Kill Ratios

[JoeB]

Sorry but this kill ratio statistic is a nonsense,

1. if aircraft are unfit to fly because they have no spares or fuel, that says nothing about the effectiveness of the aircraft but of the logistical situation at that time.

2. If an aircraft is flown by a rookie pilot or the airforce is using poor training/tactics, this says nothing about the effectiveness of an aircraft but of the superior tactics/training/experience of the opposition.

3. if an airforces strategy is to destroy the enemys bombers then again this says nothing about an aircrafts capability when you then try to compare it to the enemys escorting fighters and the only factor which matters here is was the bomber offensive defeated.

4. if an aircraft is flown in small numbers against a numerically superior enemy again this says little about the effectiveness of an aircraft and everything about the capability of the airforce to field sufficient numbers of planes and pilots!

I can only partly agree with a couple of those points.

1. Taking this as proxy for all kinds of factors not directly related to either a/c or flying crews, there's surely some truth to it. But, there's also a definite tendency for people to look at various matchups from POV of one side, IMHO. For example in early Pac campaigns Japanese land based fighters (overwhelmingly the most common opponents) were quickly shifting from one new field to the next, often very rough ones, outrunning their logistical chain etc. but that's a lot less mentioned in arguments about the high kill ratio they achieved, compared to logistical and field problems on the Allied side. Then later, neither the Allies nor the Japanese were changing fields or in the midst of chaotic advances or withdrawals, and then, for example in Burma in 1943, the kill ratio of the Type 1 v the Hurricane….stayed the same as it had been in 1942. So your point can be valid, but often IMHO, factors are mentioned without really objectively considering how similar factors also affected the other side, or considering evidence from other periods or cases from which we might deduce how much effect these factors really had. The 1942 v 1943 Type 1 v .Hurricane example suggests it might not have been that much in that case.

2 A valid points if a fighter-fighter kill ratio is used to directly deduce the effectiveness of an a/c regardless of who was operating it, but not if the kill ratio is used to deduce the relative effectiveness of fighter *units*, as it should generally be. Training, doctrine tactics and leadership (last is not brought up nearly enough IMO) are included in that. If the same or two ostensibly similar units have very different kill ratio results with different a/c v similar opposition, *then* we might deduce something about the a/c themselves.

3. As covered umpteen times, this is potentially reasonable statement in cases where kill ratio's were fairly close to 1, or perceived to be. For example I think it was mentioned RAF fighters on Malta perceived a kill ratio on 2:3 against them (it was actually 1:several Hurricane v Bf109, 1:2 Spit V's v 109's, though more favorable v Italian fighters). However the concept of 'destroying the bombers and not caring so much about the escorts' is nonsensical when the ratio is heavily against the interceptors. If the 7:1 ratio scored by Zeroes over Spit V's over Darwin in 1943 had been replicated across the board by Axis fighters over Malta, they would almost surely have gained air superiority, and probably won the whole campaign, Guadalcanal likewise. The 1943 Darwin raids were not really that serious, and the Spit units lost dozens more planes in non-combat situations but were still able to replace them pretty easily. But the Allied units at Malta and G'canal were much closer to the edge in keeping up with losses at it was, and could not have continued against a 1:7 kill ratio. To say it's 'nonsense' to measure and consider those different ratios is itself nonsense, IMHO.

4. This seems reasonable on the surface but actually there is not that strong a relationship between OOB numbers and kill ratio's in the WW's. There is a strong relationship between OOB numbers and final overall outcomes of campaigns, yes, but numbers didn't determine relative fighter unit effectiveness, and plenty of evidence IMO points to kill ratio's a *generally* good indicator of relative fighter unit effectiveness. So for example it's hard to explain the tendency of the 109's to kill ratio advantage over Malta as just an artifact of numbers and their situation as escorts when 109 units (sometimes the same ones!) scored *higher* fighter-fighter ratio's over the Western Desert when heavily outnumbered in OOB strength, and were usually the interceptors themselves. One obvious point about numbers is that if one side has 200 and the other 100 fighters in a theater that does not necessarily mean each combat will involve 2 on one side for each on the other. As another example, ca. mid 1944 USAAF/RAF fighters hugely outnumbered LW ones overall in the Western theater, but particular USAAF group formations deep in Germany would often face very large and concentrated German fighter formations, and be outnumbered.

Another key point is that 'fighter unit effectiveness' has nothing do with courage or devotion to duty, as sometimes seems assumed in emotional responses. Kill ratio's are IMO a valid general indicator of fighter unit effectiveness, with many limitations of course. But nobody is saying they are a measure of pilot bravery, let alone national mojo generally.

Joe

 

[GregP]

Sorry, but teyh effectiveness of a fighter in WWII was NOT tied to circumstance, pilots, fuel, or anything else. All sides had to deal with those things.

The effectiveness was tied solely to the employment of the fighter (or bomber, etc.) by the operator of same in the situation that was existing, using tactics devised by the forces in contest with the fuel, armament, weather, and maintenace available. All sides had to deal with it. When the results came out, only the results mattered to the opposing sides. If the missions were successful, then the fighter / pilot was considered a very good one. If not, the other way.

The situation was irrelevant since both side had to operate in the same area, with differening weather patterns and differeing spare parts (logistics chain) and crew chief / pilot competence.

Again, the results tell the story of who did better, plane, pilot, crew chief, or whatever. the circumstances don't matter a BIT, the RESULTS matter. The people who argue that point are usually on the losing side and have already lost the argument. Their arguments are false; they lost due to a combination of factors that the victor did not suffer due to superior planning, logistics, maintenance, or crew skill ... or maybe luck of the draw.

 

[JoeB]

1. Sorry, but teyh effectiveness of a fighter in WWII was NOT tied to circumstance, pilots, fuel, or anything else. All sides had to deal with those things.
...
Again, the results tell the story of who did better, plane, pilot, crew chief, or whatever. the circumstances don't matter a BIT, the RESULTS matter.

2. they lost due to a combination of factors that the victor did not suffer due to superior planning, logistics, maintenance, or crew skill ... or maybe luck of the draw.

I thought in reading over the thread I was agreeing more with you than those arguing against you, but that summary is much too extreme, and contradicts itself.

Points 1 and 2 seem contradictory to me, 1 that circumstances like pilots, fuel don't matter a bit, then 2 they lost because, inter alia, their logistics and crew skill were inferior.

And 1 is the point which defies common sense IMHO. Each side had to deal with factors like logistics and base support, but not the *same* logistics and bases. The only really common factors of that kind were weather/climate/regional geography which were really the same for each side (assuming their bases were fairly close, in very long range operations there wasn't even complete equality in those factors). The factors besides strictly a/c and pilots (and their leaders, again not emphasized nearly enough IMO) that could differ from one side to the other definitely *could* affect outcomes. But stuff like logistics or base conditions would not predict the effectiveness of the same fighter unit equipped with the same a/c in different circustances, a question which can also matter. Are these non-unit factors sometimes blown out of proportion and the difficulties of the sentimentally favored side (some people obviously have one) exaggerated compared to the opponent's difficulties? sure, but that doesn't mean those factors didn't matter 'one bit'.

Maybe you just got too wound up there..

Results matter, but if all that mattered was the final outcome of wars, we could summarize each war in one sentence, and pay no more attention than that. Besides not considering the relative effectiveness per plane or man of fighter arms, there would be no real reason to discuss the technical attributes of planes either. 'All that matters is who won the war....' I can't take that position seriously.

Joe

 

[GregP]

Re-reading my post, it sure SOUNDS like I got wound up, but I wasn't at the time as far as I recall. Maybe just tired of back and forth.

Suffice to say several of us seem to have opposing views of the significance of what happens in war. That doesn't appear to be unusual and I daresay many people can see the same reporting on what happens in war and draw completely diametrically opposed conclusions. I suppose that mkaes us all quite normal.

In the end, I like kill ratio as a measure of effectiveness, and many out there don't. I already acknowledged that, though I personally like kill ratio, the amount of data missing for actually using kill ratio as a measure of effectiveness renders it less than useful. The rest of my digression is off-topic for killl ratio and I'll let this argument go away.

Finally, if we all agreed, there would be litle discussion. I look forward to more topics of discussion.

Cheers.

 

[buffnut453]

But the outcome is what mostly gets recorded in history....In WWII the outcome, even of a battle or a campaign, is what most people remember this far down the line in time.

The outcome may be what "most people remember" but it's not what interests historians...and historians certainly don't just record the outcome. They seek to find reasons and rationales for events which, inevitably, results in different perspectives being aired over time - and that's a good thing in my view.

 

[parsifal]

I agree heartily. I differ from BF in that I think the allies suffered a heavy and one sidede defeat whilst using the Buffalo. But I do not think the Buffalo was the sole reason or even the main reason, for those one sided defeats. There were lots of factors.

The Finns are reported to have chalked up a Kill loss ratio of 32:1 with their Brewsters. Would they have achieved 32:1 against an outfit like 1st or 64th hiko Sentai, or the IJNs Yawata Group ? I very much doubt it.

 

[GregP]

Good pilots will shoot down the adversary. The Fins did. Nobody else who was a user of the Buffalo had much success.

That says something, to me at least. If it doesn't to the rest of you, that's OK.

I recognize it for what it was. Reality can suck on occasion, with the Buffalo, it did, in spades. The performance was OK for the time but not for WWII a very few years later.

 

[parsifal]

Thats where I think you have your disagreement. Im the last to come to the defence of the Buffalo. I take the view that against a Zero it was a deathtrap. Trouble is, in those opening weeks its main opposition, numbers wise, was not the zero, it wasnt even the Ki 43. it was the Ki 27, at least in terms of overall numbers. and against the Ki 27, the Buffalo had advantages....not many, but some.

Not all the users of the Buffalo were so completely down on it. RAAF or the USN didnt think much of it. But at least one FAA pilot (Brabham) gave it a positive review after Crete

And, the numbers are not as one sided as you think. The Buffalo represented the sole fighter available in Malaya and was the most numerous in Burma as i recall. The Japanese were reported to have lost up to 250 a/c in those opening campaigns through to the end of April, to all causes. Since we are comparing total losses, to all causes for the buffalo, we should do the same for the japanese. 250 a/c lost in a campaign where 150 Buffaloes were lost is not as bad an exchange rate as is being portrayed is it not?

 

[GregP]

Parsifal, please love the Buffalo in good health. I don't and won't. But I'll also will refrain from trashing it unless I detect excessive praise for I believe to be the worst US fighter in service at the start of the war. Then I may be unable to keep from chipping away at the Buffalo ... a bit.

The Buffalo, to me, is sort of like the worst girlfiend you ever had ... at times she was marvelous, but she's an ex-girlfriend for a reason.

 

[[SC] Arachnicus]

I might be a little late to the show on this topic but personally I think that any pilot that was able to walk away from their plane, wether they landed the destroyed plane or bailed from it can debate for a good reason that they are not a "kill".

 

[GregP]

That brings up a very good question ... is a "kill" an aircaft or a pilot? If a pilot, then shooting one in a parachute might be acceptable. If a kill is an aircraft, then if the aircraft is no longer flyable after combat, IS it a kill?

Repairs may return it to service, but the result was a kill since it was no longer a flyable opponent. Or, is a kill a "destroyed" aircraft?

If so, what is "destroyed?"

Almost ANY crashed aircaft CAN be restored ato flyable condition. I volunteer at the PLanes of Fame Museum and WE restore absolute wrecks to flying condition. We are just finishing a Yokusuka D4Y Judy to static taxiable condition, and the ONLY reason it is not flyable, is lack of design data. The horizontal longerons are NOT to spec and we can't FIND the spec. Also, we used 7075 Aluminum instead of 2024 T3.

So, what IS "destroyed?" What IS a "Kill?"

If the pilot walks away and it is not a kill, should we shoot him in the parachute or should we award a kill when a fighter pilot brings down another aircraft?

I say when someone brings down an aircaft in combat as a result combat, it is a kill. Not when the enemy's engine fails; not when the enemy is flying off smoking, but when the enemy aircaft goes down as a direct result of combat, whether or not it is returned to service with parts from another wreck or new parts. Repair and return to service can be done even with a plane that burns to the ground with a dead pilot.

What do you think?

 

[Njaco]

For me, 'kill' would mean destruction of the a/c. You can have as many pilots as you may need but if they don't have a machine to fly, they're useless. So destruction of material would be a high priority.

 

[stona]

I think the "kill" game is misleading and certainly produces confusing statistics for the reasons above.

Any air force wants to know how it is doing and calculating estimated kills from the Intelligence Officers' reports and kill ratios has been shown to be a very unreliable way of doing this. Bad intelligence can be worse than no intelligence.
A far better gauge,but one obviously not readily available to an enemy,is the number of aircraft that an air force itself writes off,i.e. deems not worth repairing for whatever reasons.

Cheers

Steve

 

[GregP]

I don't believe victory awards were ever a measure of how an air force was doing. Rather it was a easy way to build pilot morale and foster aggressive flying in fighters. Make 'em heros and everybody wants to be one.

You have a pretty good point in that how many birds are written off operationally is one measure os training and effectiveness.

If a pilot simply runs out of fuel, is that any indication of a weakness in the aircrtaft? No, but it IS an indiocation of lack of attention on the pilot's part.

Losses due to mechanical failure are a good indication of either design issues or maintenance issues ... or bad luck. All things mechanical fail, the real question is how often.

Perhaps a good indication of how an air force is doing might be the state of the enemy's air force ... assuming you can ob tain the data.

 

[stona]

I don't believe victory awards were ever a measure of how an air force was doing. Rather it was a easy way to build pilot morale and foster aggressive flying in fighters. Make 'em heros and everybody wants to be one.
If a pilot simply runs out of fuel, is that any indication of a weakness in the aircrtaft?

Victory awards were certainly used in the way you specify in the Luftwaffe. The RAF for the most part actively discouraged the lauding of the individual at the time preferring to promote the "team effort".

The intention of all those debriefings and Intelligence Officers' reports was certainly to assess enemy losses and,until they were seen to be palpably wrong,the data wasused in strategic decision making,notably by the Luftwaffe in the second week of August 1940 when they were somewhat surprised to discover that the RAF had plenty of fighters covering the approaches to the Midlands and the North across the North Sea.
The assessments had a negative effect on Luftwaffe morale too. If you tell your aircrews that the opposition is broken and has little left,only for them to be met by increasing resistance they are likely to be sceptical at best and at the worst feel that they are losing.

I was careful to make the point about written off aircraft that a write of was deemed "not worth repairing",not irrepairable. I suspect that the criteria for the USAAF or RAF in 1944 would be somewhat different to the Luftwaffe's. As you quite rightly said,anything can be repaired.

If your aircraft keep running out of fuel you'd better take a look at your pilot training

Cheers

Steve

 

[drgondog]

I was careful to make the point about written off aircraft that a write of was deemed "not worth repairing",not irrepairable. I suspect that the criteria for the USAAF or RAF in 1944 would be somewhat different to the Luftwaffe's. As you quite rightly said,anything can be repaired.

If your aircraft keep running out of fuel you'd better take a look at your pilot training

Cheers

Steve

The first point is indeed a factor in the discussion of 'aircraft destruction' versus 'badly damaged-but repaired and returned to service' versus 'badly damaged and salvaged for parts'. The Claims review process to award credits for destruction, probably destroyed, damaged and 'no credit' was simply a complex process to try to understand impact to the enemy capabilities. The Victory Credit per se has political/morale overtones. I have been continually mystefied regarding the 8th AF bomber claims versus fighter claims OUTCOMES as the published 'Claims' so far overstated the effectiveness of the bomber gunners - to the point where I cannot believe that the review process didn't weigh trailing crews as the first point of cross reference to individul claims of bombers in front. If the trailing crew concensus was "We saw Perhaps three fighters blow up or lose a wing or enveloped in flames" but the individual totals summed up to "We got 51 German aircraft destroyed" - then the overclaims would not have been so severe.

As to running out of fuel? For escort fighters, particularly the P-47, the wingman was always at a disadvantage on fuel consumption AND every fighter squadron and flight leader was trying to maximize coverage of the bombers - creating a complex judgment challenge. As an example, the 355th FG lost five P-47s due to lack of fuel for three reasons on November 7, 1943. First, the 355th stayed with their assigned bomber box 10 minutes longer than planned because the 'relief escort' was late. Second, the planned route did Not account for severe west to east headwinds during the return leg. Last, the final stage of the return was the North Sea which was a death sentence for a ditching or bail out..

So, easy to make comment about 'training', not so easy to execute despite Very well trained and experienced pilots, when call of duty and the Weather Gods interfere with fate.

 

[stona]

As to running out of fuel? For escort fighters, particularly the P-47, the wingman was always at a disadvantage on fuel consumption AND every fighter squadron and flight leader was trying to maximize coverage of the bombers - creating a complex judgment challenge. As an example, the 355th FG lost five P-47s due to lack of fuel for three reasons on November 7, 1943. First, the 355th stayed with their assigned bomber box 10 minutes longer than planned because the 'relief escort' was late. Second, the planned route did Not account for severe west to east headwinds during the return leg. Last, the final stage of the return was the North Sea which was a death sentence for a ditching or bail out..

So, easy to make comment about 'training', not so easy to execute despite Very well trained and experienced pilots, when call of duty and the Weather Gods interfere with fate.

I would be the last person to demean the commitment and determination of those fighter pilots to stay with and cover their comrades. I understand why they did it. Nonetheless a harsher judge than I could still argue that they made a bad call,albeit for the right reasons.
Me? I'd give them a medal.
Cheers
Steve

 

[JoeB]

I think the "kill" game is misleading and certainly produces confusing statistics for the reasons above.

Any air force wants to know how it is doing and calculating estimated kills from the Intelligence Officers' reports and kill ratios has been shown to be a very unreliable way of doing this. Bad intelligence can be worse than no intelligence.
A far better gauge,but one obviously not readily available to an enemy,is the number of aircraft that an air force itself writes off,i.e. deems not worth repairing for whatever reasons.

I think we should be looking at this issue from the perspective of historians, not the AF's at the time. Maybe we're not really historians, but we're sure as hell not the participants of the time.

Of course it's very important to understand that the view of *any* warfare from one side, at the time, is different than the view of a historian who can access information from both sides, and analyze without the stress of combat, or conflicting goals as for example the morale effect on pilots or bomber crews of awarding victory credits v estimating how many enemy a/c were actually destroyed.

So I assume we're trying to find a somewhat easier answer, how many a/c were downed on each side by the opposing fighters* . If all we have to go on is the claims of one side, then the analysis is over and the answer is: we don't know the kill ratio. If we have only totals of a/c destroyed on each side to all causes, likewise there's not much we can do with that. And if we take the (almost always IME nationally biased and agenda-laden) position 'I don't trust so and so's records', again, stop the process, answer: don't know the kill ratio.

But in many air campaigns of the 20th century there are pretty detailed and complete records from both sides. It's true that in the abstract there are potential 'philosophical' questions about what constituted a kill. But rather than try to find a 'right' answer to all these questions, since kill ratio's are a comparative statistic, I propose simply using a consistent method of counting, and tell people what it is, in fact if people have questions about the count for a particular smaller campaign, the person giving the ratio should be able to also present the 'judgement call' cases and let others make their own decisions.

Personally my standard in counting up kills in various two sided books and in original records (I've studied a fair amount in primary source records in three cases so far: US in Korea, Soviets in Korea, JNAF in Pac War) is to count as kills as follows:
Degree: a/c which crashed, or belly landed either at or away from their a/f's unless it's positively known they were later repaired; not counting a/c which landed wheels down at their a/f's unless it's positively known they *weren't* repaired, and to count the freak cases of pilot death but a/c survival as kills.
Cause: losses attributed in the plane's 'own' side records to enemy fighters, plus a/c which disappeared or ran out of fuel in contact with enemy fighters (as seen from opposing records), ie doesn't include all fuel exhaustion losses, and this is another reason general loss totals are not that useful, but you need actual combat reports or detailed accounts in a (trustworthy) book.

Those may not be the 'right' standards, but if kept consistently a lot of the uncertainty factors out. Also IMO there's a tendency to overemphasize the importance of those marginal judgement call cases. For example in our (in)famous debates here about Zero v Spit over Darwin, of 4 Zeroes lost in the whole campaign 3 'failed to return' and one ditched. Under my rules they all 4 count as fighter combat losses since there were (multiple each) opposing claims, though we can't be 100% sure they were all due to hostile action. But besides those there weren't any purely operational losses, pilot killed a/c saved, don't know if a/c was scrapped etc. Often those marginal cases are a quite small % and quibbling over them doesn't change the answer much or even at all. In other campaigns though classification of fuel exhaustion, particularly, might become a significant issue to debate.

OTOH stuff like counting AA losses of a fighter force (if really apparently so on detailed study) and comparing those to losses inflicted by that force on opposing fighters... is just nonsense IMHO. Sure, it was important what fighters might achieve v ground targets compared to losses to ground fire; but it's completely separate and irrelevant question from the effectiveness of opposing fighter units, again except in highly exceptional cases unlikely to affect overall answers much if at all.

*which I agree is not the only thing to ever look at, but it's one significant metric worth looking at IMO, and I've been totally unconvinced by the counter arguments over the years on this forum, usually by obvious fans of particular air arms that didn't so well in this measure in a particular campaign being discussed. Fighter-fighter kill is *one*, not the only, significant measure to look at in judging the relative effectiveness of fighter units, and in *some* cases we might be able to compare to other information and infer *something* of the capabilities of a/c themselves.

Joe

 

[stona]

The problem is that there was,and probably still isn't,any kind of standard way of calculating losses or kills. I don't believe that any WW2 airforce really had the foggiest idea how many of its enemy's aircraft it had actually destroyed in aerial combat. They had plenty of statistics but they were way wide of the mark.

Figures collated using different criteria are a nonsense as comparitive statistic. It is literally like comparing apples and oranges.

Combat reports,of which I have read hundreds,are certainly not reliable and full of the most basic assumptions. One pilot claims a "probable" for an aircraft that,in his opinion,passed through the cloud base in an uncontrollable and irrecoverable fashion whilst another describes this as his last ditch method of evasion!

Cheers

Steve

 

[Kryten]

there are so many variables involved that I honestly believe the only true way of measuring the effectiveness of an air force during a particular campaign is the actual outcome of the campaign!