Greatest WWII Military Commanders: Updated

[starling]

well,all i can find,as well as others,is no specific dates for the ultra intell,just remarks on google,etc.
my personal opinion is that rommel was simply out generalled,by monty,when rommel attacked medenine.i did find a site quoting monty,he expected rommel to lash out at 8th army,because rommel undrstood that supplying large formations was indeed very difficult.i believe rommels intel said 51st highland div and 7th armd div,were the 2 formations,leading 8th army.
unfortunately for rommel,monty did pre-empt him,and bought up other units, new zealand div and 4th armd bde,and thoroughly defeated rommel,and his africa corps,who had all sworn allegance to hitler.
i never mentioned patton,although i have nothing but praise for him,he was perhaps the finest cavalry general in the allied line up.yours,starling.p.s.i just wish we knew the so called ultra dates.

 

[parsifal]

suggest you read the article I attached to my last post. The allies were receiving direct battlefield advantages in the latter stages of the NA campaign, and specifically from Alam halfa and onwards.

Also Rommel was not even in direct control of the formation, nor was it even his own plan. He is guilty of simply acquiescing, and allowing German units to be committed to the attack.

Finally, medennine was only ever meant to be a spoiling attack, which it partially was. It allowed the axis two weeks grace, in which to get into position, and then resist the allies push, with Italian units, for the most part, no less

 

[Bigxiko]

my vote is with Rommel and Montgomery

 

[starling]

all the wiki info suggests rommel was indeed in command of the forces;10pz div,15pz div,21pz div,90th light div,164 div and italian units,that attacked monty,although google suggests rommmel was a bit sickly.
but we must also remember that monty was gatherng supplies with which to attack mareth.yours,starling

 

[starling]

this battle was imho the best-executed brief defensive battle of ww2.invigorated by their spectacular performance at kasserine,rommel and messe,concentrated the africa corps and 10th pz div,in the matmata hills,while mounting a feint attack by mobile infantry from the north.the axis attack was a disaster.starling.

 

[starling]

so,does anyone know the o.o.b for montys attack at the mareth line.i know the 4th indian div,less one bde,was present in the british attack.starling.

 

[parsifal]

Medennine was a carefully prepred and sucessful defensive battle, but it is contentious to say it was the best defensive battle of the war. There are a lot of battles, long and short, fought defensively that many might argue are comparable

To name a few, in no particular order

Kerala
Kokoda
Cassino
Alam Halfa
Stalingrad
Kursk (Russian)
Bataan
Guadacanal
Bastogne
British defence at Arnhem
Rommels defensive/offensive battles at Gazala, and earlier against battleaxe
Defence Of Tobruk
American defensive at midway
American CAP defences at Phil Sea
Japanese defence at okinawa

Etc etc

 

[Danielmellbin]

I've gone with the best as I see them from each Country.

Mannstein
Patton
Yamamoto
Montgomery
Lascar (not on list - Romania)
Mannerheim
Messe (not on list - Italy)
Juin (not on list - France)
Anders (not on list - Poland)
Zhukov
Blamey (not on list - Australia)
Freyberg (not on list - New Zealand (inspite of his blunder at Crete))
Smuts (not on list - South Africa)
Veress (not on list - Hungary)

But the best of the best is IMO still by far Mannstein.

 

[Danielmellbin]

Medennine was a carefully prepred and sucessful defensive battle, but it is contentious to say it was the best defensive battle of the war. There are a lot of battles, long and short, fought defensively that many might argue are comparable

To name a few, in no particular order

Kerala
Kokoda
Cassino
Alam Halfa
Stalingrad
Kursk (Russian)
Bataan
Guadacanal
Bastogne
British defence at Arnhem
Rommels defensive/offensive battles at Gazala, and earlier against battleaxe
Defence Of Tobruk
American defensive at midway
American CAP defences at Phil Sea
Japanese defence at okinawa

Etc etc

Stalingrad and Bastogne have to take my prize here (perhaps Cassino aswell)!

 

[Freebird]

I've gone with the best as I see them from each Country.

Mannstein
Patton
Yamamoto
Montgomery
Lascar (not on list - Romania)
Mannerheim
Messe (not on list - Italy)
Juin (not on list - France)
Anders (not on list - Poland)
Zhukov
Blamey (not on list - Australia)
Freyberg (not on list - New Zealand (inspite of his blunder at Crete))
Smuts (not on list - South Africa)
Veress (not on list - Hungary)

But the best of the best is IMO still by far Mannstein.

Good choice of Freyburg - but why do you say "blunder at Crete"? He did the best he could with very inadequate air, armour material resources. {They did not even have enough shovels to dig foxholes! Did you mean to say "failure" instead of blunder?

Good choice of Smuts, although he was not really a military leader, he would be a good choice on the other "political leader" poll.

 

[Danielmellbin]

Good choice of Freyburg - but why do you say "blunder at Crete"? He did the best he could with very inadequate air, armour material resources. {They did not even have enough shovels to dig foxholes! Did you mean to say "failure" instead of blunder?

With the ULTRA available to him - it should have been the first large scale German defeat of the war IMO. In "Crete - the battle and resistance" Anthony Beevor speculates that he misread the ULTRA messages and that this caused him to be preoccupied with seaborne landings - instead of launching an attack at Maleme airfield in time. All the German paradrops where a disaster - except the one at Maleme. And a counterattack at this airfield would have doomed the german operation. Sadly Freyberg would not release reserves or troops guarding the beaches. And in turn the 2nd Mountain division was airlanded in and turned the tide.

 

[Freebird]

With the ULTRA available to him - it should have been the first large scale German defeat of the war IMO. In "Crete - the battle and resistance" Anthony Beevor speculates that he misread the ULTRA messages and that this caused him to be preoccupied with seaborne landings - instead of launching an attack at Maleme airfield in time. All the German paradrops where a disaster - except the one at Maleme. And a counterattack at this airfield would have doomed the german operation. Sadly Freyberg would not release reserves or troops guarding the beaches. And in turn the 2nd Mountain division was airlanded in and turned the tide.

Hmm. Well Seaborne landings were a serious threat, but the invasion fleet was caught by the RN with heavy casualties.

I had read that one of the subordinates "lost his nerve" and failed to push the Para's back. I will have to look that one up though.

 

[Danielmellbin]

Hmm. Well Seaborne landings were a serious threat, but the invasion fleet was caught by the RN with heavy casualties.

I had read that one of the subordinates "lost his nerve" and failed to push the Para's back. I will have to look that one up though.

Well - if ULTRA had not been available seaborne landings might have been a threat. But ULTRA signals sent to Freyberg clearly stated that the main threat was airborne and that seaborne landings would only be diversionary. Furthermore the trip from Greece took more than 12 hrs and at night the agressive RN "ruled the waves". The boats that sailed from Greece where found in pitch darkness and slaughtered along with their single destroyer escort (the soldiers in liferafts where then machine gunned and depthcharged by orders of the commanding Brittish officer - taking revenge for the past days losses). Yea some subordinates lost their nerve - but none that had any decisive influence on the battle when compared to the failure to not order an attack on Maleme.

The reason I do not think of Freyberg as a poor commander (far from it) is that agree with Anthony Beavors assesment that he must have misunderstood the messages he recieved (and remember only he was allowed to read them). Other than that he was a very capable and sympathetic field commander who's only weakness IMO was an odd hesitation to replace poor performing officers serving under him (rumor has it that he was a man who wanted to be loved by all).

 

[Freebird]

Other than that he was a very capable and sympathetic field commander who's only weakness IMO was an odd hesitation to replace poor performing officers serving under him (rumor has it that he was a man who wanted to be loved by all).

This may indeed be the case.

In the overall picture Freyberg was left "holding the bag" for a truly foolhardy mission pushed by Churchill Eden, for a Greek intervention that the underequipped British Army was not capable of, and which the Greeks themselves did not want.


IMO the main loss was in Greece where the Allies lost all of their heavy equip. I would rate the battle in Crete almost a draw, because most of the Allied troops were evacuated, while the German para's suffered such heavy losses that they weren't used in Malta or Azores, far more important targets.

 

[Danielmellbin]

This may indeed be the case.

In the overall picture Freyberg was left "holding the bag" for a truly foolhardy mission pushed by Churchill Eden, for a Greek intervention that the underequipped British Army was not capable of, and which the Greeks themselves did not want.


IMO the main loss was in Greece where the Allies lost all of their heavy equip. I would rate the battle in Crete almost a draw, because most of the Allied troops were evacuated, while the German para's suffered such heavy losses that they weren't used in Malta or Azores, far more important targets.

I agree - Greece was a doomed cause - and an expensive PR job to put it bluntly. The overkill employed by the Germans in the Balkans theatre meant that any ammount of Brittish reinforcements wouldn't have helped. Much less when keeping an eye on what it cost in the fragile desert war. However making a show of standing by Greece - yet another fall to the axis - was probably important in the bigger world political view.

 

[Freebird]

I agree - Greece was a doomed cause - and an expensive PR job to put it bluntly. The overkill employed by the Germans in the Balkans theatre meant that any ammount of Brittish reinforcements wouldn't have helped. Much less when keeping an eye on what it cost in the fragile desert war. However making a show of standing by Greece - yet another fall to the axis - was probably important in the bigger world political view.

A very interesting topic {there must be a thread on it} IMHO, the answer is to send about 1 well equipped division to Crete, and nothing to Greece. Send a generous batch of supplies to the Greeks {AT rifles, AA guns Artillery etc} and about 2 squadrons of RAF Hurricanes to contest the air. if the situation falls apart the Hurri's can always withdraw.

Transfer as many squadrons of Hampdens, Whitleys Wellingtons to Crete as will fit, and start heavy night bombing of the Italian Adriatic ports to help interdict the re-supply of Albania. The night bombing in 1941 is nearly useless at hitting anything except ports, so it won't make any difference to the northern effort

 

[Danielmellbin]

A very interesting topic {there must be a thread on it} IMHO, the answer is to send about 1 well equipped division to Crete, and nothing to Greece. Send a generous batch of supplies to the Greeks {AT rifles, AA guns Artillery etc} and about 2 squadrons of RAF Hurricanes to contest the air. if the situation falls apart the Hurri's can always withdraw.

Transfer as many squadrons of Hampdens, Whitleys Wellingtons to Crete as will fit, and start heavy night bombing of the Italian Adriatic ports to help interdict the re-supply of Albania. The night bombing in 1941 is nearly useless at hitting anything except ports, so it won't make any difference to the northern effort

I totally agree on your asessment of what would have been the best solution. But saying "Thanks for being on our side - but sorry we can't help" to the Greeks wouldn't exactly have helped the allied cause much.

 

[Freebird]

I totally agree on your asessment of what would have been the best solution. But saying "Thanks for being on our side - but sorry we can't help" to the Greeks wouldn't exactly have helped the allied cause much.

In fact this is what the Greeks preffered! They would much rather have supplies than troops! It was only after some heavy persuasion that the Greeks reluctantly agreed to have British troops on the mainland. Metaxas assumed {correctly} that British troops landing would guarantee that Hitler would invade with the maximum effort.

Hey how about Metaxas as Greek leader?

Anyways, a significant bombing effort would probably do more to hamper the Italian war effort than any ground troops sent to Greece. And the Hurricanes deployed to contest the air would be a very visible show of support. Meanwhile the Desert Army could make much quicker work of the Italians in Africa, a real solid benefit.

 

[Danielmellbin]

In fact this is what the Greeks preffered! They would much rather have supplies than troops! It was only after some heavy persuasion that the Greeks reluctantly agreed to have British troops on the mainland. Metaxas assumed {correctly} that British troops landing would guarantee that Hitler would invade with the maximum effort.

Hey how about Metaxas as Greek leader?

Anyways, a significant bombing effort would probably do more to hamper the Italian war effort than any ground troops sent to Greece. And the Hurricanes deployed to contest the air would be a very visible show of support. Meanwhile the Desert Army could make much quicker work of the Italians in Africa, a real solid benefit.

Metaxas - Don't really know alot about him. Yihaa - a new subject to read about years of geeking through WW2 books makes it hard to find new subjects

Yea - the Greeks made the right assesment (well - Hitler would have squashed them anyway - but the Brittish forces neither helped nor made it worse). However again - I think that the bigger picture was what made the difference in making the brits so persistent.

I Remember reading that Churchill and certain brittish commanders believed that the balkan front could hold on and even make offensive moves by combining the 2 million strong Yugoslav army (impressive number but horribly trained, placed, equipped and motivated) , the greek army and brittish and commonwealth forces. However I'll want to see that statement from more than one source before I believe it.

 

[Freebird]

Metaxas - Don't really know alot about him. Yihaa - a new subject to read about years of geeking through WW2 books makes it hard to find new subjects

Yea - the Greeks made the right assesment (well - Hitler would have squashed them anyway - but the Brittish forces neither helped nor made it worse). However again - I think that the bigger picture was what made the difference in making the brits so persistent.

I Remember reading that Churchill and certain british commanders believed that the balkan front could hold on and even make offensive moves by combining the 2 million strong Yugoslav army (impressive number but horribly trained, placed, equipped and motivated) , the greek army and brittish and commonwealth forces. However I'll want to see that statement from more than one source before I believe it.

Churchill had very poor strategic sense, he often ignored good advice from the Generals.

In fact {IIRC} Metaxas was quite old, it was only after he passed away that the UK convinced the Greeks to allow their troops in. And I disagree, the arrival of the Brits made Hitler send a much larger force, he didn't want to allow them to get set up on the continent.

Brooke had the smartest approach to this question, the Brits simply were not ready or properly equipped for this operation, and it was foolish to "let up" on a beaten enemy {the Italians in N.Africa} to switch to a different front. This would only allow the beaten Italians time to rebuild, and would probably result in both operations failing. {Which is exactly what happened}