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We have the advantage of hindsight including after action battle reports.
What different classes of ships were designed to do is something else.
And a lot of this stuff took place over 10-12 years and since it takes around 3 years to build a cruiser there was a lot overlap.
You also were dealing the aftermath of the treaties and with radar coming it to disrupt the preconceived notions of night (poor weather) combat.
The US had maxed out their allotment of heavy cruisers with 8in guns. Due to the treaty language anything with an 8" gun (aside from carriers) was a heavy cruiser, didn't matter how many guns or the tonnage as long as it was under 10,000ton.
Also by treaty the next break was 6"in guns for light cruisers, mostly. However the "light cruiser" was also capped at 10,000tons and at times (depends on the treaty) the tonnage was not which lead to the Mogami class and the Brooklyn class
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Fifteen 6" guns. The US built 9 of these things which were basically 10,000 ton cruisers were different turrets/guns.
The US guns could range to just over 25,000yrds but a lot these max ranges were somewhat of an illusion.
However in a closer range night battle the high rate of fire (up to 10rpm per barrel) was considered to be quite an advantage over the 2-3 rpm of the 8' guns.
However at 10,000tons they were bit expensive to use as destroyer leaders in a night torpedo attack, they were also, shall we say, HUGE in size for night torpedo attack (1936-38 here, forget radar). The old Omaha class, which was similar in age to the Japanese light cruisers, had a number of problems. While low and fast they took water over bow/sides, the hull was weak and the fuel tanks leaked contaminating the fuel oil.
This was part of the reasoning for the Atlanta class. A 6,000 ton ship that was fast enough to keep up with/lead destroyers, better protected than a destroyer and with enough firepower to overwhelm one or more destroyers or a small light cruiser (5-6000 tons). Also kept ammo supply easy.
Now please note that the Cleveland class kept almost the same hull and swapped one triple 6" turret for two twin 5" turrets.
The US called all the 6" gun cruisers CLs but they often made up a fair amount of the cruiser forces in many of the early Pacific battles.
Battle of Empress Augusta Bay (Nov 1-2 1943) was all Cleveland class light cruisers and destroyers and while not a very decisive battle it was a win for the US navy and was the last battle of the Solomons/first battle for Bougainville. Radar had also come quite far since the late summer of 1942.
Only one Baltimore class cruiser showed up in combat in 1943 (Nov) with the 2nd one showing in Jan 1944.
The Wichita showed up in the Spring of 1939 and is the only US 8" cruiser to be completed between Vincennes (Spring 1937) and the Baltimore.
Flashless powder may have not worked in battle quite as intended but it did form part of the planning during 1941-42.
A lack of actual night battle practice in the USN during the peace time years may have hidden a number of things. It did reduce peacetime collisions though.
This is often overlooked or the reason why is overlooked.Yes I agree, but the bigger guns did seem to outrange the smaller ones by a good margin in the actual battles.
Again wrong.I think Atlanta class was a good ship, especially for AA, but one of the other flaws of the class though was a lack of sonar or depth charges, and they seemed to be pretty vulnerable to submarines.
Again wrong.
As designed they were fitted with sonar and two rails aft each holding 5 DC. Then in Jan 1942 that was expanded to a full destroyer outfit by adding 6 DC throwers each holding 6 DC. But the issue with them was that, as 6,000 tons standard displacement cruisers, they did not have the manoeuverability of a destroyer to go submarine hunting (their tactical diameter was estimated at 900 yards). As the war went on and their use became more focussed on the anti-aircraft role the DC throwers were ordered removed in Feb 1943 and the DC rails in Oct 1944. In both cases the weight saving was used to buy additional light AA weapons.
Their main problem was their relatively small size. So the first 8 ships only got SC radar and not the big SK set with its greater range or the fighter director SP. As the war went on other sacrifices had to be made. In the second group the wing 5" turrets were sacrificed along with the boats and boat crane (a common alteration to US ships) for more Bofors mounts as completed they shipped 8 twins). In 1945 the TT were beginning to be sacrificed, starting with Oakland, for a further increase in the light AA battery.
When the third group was ordered (Juneau, Spokane & Fresno) 5" turrets Nos 2, 3, 4 & 5 were all dropped a deck which bought enough topweight & stability for the full cruiser radar suite and even more light AA.
Sorry I wasn't clear, that wasn't a "gotcha". it was just extra detail.If that isn't what you are saying, make it clear.
Sorry I wasn't clear, that wasn't a "gotcha". it was just extra detail.
However since you seem to think that everything is a "gotcha" I am done replying to this part of the discussion.
Perhaps drifting too much into naval stuff, but the above is very interesting, any explanation why they chose a 6000 ton design instead of an 8000 ton one?That is not true.
The design evolution of the Atlantas went back to mid-1934 to find a smaller successor to the 10,000 ton 6" armed Brooklyn class in light of the negotiations that took place ahead of the Second London Naval Conference (Dec 1935-March 1936) and the resulting 1936 Treaty that limited cruisers to 8,000 tons.
Friedman in his "US Cruisers An Illustrated Design History" devotes a chapter of over 30 pages to their design evolution. In that process they went through some 26 designs with various combinations of size, power and armament before the Atlanta as we know it was arrived at. Those included versions with varying numbers of 5"/38 or combined 6"/47 plus 5"/38 or even 6"/47 DP on tonnages ranging from 3,500 tons to 8,400 tons and speeds from 32.5 to 36 knots.
Throughout the process however what they were seeking was a cruiser that
1. Could work with destroyers for general purposes and
2. Was a general purpose cruiser to work with the battlefleet i.e. a replacement for the Omaha class.
So surface action was very much envisaged when they were designed. Reading Friedman the striking thing is how little there was in the discussions about its main armament anti aircraft capabilities. The emphasis was very much on surface action, hence the debate about 6" v 5" main armament. 6" DP had to be rejected on weight grounds and likely delays to the turret design and the mixed battery on a ship of that size wasn't popular.
It took until July 1938 to come up with a preliminary design and Nov 1938 for it to be finalised and it still didn't suit everyone. Orders were placed in April 1939 for the first 4 ships.
As ordered they were classified as CL i.e. light cruiser. The survivors and subsequent ships of the class were not redesignated as CLAA until Feb/Mar 1949. The CLAA designation did not exist until that point in time and by then half of them had been out of commission for 2-3 years.
Good read, however inevitably one can see a bias there. Adding the 1943-44 torpedo launch/hit figures when the IJN was increasingly loosing it's edge due to ship and men losses, faced with an ever increasing and adapting USN is a bit misleading imo. Rather the 1942 statistics, when IJN was at it's peak are a much better indication as to how the hypothetical decisive battle could have went. Note that in 4 of the 6 battles with a large numbers of torpedoes launched (i discount the below 10 numbers for now), IJN scores hovered around 12-13%. The outliers are Java sea (launched from too far?) and second Guadalcanal (not quite sure what happened there, just pure luck for the american BBs not to be hit?).The start of this article shows how the Japanese intended to use a massive night time torpedo strike as part of the "Decisive Battle" with the 24" Long Lance torpedoes and how the torpedo cruisers would have fitted in to that. There is then an analysis of the various battles they were used in and their effectiveness.
Do you fully appreciate the extent to which gunnery radars had been developed and fitted "in the early years"?The whole notion that "flashless" powder is a game changer or a crucial element for surface combat is BS, since it's limited to the smaller caliber guns among other reasons. And the smaller caliber guns did not win the major naval battles of the Pacific War. Even radar doesn't seem to have mattered that much in the early years. It certainly didn't save the Exeter when it went up against the IJN. It wasn't really a major factor for the US until in later 1943, and even then, was probably not decisive for surface combat.
Proximity fused AA shells on the other hand, a British innovation turned into reality by the Americans, did seem to matter. Fire directors mattered. Well trained crews mattered. Effective torpedoes mattered, and the RN did have those. And so did big guns.
I'm not trying to play "gotcha" The problem I have is that so much of what you post is at best inaccurate or ill informed, especially when it comes to anything connected with Britain.. As far as I am concerned it is a question of trying to ensure the information is correct for you and others to understand the true position.I'm all about adding the finer details but some of y'all just love the 'gotcha' game a little too much, especially when your 'gotcha' is some detail which isn't really relevant to the argument. What is your point? Do you really think, are you really trying to argue, that most or even say, more than half of the surface combats (above the level of say, PT boats) in the Pacific War were not decided by heavy (as in, 8" or better) naval guns or torpedoes?
If that isn't what you are saying, make it clear.
Any time a smaller detour than the naval stuff and the flashless powder!By the way, a slight detour,
I'm not trying to play "gotcha" The problem I have is that so much of what you post is at best inaccurate or ill informed, especially when it comes to anything connected with Britain.. As far as I am concerned it is a question of trying to ensure the information is correct for you and others to understand the true position.
Do you fully appreciate the extent to which gunnery radars had been developed and fitted "in the early years"?
And radar was not a panacea. Much depended on the skills of the operators and the surrounding environment. There were significant problems when ships operated close to land due to clutter from the topography. That was a particular problem in the Solomons in 1942.
If you look at Second Guadalcanal, you notice that the destroyers firing most of the torpedoes were old and didn't carry the Type 93. The newer destroyers seem to have used their torpedoes during First Guadalcanal. Of course, Atago and Takao had Type 93s but misidentified their enemy and presumably misjudged their speed. The two destroyers sent by Tanaka also carried the Type 93s but arrived a little late as Lee turned away.Snip.... The outliers are Java sea (launched from too far?) and second Guadalcanal (not quite sure what happened there, just pure luck for the american BBs not to be hit?).
If the IJN has a really good day during this hypothetical kantai kessen and the hits are hovering in the region of 12-13%, they might just about pull it off!