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But as I pointed out this is not necessarily true. The Implacable class and Taiho carried (or could have) a very similar complement to an Essex class. Early war the RN didn't use large permanent deck parks, as per the USN but when they began to do so, most of the differences in aircraft capacity vanished.Midway was the curiosity until a lot of combat aircraft came from Midway and started firing. Then it has their full attention.
I doubt the IJN knew the USN torpedoes were poor. So any torpedo attack is hair raising.
Armoured decks carry less aircraft so its not a no brainer. Less combat aircraft mean that you need something like 3 Armoured carriers against 2 unarmoured to carry same air power. It's all about the numbers.
Let's keep in mind that the exalted Kido Butai of Pearl Harbor fame was never tested defensively during that battle. They laid off to the north of Oahu and sent in their airstrikes.
How would that have changed, historically, if the U.S. Carriers that were out to sea on 7 December, happened to come across them during the attack?
How would the IJN's task force handled attacks differently between Pearl Harbor and Midway? The answer is simple: there would not have been any difference...the legendary Kido Butai was not put to the true test until Midway and they fell like a house of cards under pressure.
Just as with their featherweight but agile and very adept fighter aircraft, their best defense is a good offense? Especially when coupled with the element of surprise, that seems to reflect their thinking...The Japanese carriers did seem to have glass jaws when hit compared to Illustrious as an example, who took one 1000kg direct hit, 6 500kg direct hits plus a further 500kg near miss, and she then sailed into Grand Harbour under her own steam, she was one tough girl with a crew to match.
Just as with their featherweight but agile and very adept fighter aircraft, their best defense is a good offense? Especially when coupled with the element of surprise, that seems to reflect their thinking...
Yes, that's what I'm trying to say, actually. They seemed to think a good offense and surprise could carry the battles. They were right, when it worked. When it didn't work, they were on their heels, bad. At Pearl, it worked; at Midway, it didn't. Their ships turned out as vulnerable as their aircraft.Trouble is Japanese planes had no defence, it's common to hear how Japanese aircraft had longer legs and were very agile in a fight compared to Allied aircraft but everything else was sacrificed to meet that requirement, so no armour, self sealing tanks, effective armament or radio. Gun camera footage of Allied/German aircraft show many of them getting chucks ripped off them but surviving, Japanese aircraft turn into balls of flame or shed wings at the first sign of a decent hit. Offensive tactics only work if your fight on your terms, a smart enemy is not going to let you do that.
I hear you, but let's look at the big picture. The Japanese were in this to finish this thing quickly, before the Americans could mobilize. I don't think they were thinking safety like we were as much. If you look at the evolution of the A6M, they were late in these revisions. It was too late, too, to make a difference. The war was lost for them after Midway, and they knew that deep in their hearts. They failed to break our back, and they knew that was it, it was over. They kept on trying, but they knew they were overmatched.If I remember correctly, I think I read somewhere, probably in "The First Team", that the F4F did not initially have self sealing tanks and armor until around the battle of Coral Sea. According to "America's Hundred Thousand", the F4F-3 did not have armor or self sealing tanks until late aircraft. So initially the Zero was consistent with the F4F in lack of protection only the Japanese were late in adapting to the need.
Very interesting. I had always read and therefore assumed that the Japanese resistance to self sealing fuel tanks was due to weight increase alone.The reason they were resistant to the armor plating was the weight; the reason they were resistant to the self-sealing tanks was the loss of fuel-capacity in those padded tanks, which was around 20-25%, give or take.
Interesting side note. The tanks wouldn't necessarily explode when they were hit, unless they were hit with a lot, all at once. The tracer-fire would bring down the aircraft with the hit tanks by igniting the combustible vapor trails. I don't have citation for that (...or, more precisely, verification outside of the pilots, themselves, I've had the privilege of sitting with, and listening to).Very interesting. I had always read and therefore assumed that the Japanese resistance to self sealing fuel tanks was due to weight increase alone.
The Hosho and the Zuiho were too far out of range for any Kido Butai (Carrier Div. 1/2) "orphans".
The Japanese strategy of making the zero a light-weight, long-range fighter at the expense of armor and fuel tank protection was a sound one through the conquest part of the war. Despite these deficiencies, zero losses were manageable at least until the Battle of Midway, and in that battle, most of the planes were lost on board the ships rather than in combat.