YOU were using Lukacs as a source for your arguments .
But, what did I find when I googled John Lukacs?
'' In Lukacs's view, Barbarossa was not inspired by anti-Communism or any long-term plan to conquer the Soviet Union,but it was rather an ad hoc reaction forced on Hitler in 1940-1941 by Britain's refusal to surrender .''
And the article on Wiki gives as source :The Hitler of History, P 133 & 149-150 .
Thus, even Lukacs is disagreeing with you . And Kershaw was going in the same direction .
I sourced Lukacs' book about the political disagreements in Parliament about whether to continue the war or sue for peace in May 1940. That does not mean I agree with everything he has ever written.
Interesting that you call me out for citing Lukacs when, in post #862 you said "I have not much faith in Lucacs .He writes fiction." So, which parts of Lucaks' writings are fiction/ Is it the stuff about London in May 1940 or his views on Barbarossa and anti-Communism.
FWIW, I'm glad to see you're citing Wikipedia instead of actually reading the scholarly works for yourself. It's a great way to win an argument.
Other point : you are unable to understand that a plan ( not Otto ) being ''initiated'' in July 1940,does not mean that the political leadership had decided to execute this plan .
FYI :
there were several ''plans '' not ONE plan ,and the final plan was composed of elements of these several plans .
There were (and the list is not exhaustive )
Operationsentwurf Ost (5 August ) by Marcks who estimated the Soviet strength on 119 divisions and 28 brigades and expected a campaign of 9-17 weeks .
There was also the Operationsstudie Ost from Lossberg (15 September )
And Paulus also was involved (29 )ctober )
On December 18 Hitler signed the Barbarossa Weisung, but even then,the preparations continued:
On January 31 1941 the OKH presented its Aufmarschanweisung Barbarossa .
Hitler did not decide in July 1940 to attack the SU ,but at the end of 1940.
Some observations on military planning:
1. Military planning precedes the commander's decision which directs the action. You don't decide and then plan; you plan in order to make smart, informed decisions. The commander directs the planning to start because (a) he expects to conduct operations, or (b) he's developing a contingency plan in case of operations.
2. Planning typically involves the development of multiple courses of action (COAs) which are presented to the commander who decides which COA, or combination of COAs, will be executed.
3. Planning is not a linear activity. It is highly iterative as new information and new senior leader direction is received.
4. Planning NEVER starts with a blank sheet of paper. You ALWAYS start with an existing plan as a jumping-off point. The planning effort may integrate components from multiple prior plans.
Again, I will stress that I do this stuff for a living. I know of what I speak. To give you an example of the amount of time it takes to plan major operations, we have an existing OPLAN on the shelf that is massive in scope. Updates to it take at least 3 months to complete...and it's far less complex than Barbarossa.
If Hitler had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union, then all the planning for Barbarossa was nothing more than a contingency plan. Bell has the following to say, which I've transcribed for you, that tallies well with my comments above (P.M.H. Bell "The Origins of the Second World War in Europe", 2nd Ed pp.323-324):
Not all plans are carried out - the directive of November 1940 for an attack on Gibraltar, for example, came to nothing. The absolute certainty of an attack on the Soviet Union cannot, therefore, be assumed on the basis of the military plans alone. But the scale of the military preparations, and the time and energy devoted to them, put the planning for Barbarossa in quite a different category from that of Gibraltar. Certainly from December 1940 onwards it was clear that this was no mere contingency plan, but, short of something extraordinary, would be put into effect. The question is why?
One answer is that it was the fulfilment of a long-formed intention. Alan Bullock concluded firmly in his biography of Hitler that: 'Hitler invaded Russia for the simple but sufficient reason that he had always meant to establish the foundation of his thousand-year Reich by annexation of the territory between the Vistula and the Urals.' Other motives, at most, only reinforced a decision he had already reached. This conclusion has been widely shared and evidence for it may be found throughout Hitler's writings and talks to Nazi and service leaders over a long period. His mind appeared to be firmly set in this mould by the 1920s and the longer his dictatorship lasted the less open he was to new ways of thought.
By 1940 it is probable that the mould was unbreakable. Hitler took up other ideas - an invasion of Britain, a move through Spain, a Mediterranean Campaign, a grand alliance to include the USSR - but he dropped them again. To an attack on the Soviet Union he constantly returned.
The bottom line is that Hitler ordered planning to start for an invasion of Russia. The scale of effort and level of preparation strongly suggests that this was no mere contingency plan. Once planning was complete, 5 months later (a not-unreasonable amount of time given the complexity of the plan), Hitler directed that the plan be executed.
Hitler did not decide in July 1940 to attack the SU ,but at the end of 1940, always with the caveat that if Britain capitulated before the start of Barbarossa, this would make Barbarossa not only unnecessary , but also impossible :
140 combat divisions were committed for Barbarossa and 10 Security divisions who would kill Jews and potential partisans . Bit if Britain gave up, Germany would need at least 40 divisions for the occupation of the British Islands (including Ireland ).As there were no 40 divisions available in Germany, the only solution would be to take away 40 divisions from the Ostheer .which would make Barbarossa impossible .
Again, you're assuming that a British capitulation would require occupation of the British Isles by German forces. That is an entirely false assumption to make. If a Parliamentary vote of no-confidence went against Churchill and he was replaced by someone who was willing to agree peace terms with Hitler, then it's far more likely that Britain would adopt a neutral stance, particularly if the constituent parts of the British Empire were no longer under threat of German attack. As I've said all along, the loss of the Battle of Britain didn't need to be an all-out military defeat followed by invasion and occupation. Hitler's aims of knocking Britain out of the war could have been achieved by influencing Parliament to replace Churchill with a more peace-minded alternative.