mikewint
Captain
Historian David McCullough stated, "people living 'back then' didn't know they were living 'back then'," and to judge the decisions of people in 1945 by the standards of 2018 is not only ahistorical, it is pointless. Truman and his advisers made the only decision they could have made; indeed, considered in the context of World War II, it wasn't really much of a decision at all. Had Truman and his commanders shrunk from doing everything possible to force the war to its end, the American people would never have forgiven them. This judgment no doubt mattered more to these leaders than the disapproval of academic historians a half century later, and rightly so.
In general there are three arguments usually made against the use of the bomb in 1945. First, that to use the bomb only against Japan was racist; second, that it was pointless; and third, that it was done purely for political effect that had more to do with the Soviet Union than with the war in the Pacific.
#1. The Racist Argument - The "White" US would never use a nuclear bomb against "White Germans". It is difficult to believe that the Allies would have spared the Germans anything after turning the streets of German cities like Dresden to glass under repeated firebombing. Now there is evidence that FDR's advisers thought about using the bomb against Germany, however, while the dangers of radiation weren't completely known it was known that they were deadly (two scientists had died horrible deaths of radiation poisoning while working on the Manhattan Project). An atomic bomb dropped on a land-locked country like Germany posed a radiation threat to other allied countries. There were also many thousands of Americans of German descent; would a political Truman have dared angered them with a nuclear bomb on Germany? The more obvious objection, however, is that the first atomic test took place in July 1945, two months after the Nazi surrender in May, but by the time Truman took office, it was a moot point: the Nazis were beaten and the invasion of Germany was winding down, not gearing up.
#2. It was pointless: The Japanese Navy, Army, and Air Force were defeated. Truman should have realized that Japan was beaten?
This is one of those arguments that assumes modern-day omniscience on the part of historical figures. The fact of the matter is that Japan was not preparing to surrender; it was preparing to fight to the death. The invasion of the Japanese home islands was not going to look like the invasion of Germany, where the Nazi armies were crushed between advancing U.S. and British forces on one side and Soviet troops on the other. The Japanese home island invasion was projected to cost a half-million to a million Allied and Japanese lives— all in what should have been the last months of the war. OK, we've all heard that one before but let's assume that Harry Truman was either duped or made an honest mistake, and that the invasion casualty estimates were way off. (One historian has suggested that these estimates were ten times too high .) If the figure of 500,000 – 1,000,000 casualties was wrong, then Truman was only risking, ONLY mind you, 50,000 – 100,000 lives. But would even one more Allied death have been worth not dropping the bomb, in the minds of the president and his advisors, after six years of the worst fighting in the history of the human race?
Let's go down that road: The war ends, with yet more massive bloodshed, probably at some point in 1946. The existence of the bomb becomes known, and the president of the United States has to explain to hundreds of thousands of grieving parents and wounded veterans that he did not use it because he thought it was too horrible to drop on the enemy, even after a sneak attack, a global war, hundreds of thousands of Americans killed and wounded in two theaters, and years of ghastly firebombing. Seventy years later, we would likely be writing retrospectives on "the impeachment/execution of Harry S. Truman."
#3. The political effect on the Soviet Union and keeping them out of Japan.
There's no doubt that the Americans wanted the war over before the Soviets could enter Japan. From the victory at Stalingrad in 1943 onward, U.S. leaders realized that Stalin's Soviet Union was not interested in a peaceful world order policed by the great powers. The Americans were in a hurry to force a Japanese surrender, but they had no way of knowing whether that surrender was imminent. Ward Wilson, for one, claims that the Japanese surrendered not because of the bomb but because of the Soviet entry into the Pacific war, but only the most cold-blooded president would have counted on this and held America's greatest weapon in reserve.
By August 1945, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had deteriorated badly. The Potsdam Conference between U.S. President Harry S. Truman, Russian leader Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill ended just four days before the bombing of Hiroshima. The meeting was marked by recriminations and suspicion between the Americans and Soviets. Russian armies were occupying most of Eastern Europe. Truman and many of his advisers hoped that the U.S. atomic monopoly might offer future diplomatic leverage with the Soviets and a quick lone US defeat of Japan without a Soviet invasion would keep them out of Japan.
Now let's revisit #2 above, i.e., Truman decides not to drop the bomb and the US and Soviets invade Japan. The Soviets fight their way through Japan. They like the US taking huge casualties in the process before Japan is defeated. As above after the war's end the existence of the bomb becomes known both in America and Russia. The speeches Stalin and his successors would have given during the Cold War write themselves: "America allowed Soviet soldiers to spill their blood on the beaches of Japan, while Truman and his criminal gang protected the secret of their ultimate weapon. We shall never forget, nor forgive, this useless squandering of Soviet lives…"
In general there are three arguments usually made against the use of the bomb in 1945. First, that to use the bomb only against Japan was racist; second, that it was pointless; and third, that it was done purely for political effect that had more to do with the Soviet Union than with the war in the Pacific.
#1. The Racist Argument - The "White" US would never use a nuclear bomb against "White Germans". It is difficult to believe that the Allies would have spared the Germans anything after turning the streets of German cities like Dresden to glass under repeated firebombing. Now there is evidence that FDR's advisers thought about using the bomb against Germany, however, while the dangers of radiation weren't completely known it was known that they were deadly (two scientists had died horrible deaths of radiation poisoning while working on the Manhattan Project). An atomic bomb dropped on a land-locked country like Germany posed a radiation threat to other allied countries. There were also many thousands of Americans of German descent; would a political Truman have dared angered them with a nuclear bomb on Germany? The more obvious objection, however, is that the first atomic test took place in July 1945, two months after the Nazi surrender in May, but by the time Truman took office, it was a moot point: the Nazis were beaten and the invasion of Germany was winding down, not gearing up.
#2. It was pointless: The Japanese Navy, Army, and Air Force were defeated. Truman should have realized that Japan was beaten?
This is one of those arguments that assumes modern-day omniscience on the part of historical figures. The fact of the matter is that Japan was not preparing to surrender; it was preparing to fight to the death. The invasion of the Japanese home islands was not going to look like the invasion of Germany, where the Nazi armies were crushed between advancing U.S. and British forces on one side and Soviet troops on the other. The Japanese home island invasion was projected to cost a half-million to a million Allied and Japanese lives— all in what should have been the last months of the war. OK, we've all heard that one before but let's assume that Harry Truman was either duped or made an honest mistake, and that the invasion casualty estimates were way off. (One historian has suggested that these estimates were ten times too high .) If the figure of 500,000 – 1,000,000 casualties was wrong, then Truman was only risking, ONLY mind you, 50,000 – 100,000 lives. But would even one more Allied death have been worth not dropping the bomb, in the minds of the president and his advisors, after six years of the worst fighting in the history of the human race?
Let's go down that road: The war ends, with yet more massive bloodshed, probably at some point in 1946. The existence of the bomb becomes known, and the president of the United States has to explain to hundreds of thousands of grieving parents and wounded veterans that he did not use it because he thought it was too horrible to drop on the enemy, even after a sneak attack, a global war, hundreds of thousands of Americans killed and wounded in two theaters, and years of ghastly firebombing. Seventy years later, we would likely be writing retrospectives on "the impeachment/execution of Harry S. Truman."
#3. The political effect on the Soviet Union and keeping them out of Japan.
There's no doubt that the Americans wanted the war over before the Soviets could enter Japan. From the victory at Stalingrad in 1943 onward, U.S. leaders realized that Stalin's Soviet Union was not interested in a peaceful world order policed by the great powers. The Americans were in a hurry to force a Japanese surrender, but they had no way of knowing whether that surrender was imminent. Ward Wilson, for one, claims that the Japanese surrendered not because of the bomb but because of the Soviet entry into the Pacific war, but only the most cold-blooded president would have counted on this and held America's greatest weapon in reserve.
By August 1945, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had deteriorated badly. The Potsdam Conference between U.S. President Harry S. Truman, Russian leader Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill ended just four days before the bombing of Hiroshima. The meeting was marked by recriminations and suspicion between the Americans and Soviets. Russian armies were occupying most of Eastern Europe. Truman and many of his advisers hoped that the U.S. atomic monopoly might offer future diplomatic leverage with the Soviets and a quick lone US defeat of Japan without a Soviet invasion would keep them out of Japan.
Now let's revisit #2 above, i.e., Truman decides not to drop the bomb and the US and Soviets invade Japan. The Soviets fight their way through Japan. They like the US taking huge casualties in the process before Japan is defeated. As above after the war's end the existence of the bomb becomes known both in America and Russia. The speeches Stalin and his successors would have given during the Cold War write themselves: "America allowed Soviet soldiers to spill their blood on the beaches of Japan, while Truman and his criminal gang protected the secret of their ultimate weapon. We shall never forget, nor forgive, this useless squandering of Soviet lives…"
