Malta 1940

parsifal i never quoted Barnett i quoted the naval-history.net and i just added a few line of your selected quote. They can sent a BB so they deleted Menace and up the medit fleet so this is an other WI, for me is ok no Menace the Barham was send to Medit Fleet or Force H. This give 7 BBs to british fleets in mid september (Resolution no Menace no damage stay in service) and 2 CV (no Menace no detachment of Ark Royal) a this point probably the alone Medit Fleet had almost the same number of BBs of italian fleet plus the CV, too enemy fleet for a invasion of Malta w/o large marines capability so postponed the Malta invasion.
I don't give stupidity to british, iv'e just stay with Menace operation, if was not a important operation was not did and prepared within the BoB.
No relatively impossible set the data of invasion if you are not in war, in july the germans were in war with the british, and for true never did a actual day of invasion only possible days that is a different thing, in juanary 44 the allies were already in war from years, the japanese start of war was following their planes, oh so the italian were incapable also in a WI scenario oh i was sure that this was your opinion.
And sources of this (planes on air)??

On Omaha i've writed but obviously you can not read, there were 2 btls (III/726 and I/916) on the beach. Generally at time the german rgt were on 2 btls. i've the orbat on my laptop not here so i can not give info on what coy were where.

We seem to have had some discussion as to how many BBs may be available for this showdown, what about the relative merits of the two Navies actual ships, leaders and tactics?

The Italians may be very well capable of putting 5-10 battalions ashore in August/Sept of 1940. Can they keep them there? Supplied and provide reinforcements?

Malta gets stronger with convoy that arrives so the window of opportunity is fleeting. Granted the Italians also get stronger.

The British and Maltese know exactly where the Italians have to land (or at least the most likely sites) because Malta has been invaded before and fortifications/watch towers have been in place to watch all the likely spots for over 300 years. Coming up with a new spot (capable of handling a force of battalion size)is impossible.
The sooner the Italians strike the less time the British have to put out mines and prepare other surprises, but the less time the Italians have for aerial bombardment. The Italians have a very short window on the codes (if any) and while the British may not know the course/speed of the Italian ships they are probably going to get a pretty good idea of when the whole operation is scheduled for.

Italians have an ammo problem, load the BBs with HE blast the shore defenses or load with AP and hang back letting the cruisers duke it out with the shore batteries and wait for the British fleet? Doing shore bombardment and then running back to port to reload leaves the invasion fleet open to the British attack. AP doesn't work well for shore bombardment and HE, while it can mission kill a ship cannot usually put one on the bottom.

Italians also have to be careful with logistics. Using Syracuse as a base is convenient but if you swipe some of the Messina ferry's for ersatz landing craft that means you may have trouble getting supplies TO Syracuse and they will have to be stockpile before hand.

Malta appears to be an easy place to defend.

Attached is a map showing the beaches of Malta. There are no beaches on the southern coast, one very close to valletta another in a Bay on the extreme southern tip of the island, again in the confines of a small bay. The majority of the beaches are in the north, between Gozo and the main island. Some of the beaches are better from an asault point of view than otherm but none of them apear large enough to attempt a large scale invasion on a broad front, Many of them are small, and flanked by high headlands and the like....perefect for enfilading fire. Quite a few beaches appear to have rocky underwater obstacles that would play havoc on the invasion barges.

Bottom line is this i think, the beaches of malta dont appear all that good for a large scale invasion. Many locations could be easily mined others are too small, or have danagerous enfilading positions. Others appear to have underwater hazards.

Of course this is only a very cursory examination, one would need a detailed beach survey to do that, and without frogmen that means an onsite surface appraisal . Beach surveys could be cursory, but there is an increasing risk of disaster the less information is provided to planners. And this situation that I am seeing is not one where safe assumptions can be made about anything. Ideally you need cadastral surveys done complete with theodalite and depth lines, as wll as diver inspections of the bottom surface. That would be difficult to do in a 1938 style environment, given that Italy was considered a potential enemy and pariah state from 1935. You cannot exactly send in military survey teams for beach assessments and not attract attention to yourself.

Anyway, quite apart from the discussion, what a beautiful place.

http://www.maltamaltamalta.com/activities/beaches-swimming/

Something to remember about the Normandy landings is the hard won experience of the Allies from previous landings in the Med and the fiasco at Dieppe, experience that the Italians wouldn't have had. Were they aware of what an opposed landing would require fully? how much support was required? how effective would a bombardment be?

I think it would be foolish to believe that the British would have no warning about a planned invasion of Malta. Even if they didn't have the codes broken there would be an increase of radio traffic simply because of the extra organisation involved. Again going back to Normandy the Germans were expecting something they were just fooled as to the real location by a massive disinformation campaign, something that is not really open to the Italians in this case.

The italians have the runs on the board as far as capbility. They can and did, undertake amphibious assaults of meedium scale. However, they never had to undertake such operations against a large number of modern equipped defenders and/or anything other than an opposing force that at best can be described as "primitive". The operations in Albania were perhaps the most opposed landings they ever undertook, but the defending forces were basically pitch fork armed militia in pathetic numbers. Against the 346 defenders at Vlore (I think it was Vlore) the defenders managed to contain a total force of more than 15000 (of which I think about 1000 were in the initial assaults) for almost 24 hours. Against the 7-9000 Malta defenders the 15-30000 attackers, attacking at what appears at most reinforced battalion to regimental level (both because of the limited sealift capacity and also because of the very limited beach sizes), I dont see the italians making much headway at all. Perhaps at best they might achieve a lodgement, and then dig in relying on further reinforcement some days or weeks down the track. But in that time the RN will react, and from there it is inescapable to conclude....game over. The Italian fleet never once got the upper hand in 1940 in toe to toe engagements, and always avoided outright defeat by using their superior speed. Even at Sirte, where there were 2 Italian Battelships to one small British Battelcruiser (the Renown.....Ramillies was there but fired only two rounds), the italians were already retiring after Renown had opened fire.


How the italians conducted themselves makes good sense, but that is not what is required for a sea control mission. The italains neeeded to accept battle, and in open battle the 15" heavy Battleships of the RN had a distinct advantage over the 13.5 in armed older, lighter BBs of the RM. The modern BBs of the RM were a different matter, but they never had the accuracy to be more than a problem to the RN , not a solution to the RMs problems.

The older Italian Battleships didn't have 13.5in guns, they had 12.6in guns. AP shells were 1157lbs?

The Italian 15in shells carried about 1/2 the amount of explosive as the British 15in shells for both AP and HE.

Ill stand corrected on that, but its the type of armament that ships like Warspite were designed to withstand. I dont think they were invulnerable, not at all, but they were tougher and more resilient than their older Italian counterparts.

Its not impossible for the italians to win, but it is hard. They would need to be super aggressive and super resilient in a fight like this and prepared to take a lot of punishment to win the battle. If I were the Italians I would use my two new BBs to try and work the flanks of the British battle Line, whilst trying to keep them honest with the three old der modernised BBs. As the British, I would attach the Renown to the cruiser line and use her to try and thwart or stymie the Italian flanking moves. I would organize my main gun line into two divisions, a fast division (built around ships like the Warspite....top speed 24.5 knots) and slow division built around the old R class (top speed around 22 kn). The old ships would hang a beeline straight for the invasion fleet, no deviations, sabres drawn ready to cut it to pieces. Forces the italians to place their battle line in such a way as to protect the amphibs, and thereby place themselves at great risk.

I would not expect Italian airstrikes to be at all effective. They had no track record to suggest otherwise up to that point, and no great usage of torpedoes in their aircraft until the following year. Therer was some usage, but not extensive. RN Carriers, would consist of Ark Royal, Illustrious and Eagle, with Argus a possibility. That gives them a strike capability of around 50 a/c, well proven and able to inflict significant damage on the Italians.

parsifal said:

and slow division built around the old R class (top speed around 22 kn).

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Just a minor point but I believe by 1940 the Rs were well down on speed and were around the 20 knot speed on a good day, they were all badly in need of new boilers and turbines.

Sorry, I know this thread is concerned with 1940, but it seems somewhat relevant.
From Red Tobruk: Memoirs of a World War II Destroyer Commander Bless Our Ship: : Captain Eric Bush

On the 21st March a convoy of four merchant ships had set out from Alexandria to bring relief to Malta. Intelligence indicated that the Italian fleet would attempt to attack at some point. The heavy escort of Royal Navy ships was therefore somewhat prepared when on the afternoon of 22nd March 1942 'a thin wisp of smoke' appeared on the horizon. Frank Gregory-Smith records that he felt curiously relaxed at this point, even though the next more detailed report suggested they faced three battleships. As a matter of routine they could also expect to come under air attack from both bombers and torpedo bombers.

Vice Admiral Vian had prepared a plan that involved shielding the convoy with some of his force of destroyers, whilst constantly threatening the Italian fleet with a torpedo attack from other destroyers – a plan that very largely succeeded.

Captain Frank Gregory-Smith was on HMS Eridge:

A series of flashes in the smoke followed by a dull, rumbling boom announced the opening of the surface engagement. As if this was a signal, a formation of torpedo bombers flew into sight, skimming just above the sea. Simultaneously an even larger group of high level bombers were briefly glimpsed through the smoke and clouds on the opposite side of the convoy. Escorts to port and astem of the convoy immediately engaged the high formation, leaving the torpedo bombers to HMS Southwold, HMS Dulverton and HMS Eridge.

The ship shuddered under the opening salvoes and high explosive started to burst around the low flying aircraft. Their crews, obviously surprised by such a heavy concentration from so few ships, promptly split into smaller groups and tried to penetrate the screen on a broader front. Even then gunfire continued to harass them, forcing them into individual units which dropped their torpedoes haphazardly and at such long range that all ships had time to tum towards their tracks, just as bombs from the high formation exploded in a compact mass well astern of the supply ships.

Meanwhile, the two surface forces, exchanging rapid fire as they rolled, twisted and plunged through the heavy seas, were closing at a relative speed of fifty knots. The British were already partially hidden by smoke, which the Italians would have to penetrate if they were to get within range of the supply ships. Just before reaching effective gun range, the Italian Admiral swung his ships to port. To prevent him stealing the weather gauge, the British followed his movements and stretched at high speed eastwards.

On this course, British smoke drifted rapidly to leeward and, when its outer fringes reached the Italians, their Admiral, fearing a torpedo attack, edged his ships further to port. But the smoke still thickened around his ships, harassing them until the Italian Admiral suddenly lost his nerve and swung his cruisers, followed by a division of destroyers which had unexpectedly appeared astem, in a broad sweep to the northward. Rear Admiral Vian held on until satisfied that the enemy was definitely retiring and then turned towards the convoy; some twenty miles to the south-westward.

It was not all over. A very short time later another force appeared. Captain Eric Bush was in command of HMS Euryalus:

The enemy, as we know now, was in two groups at this stage, the nearer, about nine miles away, consisting ofthe two eight-inch and one six-inch cruisers and four destroyers we had met before, and the second group, at a distance of fifteen miles, comprising the modern battleship Littorio and four destroyers. We were in for something now, all right! I knew that Admiral Vian would never leave the convoy to its fate, so if needs be we would be fighting to the end.

In the next two hours the fate of our whole force was in the balance. With the powerful ships at his disposal the Italian admiral could easily have wiped us out, but he could not bring himself to enter the smoke-screen knowing that we were waiting for him on the other side.


HMS CLEOPATRA throws out smoke to shield the convoy as HMS EURYALUS elevates her forward 5.25 inch guns to shell the Italian Fleet.



An ammunition supply party bringing up shells for the 5.25 inch guns, during a lull in the action, on board HMS EURYALUS, on convoy duty in the eastern Mediterranean.



The Italian battleship Littorio outranged and outgunned all of the Royal Navy ships but dared not penetrate the British smokescreen. When darkness fell, without radar, she was forced to withdraw.

Vincenzo said:

on Cesare back: the book have not date but there is a table with bimestral report of ready ship (the italian words are "pronte all'impiego" i think this would be that the ship are in the fleet is a decision of Admiral (the Squad (Corps) Admiral) the use: 1/7/40 BBs: 4, 1/9/40 BBs:4, 1/11/40 BBs:6, 1/1/41: BBs:3, 10 june 1940:2, this not help we already knewn that Cesare was back in operation to end of august.

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Why would there only be 4 BB's on 1/9/40?

Vincenzo said:

The point is: the italian was preparing malta invasione since somewhere before of war, for ready in time almost from september '39, the british can be sure the invasion coming in that month or the follow month? so they postponed for ever the Manace operation? and Barham was sent for Manace w/o Manace you don't have Barham (but you've Ark Royal).

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Well I would say Menace probably postponed about 5 or 6 weeks.

I agree with Parsifal on this, The threat on Malta BoB takes first priority, Menace is not nearly as urgent.

If I were to decide, I'd see Menace in early November, with Royal Sovereign + another BB.
Frankly, I don't see why they can't support an operation against French West Africa with a French battleship!

parsifal said:

The italians, with their inherently innefficient interservice co-operation, and the need to requisition shipping and obtain foreeign help would need months or yeasrs to prepare for an assault like this. The Japanese were planning their amphibious operations for December 1941, as far back as July, planning for the Midway operation began in January 1942, and detailed planning was occuring from the middle of March. The amphibious excercises Ive been involved in take years to organize, but the actual planning for a brigade sized asault generally takes about 3 months to plan and prepare for.

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Do we have any examples of amphibious assaults done with shorter preparation?

Vincenzo said:

On Omaha beach the defend unit was the 352nd divison, a rgt of 716th division was under of 352nd divison, on the beach there were III/726 and the I/916 btls. in the area there were the 3 rgt of 352nd division and the attached 726 of 716th, the Panzer Lehr division later was added to defend forces

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Vincenzo said:

On Omaha i've writed but obviously you can not read, there were 2 btls (III/726 and I/916) on the beach. Generally at time the german rgt were on 2 btls. i've the orbat on my laptop not here so i can not give info on what coy were where.

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I can read just fine.
The 352 was NOT just defending Omaha, but Gold beach sector as well.

So bottom line, the US landed 60,000+ troops with heavy support during the first 24 hours, in a sector that had 2 battalions defending the beach, with about one other regiment as backup in the first 24 hours.
The Italian assault will be facing a similar concentration of defensive troops, with a force perhaps 10% the size of the Omaha landings, correct?

fastmongrel said:

Just a minor point but I believe by 1940 the Rs were well down on speed and were around the 20 knot speed on a good day, they were all badly in need of new boilers and turbines.

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The Resolution had been recently refitted and might have been in the 21 - 21.5 knot range
The British ships will certainly be slower than the Italian ships

parsifal said:

Ill stand corrected on that, but its the type of armament that ships like Warspite were designed to withstand. I dont think they were invulnerable, not at all, but they were tougher and more resilient than their older Italian counterparts.

Its not impossible for the italians to win, but it is hard. They would need to be super aggressive and super resilient in a fight like this and prepared to take a lot of punishment to win the battle. If I were the Italians I would use my two new BBs to try and work the flanks of the British battle Line, whilst trying to keep them honest with the three old der modernised BBs. As the British, I would attach the Renown to the cruiser line and use her to try and thwart or stymie the Italian flanking moves. I would organize my main gun line into two divisions, a fast division (built around ships like the Warspite....top speed 24.5 knots) and slow division built around the old R class (top speed around 22 kn). The old ships would hang a beeline straight for the invasion fleet, no deviations, sabres drawn ready to cut it to pieces. Forces the italians to place their battle line in such a way as to protect the amphibs, and thereby place themselves at great risk.

I would not expect Italian airstrikes to be at all effective. They had no track record to suggest otherwise up to that point, and no great usage of torpedoes in their aircraft until the following year. Therer was some usage, but not extensive. RN Carriers, would consist of Ark Royal, Illustrious and Eagle, with Argus a possibility. That gives them a strike capability of around 50 a/c, well proven and able to inflict significant damage on the Italians.

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In regards to battleships, while the British would have 7 cappital ships, I can see them retaining one in Gibraltar, and not sending the entire Force H to Malta.

So just just for the sake of argument, suppose the British have 6 ships: Warspite, Malaya, Barham, Valiant, Resolution Renown.
How would they plan the operation? Would they try to intercept off the coast of Malta?

How would Italy plan to defeat a powerful British fleet, especially given the ineffective performance of airstrikes during battle the previous month?


Suppose that Italy did have 250 or so fighters available, how many could actually be held on station to escort/defend during the naval action at Malta?
Suppose a squadron of CR42's take off from Italian airbases that are 80 or 90 miles away, so about 30 min flying time to Malta, how many min would they have to linger? What would be the turnaround time to rearm refuel when they returned?

Do we have any examples of amphibious assaults done with shorter preparation?

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None that I can think of that are of a similar size to the one being projected here.There are contemporary examples that we could consider.

1) Gallipoli - First proposed 14 November 1914, active planning underway from Feb 9 1915. Good similarity in terms of size of the operation, but suffered from very poor prepration and survey work

2)Weserubung - Invasion of Norway. Similar time frame, multiplicity of landings, extemporised landings, landings largely (or expected to be) unnopposed. Military planning for operation began 14 December 1939

3) Watchtower - invasion Of guadacanal - Similar time frame, but smaller operation (single division). Planning began June 19 1942, in time for an August landing. Landing went without a hitch, because it was largely unopposed (not Tulagi). Did not attempt any deep peenetrations of the islands....just to set up defensive perimeter around the airfield.

4) Operation RI - Operational side of the Pt Moresby invasion - reinforced regimental sized operation.Operational planning began from January 6 1942, operation began (but was recalled) early May 1942.

5) Operation FS - Operational plan for the overland occupation of moresby, including amphiob ops at Buna. Landing by about 7000 Japanese of the SSF. Basically a reinforced regiment again, and using the same transports and organization as Op RI. A lot of overlap with the earlier cancelled seaborne invasion, but operational planning began 9 June for planned invaion in early August. The Japanese believed the Australian ground forces were at Kokoda, but 39th Bn was arriving as the landings went in (landings themselves were unopposed however)

6) Milne Bay (Operation RE) - Poorly conceived and executed operation at Battalion strength. Planning began July 26, carried out late August 1942....total failure.

Im sure there are examples of smaller, less well planned amphibs, such as the hooking operations by Yamashita in Malaya, but I dont think, for various reasons, that these operations are comparable to a fully planned major assault such as this one

In regards to battleships, while the British would have 7 cappital ships, I can see them retaining one in Gibraltar, and not sending the entire Force H to Malta.

So just just for the sake of argument, suppose the British have 6 ships: Warspite, Malaya, Barham, Valiant, Resolution Renown.
How would they plan the operation? Would they try to intercept off the coast of Malta?

How would Italy plan to defeat a powerful British fleet, especially given the ineffective performance of airstrikes during battle the previous month?

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They might a lesser number (around 5 as you suggest) at the actual battlefront because of refit issues. british ships were not as completely rebuilt as the italians, and already in 1940 were showing signs of wear. Typical rule of thumb, a ship will spend 1 week out of 4 undergoing some kind of repair. Italy would have this sort of problem too, but for a major operation like this they have the initiative so can sort of "fudge things" to bump up operational numbers a bot.....in other words they might have 5 BBs, but at least one might be a bit sick.

Contrary to what DonL and Vincenzo claim, there is no rush for the british. The outer defences of the island are more than likley to take some time to soften up for invasiopon, and ideally the Italiansd need to be committed to the actual invasion at the time of the british intervention.....that means the fleet will arrive off malta at night....around midnight I would surmise. I have to make some estimations here, which is always dangerous in this environment, but I would estimate the italians would need a day to embark and a day to asseble their fleet. I would surmise that they would draw ships from Naples, Taranto, Messina and Syracuse. Naples is about 3 days sailing time from Malta, plus we have the dealys of embarkation and assembly....all up transit time is about 5 days minimum.


For the British I expect they would split into two forces....one to escort the relief ground forces (possibly built around the "R" class ships and the carriers Eagle and Argus). The other would be the main force....the fast division, and I see them built around Renown, Warspite, Malaya, barham and Valiant, and the Carriers Ark Royal and Illustrious.

If I were to prepare a "wet dream" plan of attack for the british, i would be using Malta as bait, so as to ambush as much of the italian fleet as i could. The trick for the british is to remain undetected on that last day that the Italians are approaching....a didfficult ask, but certainly not impossible, given what happened with hats (the entire fce H remained undetected until after completion of the operation and Somervile was heading home). If Fce H and the med flt could remain undetected, I would position the british forces over the horizone and allow the italian fleet to approach. Once night fell and the invasion bombasrdment had begun, I would arrange for the shore parties on Malta to commence firing starshell and continue to do so, thereby illuminating the Italian armada (and very possibly blinding the ships lookouts). I would then approach from the ofshore side of the fleet and reduce range to point blank before opening fire. Have the DDs on the lee side ready to make smoke. I would worry too much about the amphibious forces too much....concentrate on disabling all five battleships. iwould intend to bag all five of them,

With a night battle, the Italians are going to do really poorly. It wouldnt matter if i only have parity, or even less, italian night fighting skills are just so poor that this would end up being a duck hunt for the british...battleships pouring fire into their opposition, Night trained Swordfish crews launching torepdo after totpedo at point blank range....it would have be considered that a massacre of the italians is the overwhelming likelihood.

This is the sort of situation that Cunningham and Somerville could only dream about. Historically the italians never risked this sort of operation for good reason. They preferred to die the slow death of the convoy wars to North Africa, but that made sense....it was the operational imperative for them.

Suppose that Italy did have 250 or so fighters available, how many could actually be held on station to escort/defend during the naval action at Malta?

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None. the action will be a night action, not unlike Savo Island

On the vulnerability of open pit coastal guns during early part of WWII. From an old reply on another site.
"Also the inability to hit pinpoint targets is shown on what happened to two Finnish coastal batteries, Mantsi and Järisevä. Both of these were subjected to much bombing and counter-battery fire but were not silenced even if they were two gun (Mantsi with 152mm cannon and Järisevä with 120mm cannon) open pit structures, if I remember correctly still in WWI style side by side layout and without any meaningful AA defense. IIRC Mantsi, which very early fell far behind Soviet rear and was therefore completely on its own, had only one or two 7,62mm AAmgs most of the war, after 2½ months fighting Mantsi got one 40mmBofors, but even after numerous bombing attacks it stayed in action to the end of war and harassed Soviet supply traffic along the coastal road on the NE shore of Lake Ladoga. It suffered some damage but I cannot remember how much of that was caused by bombing and how much by counter battery fire. Järisevä on the other hand situated in Karelia Isthmus near the eastern end of Finnish Mannerheim Line, which was the main line of defense of the Finnish Field Army. One important function, other than its own firepower, of Järisevä was to mask nearby much more powerful (4x152mm cannon) Kaarnajoki battery, which remained unknown to Soviets almost to the end of the war. The older Järisevä which situated at the tip of a point of land was known by Soviets but the new Kaarnajoki battery, which situated more inland in a forest was not. Even if subjected to heavy bombing and much counterbattery fire also Järiseva, even if rather badly damaged, stayed in action to the end of the war."

Juha

The thing is you have to get just about a direct hit on the gun/mount. landing 20ft away does kill would crew but does little or nothing to the gun. A hit 20ft away on a ships gun can jam the turret, start fires ( setting concrete on fire is difficult) or let water into the ship.

When being shot at by ship mounted guns the shore battery guns are very small targets. Again what would be a near miss on a ship (20 feet below turret) doesn't do a thing to these guns ( 20ft low puts the the shell into the cliff quite a number of feet in front of the gun.)

If things get really bad (bombing?) crew can take shelter in bombproof shelters and come out when the planes leave.

stug3 said:

Sorry, I know this thread is concerned with 1940, but it seems somewhat relevant.
From Red Tobruk: Memoirs of a World War II Destroyer Commander Bless Our Ship: : Captain Eric Bush

On the 21st March a convoy of four merchant ships had set out from Alexandria to bring relief to Malta. Intelligence indicated that the Italian fleet would attempt to attack at some point. The heavy escort of Royal Navy ships was therefore somewhat prepared when on the afternoon of 22nd March 1942 'a thin wisp of smoke' appeared on the horizon. Frank Gregory-Smith records that he felt curiously relaxed at this point, even though the next more detailed report suggested they faced three battleships. As a matter of routine they could also expect to come under air attack from both bombers and torpedo bombers.

Vice Admiral Vian had prepared a plan that involved shielding the convoy with some of his force of destroyers, whilst constantly threatening the Italian fleet with a torpedo attack from other destroyers – a plan that very largely succeeded.

Captain Frank Gregory-Smith was on HMS Eridge:

A series of flashes in the smoke followed by a dull, rumbling boom announced the opening of the surface engagement. As if this was a signal, a formation of torpedo bombers flew into sight, skimming just above the sea. Simultaneously an even larger group of high level bombers were briefly glimpsed through the smoke and clouds on the opposite side of the convoy. Escorts to port and astem of the convoy immediately engaged the high formation, leaving the torpedo bombers to HMS Southwold, HMS Dulverton and HMS Eridge.

The ship shuddered under the opening salvoes and high explosive started to burst around the low flying aircraft. Their crews, obviously surprised by such a heavy concentration from so few ships, promptly split into smaller groups and tried to penetrate the screen on a broader front. Even then gunfire continued to harass them, forcing them into individual units which dropped their torpedoes haphazardly and at such long range that all ships had time to tum towards their tracks, just as bombs from the high formation exploded in a compact mass well astern of the supply ships.

Meanwhile, the two surface forces, exchanging rapid fire as they rolled, twisted and plunged through the heavy seas, were closing at a relative speed of fifty knots. The British were already partially hidden by smoke, which the Italians would have to penetrate if they were to get within range of the supply ships. Just before reaching effective gun range, the Italian Admiral swung his ships to port. To prevent him stealing the weather gauge, the British followed his movements and stretched at high speed eastwards.

On this course, British smoke drifted rapidly to leeward and, when its outer fringes reached the Italians, their Admiral, fearing a torpedo attack, edged his ships further to port. But the smoke still thickened around his ships, harassing them until the Italian Admiral suddenly lost his nerve and swung his cruisers, followed by a division of destroyers which had unexpectedly appeared astem, in a broad sweep to the northward. Rear Admiral Vian held on until satisfied that the enemy was definitely retiring and then turned towards the convoy; some twenty miles to the south-westward.

It was not all over. A very short time later another force appeared. Captain Eric Bush was in command of HMS Euryalus:

The enemy, as we know now, was in two groups at this stage, the nearer, about nine miles away, consisting ofthe two eight-inch and one six-inch cruisers and four destroyers we had met before, and the second group, at a distance of fifteen miles, comprising the modern battleship Littorio and four destroyers. We were in for something now, all right! I knew that Admiral Vian would never leave the convoy to its fate, so if needs be we would be fighting to the end.

In the next two hours the fate of our whole force was in the balance. With the powerful ships at his disposal the Italian admiral could easily have wiped us out, but he could not bring himself to enter the smoke-screen knowing that we were waiting for him on the other side.


HMS CLEOPATRA throws out smoke to shield the convoy as HMS EURYALUS elevates her forward 5.25 inch guns to shell the Italian Fleet.



An ammunition supply party bringing up shells for the 5.25 inch guns, during a lull in the action, on board HMS EURYALUS, on convoy duty in the eastern Mediterranean.



The Italian battleship Littorio outranged and outgunned all of the Royal Navy ships but dared not penetrate the British smokescreen. When darkness fell, without radar, she was forced to withdraw.

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As an aside to this aside, my grandfather served on HMS Eridge from commision to pay off in either X or Y turret, unfortunatley I don't know which. I would definatley recommend Red Tobruk as a cracking read.

Some of the RN BBs had already been tested by hits from French and German BBs and shown that they were quite resilient - would the Italian BBs have stood up to a stand up shoot out with the RN 15 inch shells?

I think the Rs would have been equal to and QEs would have been better than the rebuilt Conte di Cavour and Andre Dorias. The rebuilds had a speed advantage but the rebuild left the main armour belt almost completely submerged and the deck armour was in thin layers and probably wouldnt have kept out a plunging 15" shell. The Littorios would have overmatched the RN ships but did seem to have lots of main armament accuracy problems and never fired as fast as designed.

If the Italian fleet had been caught at night by a force of QEs and either Hood or Renown plus at least one flat top I think the italians would have had to turn and run or be badly mauled.

Yes, I had read that the Italian guns had some issues with their accuracy - their spread of shot being far greater than that of the RN ships. That and the accompanying aircraft carrier would make any Italian battlefleet very nervous!

I think the carrier would have been the Ace in the hole for the RN. A strike by Swordfish would throw the Italians into a panic and say 15 torpedoes dropped 2 or 3 are going to hit and slow down the Italians so that the slower RN vessels could move in for the kill. If the Italian fleet exits the area at night to avoid the Battlefleet then the RN can send in cruisers and smash the invasion fleet and any bridgehead the infantry have gained. The RN would rule the waves at night and could come back repeatedly and sink anything bigger than a box of matches.