Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Only after the US entered the war. Before that it was the British and its commonwealths that held the torch in NA.
Greatest WWII Military Commanders: Updated
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parsifal
Colonel
so you would agree,before alexander and the 8th army ambled up,eisenhouer was ground forces commander in tunisia.yours,starling
No, Eisenhower was the theatre commander, in command of the overall assets, land, sea, and air. he also had certain authority viz a viz political events, particualrly with respect to negotiating with the Vichy forces, and the free French Forces, and theresistance fighters as well
There are really two phases in the Allied command structure for the north african campaign, with a major re-organization occurring after the defeats at kasserine.
Victory at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers gave the United States Army and its British ally solid toeholds in the western Mediterranean Theater of Operations. But it offered no guarantee of easy access to Italy or southern Europe, or even to the eastern end of the Mediterranean, where the British desperately needed assistance to secure Egypt and strategic resources in the Near East. The sudden entrance of American forces during 8-11 November 1942 created an awkward deployment in which two pairs of opposing armies fought in North Africa, one in Tunisia, the other in Libya. Neither Axis nor Allies found any satisfaction in the situation; much fighting remained before either adversary could consider North Africa secure.
At this p[oint, the ground forces commanders were Anderson (in charge of 1st Army), and Fredendall (I think, in charge of US II Corps), later Juin would join, in comand of XIX French Corps
The awkward command structure forced on Eisenhower following the Torch landings contributed significantly to the slow progress of the allis in western africa.
The apparent progress of the allies in the theatre belied a string of muddled operations and stinging reverses. Frustrated and furious, Eisenhower wrote a scathing description of Allied performance in the Tunisia Campaign. To Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall he confided his view that American and British operations had thus far managed to violate every accepted tactical principle of warfare and would be condemned in the military school system for decades to come .
While Eisenhower struggled to contain squabbles on the Allied side, the Germans hit Sidi Bou Zid, ten miles beyond Faid. With over 200 tanks on both sides, a huge, drawn-out battle appeared in the making. But US armor was spread too thin, and the panzers punched through in only one day. An ineffective counterattack the next day and the stunning capture of some 1,400 troops forced the US to undertake a major withdrawal. As the 1st Armored Division fell back, enemy pressure eased. However, on the 16th the Germans resumed their westward push, seizing Sbeitla, twenty-five miles beyond Sidi Bou Zid. Again the Americans scrambled back to establish a new defensive position, this time at Kasserine Pass. Four days of successive defeats cost II Corps dearly. The Americans lost 2,546 missing, 103 tanks, 280 vehicles, 18 field guns, 3 antitank guns, and 1 antiaircraft battery.
The succession of II Corps defeats did not end with the loss of Sbeitla. Rommel saw the opportunity to keep his battered adversary reeling with a push for an even bigger prize: Kasserine Pass, gateway to Algeria. Adding the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions to his German-Italian Panzer Army, Rommel struck the II Corps on 19 February. By the next afternoon the pass was in Axis hands. Only the valiant stands of individual battalions and companies on isolated hilltops interrupted Rommel's progress. As an alarming indication of falling morale, American troops abandoned huge stocks of equipment. In a final insult, the disastrous series of defeats was ended not by stiffening American resolve but by a shift in Axis priorities. Concerned that the British Eighth Army might attack from Libya while he was moving west, Rommel turned back to the east.
The conduct of Allied operations in both northern Tunisia in December 1942 and the central mountain ranges in February 1943 forced a total reexamination of Allied organization and plans. In short order General Eisenhower restructured the Allied command and changed key personnel. A new command—the 18th Army Group under British General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander—tightened operational control over the combat corps and armies of the three Allied nations. With the British Eighth Army now close enough to the Allied southern flank to affect Axis operations, the three national commands in Tunisia narrowed their battlefronts and shifted north. Because the U.S. II Corps had taken high casualties and lost so much equipment during the February battles, and—in the British view— shown tactical incompetence, the Americans were to play a role auxiliary to the British in the next phase of the campaign. Accordingly, Alexander's staff was primarily British
The Americans received the highest-level personnel change when in early March Eisenhower selected Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., to command II Corps. Now the Allies had a field commander who would cause his adversaries genuine concern for his willingness to attempt maneuvers others thought rash. With Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley as his deputy, Patton set about rebuilding the II Corps into the panzer-killing force he knew it could become. Overlooking no detail—including neckties in the heat of North Africa—Patton pushed his men to fight and dress like the best soldiers in the world. Within days they knew they were led by a commander who would not let them fail
No, Eisenhower was the theatre commander, in command of the overall assets, land, sea, and air. he also had certain authority viz a viz political events, particualrly with respect to negotiating with the Vichy forces, and the free French Forces, and theresistance fighters as well
There are really two phases in the Allied command structure for the north african campaign, with a major re-organization occurring after the defeats at kasserine.
Victory at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers gave the United States Army and its British ally solid toeholds in the western Mediterranean Theater of Operations. But it offered no guarantee of easy access to Italy or southern Europe, or even to the eastern end of the Mediterranean, where the British desperately needed assistance to secure Egypt and strategic resources in the Near East. The sudden entrance of American forces during 8-11 November 1942 created an awkward deployment in which two pairs of opposing armies fought in North Africa, one in Tunisia, the other in Libya. Neither Axis nor Allies found any satisfaction in the situation; much fighting remained before either adversary could consider North Africa secure.
At this p[oint, the ground forces commanders were Anderson (in charge of 1st Army), and Fredendall (I think, in charge of US II Corps), later Juin would join, in comand of XIX French Corps
The awkward command structure forced on Eisenhower following the Torch landings contributed significantly to the slow progress of the allis in western africa.
The apparent progress of the allies in the theatre belied a string of muddled operations and stinging reverses. Frustrated and furious, Eisenhower wrote a scathing description of Allied performance in the Tunisia Campaign. To Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall he confided his view that American and British operations had thus far managed to violate every accepted tactical principle of warfare and would be condemned in the military school system for decades to come .
While Eisenhower struggled to contain squabbles on the Allied side, the Germans hit Sidi Bou Zid, ten miles beyond Faid. With over 200 tanks on both sides, a huge, drawn-out battle appeared in the making. But US armor was spread too thin, and the panzers punched through in only one day. An ineffective counterattack the next day and the stunning capture of some 1,400 troops forced the US to undertake a major withdrawal. As the 1st Armored Division fell back, enemy pressure eased. However, on the 16th the Germans resumed their westward push, seizing Sbeitla, twenty-five miles beyond Sidi Bou Zid. Again the Americans scrambled back to establish a new defensive position, this time at Kasserine Pass. Four days of successive defeats cost II Corps dearly. The Americans lost 2,546 missing, 103 tanks, 280 vehicles, 18 field guns, 3 antitank guns, and 1 antiaircraft battery.
The succession of II Corps defeats did not end with the loss of Sbeitla. Rommel saw the opportunity to keep his battered adversary reeling with a push for an even bigger prize: Kasserine Pass, gateway to Algeria. Adding the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions to his German-Italian Panzer Army, Rommel struck the II Corps on 19 February. By the next afternoon the pass was in Axis hands. Only the valiant stands of individual battalions and companies on isolated hilltops interrupted Rommel's progress. As an alarming indication of falling morale, American troops abandoned huge stocks of equipment. In a final insult, the disastrous series of defeats was ended not by stiffening American resolve but by a shift in Axis priorities. Concerned that the British Eighth Army might attack from Libya while he was moving west, Rommel turned back to the east.
The conduct of Allied operations in both northern Tunisia in December 1942 and the central mountain ranges in February 1943 forced a total reexamination of Allied organization and plans. In short order General Eisenhower restructured the Allied command and changed key personnel. A new command—the 18th Army Group under British General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander—tightened operational control over the combat corps and armies of the three Allied nations. With the British Eighth Army now close enough to the Allied southern flank to affect Axis operations, the three national commands in Tunisia narrowed their battlefronts and shifted north. Because the U.S. II Corps had taken high casualties and lost so much equipment during the February battles, and—in the British view— shown tactical incompetence, the Americans were to play a role auxiliary to the British in the next phase of the campaign. Accordingly, Alexander's staff was primarily British
The Americans received the highest-level personnel change when in early March Eisenhower selected Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., to command II Corps. Now the Allies had a field commander who would cause his adversaries genuine concern for his willingness to attempt maneuvers others thought rash. With Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley as his deputy, Patton set about rebuilding the II Corps into the panzer-killing force he knew it could become. Overlooking no detail—including neckties in the heat of North Africa—Patton pushed his men to fight and dress like the best soldiers in the world. Within days they knew they were led by a commander who would not let them fail
starling
Airman 1st Class
when ike wrote his scathing report to marshal about american and british problems,do we know where eisenhowre,s hq was.
the squabling in the west,or torch area must have been militarily forseen,should they not.
when alexander took control of 18th a/g.did he become the allied ground force comander then.someone mmust have.
how were the allied airforces disposed after 18th a/g became operational.yours,starling
the squabling in the west,or torch area must have been militarily forseen,should they not.
when alexander took control of 18th a/g.did he become the allied ground force comander then.someone mmust have.
how were the allied airforces disposed after 18th a/g became operational.yours,starling
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Those are questions that I don't know, maybe parsifal or Kruska or others can give you an idea. But as far as Air Forces after NA you can check this site as it gives the US deploment of AF from around the globe. It is a lot of boring reading though.
Index of /~mcgrew/wwii/usaf
BTW love your avatars with Clint!
Index of /~mcgrew/wwii/usaf
BTW love your avatars with Clint!
parsifal
Colonel
when ike wrote his scathing report to marshal about american and british problems,do we know where eisenhowre,s hq was.
His HQ was at Gibraltar, he may have moved it as the campaign wore on. however, it is unlikley, given the very extensive communications, naval and air facilities that he could call on at the bas. I also suspect that the Allies did not want to risk a fifth column pro-vichy attack on Eisenhower in the same vein as Darlans assassination.
the squabling in the west,or torch area must have been militarily forseen,should they not.
I dont think anyone realized at the time the immense difficulties that would present themselves in co-ordinating a multi-national force, across such vast distances
when alexander took control of 18th a/g.did he become the allied ground force comander then.someone mmust have.
Alexander was placed in command of 18AG. As the name suggests, it had under its command, 1st and 8th armies. Alexander was in nominal control of the land forces, but the Americans in particualr tended to bypass and go directly to Eisenhower. This created obvious Command Control problems.
how were the allied airforces disposed after 18th a/g became operational.yours,starling
Not sure, suggest you look at the site provided by NJ
His HQ was at Gibraltar, he may have moved it as the campaign wore on. however, it is unlikley, given the very extensive communications, naval and air facilities that he could call on at the bas. I also suspect that the Allies did not want to risk a fifth column pro-vichy attack on Eisenhower in the same vein as Darlans assassination.
the squabling in the west,or torch area must have been militarily forseen,should they not.
I dont think anyone realized at the time the immense difficulties that would present themselves in co-ordinating a multi-national force, across such vast distances
when alexander took control of 18th a/g.did he become the allied ground force comander then.someone mmust have.
Alexander was placed in command of 18AG. As the name suggests, it had under its command, 1st and 8th armies. Alexander was in nominal control of the land forces, but the Americans in particualr tended to bypass and go directly to Eisenhower. This created obvious Command Control problems.
how were the allied airforces disposed after 18th a/g became operational.yours,starling
Not sure, suggest you look at the site provided by NJ
starling
Airman 1st Class
so from the beginning of torch,nov 42,until the creation of 18th a/g in feb 43,under the command of alexander,this is 3 months.eisenhower was in command of brit 1st army,american 2 corps and the french,his hq was at gibraltar.
instead of writing scathing letters to marshal,perhaps he should have been up the front with his commanders,putting the schoolboy remarks right,that he had written to marshal beforehand.yours,starling.
instead of writing scathing letters to marshal,perhaps he should have been up the front with his commanders,putting the schoolboy remarks right,that he had written to marshal beforehand.yours,starling.
parsifal
Colonel
so from the beginning of torch,nov 42,until the creation of 18th a/g in feb 43,under the command of alexander,this is 3 months.eisenhower was in command of brit 1st army,american 2 corps and the french,his hq was at gibraltar.
instead of writing scathing letters to marshal,perhaps he should have been up the front with his commanders,putting the schoolboy remarks right,that he had written to marshal beforehand.yours,starling.
Eisenhower was not the ground forces commander at any stage. He was the theatre commander. In that capacity, he did an excellent job of an exceptionally difficult assignment. And he was acting 100% correctly to work through the higher command in order to make the changes that he did. You make it sound like the letters he was writing were frivolous and pointless. I have not see those letters, but he would have needed the agreement of his boss, Marshall, in order to carry out the administrative changes that he did.
The land forces commander (at the army level) Anderson (with the 1st Army). Montys forces were not placed under Eisenhowers control until after the formation of 18AG. However, the French XIX, under Juin, and the US IICorps , under fredendall, frequantly did not work in well under Anderson, co-ordination seems to have been the ain problem. This was firmly the responsibility of Anderson, but it was simply beyond him. Eisenhower eventually did act, but perhaps he was too slow to do so. But in his defence, there were a lot of other issues to take care of at the time.
instead of writing scathing letters to marshal,perhaps he should have been up the front with his commanders,putting the schoolboy remarks right,that he had written to marshal beforehand.yours,starling.
Eisenhower was not the ground forces commander at any stage. He was the theatre commander. In that capacity, he did an excellent job of an exceptionally difficult assignment. And he was acting 100% correctly to work through the higher command in order to make the changes that he did. You make it sound like the letters he was writing were frivolous and pointless. I have not see those letters, but he would have needed the agreement of his boss, Marshall, in order to carry out the administrative changes that he did.
The land forces commander (at the army level) Anderson (with the 1st Army). Montys forces were not placed under Eisenhowers control until after the formation of 18AG. However, the French XIX, under Juin, and the US IICorps , under fredendall, frequantly did not work in well under Anderson, co-ordination seems to have been the ain problem. This was firmly the responsibility of Anderson, but it was simply beyond him. Eisenhower eventually did act, but perhaps he was too slow to do so. But in his defence, there were a lot of other issues to take care of at the time.
Freebird
Master Sergeant
Good post Parsifal.
Starling, there were a few US commanders that did a poor job - but I don't think Ike falls in that category. He did a good job keeping the lid on all the political problems brewing up in North Africa.
If there had been an un-diplomatic leader there {yes, like Patton or Monty!} the Allies could have easily ended up using 75% of there troops defending their supply lines from hostile rebellious French, Bedouins etc!
starling
Airman 1st Class
i believe rommel attacked 8th army at medanine on 6/3/43.his corps contained primarily the,90 light div,164th div,and 10th,15 and 21st pz div,along with some italian units.
do we know when alexander was given ultra info,which gave him knowledge of date of rommels attack on 8th army.cheers,starling.
do we know when alexander was given ultra info,which gave him knowledge of date of rommels attack on 8th army.cheers,starling.
I voted for Nimitz for his management of the Pacific War.
Spruance for his ability to rise for the occasion, suddenly from a cruiser commander to carrier fleet commander in eve of decisive battle (Midway) and his handling of that battle. IMHO a cool and analytical leader also very brave IIRC.
Park for his handling of BoB and Malta air battles in 42. Very skillful fighter leader.
von Manstein very good operational mind, very good planner and also very good field commander.
Juha
Spruance for his ability to rise for the occasion, suddenly from a cruiser commander to carrier fleet commander in eve of decisive battle (Midway) and his handling of that battle. IMHO a cool and analytical leader also very brave IIRC.
Park for his handling of BoB and Malta air battles in 42. Very skillful fighter leader.
von Manstein very good operational mind, very good planner and also very good field commander.
Juha
JugBR
Staff Sergeant
rommel should win by 10+ votes diference, of course.
so i voted for zhukov, because the man is a legend on russia and im very interested by the russian history of ww2 ate the moment
so i voted for zhukov, because the man is a legend on russia and im very interested by the russian history of ww2 ate the moment
starling
Airman 1st Class
i believe monty usually ambled behind rommel with 2 divs.at the time of medanine,xxxcorps;51st highland div,7th armd div and 201 guards bde.
anyone else got more info.starling.
anyone else got more info.starling.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Operation Capri - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The 51st (Highland) Division commanded by Major-General Douglas Wimberley, 7th Armoured Division (General George Erskine) and New Zealand 2nd Division (Bernard Freyberg) of the 8th Army. The open southern flank was covered by the 4th Light Armoured Brigade, which included the Free French Flying Column (FFFC) and the 1e Bataillon d'Infanterie de Marine et du Pacifique.
on the German side - Two German infantry divisions, the 90th Light and 164th Light, and the 10th, 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions of the Deutsches Afrika Korps (estimated 200 tanks). The Spezia Division of the Italian 1st Army occupied the Mareth Line.
The 51st (Highland) Division commanded by Major-General Douglas Wimberley, 7th Armoured Division (General George Erskine) and New Zealand 2nd Division (Bernard Freyberg) of the 8th Army. The open southern flank was covered by the 4th Light Armoured Brigade, which included the Free French Flying Column (FFFC) and the 1e Bataillon d'Infanterie de Marine et du Pacifique.
on the German side - Two German infantry divisions, the 90th Light and 164th Light, and the 10th, 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions of the Deutsches Afrika Korps (estimated 200 tanks). The Spezia Division of the Italian 1st Army occupied the Mareth Line.
starling
Airman 1st Class
o.k,we now have the o.o.b,roughly.although the opposing air forces are a bit fuzzy.all we need are thedates when the africa corps were known via ultra to be attacking,and when alexander was given the approx date.this,i believe is very important.i also would,if anyone knows ,like to know the approx rommel plan of attack.yours,starling.
parsifal
Colonel
Order of Battle
(Please note I have basede my response mostly on wiki. i have other sources, but none of them summarizes the situationas well as the wiki article)
I dont actually have the total forces assigned to 8th Army at the time of Operation Capri the Medennine battle, however, I am almost certain that they were the same as those employed in Operation Pugilist Operations to break the Mareth line, which began just 9 days after the Medennine battle ended), since Allied losses associated with the Medennine battle were minimal. The following is the list of forces for both sides, in the battles for Medennine, Operations Pugilist (19-23 March) and Supercharge II ( 26 Mar - 31 Mar).
British Eighth Army (General Sir Bernard Montgomery)
XXX Corps (Lieut.-General Sir Oliver Leese)
British 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division
British 51st (Highland) Infantry Division
4th Indian Infantry Division
British 201st Guards Brigade
British 23rd Armoured Brigade
New Zealand Corps (Lieut.-General Bernard Freyberg)
New Zealand 2nd Division
British 8th Armoured Brigade
1st Battalion King's Dragoon Guards
64th Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery
57th Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery
One Battery 53rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery
LeClerc's Force
X Corps (Lieut.-General Sir Brian Horrocks)
British 1st Armoured Division
British 7th Armoured Division (including 4 Light Armoured Brigade, less King's Dragoon Guards)
Free French Flying Column
1st Italian Army (General Giovanni Messe)
In the line:
XX Corps
136 Motorised Division Young Fascists (actually no stronger than a reinforced regiment)
101 Motorised Division Trieste
German 90th Light Afrika
XXI Corps
80 Infantry Division La Spezia
36 Infantry Division Pistoia
German 164th Light Afrika
In reserve:
German 15th Panzer Division
Covering Tebaga:
Saharan Group
Uncommitted:
German 21st Panzer Division
On the Gafsa front:
German 10th Panzer Division
Centauro Group
The 19th Flak Division, with sixteen 88-millimetre batteries and several 20-millimetre anti-aircraft batteries, was all on the coast, the 1st Luftwaffe Brigade, little stronger than a battalion, was behind Young Fascists, and Africa Panzer Grenadier Regiment watched the main Gabès–Mareth road. These, together with 164 Light Division, comprised the only mobile infantry groups available
(Please note I have basede my response mostly on wiki. i have other sources, but none of them summarizes the situationas well as the wiki article)
I dont actually have the total forces assigned to 8th Army at the time of Operation Capri the Medennine battle, however, I am almost certain that they were the same as those employed in Operation Pugilist Operations to break the Mareth line, which began just 9 days after the Medennine battle ended), since Allied losses associated with the Medennine battle were minimal. The following is the list of forces for both sides, in the battles for Medennine, Operations Pugilist (19-23 March) and Supercharge II ( 26 Mar - 31 Mar).
British Eighth Army (General Sir Bernard Montgomery)
XXX Corps (Lieut.-General Sir Oliver Leese)
British 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division
British 51st (Highland) Infantry Division
4th Indian Infantry Division
British 201st Guards Brigade
British 23rd Armoured Brigade
New Zealand Corps (Lieut.-General Bernard Freyberg)
New Zealand 2nd Division
British 8th Armoured Brigade
1st Battalion King's Dragoon Guards
64th Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery
57th Anti-Tank Regiment, Royal Artillery
One Battery 53rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery
LeClerc's Force
X Corps (Lieut.-General Sir Brian Horrocks)
British 1st Armoured Division
British 7th Armoured Division (including 4 Light Armoured Brigade, less King's Dragoon Guards)
Free French Flying Column
1st Italian Army (General Giovanni Messe)
In the line:
XX Corps
136 Motorised Division Young Fascists (actually no stronger than a reinforced regiment)
101 Motorised Division Trieste
German 90th Light Afrika
XXI Corps
80 Infantry Division La Spezia
36 Infantry Division Pistoia
German 164th Light Afrika
In reserve:
German 15th Panzer Division
Covering Tebaga:
Saharan Group
Uncommitted:
German 21st Panzer Division
On the Gafsa front:
German 10th Panzer Division
Centauro Group
The 19th Flak Division, with sixteen 88-millimetre batteries and several 20-millimetre anti-aircraft batteries, was all on the coast, the 1st Luftwaffe Brigade, little stronger than a battalion, was behind Young Fascists, and Africa Panzer Grenadier Regiment watched the main Gabès–Mareth road. These, together with 164 Light Division, comprised the only mobile infantry groups available
Attachments
starling
Airman 1st Class
cheers parcifal.i understood horrocks was o.c.x111 corps.i also read that x111 corps,was stripped of its transport,to supply xxxcorps.
we must also remember that as rommel retreated,his pioneers,or whatever german engineers r called destroyed docks,harbours etc,tobruck,benghasi,tripoli,were all heavily smashed up.do not forget this.8th army did have problems not dissimilar to the africa corps.starling.
we must also remember that as rommel retreated,his pioneers,or whatever german engineers r called destroyed docks,harbours etc,tobruck,benghasi,tripoli,were all heavily smashed up.do not forget this.8th army did have problems not dissimilar to the africa corps.starling.
starling
Airman 1st Class
cannot find any sites giving the so called ultra info monty got in advance of the africa corps attack on him at medenine.i can only find sites involving areal recon.very interesting is this.starling.
parsifal
Colonel
As far as I know, 8th army's supply problems, whilst not small (they advanced over 1400 miles in 3 months) were quite well managed. The British built a railway link from the railhead at Matruh, to Tobruk in a very short space of time. Dont know when Tobruk and Benghazi were returned to operations, but neiuther was it a big problem. The British made full use of the Via Balbia, and were far better placed as far as the availability of supply trucks were concerned. I have never read that there were severe supply problems for the British in the cyrenaican Theatre. Now, that just didnt happen, the british paid a lot of attention to logistics, which is something the germans did not do. Even if they had had a bigger supply tail to call on, i doubt the germans would have done as good a job as the british in this particular area of warfare.
As the 8th Army approached Tripoli, however, things started to get a little tense, the British by then were starting to reach the end of their supply lines, and had to capture Tripoli to ease this problem. The Brits captured tripoli 23-01-43, and as you say the port facilities had been demolished. However, it was not so comprehensive as you suggest. The first steamer entered the harbour 26-01-43, and was more or less restored to full capacity by 04-02-43
As the 8th Army approached Tripoli, however, things started to get a little tense, the British by then were starting to reach the end of their supply lines, and had to capture Tripoli to ease this problem. The Brits captured tripoli 23-01-43, and as you say the port facilities had been demolished. However, it was not so comprehensive as you suggest. The first steamer entered the harbour 26-01-43, and was more or less restored to full capacity by 04-02-43
parsifal
Colonel
Try this link
The North African Campaign Of World War II
It does not give specific details on the effect of Ultrs on medennine, however, it does say that towards the end of the North African Campaign, (ie after Alam halfa) the Allies were receiving Ultra intelligence that was of benefit from a battlefield perspective
Freebird
Master Sergeant
What are you getting at Starling? Are you comparing Monty, Rommel Patton in their performance in North Africa to that of Ike?
