How would the Allies have dealt with large numbers of ME 262s?

[stona]

It would have been hard to "make him pay dearly" if the attack was by say four Me 262s that could disengage at will. I also suspect that the LW failure to engage escorts was due to the same problems that confounded attempts to attack the LW with big wings during the BoB.

I think that you and others are overestimating the capabilities of the Me 262 and its pilots. I'm not sure how many would volunteer to attack an 8th AF Fighter Group of 40+ fighters as a single schwarm.

I'm sure you are right about the second part, though the Luftwaffe did have in place a method for assembling larger formations over various beacons or land marks.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Civettone]

Why not?

Nuuuman, there is no easy fix. What are your arguments?
The Allies were developing jets.
- Yes, but not with sufficient range to fight over Germany. At least not while flying from Britain, which is what they are supposed to do in this early 1944 scenario.

Me 262s were shot down by Allied piston engined fighters
- And Il-2s shot down plenty of BF 109s. Aerial combat is unpredictable, but in the end, there is no doubt that the Me 262 was far superior to any piston engined fighter.

Its engines were put into production before they were reliable enough for mass production
- So your easy fix is to hope for the engines to malfunction? The Jumo 004s were okay as long as they were operated correctly. 25 hours is plenty for a combat aircraft. And then the 004B-4 engines came which could do with 100 hours til overhaul.

Germany did not have infinite supplies and could only build a certain number of aircraft
-They managed to construct almost 1,500 jets in the last months of the war. That is with a parallised industry and major shortages. Meanwhile, production of other aircraft and weapons continued undiminished.

attack them as they took off and were on finals for landing, a recommendation was destruction of their airfields as well.
- Don't you see that this actually proves that there was little to be done against the Me 262? The Allies only hope to destroy them was by circling above the jet airfields.

Also the mere fact, that you come up with half a dozen arguments already proves my point: there is no easy fix against large swarms of airborne Me 262s.

Also, it might be a good idea to re-examine the airborne kill-loss ratio for the Me 262. And keep in mind that the Me 262 pilots were instructed to ignore the escort fighters and go for the bombers.

Kris

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The Japanese and Italians used to think the same thing.

I'm skeptical of the "airfield combat" proposal. If it was possible to catch Me 262s on final, it was possible to catch any LW piston engine plane.

AFAIK, that's essentially what happened. When the P-51s were released to range over the continent, and especially LW bases, they caught anything that was taking off or landing. You don't hear of it because it was just part of the bigger story of the seizing of air superiority over the continent. The Me-262 was noteworthy because it showed the new high performing jet was just as vulnerable (and more so) in that flight regime as any aircraft.

The fantasy WW2 seems to be based on two assumptions. First, that the 262 become available for use about 1 year earlier, when the LW still controlled the airspace above Germany and hotly contested the airspace over wider Europe.

the second implicit assumption is that allied response is fixed to historic schedules. That seems a bit unlikely even in a fantasy world.

When Goering saw P-51s over Berlin, he understood the war was lost. He didn't say, "gee, I wish we had more 262's." probably because he understood that an air superiority fighter needs the long legs of the P-38 or P-51 and that the 262 is an interceptor not a good air superiority fighter.

The 262 is an interceptor that would appear to have been hard to counter in 1943 but so were Me-109s and FW-190s.

A second assumption seems to be invoked that the P-51 being unavailable much before January 1944 limits the allies options. There were quite a lot of P-51s in Europe in 43. But they had Allison engines.

5/14/42 Rolls Royce proposes Merlins installed in late model Mustang I (NA-83).
5/29/42 P-51 delivered to RR
10/14/42 Mustang X first flight.

I would expect the Mustang program would have accelerated to provide the long legged fighter to project air superiority over European airspace, and that wide-spread conversion of Allison powered P-51s might provide an immediate answer to increase numbers, although, assuming such a program was instituted at the appearance of the first 262, the conversions probably wouldn't be ready any sooner that the P-51Bs, or about early 1944. There would have to have been some intelligence foreknowledge of the introduction of this weapon to motivate either acceleration of the P-51B or conversions... Just a thought and probably not a good one. I would imagine the necessary tooling for wide spread conversion is probably out of the question.

Performance (aka speed) is one thing and a serious consideration in this fantasy thread but so is endurance and operational tempo and especially the tactics that these attributes enable. The numbers of 262's the LW is likely able to muster are going to have a very poor ability to provide multiple sorties in defense of the homeland after December, 1943. It comes down to numbers again. The production of allied aircraft will stress the fragile technology of the jet to the breaking point by pushing it to the limits of its material failure envelope.

In the worst case, the Me-262 may have delayed the inevitable and forced a bloodier campaign but ultimately, I don't see the new technology as being able to do more than forestall it.

 

[stona]

there was little to be done against the Me 262? The Allies only hope to destroy them was by circling above the jet airfields.
Kris

Not so. That is not how 100+ Me 262s were shot down historically. I'd refer you back to Hans Fey's advice to his captors on how best to deal with the Me 262, a type with which as an ex Luftwaffe and then Besichtigung Abteilung Luftwaffe (BAL) acceptance pilot he was very familiar.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Civettone]

I am auite aware of Hans Fey interrogation report. It just boggles me how you use that document to prove your point, while his testimony clearly demonstrates the superiority of the Me 262 !




Kris

 

[Civettone]

People keep using the argument of bouncing the jets on their take off and landing. However, this would not happen in this 1944 scenario.

Why?

The effective patrolling over German jet bases started around February 1945. By that time, the Allies were already invading Germany itself. This had two major results, which would be absent in this 1944 scenario.

1. the early warning radar system collapsed, because all radars in France were lost. It was no longer possible for air controllers to form an effective air defence system. Allied aircraft were flying all over Germany, destroying targets of opportunity and disrupting communications. In these last weeks, fighter units became semi-autonomous units, fighting their own battles. There was hardly any coordination. Fuel was almost non-existent, which meant that excess pilots and planes sat by idly while Allied planes patrolled over German skies.

2. the reduced area in which the German Luftwaffe was operating, meant that only a few (paved) air fields were available to the German jet units. Coupled with the very limited amount of operational Me 262s (due to a lack of fuel), the Allies had no problem in identifying the few major Me 262 bases. Under normal circumstances, the Luftwaffe always used proxy air fields, which were used temporarily to confuse Allied intelligence on the location of the fighter unit. (This was a result of major Allied attacks on German air bases.) More bases with more aircraft would have been made the patrolling over Me 262 bases too costly for the Allies. They did not have the resources to patrol all possible air fields.

In conclusion, the 1944 scenario was very different from the 1945 reality. It would have made the Allied tactic of patrolling over known Me 262 bases a very dubious tactic.

Kris

 

[razor1uk]

Superiority is only superior when the cards of the aerial situation are decked on the pilots side and he can use them.

 

[fastmongrel]

The USAAF had to deal with radar guided MIGS and AAA over N Korea how did they cope. It seems a similar enough situation to use the response of the USAAF in 1950 to 54 to extrapolate the response in 44.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The USAAF had to deal with radar guided MIGS and AAA over N Korea how did they cope. It seems a similar enough situation to use the response of the USAAF in 1950 to 54 to extrapolate the response in 44.

Slight correction - the USAAF went away in 1947, in Korea it was the USAF

 

[oldcrowcv63]

People keep using the argument of bouncing the jets on their take off and landing. However, this would not happen in this 1944 scenario.

Why? The effective patrolling over German jet bases started around February 1945.

Kris

I've was under the impression that fighter sweeps began in the February-March 1944 time frame just after Doolittle assumes 8th AF command. Is that incorrect?

from wikipedia: (understandably not always the most reliable source)

"The rapid re-equipment of USAAF fighter squadrons enabled the new commander of the 8th AF, Jimmy Doolittle, in March of 1944 to send out Mustang squadrons in formations well ahead of the lead elements of the bomber formations, to perform air supremacy "fighter sweeps" to clear the German skies of the Luftwaffe, and permit the USAAF's bombers to operate without serious opposition."

AHT appears to confirm date, (page 335) April, 5 1944, two P-51B groups (~ 6 squadrons?) go on airfield strafing missions near Berlin and Munich destroying 100 a/c. 7 P-51 lost.

Same source indicates fighter sweeps over the continent by P-51Bs and P-38s began in late 1943. Prior briefing on the location of LW air bases would have been sop and they would have been prime targets.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

People keep using the argument of bouncing the jets on their take off and landing. However, this would not happen in this 1944 scenario.

Why?

The effective patrolling over German jet bases started around February 1945. By that time, the Allies were already invading Germany itself. This had two major results, which would be absent in this 1944 scenario.

The LW was never able to maintain 100% air superiority around its bases, this was a situation that cannot go away.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Careful reading of AHT seems to indicate that the pacing item wasn't availability of P-51 airframes but rather Merlins. I would expect that to have been changed rather quickly by re-prioritization in the event of 262's early appearance.

AHT states that, while 534 P-51B airframes had been completed in July of 1943, only 173 Merlins were received. Considering all the aircraft using merlins not specifically dedicated to countering a 262 threat, the engines existed but were otherwise allocated. The critical situation in the 8th in the Fall of 1943 was apparently prompting many such re-prioritizations of production and distribution. Seems like this would have been a reasonable response assuming its value in that role was appreciated in a timely way. I suspect that would be the real pacing item: Allies coming to the rapid realization that the answer to 262 early deployment lay in the P-51B.

 

[parsifal]

I was looking at the situation over Korea at the introduction of the Mig-15. situation is somewhat analogous to this hypothetical. Migs were not deployed to the far east until early 1950, when a single IAD (air division, about 120 aircraft), under the command of a leading WWII soviet ace was initially deployed to Shanghai, China to support the final PLA mopping up ops against the nationalists. Soviet conversion was too hasty , even though the unit flying these aircraft was handpicked, with a vast number aces from the patriotic war, conversion training was very short and inadequate.


in july the mig IAD was trasferred to Korea, to try and halt UN bombing operstions, which was relying mostly on prop driven bombers including b-29s. The UN was working over the korean peninsula systematically, trying to strangle the Korean Army's supply lines. Despite the hype, 1950-51, UN air losses were fewer than 140 a/c lost to all causes. There is a lot of dispute about Mig losses, but being conservative, probably at least 50 were lost, principally fom F-84s, F-80s, meteor F8s and a handful of F-86s. Despiute the deployment of more than 100 Migs, in the hands of some very experienced pilots, UN losses remained tolerable, and ther was no apparent let up in UN air activity. Un never lost air superiority.

i wonder if there might be a parrallel to draw with German operationsin a me 262 rich environment????

 

[Erich]

this poor thread has so bounced around from 1943, 44 and 45 it is hard to make a sensible question let alone a feasible answer to anything written as things are so convoluted. had the 262 been in the numbers in March of 45 during mid-1943 start of the US bomber campaign then real probs would of existed Allies would of been on the drawing board as hot as fire. during 43 and early 44 the LW had to need for protective high cover AF defense of prop or this case of jets as we did not see the full blown invasion of Allied ground attack forces yet ............... now getting to spring of 45 yes the LW is still in kindergarten practicing old unworkable un-novel ideas for ground to air defenses. III./JG 54 Doras could not protect Nowotny's band in the fall of 44, the Wörger staffel did nothing for the inept 262 band of JV 44. JG 7 the most threatening of the LW jet day units had absolutely NO air cover for jets upon landing or take off still thinking that tons of quad 2cm Fla would ward off any attempts by US/Soviet fighters/bombers.

I just see the thread as a full-on what-if ? maybe the original poster needs to get a 10 point specific questionnaire so we are all on the same page ?

 

[altsym]

More fighters, more bombers, more fighters, more bombers. There was no way the allies would outright lose the air war. In any realistic scenario.

 

[bobbysocks]

it's all in perspective in fact the "future" LW jet bases were to made underground with slight upsloping ramps................... the race against the inevitable time machine the LW did not have on it's side. Welters men raced from the east side trying to get behind soviet lines and steal necessary fuels for it's jets to counter BC A/C..................ha ha but what a story it is of insanity.

not a problem at all...the raf had that 363 sq of mossies that could plop a bouncy bomb right through the opening of the underground airbase.....

 

[stona]

I am auite aware of Hans Fey interrogation report. It just boggles me how you use that document to prove your point, while his testimony clearly demonstrates the superiority of the Me 262 !
Kris

That's just an example.

I have details of 105 Me 262s shot down by the allies. That includes when, where, who was flying the jet and when possible who did the shooting down. Most were shot down by fighters, a few by return fire from bombers, sometimes finished off by fighters, and a very few by flak.

That's how I know that stooging around airfields was not the only way to shoot them down. Collating that information has been a labour of love over a long time but I'll gladly share it with you.

I also have about thirty other Me 262, unknown werknummern, shot down by allied aircraft and am still working to establish more details for them. Many records, particularly German, are either missing or illegible.
Incredibly the Luftwaffe, particularly JG7, report losses on days when there is no corresponding allied claim. More normally the allies make claims when there is no corresponding Luftwaffe loss. This makes things complicated.

Incidentally the most dangerous thing to an Me 262 was the Me 262 itself. The vast majority of losses of aircraft and crew are to accidents which is what happens when an aircraft is rushed into service LOOOOONG before it is ready.

I have examples of Me 262s being attacked by a dozen or more P-51s. I have accounts of head on attacks, following the jets in climbs and jumping them as the attacked the bombers. I even have one account (Lt. Keith R McGinnis) of chasing a jet from 21,000 to 16,000 feet, closing the range, until the Me 262 rolled on its right wing and the pilot baled out. McGinnis was awarded the victory, confirmed by Lt. Darrel D Bachmann, without firing a shot!

From the German side I can think of two (there must be more) examples in which the pilot tried to accelerate by opening his throttles to abruptly resulting in engine failure or fire. In both cases the pilot survived by abandoning the aircraft.

What exactly is the source for your contention that they were virtually invulnerable and could only be shot down in particular circumstances? Your assumption is that the pilots always flew the Me262 to exploit its one advantage (speed) whereas my research into the actual historical combats, as reported by the men who were, there makes it clear that they did not.

Page One.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Erich]

....the 100 or so are kills resulting with action of the US 8/9th/15th AF and 2 TAC. nothing on RAF command added to that listing. the 425 kills of JG 7 are fatantasy should be reduced by 1/2 easily. one thing is we do not know the actions/kills and there are some against JG 7 vs the Soviet bomber/fighter forces. Also the combination of the total Kommando Hogeback with KG (6) and tw other bomber/fighter units combined in March 45-May 45 time frame against the Soviets, too many things are lost but it may have been impressive. The r4M in the ground attack came into it's own here against Soviet armor.

 

[razor1uk]

Most 262 pilots were undertrained fresh graduates or ex bomber crew as unsuited or new to being acting as fighter pilots. Only a relative few were from fighter background; I am not discounting those who became good jet fighter pilots or that there weren't difficulties or highly skilled individuals converting and flying the swallow.
Goering and also later Otto Gotlieb/G-something (name?) had fallen out with A.Gallands opinions, and Gotleib (name?) despised and usurped him and the fighter part of the LW at every opportunity to strengthen his own 'power' base.

This might account to some of the RLM's reduced support for the 262 fighter arm - that and following sometime in 43 or 44, Goering paratically gave up on administering the LW, leaving it to the factions with the LW commands and to who and what political vagaries they could or couldn't influence to their own aims.
But thiat's more related to late war regarding towards JV44 from the Battle Over Baveria book via my memory.

 

[Erich]

that's a generalization if I ever saw one. you had a cadre always of experienced pilots flying the 262 was not that big of a deal the NF pilots noted this, basic instrument skills and then get ready to crank it up and that was a big prob with the prop boyz the tremendous range of acceleration and flat out kick ass speed never encountered before.

incidentally whitemore of the 356th fg shot down on tail of a 262 that had just finished off a P-38 on PR that Whitemore and his wingman were escorting no doubt Whitemore was so pissed off and told his wingman to shoot that SOB down. they were both taken by surprise............ and White was able to bank over as the jet flamed out and shot the jet to pieces. interview with whitmore and the 356th fg association. the claims was made on February 21, 1945.more will be included a forth-coming title