vinnye
Senior Airman
I know that some people are big fans of Kill Ratios, but I am not.
The reasons why I am not a fan are ;
1) the success rate of one aircraft is a product of a LOT of factors. Some of them are ; the quality of the opposing aircraft, their pilots, and the doctrine of their air force.
2) The situation in which the combat or ambush takes place. A defending/ intercepting force may be at a disadvantage of lack of numbers or altitude.
3) The experience of the pilots of both sides. During the BoB, the RAF used outdated tactics - VIC formation etc and had not had the experience that the LW gained in Spain, Poland etc. So in simple terms it was rookies against pro's. It is not that surprising then, that the LW fighters did quite well. Similarly, on the Eastern Front. the LW faced obsolete aircraft flown by inexperienced pilots. The same could be said about the Japanese forces in the Far East - they had experience as well as modern aircraft against some obsolete inexperienced opposition.
When the Allies gained experience and learned from their mistakes and adopted tactics better suited to their aircrafts relative strengths and exploiting their opponents weaknesses - the boot began to be put on the other foot. This is most obvious in the European Theatre when the RAF and USAAF changed tactics and allowed fighter aircraft to seek out the LW on the ground and in the air and also not be tied to close bomber escort. This quickly degrade the LW in terms of strength and also vitally in terms of experienced pilots. A similar situation late in the PTO saw the Japanese lose most of their experienced pilots and aircraft and become a shadow of its former self.
None of the above is taken into account in simple Kill Ratios.
The reasons why I am not a fan are ;
1) the success rate of one aircraft is a product of a LOT of factors. Some of them are ; the quality of the opposing aircraft, their pilots, and the doctrine of their air force.
2) The situation in which the combat or ambush takes place. A defending/ intercepting force may be at a disadvantage of lack of numbers or altitude.
3) The experience of the pilots of both sides. During the BoB, the RAF used outdated tactics - VIC formation etc and had not had the experience that the LW gained in Spain, Poland etc. So in simple terms it was rookies against pro's. It is not that surprising then, that the LW fighters did quite well. Similarly, on the Eastern Front. the LW faced obsolete aircraft flown by inexperienced pilots. The same could be said about the Japanese forces in the Far East - they had experience as well as modern aircraft against some obsolete inexperienced opposition.
When the Allies gained experience and learned from their mistakes and adopted tactics better suited to their aircrafts relative strengths and exploiting their opponents weaknesses - the boot began to be put on the other foot. This is most obvious in the European Theatre when the RAF and USAAF changed tactics and allowed fighter aircraft to seek out the LW on the ground and in the air and also not be tied to close bomber escort. This quickly degrade the LW in terms of strength and also vitally in terms of experienced pilots. A similar situation late in the PTO saw the Japanese lose most of their experienced pilots and aircraft and become a shadow of its former self.
None of the above is taken into account in simple Kill Ratios.