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Medennine was a carefully prepred and sucessful defensive battle, but it is contentious to say it was the best defensive battle of the war. There are a lot of battles, long and short, fought defensively that many might argue are comparable
To name a few, in no particular order
Kerala
Kokoda
Cassino
Alam Halfa
Stalingrad
Kursk (Russian)
Bataan
Guadacanal
Bastogne
British defence at Arnhem
Rommels defensive/offensive battles at Gazala, and earlier against battleaxe
Defence Of Tobruk
American defensive at midway
American CAP defences at Phil Sea
Japanese defence at okinawa
Etc etc
I've gone with the best as I see them from each Country.
Mannstein
Patton
Yamamoto
Montgomery
Lascar (not on list - Romania)
Mannerheim
Messe (not on list - Italy)
Juin (not on list - France)
Anders (not on list - Poland)
Zhukov
Blamey (not on list - Australia)
Freyberg (not on list - New Zealand (inspite of his blunder at Crete))
Smuts (not on list - South Africa)
Veress (not on list - Hungary)
But the best of the best is IMO still by far Mannstein.
Good choice of Freyburg - but why do you say "blunder at Crete"? He did the best he could with very inadequate air, armour material resources. {They did not even have enough shovels to dig foxholes! Did you mean to say "failure" instead of blunder?
With the ULTRA available to him - it should have been the first large scale German defeat of the war IMO. In "Crete - the battle and resistance" Anthony Beevor speculates that he misread the ULTRA messages and that this caused him to be preoccupied with seaborne landings - instead of launching an attack at Maleme airfield in time. All the German paradrops where a disaster - except the one at Maleme. And a counterattack at this airfield would have doomed the german operation. Sadly Freyberg would not release reserves or troops guarding the beaches. And in turn the 2nd Mountain division was airlanded in and turned the tide.
Hmm. Well Seaborne landings were a serious threat, but the invasion fleet was caught by the RN with heavy casualties.
I had read that one of the subordinates "lost his nerve" and failed to push the Para's back. I will have to look that one up though.
Other than that he was a very capable and sympathetic field commander who's only weakness IMO was an odd hesitation to replace poor performing officers serving under him (rumor has it that he was a man who wanted to be loved by all).
This may indeed be the case.
In the overall picture Freyberg was left "holding the bag" for a truly foolhardy mission pushed by Churchill Eden, for a Greek intervention that the underequipped British Army was not capable of, and which the Greeks themselves did not want.
IMO the main loss was in Greece where the Allies lost all of their heavy equip. I would rate the battle in Crete almost a draw, because most of the Allied troops were evacuated, while the German para's suffered such heavy losses that they weren't used in Malta or Azores, far more important targets.
I agree - Greece was a doomed cause - and an expensive PR job to put it bluntly. The overkill employed by the Germans in the Balkans theatre meant that any ammount of Brittish reinforcements wouldn't have helped. Much less when keeping an eye on what it cost in the fragile desert war. However making a show of standing by Greece - yet another fall to the axis - was probably important in the bigger world political view.
A very interesting topic {there must be a thread on it} IMHO, the answer is to send about 1 well equipped division to Crete, and nothing to Greece. Send a generous batch of supplies to the Greeks {AT rifles, AA guns Artillery etc} and about 2 squadrons of RAF Hurricanes to contest the air. if the situation falls apart the Hurri's can always withdraw.
Transfer as many squadrons of Hampdens, Whitleys Wellingtons to Crete as will fit, and start heavy night bombing of the Italian Adriatic ports to help interdict the re-supply of Albania. The night bombing in 1941 is nearly useless at hitting anything except ports, so it won't make any difference to the northern effort
I totally agree on your asessment of what would have been the best solution. But saying "Thanks for being on our side - but sorry we can't help" to the Greeks wouldn't exactly have helped the allied cause much.
In fact this is what the Greeks preffered! They would much rather have supplies than troops! It was only after some heavy persuasion that the Greeks reluctantly agreed to have British troops on the mainland. Metaxas assumed {correctly} that British troops landing would guarantee that Hitler would invade with the maximum effort.
Hey how about Metaxas as Greek leader?
Anyways, a significant bombing effort would probably do more to hamper the Italian war effort than any ground troops sent to Greece. And the Hurricanes deployed to contest the air would be a very visible show of support. Meanwhile the Desert Army could make much quicker work of the Italians in Africa, a real solid benefit.
Metaxas - Don't really know alot about him. Yihaa - a new subject to read aboutyears of geeking through WW2 books makes it hard to find new subjects
Yea - the Greeks made the right assesment (well - Hitler would have squashed them anyway - but the Brittish forces neither helped nor made it worse). However again - I think that the bigger picture was what made the difference in making the brits so persistent.
I Remember reading that Churchill and certain british commanders believed that the balkan front could hold on and even make offensive moves by combining the 2 million strong Yugoslav army (impressive number but horribly trained, placed, equipped and motivated) , the greek army and brittish and commonwealth forces. However I'll want to see that statement from more than one source before I believe it.