How Europe Went to War in 1914

[Marcel]

Well said Redcoat. Modern criticism of military leaders is easily done with the gift of hindsight.
Haig Harris have been demonized but, I always ask the question 'what would you have done in the same situation if you were General Haig or Bomber Harris?'
I usually don't get a sensible answer to that... because IMHO there isn't one.

Of course, but that's what history is: hindsight. We can judge based on what we know now. And the judgement is sometimes very kind and quite often isn't. I'm quit often careful with judging because of precisely the reason that you state here. Many mistakes are made because of the level of knowledge at the time. But some mistakes could have been avoided because the one in charge should have known better. In the case of Haig (sorry fastmongrl) the battle of Verdun had been raging for quite some time. That battle had clearly demonstrated the ineffectiveness of artillery on defense positions. The Germans had suffered enormously because of that. The attack plan on the first day of the Somme clearly shows that either Haig was totally ignorant of this, which would be outrageous, or he totally disregarded it, which means he was not willing to learn, which was not much better than the first option.
What I would have done is irrelevant, I'm not a general and I'm not trained as one. In my work I am an annalist and 'm doing that here, too. Adding pieces of evidence together and drawing a conclusion. It is my conclusion and you may disagree, that's what the forum is there for.

 

[Readie]

The attack plan on the first day of the Somme clearly shows that either Haig was totally ignorant of this, which would be outrageous, or he totally disregarded it, which means he was not willing to learn...

Expecting men to charge machine guns armed with a swagger stick and a rifle is.... well, you decide.

Historical judgements are always made usually with the spin that that particular country wants to put on it.
I can only speak for my country and the education, influences, opinions of the older generation... an element of brain washing I suppose leads most Britons to have the views they have today and some will always have in the future.

That is our legacy Marcel.

 

[parsifal]

Trouble is, he needed to launch a major attack for political and military reasons and artillery was the only thing he had.

So did Monash in July 1918, at Hamel. Comparison of the two centrepiece battles (ie the opening battles for the Somme versus the battles at Hamel) for the two men illustrates in spades their respective capabilities as military comanders and the depth of their priorites. Some may argue that Monash's opening battle at hamel as a Corps Commander benefitted from 3 years of bitterly learnt experiences, whereas Haig was 'making it up as he went along". True, except that Monash had entered the war as a brigade commander, rapidly was promoted to Divisional Commander and thenCorps and finally the commander of the whole AIF. From the very beginning he displayed remarkable concern for the welfare of his men and was fanatical about attention to detail. His battles were consistently less costly that those of any comparable commander. Not so for Haig. Monash was critical of Haigs performance from almost the moment he first met him, in early 1916.

I'm left wing and not an ex-soldier, but I'm old enough to have known a number of British WW1 vets, and, as even I was surprised to discover, none of them held any grudge against Haig

.


The Australian Army was critical of him from even before Somme. Monash's diary lays that out in Spades. Our imperial protocols prevented us from open revolt against the yoke of incompetent (mostly british) military leadership, but for most of the war, we spent trying to quietly eject British establishment from leading our troops into battle. For the most part, British ground commanders were poor and certainly uncaring of casualties. after all, they were just "expendable lower class colonials". to me that is an unfair assessment, but it is also a fair representation of the AIFs view of how the british establishmenty viewed them, and its competency as an officer class.

I'm not claiming Haig was a great general or even a very good one, but in relation to the senior generals in all the other major armies who fought in WW1 he was a lot better than modern popular opinion has him

.


Im not basing my criticism of him on the basis of any modern assessment. i base it on the known observation of the senior Australian leadership of the time. It is worth noting that haig was aware of Monash's distrust and criticism of him, and he worked very hard to deny his rise within the Australian Army, and its command. The Australian Prime minister, billy hughes was present at Hamel, primarily at the behest of Bean, Murdocj and the tacit support of haig to try and have monash removed. hughes' observation of monash's exceelenet conduct of the battle made even the Australain politicians realize that not all was well with the higher British leadership of the time. after hamel., there were no more doubts about Monash, no more little intriques and machiavellian plots by his enemies to have him removed.

 

[parsifal]

Once war was declared in 1914 Monash was appointed commander of the AIF's 4th Infantry Brigade based in Egypt at the age of 49 as part of the ANZAC Australian-New Zealand forces. Having served in the failed Gallipoli campaign in 1915, where he distinguished himself by his imaginative and effective leadership of his brigade in some of the heaviest fighting of the campaign, Monash transferred to the Western Front in June 1916, receiving a promotion to Major General and taking command of 3rd Division. He had observed the profligate loss of British lives and at that point had determned it was due to the poor standards of training and the near total lack of imagination in the tactics being used by the BEF at that point. He refused to commit the 3rd Division until further training of the formation had taken place and some infiltration and raiding principals introduced into the division's operational procedures. as a result, the 3rd Division entered the line late, but was considered by many to be the strongest and best trained (and most effective) formations in the BEF (of which the AIF was a part) and that time. 3 Divs operational record attests to that assessment

Through the next two years Monash led his command through numerous actions, including the Battles of Messines, 3rd Ypres and Polygon Wood, using pioneering raiding techniques that, whilst thoruoughly frowned upon by the British high command, nonetheless impressed with their efficiency and tight planning. I think i know where Monash derived these ideas. During the Gallipoli campaign, 7LHR (my grandfathers regiment) was attached to the 4th Brigade, or fought alongside it at places like Lone Pine. i remember my grandfather telling stories about how they developed night raiding techniques, using a combination of shotguns, gurkhas, covering fire [at that time Infantry advances were done with empty magazines]....charges were undertaken using "cold steel' only, per the british high commands ideas on "gentlemans tactics"...something completely rejected by the Australians. We went into battle with full magazines and no illusions about how trench warfare should be fought. monash would have seen all that and realized how far superior it was to the asinine tactics being insisted upon by the British.

Monash made his real mark in 1918, having been earlier appointed corps commander of the Australian forces in May, succeeding General Birdwood. Until the armistice in November Monash led his forces through fierce fighting, firstly in the Allied defence against the great German push of spring 1918.

Monash planned and executed the attack at the Battle of Hamel Hill which began on 4 July, leading to the capture of the town by combined Australian and U.S. forces (during which he demonstrated to good effect his new strategy of 'peaceful penetration'). Other similarly successful operations followed until late October, at Chignes, Mont St. Quentin, Peronne and Hargicourt and in breaking the Hindenburg Line, most significantly at Amiens. Monash used tanks to good effect, reversing the tactical order that they entered battle, and taking steps to try and improve their relaiability (by pushing forward some detachments of the maintenance crews). He used his artillery with particular cleverness, and even included elements of air support in his planned asaults. This was all designed to reduce casualties in the PBI, and along with Curries slightly different ideas, served as a model for all operations.

Monash differed from Sir Douglas Haig's assessment of the role of infantry, who was firmly wedded to the use of infantry as an attritional weapon, and believing there was really no way around the casualty rates. There probably wasnt (since casualty rates even during the period of allied advances remained high), but the difference was that Monash's tactics worked, Haigs did not. ,Monash believed rather in planning infantry assaults to most effectively co-ordinate with the use of heavy artillery, air support, tanks, etc, thereby allowing the greater chance of success - essentially anything to prevent what he deemed an unnecessary loss of life.

A brilliant tactician, Monash included in his bag of tricks the idea of bombarding German lines with gas attacks for several days preceding an offensive, conditioning German defenders to associate smoke with gas, only to use smoke cylinders on the actual day of the advance, which served not only to confuse the Germans but also ensured that they were disadvantaged in having to wear bulky gas masks as the Allied forces advanced, lessening visibility (in addition to interfering with enemy communications).

Following his success at Hamel and Amiens Monash was knighted by King George V on the field on 12 August 1918.

 

[redcoat]

Through the next two years Monash led his command through numerous actions, including the Battles of Messines, 3rd Ypres and Polygon Wood, using pioneering raiding techniques that, whilst thoruoughly frowned upon by the British high command, nonetheless impressed with their efficiency and tight planning. I think i know where Monash derived these ideas. During the Gallipoli campaign, 7LHR (my grandfathers regiment) was attached to the 4th Brigade, or fought alongside it at places like Lone Pine. i remember my grandfather telling stories about how they developed night raiding techniques, using a combination of shotguns, gurkhas, covering fire [at that time Infantry advances were done with empty magazines]....charges were undertaken using "cold steel' only, per the british high commands ideas on "gentlemans tactics"...something completely rejected by the Australians. We went into battle with full magazines and no illusions about how trench warfare should be fought. monash would have seen all that and realized how far superior it was to the asinine tactics being insisted upon by the British.

Monash made his real mark in 1918, having been earlier appointed corps commander of the Australian forces in May, succeeding General Birdwood. Until the armistice in November Monash led his forces through fierce fighting, firstly in the Allied defence against the great German push of spring 1918.

Monash planned and executed the attack at the Battle of Hamel Hill which began on 4 July, leading to the capture of the town by combined Australian and U.S. forces (during which he demonstrated to good effect his new strategy of 'peaceful penetration'). Other similarly successful operations followed until late October, at Chignes, Mont St. Quentin, Peronne and Hargicourt and in breaking the Hindenburg Line, most significantly at Amiens. Monash used tanks to good effect, reversing the tactical order that they entered battle, and taking steps to try and improve their relaiability (by pushing forward some detachments of the maintenance crews). He used his artillery with particular cleverness, and even included elements of air support in his planned asaults. This was all designed to reduce casualties in the PBI, and along with Curries slightly different ideas, served as a model for all operations.

Monash differed from Sir Douglas Haig's assessment of the role of infantry, who was firmly wedded to the use of infantry as an attritional weapon, and believing there was really no way around the casualty rates. There probably wasnt (since casualty rates even during the period of allied advances remained high), but the difference was that Monash's tactics worked, Haigs did not. ,Monash believed rather in planning infantry assaults to most effectively co-ordinate with the use of heavy artillery, air support, tanks, etc, thereby allowing the greater chance of success - essentially anything to prevent what he deemed an unnecessary loss of life.

A brilliant tactician, Monash included in his bag of tricks the idea of bombarding German lines with gas attacks for several days preceding an offensive, conditioning German defenders to associate smoke with gas, only to use smoke cylinders on the actual day of the advance, which served not only to confuse the Germans but also ensured that they were disadvantaged in having to wear bulky gas masks as the Allied forces advanced, lessening visibility (in addition to interfering with enemy communications).

Following his success at Hamel and Amiens Monash was knighted by King George V on the field on 12 August 1918.

Sorry, but your article seems to somewhat underplay the fact that both the British and Canadians also played a major part in the attacks during the hundred days and while Monash was a brillant general who was much admired by Haig, he didn't invent all the all arms tactics used by the British and Commonwealth forces during this period.

 

[Milosh]

Sorry, but your article seems to somewhat underplay the fact that both the British and Canadians also played a major part in the attacks during the hundred days and while Monash was a brillant general who was much admired by Haig, he didn't invent all the all arms tactics used by the British and Commonwealth forces during this period.

I would suspect that some of these tactics were lifted from the Canadians.

 

[Marcel]

Nice, all those nationalistic sentiments

 

[Readie]

Our thoughts here turn to Remembrance Sunday with poppies everywhere.
National pride and gratitude is in full display.
The 2 minute silence is well observed in Plymouth with, people of all ages and professions, buses, taxi's, cars and lorries stopping.
You could have heard a pin drop.

Maybe its a hard time to be thoroughly objective about who was right or wrong.
Just saying....

 

[Marcel]

Yes, John I can imagine that. For me it's much easier to be objective with ww1 than with ww2. We were just not involved in the first one.

 

[parsifal]

Sorry, but your article seems to somewhat underplay the fact that both the British and Canadians also played a major part in the attacks during the hundred days and while Monash was a brillant general who was much admired by Haig, he didn't invent all the all arms tactics used by the British and Commonwealth forces during this period.

Im not denyingor trying to underplay in any way that the victory achieved was a combined effort, or that the British and the Canadians along with American, French, New Zealanders Belgian and others all contributed to that result. I concentrated on Australian achievements, because they are what I know best. Australian forces made their share of blunders, and were limited by a number of factors, that should not be forgotten or put aside.

Neither am I denigrating the whole of the british Army. British soldiers were brave, capable soldiers, universally acknowledged as stubborn fighters. They were well served by support services, like dental and medical, which should be credited to Haig (he was not all bad, just not able to adapt). There were many officers within the british Army that should be credited with initiave, bravery, success, all those things. I am an unabashed supporter of the british and their value system. I am not a fan of the "British establishment" because it very nearly destroyed Britiain, the british Army and the British Empire.

This was about a comparison between Haig, being claimed as a competent, some even intimating above average, miliatary leader, and someone universally acknowleged as the true article of competency.....one of the military men on the allied side who developed what we might call the "professioonal" or modern military method. Before men like monash and Currie, the army was used as a blunt instrument, an attritional weapon, that very nearly destroyed itself carrying out the British establishments concepts of war. those concepts were epitomised by Haig. Haig wasnt bad, or poor, within the confines of his own social grouping. but that social grouping proved almost incapable of adaptation or modern theoretical development. Not so the men who were outside of that "club". That did include many Englishmen, but it also included men from the Dominions, who were consistently and deliberately locked out of the domain of higher command for a very long time. And in the end, because he saw Monash as a threat to his own position, he turned on him, listening and giving tacit approval to the witchunt concocted by murdoch and bean. Bean and Murdoch were clearly motivated by racist belief, being hostile to Monash's Jewish/Prussian heritage. I do not know where haig stood in that regard..

 

[redcoat]

And in the end, because he saw Monash as a threat to his own position, he turned on him, listening and giving tacit approval to the witchunt concocted by murdoch and bean. Bean and Murdoch were clearly motivated by racist belief, being hostile to Monash's Jewish/Prussian heritage. I do not know where haig stood in that regard..

There is as far as I'm aware no evidence that Haig or any of the senior British high command took any part in the witch hunt against Monash.

 

[Milosh]

Our thoughts here turn to Remembrance Sunday with poppies everywhere.
National pride and gratitude is in full display.
The 2 minute silence is well observed in Plymouth with, people of all ages and professions, buses, taxi's, cars and lorries stopping.
You could have heard a pin drop.

Maybe its a hard time to be thoroughly objective about who was right or wrong.
Just saying....

Time to post this video from 2007,


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PEblEHxkuNs

4-year-old Belgian boy--Randall-Benjamin, wearing a replica uniform, made by his Mum, as worn by the Canadian Scottish regiment during WW2

 

[parsifal]

There is as far as I'm aware no evidence that Haig or any of the senior British high command took any part in the witch hunt against Monash.

He(Haig) certainly was not a direct conspirator, but as CinC he had considerable powers over the press, which he chose not to exercise. this implies that he was happy for the newspapers to pedal their material.

The following is a partial quote from the source given.

In 1917, while visiting the Western Front as an unofficial war correspondent, Murdoch conducted negotiations with Field Marshal Douglas Haig in support of the Australian government's policy of the Australian Imperial Force (A.I.F.) divisions to be brought together into a united Australian Corps Murdoch pushed for the appointment of Major General Brudenell White as the new corps' head while denigrating Major General John Monash, the latter was given command when the combined corps was formed in 1918. Along with official war correspondent Charles Bean, Murdoch continued to lobby Haig for Monash's demotion by appealing firstly to Haig and then directly to Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes. Haig was not swayed, but he did allow and approve press releases from Murdoch that were scurrilous and completely baseless. Given that Haig was meticulous in his knowledge of his senior commanders, he had to have known Murdoch was making false statements. And yet, he nevertheless acquiesced and allowed the stories to run. "Death by neglect" is one way of putting it. By allowing these press releases to run, Haig enabled Murdoch to mislead billy hughes into the belief that the A.I.F.'s senior officers were strongly opposed to Monash. Murdochs (and Beans) intrigues were exposed by Hughes, when Hughes visited the front just before the Battle of Hamel intending to replace Monash. He first consulted the same senior officers and discovered that their support for their commander was strongly positive and that Monash's powers of planning and execution were excellent. The subsequent outcome of the Hamel assault closed the question of Monash's suitability, but later in the same year Murdoch again attempted to convince Hughes that Monash should not control the repatriation of Australian troops

Australian Dictionary of Biography Murdoch, Sir Keith Arthur (1885 - 1952) published by Australian National University, ISSN 1833-7538

 

[VBF-13]

He(Haig) certainly was not a direct conspirator, but as CinC he had considerable powers over the press, which he chose not to exercise. this implies that he was happy for the newspapers to pedal their material.

The following is a partial quote from the source given.

In 1917, while visiting the Western Front as an unofficial war correspondent, Murdoch conducted negotiations with Field Marshal Douglas Haig in support of the Australian government's policy of the Australian Imperial Force (A.I.F.) divisions to be brought together into a united Australian Corps Murdoch pushed for the appointment of Major General Brudenell White as the new corps' head while denigrating Major General John Monash, the latter was given command when the combined corps was formed in 1918. Along with official war correspondent Charles Bean, Murdoch continued to lobby Haig for Monash's demotion by appealing firstly to Haig and then directly to Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes. Haig was not swayed, but he did allow and approve press releases from Murdoch that were scurrilous and completely baseless. Given that Haig was meticulous in his knowledge of his senior commanders, he had to have known Murdoch was making false statements. And yet, he nevertheless acquiesced and allowed the stories to run. "Death by neglect" is one way of putting it. By allowing these press releases to run, Haig enabled Murdoch to mislead billy hughes into the belief that the A.I.F.'s senior officers were strongly opposed to Monash. Murdochs (and Beans) intrigues were exposed by Hughes, when Hughes visited the front just before the Battle of Hamel intending to replace Monash. He first consulted the same senior officers and discovered that their support for their commander was strongly positive and that Monash's powers of planning and execution were excellent. The subsequent outcome of the Hamel assault closed the question of Monash's suitability, but later in the same year Murdoch again attempted to convince Hughes that Monash should not control the repatriation of Australian troops

Australian Dictionary of Biography Murdoch, Sir Keith Arthur (1885 - 1952) published by Australian National University, ISSN 1833-7538

I don't know but that I agree with Redcoat on this one, Parsifal. And what do you call the innuendos in this article, if not a "witch hunt?" This wasn't Haig's business to get involved in the campaign for the leader of this bunch. That decision was up to the Prime Minister.

 

[parsifal]

well, i win some, i lose some....thats the way it is i suppose. Maybe we should move on...

 

[GrauGeist]

Just a point to make here, but through and even in the post Victorian age, high ranking Generals (and Admirals) wielded considerable power in political and social circles.
If they were made to look bad (whether fact or assumption), they had the ability to "pull a few strings" and create difficulties for the source of their displeasure.

 

[parsifal]

quite a number of British generals are worth mentioning because of their skill. hereare a few i think worth talking about:

Rawlinson is a controversial general to consider. He was the commander of 4th Army (of which the AIF was a part), and led the BEFs most successful component from 1917. He is often remembered for his failures at the Somme, the shadow of this one battle hangs over his career – The Somme. Rawlinson was the general most responsible for planning the battle of the Somme, and it was his army that bore the brunt of the fighting.
Yet despite the failures of the Somme, Rawlinson was a visionary. It was he who planned and conducted the first night battle by a modern army, and it was Rawlinson who pioneered the idea of Combined Arms Operations. His victory at Amiens – called "the Black Day of the German Army" by Erich Luddendorf – was the first battle in history where the efforts of infantry was closely supported by mass artillery using modern targeting and fire support plan techniques, mass cavalry charges, mass armored advance and aerial support. He showed the future of battlefield tactics and integrated operations.

Allenby is widely regarded as one of the best commanders of the First World War and is certainly remembered as one of the most successful. He had experience combat in the Boer War, with his Cavalry Column having been engaged in constant combat for two years. During that war he had learned contempt for the established higher command and, on the Western Front, it was this contempt that saw him replaced by Byng after feuding with Haig despite having distinguished himself in combat.
He was reassigned to the Middle-East and there he would prove his worth. He quickly gained the respect of the troops of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force by moving his HQ to a position closer to the front, visiting the troops regularly in the frontlines, reorganizing the EEF into an effective Corps system and imposing discipline and professionalism on the whole command. He gave financial support to T.E. Lawrence's efforts to unite the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Empire. He showed capability in both strategy and tactics and, much like Rawlinson, he became a pioneer of modern warfare with his victory at Megiddo being considered the precursor of Blitzkrieg.

Plumer looked the part of a typical First World War British General, with his receding chin and white moustache, yet he was anything but. Plumer was a man who operated in prudent reality: he did not expect his army to break through the enemy lines and charge to Berlin, nor did he expect his men to be superhuman. In his detailed plans he planned for only modest goals – keeping in mind the weather and terrain involved and the morale of his men – then trained his men thoroughly for the task he had set them. "Daddy" Plumer was arguably the finest commander on the Western Front and his victory at Messines was one of the most complete in the entire war

 

[silence]

Sounds like Monty took a few pages from Plumer. (Not being a Monty fan, I'll just stop there before I start anything.)

I need to learn so much more about the Great War, but the cost in lives vs. ground gains is so depressing for the most part and the naval war outside of Dogger Bank and Jutland is rather boring. Maybe I'll just stick with the air war.... (but no zeps! Spads, Sopwiths, and Fokkers! Jastas and Escadrilles! Oh, and the Albatrosses: love that shark-like look. Teutonic peoples seem to have a knack for making planes look like killing machines.)

 

[Readie]

'Yes, John I can imagine that. For me it's much easier to be objective with ww1 than with ww2. We were just not involved in the first one'.

I admire your staightforward honesty Marcel.

I hope people have learnt a few things from this thread.
WW1 is a very emotive war and feelings run deep as you have probably gathered....

You should be a moderator mate.

 

[VBF-13]

He gave financial support to T.E. Lawrence's efforts to unite the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Empire.

You know Arab oil figured into that. They just didn't figure it was the right time to tell the Arabs about it.