I'll just say Allies from now on.

"Yes, Patton wanted to cut off the Germans but, no, Patton did not feel that his Army was used incorrectly. If you have a quote of Patton saying something to that effect, that would be interesting to read.

Everything I've read indicates Patton was happy with the Houffalize target but frustrated with his rate of progress."

If Patton didn't believe the U.S army was being used incorrectly than I can only reduce my credit for him as a commander. But I'm sure I have read somewhere of his distaste for pushing the bulge, rather than destroying it. I will look.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

To all sides involved lets not let this thread turn into a name calling session okay.

 

[syscom3]

Plan_d, every general makes mistakes in a war.

And there is a lot of truth in the old saying "the side who makes the least mistakes in a war will win".

So I think it is very fair to say that Ike made far fewer mistakes than his opponents.

However no one has shown that Ike, Patton or Montgomery "blundered" in any battle or campaign in which the outcome was a defeat.

 

[drgondog]

Blunder - A gross, stupid or careless mistake.

It would be a matter of opinion if a mistake was small or great, but blunder doesn't have to change the course of the war. So, I don't believe I'm mixing anything up, syscom.

In my opinion Eisenhower made tactical and strategic mistakes which were serious; as the war could have been ended sooner. Market Garden was a serious mistake in the whole European campaign, it cost lives and time.

The German Ardennes Offensive was a mistake on the German side; I don't believe nor did I ever say that the U.S forces made a mistake. But what I do say is this; the U.S forces didn't show an overall great strength of defence (as has been stated) and the Allied (note: Not soley U.S) counter action was wrong.

"Now we have another Brit expert lecturing on the myriad deficiencies of the American soldier and commanders.

I have to sit back and ponder why Europe (and UK) is not speaking either German or Russian. From your point of view it certainly had nothing to do with US contribution.."

drgondog,

I can see that you are one of those people that believes the U.S can do no wrong. I advise not to take it personally if someone points out a fault in the U.S.

You don't see very well.

I made several comments regarding flawed American commanders, tactics and strategy in many other posts before this thread and our discussn of your point of view about the many other flaws I had forgotten.

I was the first between us to point out Mark Clark's and Lucas' performances in Italy so your comment regarding me as a US bigot is not just incorrect but continues to be intended insult. I didn't trot out the BS meter when you pontificated how Alexander would have easily defeated Kesslering when the bumbling American Generals traipsed through Rome. You had not one whit of a fact to base that speculation.

You have zero facts to base a comment that Montgomery could have executed Market Garden Successfully in Auguts but I let that pass.

You had not one shred of evidence to base a comment that the German thrust, was not only irrelevant to the war, but that it was just as irrelevant if it had gone all the way to Paris. You get my drift?

I did not flare when you carefully trashed Patton's reputation- I did not denigrate the British contribution on the North Flank despite the minimal percentage of Brit forces applied to the battle.

Your comment above is an example of your lecture style however and I must confess to being greatly irritated by what I perceive as a condescending view on your part, combined with making silly unsupported statements such as Market Garden 'works' in August.

When you assume a posture of a lecturer you should be more careful regarding not only the style but also the facts - I have that flaw myself but I confess I am in the presence of a master.

My anger was your comments that nothing that American troopers accomplished at Stavelot, Bastogne and St Vith was 'relevant' and that the thrusrt could have gone to Paris and still be 'irrelevant'

Here's my UNSUPPORTED speculation about the Relevance of the German attack at least going past the Muese. Extending that sir, means that had the Germans accomplished their objective with a drive to the Meuse or to Antwerp (or Paris) - the Allied timetable would have been set back 3-6 months if the US was simply forced to blow the fuel dumps to keep the Panzers from re-fueling.

The Russians were clever enough to thoughtfully delay crushing Berlin and running to the Rhine - the Alliance would have blown up as Eisenhower would have been fired and then insisted that Monty be sacked also.

At the least Austria and all of Germany come under USSR control, possibly Denmark - there is nothing much for the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe as a bulwark against Communist domination - the US loses interest at 'occupying Britain or fighting any more in Europe in WWII - a highly possible scenario to your 'irrelevance'?

Now your turn to trash that scenario and demonstrate that the defense and results achieved by American troopers was 'irrelevant' - I will listen to your explanation

From my point of view, I see that you're being childish and turning this discussion into a British vs. American argument about World War II. There's plenty of your fellow Americans on this board that know what my point of view is and I'm not anti-American. I'm not like you, I can give credit to other nations.

The fact of the matter is; you couldn't reply to single one of my comments and had to resort to attacks. Stop being a child.

Perhaps if you stop lecturing, stick to facts rather than conjecture on the 'irrelevance of the Bulge' and go back and re-read your posts and mine you will find a difference of opinion until the pretty silly remarks about the 'irrelevance of the fights at St Vith, Stavelot and Bastogne. Next examine your points that I did not rebut. I pointed out several examples but what was the point to rebutting your point of view that that you posed as facts with no facts? What is to rebut?

You may have a shorter memory than mine and mine is very short.

"Eisenhower wanted to cut the Germans off. The plan called for the American First and Third Armies to collapse the pocket at Houffalize, well behind the German front. Anyone who looks at a map of the battle will see that capturing Houffalize quickly would have achieved that goal.

Ike pushed Montgomery to launch the attack on 1-Jan. Monty felt it imprudent to move that quickly and didn't launch his attack until 3-Jan.

Monty's two day delay wasn't the proximate cause in the German forces escaping the collapsing pocket. A well executed German retreat was. However Monty's slow reaction was much more a contributing factor than Ike's supposed lack of vision."

jmf003,

Houffalize would have been a good target to ensure encirclement of a lot of the German forces but Eisenhower gave a target in the centre of the German bulge. His intention was to move to Houffalize from the front and sides which leads to the bulge being pushed out, not surrounded.

If Eisenhower truly wanted the bulge to be encircled the order would have been to take line from St. Vith - Wiltz. Montgomery shouldn't have delayed - you're certainly right and credit must be given to the German discipline in retreat. But Eisenhower should have given deeper targets than Houfalize but he knew it would lead to the bulge being pushed out.

"It is true that the BEF wasn't defending at the point of attack. However the BEF's invasion of Belgium was based on an expectation that the French lines would hold. The French collapse left the BEF's flank exposed and directly led to the near disaster at Dunkirk.

Surely the successful German attack through the Ardennes was a surprise to the BEF in any reasonable definition of "surprise." If not the BEF were completely bonkers to have invaded Belgium while expecting the Germans to make that position untenable."

The British were surprised to see the French collapse so quickly. But the BEF wasn't surprised to see an attack through that region; the fact that it succeeded was the surprise.


"This is more of a niggling point but most reports of the battle put the German troop count at 500,000, the American troop count at 600,000, the British troop count at 55,000, along with a smaller complement of Canadian, Belgian, and French troops.

With more than 90% of the Allied troops being American, it's not unreasonable for a person to suggest that the Americans stopped the Germans. Certainly 55,000 British troops on their own were not going to stop 500,000 Germans but 600,000 American troops on their own might have.

Stating that "the 1944 offensive was stopped by both the British and American forces" without mentioning the scale of British involvement is a bit misleading. And if it's a matter of honor to give Britain credit for its contributions in a minority role, why mention the British troops without mentioning the other nations?"

Fair enough statement, I should have mentioned the British in a minority role. As for mentioning every nationality involved in a fight, I'd rather spend my time doing other than things than listing almost every country in the world - I'll just say Allies from now on.

Why yes, given the proportions, the 80,000 casualties the US suffered in that battle (~50% of land casualties in ETO to inflict 200,000+ casualties on some of the best units the Wermacht had left), you might have mentioned that fact.. but it slipped your mind in your fervour to describe the 'irrelevance' Point of View?

"Yes, Patton wanted to cut off the Germans but, no, Patton did not feel that his Army was used incorrectly. If you have a quote of Patton saying something to that effect, that would be interesting to read.

Everything I've read indicates Patton was happy with the Houffalize target but frustrated with his rate of progress."

If Patton didn't believe the U.S army was being used incorrectly than I can only reduce my credit for him as a commander. But I'm sure I have read somewhere of his distaste for pushing the bulge, rather than destroying it. I will look.

We're delighted that you might re-examine your former contempt for Patton and re-adjust Your view of his reputation as a commander to a new low. It could only cement your reputation as a thoughtful and unbiased historian

Chris - for you I apologise for thinking you were a complete puss. Your last PM had more thought than the first one and I respect the way you handled it.

 

[lesofprimus]

Welcome back Mark, nice 2 see u again after these couple months...

 

[lesofprimus]

Glad u put that there Bill.... U know we cant have strife between the Mods and u lesser beings....

 

[drgondog]

Glad u put that there Bill.... U know we cant have strife between the Mods and u lesser beings....

Dan - let me tell you that I respect you above all others on this forum. Let me also tell you as a continuation that I bow to no man, no reference to how our parents raised us or passion for the contribution of American troopers in WWII - especially 504PIR or 8th AF. and i will not suffer the abundant fools that denigrate our contibutions in that war or any other.

Airborne all the way with a modest reference and respect to ****ing squid seals. we did it long before you and never failed our mission. If you want to understand why I was so pissed at D-Plan reference this comment.

Regards,

Bill Marshall

and for my sons - Sempi ****ing Fi

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Bill if you ever want to vent on something you know how to pm me. I am not the bad guy you may have thought I was. I think you will find we agree on more things than one.

I just have a job here as a moderator and I try to take that seriously.

 

[plan_D]

"I was the first between us to point out Mark Clark's and Lucas' performances in Italy so your comment regarding me as a US bigot is not just incorrect but continues to be intended insult. I didn't trot out the BS meter when you pontificated how Alexander would have easily defeated Kesslering when the bumbling American Generals traipsed through Rome. You had not one whit of a fact to base that speculation."

If you find it an insult, that's your problem. The problem I've got here is your continued effort to turn this into American vs. British style of argument; I never stated that Alexander would have easily defeated Kesslering - as Alexander and Keeslering had already faced off at Monte Cassino.

I have every fact to show the world that Mark Clark made a tremendous mistake in capturing Rome instead of cutting off the German retreat. Just because Mark Clark was American, it doesn't mean you need to take it as an insult. Nor do I believe I ever stated that American generals were bumbling in Italy - albeit I do believe Mark Clark was. A better general in Clark's position would have been William Simpson (who was a great general) - but then the U.S wouldn't have had him as U.S Ninth Army commander.

The simple fact that I believe the best Allied commander was Alexander, shouldn't be taken as an insult either. I'm sure your personal favourite would be American - while my best overall is German (Heinz Guderian - or maybe, Balck).

"You have zero facts to base a comment that Montgomery could have executed Market Garden Successfully in Auguts but I let that pass."

You mean aside from the fact that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions weren't in Arnhem and Nijmegen in early August? Without them the plan would have been a complete success - as they were the major blocking forces of the opposition.

I'll leave you with those for now, if you want evidence - just ask for it. Don't get your knickers in a twist. I'm going out now, I'll reply tomorrow ... just look forward to it.

Oh and Dan, thanks. I've been very busy with college and lots of overtime at work; first year went well - I've got extremely high grades (apparently I'm excellent at aerodynamics).

 

[syscom3]

I will have to agree that Mark Clarks capture of Rome and not encircling the German troops does constitute a blunder.

Once Southern France invasion in Aug 1944 was done, most of the allied troops in Italy should have been withdrawn and sent to France.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Great to hear about your grades Mark! Keep it up!

 

[Marcel]

"
"You have zero facts to base a comment that Montgomery could have executed Market Garden Successfully in Auguts but I let that pass."

You mean aside from the fact that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions weren't in Arnhem and Nijmegen in early August? Without them the plan would have been a complete success - as they were the major blocking forces of the opposition.

The general believe in holland is that Market Garden was just too late. Had it been done on september the 5th, the germans would 've been in full retreat. They totally panicked after the capture of Atwerp. It's called "dolle dinsdag", something like "crazy tuesday" in English. They wouldn't have had time to regroup.

 

[drgondog]

The general believe in holland is that Market Garden was just too late. Had it been done on september the 5th, the germans would 've been in full retreat. They totally panicked after the capture of Atwerp. It's called "dolle dinsdag", something like "crazy tuesday" in English. They wouldn't have had time to regroup.

Marcel, with respect, the problem with that statement and even yours is that is opinion. The prevailing opinion in August and September 1944 among the British and American Planners was that Operation Market Garden was going to succeed in September - but that was wrong wasn't it?

The next question to debate is 1.) why was an earlier date discarded, if even contemplated?, or 2.) was it feasible to plan and stage the forces earlier?

I don't know the answers but I do understand logistics in getting airborne armies educated to objectives, staged and moved - moreso in joint allied attacks. I'm not sure what two weeks meant but suspect more a.) staging fuel, and b.) organizing the airborne assault.

As to August -

opinion ---------> neither the 82nd or the 10st had absorbed the replacements, had re-equipped and were ready to go after the losses and relatively late departure from Normandy. I am not as familiar with British Airborne state of readiness but recall they disengaged earlier and had many fewer casualties in the Normandy campaign?

If you play what if game, how about what if the north flank of Falaise had been closed or Patton had not been ordered to stop?

 

[mkloby]

I've been very busy with college and lots of overtime at work; first year went well - I've got extremely high grades (apparently I'm excellent at aerodynamics).

Right on Marc. Have you gotten into aerodynamics regarding rotary wing flight yet? When I got into that load, it nearly fractured my skull! Good to see you back, though.

 

[trackend]

I believe that market Garden was far too hastily thought up and executed to have any real chance of total success. I feel that the amount of success achieved is down to the troops determination to carry out their missions despite being dealt a lousy hand from the generals.

 

[drgondog]

"I was the first between us to point out Mark Clark's and Lucas' performances in Italy so your comment regarding me as a US bigot is not just incorrect but continues to be intended insult. I didn't trot out the BS meter when you pontificated how Alexander would have easily defeated Kesslering when the bumbling American Generals traipsed through Rome. You had not one whit of a fact to base that speculation."

If you find it an insult, that's your problem. The problem I've got here is your continued effort to turn this into American vs. British style of argument;

I didn't find those comments insulting, merely uniformed and opinion based rather than fact based

Here is what I found insulting, and still do.

"So, defense at Bastogne, St Vith, Stavelot, etc or the Engineer's clever and effective small unit defenses at all the bridges in front of German armor was 'irrelevant' - it was all about 'Germans not well supplied and reserves"?

The defence of of those places was irrelevant, yes. The capture of Bastogne might have allowed the German forces to push a few more miles but no matter how far the Germans got, they were doomed to fail. The U.S forces could have just melted away and allowed the Germans to drive unhindered to Paris and they would have still failed.

I commented in a previous post that the notion of that defense being "irrelevant" was not only insulting to the 80,000 casualties, but had far reaching consequences to the duration of the war and the political framework of Europe - had the German Army succeeded in capturing the fuel dumps much less 'drive to Paris' as the other extreme of your 'irrelevancy' remark. The remark about Europeans speking Russian is a derivative of what I believe the consequences of not stopping the Germans where they were stopped

This isn't a Brit vs American issue - its about you and your lecturing style and the multitude of remarks that are interesting opinions but not fact based.

I'm willing to be convinced that you have facts but you haven't trotted them out yet.

Here are four Topics:
1. Demonstrate by fact that the Panzer Divisions would not have gotten past the Muese and on to Antwerp had the American units simply withdrawn and melted away versus what did happen at Stavelot, Bastogne and St.Vith Detail specifically how far the Panzers could go with no resistance until the point you define, as the master strategist, as the El Alemain of Belgium (or Paris). What is your 'coup de gras'?.

Oh, and leave out Patton move as this is about Americans melting away instead of attacking

2. Demonstrate by fact that the war would not have lasted at least 3 months more in Europe. Expand on the tactics that show beyond a shadow of a doubt that all of the Germans in the Bulge would be trapped and eliminated as you pose. Follow up with Geo Political consequences of a 3-6 month delay if your strategy can't be proven.

3. Demonstrate by fact that the Allies could have planned, supplied and trained the soldiers for the Market Garden attack in August - with particular detail on the airborne divisions. Cite references that Allied Planning knew where the 9th and 10th Panzer were in August and the knowledge that they 'were in panicked retreat' -

To a brilliant strategist like Monty it would have been simple to compel an earlier assault given the above knowledge and available assets? I think so - so why didn't it go forward much earlier? Is it possible that Monty didn't know where they were, and further didn't make that a red flag 'Risk'?

4. Demonstrate by fact how Alexander would have managed the thrust short of Rome to pivot and cut Kesslering off. Asuume you have all the assests available in Italy. Spend some time detailing the differences in terrain from the killing fields from Salerno all the way to Rome and the cleverness of Alexander to demonstrate that he could have managed this coup across the Italian backbone and cite the successes Alexander had against Kesslering in the mountains. Tell us what you do with the forces at Anzio?

Cite as examples other campaigns in other wars as well as WWII where fast attacks across mountains were successful?
You mean aside from the fact that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions weren't in Arnhem and Nijmegen in early August? Without them the plan would have been a complete success - as they were the major blocking forces of the opposition.

See the above remark on this
).

So, to be clear. I do not despise Brits. or Germans. or Japanese. I'm not happy about Nazi's or our far left politicians.

I think you (who happen by birth to be a Brit) made multiple unsubstantiated statements, and did denigrate the the actions of the 82nd, 27th, 101st/10 Armored, and the Engineers running around blowing up bridges to foil German Panzers everywhere, --- as 'irrelevant'.

I became angry at the last remark because you did not temper the remarks with a shred of irrefutable proof that those actions were in fact 'irrelevant'.

You have offered no thesis to show that absent such defense against incredible odds that the war would not have lasted at least three months more.

If you think that could not have been possible and demonstrate irrefutably that the war not only would not have lasted that long but beyond a shadow of a doubt would have resulted in quicker capitulation -

Then I will publically apologise for thinking you a 'expert Brit' that falls way short of being an expert. Remember, in this debate you are the lecturing authority.

 

[drgondog]

Right on Marc. Have you gotten into aerodynamics regarding rotary wing flight yet? When I got into that load, it nearly fractured my skull! Good to see you back, though.

Rotary Wing aero is a very specialized subsection of aero as is Ducted Fan.

I actually did my Aero Master's thesis on "The effect of centerbody geomety within a Ducted Fan or Rotor on thrust"..

the math model was all about distributing vortices in a ring/circle and using sources and sinks to provide the centerbody shape - with some interesting (admitted small population of 'interest') conclusions when a velocity distribution is generated..

The math and computer models on rotary wings were not very accurate in the late 60s.

Regards,

Bill

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Right on Marc. Have you gotten into aerodynamics regarding rotary wing flight yet? When I got into that load, it nearly fractured my skull! Good to see you back, though.

I found rotary wing very easy. Maybe because I grew up with it and learned about it in a Military School which you are doing as well at this very moment.

If you have any questions about rotary wing stuff you know how to get in touch with me Mark.

 

[pbfoot]

I learnt a lot about various battles here and having a vested interest in Falaise as the Lincoln and Welland Regiment is a local unit and had a uncle with it was heavily involved . My research shows that Bradley ordered Patton to halt
and here is my source with a qoute taken from it I hope I haven't taken this out of context
DECISION AT ARGENTAN
While the Canadians endeavored to resume their attack toward Falaise, the XV Corps drove north from Le Mans on 10 August and secured Alencon two days later. General Patton had set the corps objective at the army group boundary-north of Alencon and just south of Argentan-so Haislip's forces continued their attack. Since Patton's order had also directed preparation for a "further advance" beyond the army group boundary, and since the army group boundary seemed within reach, Haislip-on the basis of the "further advance" inferentially authorized-established Argentan as the new corps objective. With two armored divisions and two infantry divisions comprising his forces, Haislip judged that he could hold a solid shoulder between Alencon and Argentan, and with the Canadians, who were to reach Argentan from the north, thus encircle the German forces to the west. [13]

As the XV Corps attacked toward Argentan, General Haislip pointedly notified General Patton that he was about to capture the last objective furnished by the army commander. By implication, Haislip requested authority to proceed north of Argentan if the Canadians were not yet there. He suggested that additional troops be placed under his command so that he could block all the east-west roads under his control north of Alencon. [14]

Since the Canadians had made no further progress toward Falaise while the XV Corps had moved rapidly, Patton sent word for Haislip to go beyond Argentan. Haislip was to "push on slowly in the direction of Falaise." After reaching Falaise, Haislip was to "continue to push on slowly until ... contact [is made with] our Allies," the Canadians. [15] Attacking toward Argentan on the morning of 13 August, the XV Corps struck surprising resistance. The advance halted temporarily. But as the corps was preparing to make a renewed effort to get to and through Argentan, a surprising message came from the Third Army. General Bradley had forbidden further movement northward. General Patton had to order General Haislip to stop. Instead of continuing to the north to an eventual meeting with the Canadians, the XV Corps was to hold in place. less then 25miles separated Canadians and Americans-the Argentan-Falaise gap, through which the Germans tried to escape. Why Bradley did not allow Patton to let the XV Corps continue north and seal the Argentan-Falaise pocket is the main question of debate