Greatest military blunder of WWII

[drgondog]

I will have to agree that Mark Clarks capture of Rome and not encircling the German troops does constitute a blunder.

Once Southern France invasion in Aug 1944 was done, most of the allied troops in Italy should have been withdrawn and sent to France.

My first reaction is to agree Syscom. I'd have to ponder the after effect of the vacuum on the recently freed Italians. The German Army was not known for having Idle hands.

But Kesslering would not be a threat with no mobility to speak of and no access to move his remaining troops to a useful place except perhaps the Balkans - which might have slowed the USSR.

I suspect the notion was contemplated and rejected for political reasons.

Regards

Bill

 

[drgondog]

I learnt a lot about various battles here and having a vested interest in Falaise as the Lincoln and Welland Regiment is a local unit and had a uncle with it was heavily involved . My research shows that Bradley ordered Patton to halt
and here is my source with a qoute taken from it I hope I haven't taken this out of context
DECISION AT ARGENTAN
While the Canadians endeavored to resume their attack toward Falaise, the XV Corps drove north from Le Mans on 10 August and secured Alencon two days later. General Patton had set the corps objective at the army group boundary-north of Alencon and just south of Argentan-so Haislip's forces continued their attack. Since Patton's order had also directed preparation for a "further advance" beyond the army group boundary, and since the army group boundary seemed within reach, Haislip-on the basis of the "further advance" inferentially authorized-established Argentan as the new corps objective. With two armored divisions and two infantry divisions comprising his forces, Haislip judged that he could hold a solid shoulder between Alencon and Argentan, and with the Canadians, who were to reach Argentan from the north, thus encircle the German forces to the west. [13]

As the XV Corps attacked toward Argentan, General Haislip pointedly notified General Patton that he was about to capture the last objective furnished by the army commander. By implication, Haislip requested authority to proceed north of Argentan if the Canadians were not yet there. He suggested that additional troops be placed under his command so that he could block all the east-west roads under his control north of Alencon. [14]

Since the Canadians had made no further progress toward Falaise while the XV Corps had moved rapidly, Patton sent word for Haislip to go beyond Argentan. Haislip was to "push on slowly in the direction of Falaise." After reaching Falaise, Haislip was to "continue to push on slowly until ... contact [is made with] our Allies," the Canadians. [15] Attacking toward Argentan on the morning of 13 August, the XV Corps struck surprising resistance. The advance halted temporarily. But as the corps was preparing to make a renewed effort to get to and through Argentan, a surprising message came from the Third Army. General Bradley had forbidden further movement northward. General Patton had to order General Haislip to stop. Instead of continuing to the north to an eventual meeting with the Canadians, the XV Corps was to hold in place. less then 25miles separated Canadians and Americans-the Argentan-Falaise gap, through which the Germans tried to escape. Why Bradley did not allow Patton to let the XV Corps continue north and seal the Argentan-Falaise pocket is the main question of debate

Bradley says in Soldiers Story that he was ordered by Montgomery to halt at the assigned objective and let the Canadians continue toward XV Corps. I'm going to look at Blumenson's Patton Diaries to see if more is said.

Arthur Bryant author of Triumph in the West, based on Alanbrooke's Diaries, goes into great detail regarding the events and dialogues between Monty and Ike and Bradley - but strangely silent on the failure to close the 25 mile gap.

 

[syscom3]

...
But Kesslering would not be a threat with no mobility to speak of and no access to move his remaining troops to a useful place except perhaps the Balkans - which might have slowed the USSR.
....

I would say having enough troops in Italy to keep the Germans busy would be preferable, but the bulk of the land forces should have been sent to France and used to invade the German homeland (or even drive eastwards and try to cut off Kesselring in the Po valley.)

Either way, once the allied armies were on the German border, Italy became a sideshow and irrelevant.

 

[plan_D]

Syscom,

"I will have to agree that Mark Clarks capture of Rome and not encircling the German troops does constitute a blunder.

Once Southern France invasion in Aug 1944 was done, most of the allied troops in Italy should have been withdrawn and sent to France."

The original plan of Alexander was for the British 8th Army to move up Route 6 through Cassino and on to Frosione while the U.S II Corps moved up Route 7 toward the U.S VI Corps who were to breakout of the Anzio bridgehead. The U.S VI Corps were supposed to breakout and move east to Route 6 to cut off the German 10th Army who were to be retreating after the battle for Cassino.
The idea was that an encirclement of the German 10th Army would allow Allied forces to capture the Po Valley with relative ease and then move through the Ljubljana Gap to reach Vienna before the Russians.

Instead, Mark Clark wanted to gain glory and ordered his men north to capture Rome before the British. He believed that Alexander was trying to rob him of his 'prize'. So insane was Clark that he even ordered his troops to fire on any British trying to reach Rome. Clark got his prize when the U.S 88th Blue Devils division entered Rome, allowing the German Army to escape up Route 6 with the British 8th Army in pursuit. Turning north before Rome the German forces set up the Gothic Line just north of Florence which held the Allies in Italy until April 1945.

I must point out that in the area of operations only Route 6 and 7 were large enough to take the armies of both sides north with any pace - and were vital for movement.

I don't know what capturing Vienna would have achieved in the long run, or how Germany would have reacted to this new front but I can safely say that by allowing the German Tenth Army to escape; Mark Clark spent more lives of his men just for glory and allowed a campaign that should have been over before christmas 1944 to drag on 'til the end of the war.

If drgondog, you want anymore information about Italy - I will happily provide more facts and thoughts.

On to Market Garden -

"The prevailing opinion in August and September 1944 among the British and American Planners was that Operation Market Garden was going to succeed in September - but that was wrong wasn't it?"

You are right, it was wrong. The presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions doomed the operation to failure.

"The next question to debate is 1.) why was an earlier date discarded, if even contemplated?, or 2.) was it feasible to plan and stage the forces earlier?"

Montgomery did consider the operation earlier. The plan of Eisenhower was to clear Pas de Calais and Antwerp to shorten the supply lines, however Patton wanted to advance on the Siegfried Line with greater speed. Eisenhower gave the priority to 21st Army Group but spread the supplies across both Army Groups - allowing no decisive thrust.

In the event, Montgomery made an advance of 250 miles in one week to take Antwerp and Brussels. He was in a position to proceed with Market Garden then - the 1st Allied Airborne Army was ready on the 4th September. Montgomery made his plan on the capture of Antwerp and proposed it on the 9th; it should have been proposed earlier.

If Montgomery were supplied a little better, and he urged his troops forward just that little bit more Market Garden could have been ready at least a week earlier. As it was Eisenhower was being indecisive with his supplies and Montgomery failed to make Antwerp operational because 11th Armoured Division failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary.

The forces were ready but a collection of indecision on the commanders and position of troops at the time made the operation begin on the 17th September.

"As to August -

opinion ---------> neither the 82nd or the 10st had absorbed the replacements, had re-equipped and were ready to go after the losses and relatively late departure from Normandy. I am not as familiar with British Airborne state of readiness but recall they disengaged earlier and had many fewer casualties in the Normandy campaign?

If you play what if game, how about what if the north flank of Falaise had been closed or Patton had not been ordered to stop?"

The 1st Allied Airborne Army would have been ready to make the drop by the 4th September; if not earlier. I'm not playing the "what if?" game; I'm simply saying that the plan was a decisive and far reaching idea. If the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions weren't there; we would all be praising Montgomery for a genius idea. He should have listened to his intelligence and called the operation off but for me it shows Montgomery's quality in strategic thought.

As for the "zero facts" on August part; the only reason the plan failed was because of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer - if Montgomery was given priority and pushed his forces over the Seine on the 26th August toward Arnhem - the SS Panzers would not have been present to hold the advance.

On the college subject; No I haven't done rotary wing yet - that's next year. I did eight units in the first year, achieved merits on six and distinctions on two. It's good to finally get back to the debates - I've been reading about the British Isles naval forces recently from 616 AD - 1815 (I've only just finished the American War though). So I might just start bringing up some subjects about the naval war of the War of Independance (or American War).

I shall deal with the Ardennes Offensive in another post.

 

[plan_D]

"1. Demonstrate by fact that the Panzer Divisions would not have gotten past the Muese and on to Antwerp had the American units simply withdrawn and melted away versus what did happen at Stavelot, Bastogne and St.Vith Detail specifically how far the Panzers could go with no resistance until the point you define, as the master strategist, as the El Alemain of Belgium (or Paris). What is your 'coup de gras'?.

Oh, and leave out Patton move as this is about Americans melting away instead of attacking"

I must not have been precise; the strategy should have been for the U.S 1st Army to melt away to a position favourable for defence - maybe the Meuse crossings.

I never stated that the German units would not reach the Meuse crossings, on the contrary, without the resistance at Bastogne the German spearhead could have probably reached Namur - if not further. However, the German forces could only go as far as their supplies and reserves would allow.

In my mind, the U.S 1st Army could have retreated to the Meuse and hold them there. With the Germans drawn into the trap, the U.S 3rd Army and U.S 9th Army could simply aim to meet at Dasburg - cutting the German advance off from Germany. Even if the German forces advanced through Namur, they would only drive themselves further into a pincer.

If the situation became dire, the British XXX Corps was present to provide a blocking force for the Meuse (as did happen).

As for "Oh, and leave out Patton move as this is about Americans melting away instead of attacking"

I never stated Patton should not have attacked; don't try and dictate the terms of the discussion it'll be fruitless.

"Demonstrate by fact that the war would not have lasted at least 3 months more in Europe. Expand on the tactics that show beyond a shadow of a doubt that all of the Germans in the Bulge would be trapped and eliminated as you pose. Follow up with Geo Political consequences of a 3-6 month delay if your strategy can't be proven."

Since the possibilites of a different strategy cannot be 100% proven then that's nigh impossible. I can only give you an idea; and let you think for yourself.

If the Germans were allowed to continue their meagre five divisions of reserve would not have been enough to hold off the U.S 9th and 3rd Armies at the base of the offensive. If the U.S armies would have met at Dasburg, the German armies in the Ardennes would have had no avenue for retreat.

I don't see how a couple more days in the Ardennes to destroy an army could result in a 3 - 6 month delay in the war; on the contrary had the Allies encircled the German army it would have shortened the war.

I'd advise a look at the maps, the position and strength of the German troops would have been hopeless against a concentrated attack at the base of the offensive. The real counter blow was made from the tip and all sides of the bulge, which forced it out.

"3. Demonstrate by fact that the Allies could have planned, supplied and trained the soldiers for the Market Garden attack in August - with particular detail on the airborne divisions. Cite references that Allied Planning knew where the 9th and 10th Panzer were in August and the knowledge that they 'were in panicked retreat' -

To a brilliant strategist like Monty it would have been simple to compel an earlier assault given the above knowledge and available assets? I think so - so why didn't it go forward much earlier? Is it possible that Monty didn't know where they were, and further didn't make that a red flag 'Risk'?"

I've already given the reasons why the plan didn't go ahead in August. As for the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions, the Allies knew there was armour in Arnhem before Market Garden so it seems that Monty discarded the Panzer Divisions as just another obstacle that can be overcome. It's hindsight that provides the knowledge that the 9th and 10th weren't there in August.

"4. Demonstrate by fact how Alexander would have managed the thrust short of Rome to pivot and cut Kesslering off. Asuume you have all the assests available in Italy. Spend some time detailing the differences in terrain from the killing fields from Salerno all the way to Rome and the cleverness of Alexander to demonstrate that he could have managed this coup across the Italian backbone and cite the successes Alexander had against Kesslering in the mountains. Tell us what you do with the forces at Anzio?

Cite as examples other campaigns in other wars as well as WWII where fast attacks across mountains were successful?"

I've already said what Clark should have done and was told to do. It's obvious that he had the chance as the U.S II Corps crossed over to Route 6 two days before the capture of Rome. Had Clark sent his VI Corps over they would have captured Kesslering.

The map provided shows the position that II Corps reached on 2nd June, Valmontone. It's clear that the roadways leading to Valomtone were large and VI Corps had every chance to reach the town (and Route 6) to block the German Tenth Army.

On the 25th May, Clark made the decision to turn north and drive up Route 7 (Highway 7 on the map) to take Rome instead. I can't say much more but if it took II Corps from 25th to 2nd June to reach Valomtone from Borgo Grappa, then isn't it feasible to suggest (as everyone has done since World War II) that VI Corps could have reached that town given a concentrated effort.

It's not a matter of the Italian backbone or fast campaigns across mountains in other wars; just look for yourself. Alexander made the plan, Clark failed to abide by it and the Tenth Army got away - face the facts.

 

[Soren]

Good to hear from you again Plan_D, and I'm happy to hear about your good grades in aerodynamics, the most interesting subject IMO Keep up the good work !

 

[Emac44]

You had not added the Malayan and Singapore defeat from December 1941 to February 1942 suffered by the Commonwealth and England. The Fall of Malaya and Singapore. In my mind is the greatest Military defeat in WW2

 

[FLYBOYJ]

You had not added the Malayan and Singapore defeat from December 1941 to February 1942 suffered by the Commonwealth and England. The Fall of Malaya and Singapore. In my mind is the greatest Military defeat in WW2

I just completed "Bloody Shambles Vol. I" and I have to agree....

 

[trackend]

I said the same EM at the beginning of this thread I totally agree. A total mess. The storys of commanders drinking tea while the causeway was under attack is one I have heard from a few time serving lads who spent the rest of the war suffering in POW camps under the honorable sons of nippons boots

::The fall of Singapore::

 

[syscom3]

I would also include the fall of the Philipines as part of the blunders in Malaya and Singapore.

 

[trackend]

I don't think it came on the scale of Singapore conversely the dead opposite can be said about the defense put up at Wake Island one of the great heroic actions of WW2 they could have done with some of those leaders at Singapore.

 

[timshatz]

Flyboy J, if you got to the back of the "Bloody Shambles" book (not sure which of the three it is in, maybe the second), there is a report written by a relatively junior officer (I believe he was a Wing Commander) in the RAAF that is absolutely scathing in it's analysis of the high command in Far East. Very informative.

As for Singapore, definitely a blunder but, oddly enough, not with enormous long term significance. It seems everyone (except Winston) thought Singapore would fall. At least the better officers back in England. From what I've read of the Bloody Shambles series, it was something of a dumping ground for second rate or underperforming officers. And nobody was interested in working hard. Work day was from 7:30 am to noon. Rest of the day was off. Even with the Japanese on the horizon, nothing changed.

The Phillipines was a different matter. Doug was caught flatfooted. He had changed the strategy around from a long defense in Bataan to forward defense on the beaches. In the end, neither strategy worked (although he did keep Bataan defenses active until April and Corregidor until May) as he was in the middle of the move when the attack happened. Also, the Japanese were on a war footing right away, it took a while for the US forces to get it together. The Japanese had more trouble with the Phillipines than they expected. They thought it would fall faster.

 

[trackend]

You're probably right TS however I think the loss of nearly 100,000 men did have long term effects as they all had to be replaced.

 

[timshatz]

You're probably right TS however I think the loss of nearly 100,000 men did have long term effects as they all had to be replaced.

Good point. If there is anything that bothers me about Singapore (once I get past the losers who were in command), it's the Australians who got there just in time to surrender.

It was a monumental failure of command. I think of it less as a blunder than as incompetence in the extreme. Read the "Bloody Shambles" series. Someone recommended it to me on this board and they were right. Great series.

 

[syscom3]

What was even worse was the waste of men and material in defense of the Dutch East Indies!

BTW, I was the one who first recommended everyone to that book series.

 

[Marcel]

What was even worse was the waste of men and material in defense of the Dutch East Indies!

On that I totally agree. At least from a militairy point of view. They should have withdrawn. The battle of the Java sea was total a waste of men and material. But it's comprehensible considering the position the dutch were in. It was the last of the free dutch soil (colonies of course but considered at the time). They had nowhere to run to, so they tried to make a stand. The dutch owe a lot to those US and Commonwealth soldiers who tried to help them, although it hardly made any difference.

 

[timshatz]

BTW, I was the one who first recommended everyone to that book series.

Then let me be one of the first to say, "Good call".

 

[timshatz]

On that I totally agree. At least from a militairy point of view. They should have withdrawn. The battle of the Java sea was total a waste of men and material. But it's comprehensible considering the position the dutch were in. It was the last of the free dutch soil (colonies of course but considered at the time). They had nowhere to run to, so they tried to make a stand. The dutch owe a lot to those US and Commonwealth soldiers who tried to help them, although it hardly made any difference.

Sad chapter in the history of WW2 but once the Japanese took over French IndoChina (without any fighting), the writing was on the wall for the rest of the European colonies out there. At least for anyone who studied the Japanese and their actions from the start of the century. They were going after the Malay Penisula as well as Borneo and other islands of Indonesia. The Dutch really had nowhere to go. They had no industrial base, no real income, next to nothing. They did the best they could with what they had, and continued to fight the Japanese throughout the war in the Pacific. But they were up against the wall from the start.

I've read that Roosevelt would've let them invade and take those possessions without a fight if they did not attack the US or US Possessions (ie, the Phillipines). In 1941, the US was playing for time. Needed all we could get. Turns out, we didn't get enough.

While Roosevelt would've let the Japanese attack past the Phillipines, I doubt the Japanese had any serious considerations of doing so. With the PI directly astride their lines of communications (and held by the largest power in the Pacific), it was one of the first places that had to be attacked.

 

[Bernhart]

Not sure this could be considered a milatary blunder but Hitler taking over operations all by his lonesome has got to be a huge mistake.

 

[Njaco]

Thats a good one. Missed it. definately a major blunder.