Maneuverability vs Speed (3 Viewers)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

View attachment 724693
Night bombing wasn't LeMay's idea. The switch in Sept 1944 from primarily night to exclusively day occured when Lemay took command of the 20th AF. According to Craven and Cates he implemented the tactics he had used in the ETO.
View attachment 724694
This data is for the 20th Bomber Command. For the 21st it is
View attachment 724695View attachment 724696

Full report attached
Ah, no.

Possum Hansel, who preceded LeMay in 8th AF, commanded 21st when LeMay took over from 20th in Mid-late January 1945. While LeMay commanded the 20th out of China/India - the bombing tactics were same as 8th AF - for both 20th and 21st.

Arnold was Exec over both 20th and 21st, assigned by Joint Chiefs. The command structure was first time AAF combat commands were removed from Army theatre commanders. When Lemay was assigned by Arnold to take over for Hansell - the order was 'just make it happen' - not change tactics.

Think about Arnold (or Giles/Kuter) reaction to Joint Chief 'suggestion/order' to change tactics - when coming from say Adm King - and George Marshall would never tell Arnold to change tactics. If that were necessary, Arnold would have been replaced.

The 21st was unique also in that USN Nimitz was the theatre commander and still had complete charge of Logistics, Runway construction and supplies. The Navy also fought tooth and nail to keep AAF strategic assets out Okinawa (8th AF deployment), trying to force AAF strategic assets capable of striking Japan - solely in Guam. I suspect without proof that USN wanted all of Okinawa airfields to support Naval land based ops, as well as invasion air cover responsibility. If so, cooler heads prevailed.

LeMay spent February trying to figure out who his 'keepers' were, while studying continuing issues with B-29s, high altitude jet streams affecting high alttude/high speed bombing accuracy and the differences between Japan and Germany with respect to targets, infrastructure and AAA/Fighter capabilities. He decided, for multiple reasons, that nightincindiary attacks should be more effective - and executed his plan without asking for permission from Arnold - or Giles/Kuter who were leading while Arnold was recovering from another heart attack.

The month of March, 1945 was characterized by low altitude attacks, then were tweaked for 9,000+ in April, to a steady stream of mid altitude attacks for rest of the war, save for period when USN failed to deliver sheduled re-supply of incindiaries and Day strikes resorted to HE between 15 and 20K.

Look to Arnold's 'Global Mission - pgs 564-567 and 596-598 and Mission with LeMay by Lemay/Kantor pgs 333-370.
 
You have mentioned the Centaurus over-rev failures a number of times now. How many have you personally seen? Were they using the correct Shell oil?
I have seen maybe a half dozen of them running. More importantly, Joe Yancey is one of the only guys around who can successfully hone a Centaurus cylinder back to a nice bore after it has been step-worn by piston rings. He did cylinders for the Queen's Flight (King's Flight now?), and for several owners of Centaurus-powered Sea Furies, including Ellsworth Getchell. It's the owners who told use they will not tolerate being over-revved.

Got that story from both Getchell and from Queen's Flight discussions. Nobody said the Centaurus was delicate; it isn't when properly operated. What they said was it is dead reliable when operated within normal limits and does not tolerate even 200 rpm over those limits very well. Since all of them had blown up or experienced failures of Centaurus engines outside normal limits in operation of Sea Furies, we believe them.

I ran a Ford Mustang engine with a supercharger on it for some time. When operated within published limits, it, too, was reliable. When abused, not so much. They are called "limits" for a reason, and most people have little reason or desire to test the limits. Running a Centaurus that way, not testing the limits ... it should make TBO and operate just fine as expected.

The R-3350 became a VERY reliable engine in airline service. It wasn't in combat during WWII, but WAS when Skyraiders were flying about Vietnam. My bet is the Skyraider pilots weren't abusing their engines because they were already the slowest combat fixed-wing aircraft around. So, they were running the engines to keep the engines happy. Doing that makes everyone, including the engines and pilots, work better. Using WER on a big radial far from home is a good way to experience a nylon letdown in some cases, very possibly to the detriment of the pilot's personal comfort for the next year or more.
 
Last edited:
If maneuverable fighters like the A6M Zero are considered to have been such capable fighters, if not the best in the world relative to contemporary fighters, why was it then that every single major power, including Japan itself, were committed to the development of increasingly faster and more powerful aircraft.
In addition to being superlatively agile, when it entered service in 1940 the 330 mph Zero was competitively fast for its day. For example, it wasn't until the Mk V Spitfire that Supermarine's fighter had a significantly speed advantage over the Zero (assuming the Vokes air filter used at Darwin is omitted). While they eschewed protection and to a degree firepower, Mitsubishi did not sacrifice speed for maneuverability.


The above article states the Zero's top speed at sea level at 270 mph, which is notably faster than the Hawker Hurricane's 253 mph sea level speed.
 
Last edited:
In addition to being superlatively agile, when it entered service in 1940 the Zero was competitively fast for its day. For example, it wasn't until the Mk V Spitfire that Supermarine's fighter had a significantly speed advantage over the Zero (assuming the Vokes air filter used at Darwin is omitted). While they eschewed protection and to a degree firepower, Mitsubishi did not sacrifice speed for maneuverability.
Hi
Depends what is classed as a "significant speed advantage", sources indicate the Spitfire I of 1940 had a max speed of 365 mph at 19,000 ft. Figures for the 'Zero' are A6M2 Model 21, 331.5 @ 14,930 ft; A6M3 Model 32, 338 mph @ 19,685 ft; A6M5 Model 52, 351 mph @ 19,685 ft; A6M8 Model 64, 356 mph @ 19,685 ft.
The F4F-3 appears as 328 mph @ 21,000 ft and F4F-4 as 318 mph @ 19,000 ft.
Is 30 mph classed as significant?

Mike
 
Yes, A6M didn't necessarily have super high speed at altitude, but it seemed to be fast in the medium and lower altitudes. All the early pilots, in P-40s, P-39s, Hurricanes, Buffaloes, Wildcats, seemed to complain about the A6M and Ki-43 speed among other things. They only figured out how to dive away in P-40s after working out escape maneuvers.
 
Hi
Depends what is classed as a "significant speed advantage", sources indicate the Spitfire I of 1940 had a max speed of 365 mph at 19,000 ft. Figures for the 'Zero' are A6M2 Model 21, 331.5 @ 14,930 ft; A6M3 Model 32, 338 mph @ 19,685 ft; A6M5 Model 52, 351 mph @ 19,685 ft; A6M8 Model 64, 356 mph @ 19,685 ft.
The F4F-3 appears as 328 mph @ 21,000 ft and F4F-4 as 318 mph @ 19,000 ft.
Is 30 mph classed as significant?

Mike

Apparently with the tropical filters the Spit Vs weren't getting that fast. The Aussies noted Kittyhawks had a major speed advantage over them below 16,000 ft
 
And Kittyhawk pilots were barely getting away from Zeros with complex escape maneuvers in 1942. Things seemed to get better by 1943 due to higher rated engines. P-39s didn't seem to be able to escape them. Wildcat pilots resorted to the Thach Weave
 
Is 30 mph classed as significant?
It's a good question. I'm not pilot, but I would think a claimed 30 mph advantage where both sides are in the 300+ mph range is plus/minus about equal, since the aircraft will be moving within each others ideal envelopes.

In the later war period we would see 445 mph F4U Corsairs engaging 350 mph A6M5s, where the Corsair has a 95 mph, near 30% advantage in speed. Not to mention the Corsair is twice as heavy, meaning its dive speed advantage will be immense. Now that's significant.
 
Last edited:
Yes, A6M didn't necessarily have super high speed at altitude, but it seemed to be fast in the medium and lower altitudes. All the early pilots, in P-40s, P-39s, Hurricanes, Buffaloes, Wildcats, seemed to complain about the A6M and Ki-43 speed among other things. They only figured out how to dive away in P-40s after working out escape maneuvers.
The speed advantage of A6M2 and Ki 43 was a product of a better horsepower to weight ratio. They could accelerate faster, climb faster, and usually attacked from above, converting altitude to speed.
Buzz Wagner noted that the Zero could out accelerate a P-39, but the P-39 could catch them in a straight chase.
 
Yes, A6M didn't necessarily have super high speed at altitude, but it seemed to be fast in the medium and lower altitudes. All the early pilots, in P-40s, P-39s, Hurricanes, Buffaloes, Wildcats, seemed to complain about the A6M and Ki-43 speed among other things.
Sources for both sentences? Especially for early P-40 pilots complaining about the Ki-43 speed.

Hi
Depends what is classed as a "significant speed advantage", sources indicate the Spitfire I of 1940 had a max speed of 365 mph at 19,000 ft. Figures for the 'Zero' are A6M2 Model 21, 331.5 @ 14,930 ft; A6M3 Model 32, 338 mph @ 19,685 ft; A6M5 Model 52, 351 mph @ 19,685 ft; A6M8 Model 64, 356 mph @ 19,685 ft.
The F4F-3 appears as 328 mph @ 21,000 ft and F4F-4 as 318 mph @ 19,000 ft.
Is 30 mph classed as significant?

Mike

30 mph speed difference was what the Bf 109E held against Hurricane I, what Spitfire held against Bf 110, what Fw 190 held against Spitfire V, what Hellcat had over latest Zeroes.
Spitfire I of 1938 was 30 mph faster than Zero of 1940 - timing is a big thing, too.
 
In addition to being superlatively agile, when it entered service in 1940 the 330 mph Zero was competitively fast for its day. For example, it wasn't until the Mk V Spitfire that Supermarine's fighter had a significantly speed advantage over the Zero (assuming the Vokes air filter used at Darwin is omitted). While they eschewed protection and to a degree firepower, Mitsubishi did not sacrifice speed for maneuverability.


The above article states the Zero's top speed at sea level at 270 mph, which is notably faster than the Hawker Hurricane's 253 mph sea level speed.
And the Spitfire Mk V was a land plane, how long before the Seafire outperformed a Zero, it never did in range which was what defined the Zero.
 
Hi
Depends what is classed as a "significant speed advantage", sources indicate the Spitfire I of 1940 had a max speed of 365 mph at 19,000 ft. Figures for the 'Zero' are A6M2 Model 21, 331.5 @ 14,930 ft; A6M3 Model 32, 338 mph @ 19,685 ft; A6M5 Model 52, 351 mph @ 19,685 ft; A6M8 Model 64, 356 mph @ 19,685 ft.
The F4F-3 appears as 328 mph @ 21,000 ft and F4F-4 as 318 mph @ 19,000 ft.
Is 30 mph classed as significant?

Mike
30 mph converts to about 44 feet per second.

Fighters in the ETO were having their wing guns set to converge anywhere from between 750ft down to even 160ft (Erich Hartman) - as this reflected the close ranges at which manoeuvring into position, aiming at, hitting and getting a kill were most likely. 44ft per second represents a significant advantage to an aircraft trying to get into an advantageous position to fire - or to a defending aircraft, more options to exit any position in which an attacker can achieve a no or low deflection shot that would most likely result in a decisive hit.

30 mph also enables the fighter which has that speed advantage to potentially render itself un-interceptable, provided its slower opponent does not have a height advantage or can out accelerate it if it was caught slow.

An extra 30mph also converts into extra potential kinetic energy for initial manoeuvres.

ALL the wartime accounts I've ever read regarding pilots talking about being at a speed disadvantage of this kind of magnitude seem to have regarded it as significant, even if it wasn't the be and end all. Obviously, there were tactics they could use to mitigate a speed deficit to some extent, depending on the other merits of their aircraft, but given that a fighter is designed to shoot down opponents rather than indulging in aerobatic displays, its clear to me why. Its a strong card to have in your hand.
 
30 mph is a significant advantage, it also means that flying around in a combat area, you are much less likely to have enemy aircraft moving up behind you, in aggregate. Particularly important for the early Allied fighters with the turtledeck blind spot.

but there are some caveats.

Where is the 30 mph advantage? At 20,000 ft? At 10,000? At Sea Level? At what altitude is the combat usually taking place? Does the 30 mph advantage hold when aircraft are kitted out for war, with antennas, bomb racks, external fuel tanks, etc.? We often get a bit confused by stated top speeds, which don't always reflect the reality. On paper, the P-39 (sorry) looks like it should be much faster than any A6M. But in practice it apparently turned out not to be.

Are aircraft engaging while escorting bombers at their cruise speed? Or while flying at a higher speed and altitude like on a fighter sweep or intercept mission?

A climb advantage can translate into a speed advantage. Diving too, to some extent, via extending and zoom.

I think Greg's point about acceleration and climb is a good one, it's also a matter of playing to your strengths. WW2 aircraft bleed speed very quickly in hard turns. One tactic Allies developed in the Pacific was to make either gentler or fewer turns sufficient that your speed didn't drop below a certain point, and rely on a high speed roll advantage that some of their aircraft had. And on tactics like Thach Weave. That takes discipline and constant awareness.

If you have a 350 mph plane, in theory, but you are making hard turns and drop down to 150 mph, then you probably have a heavier, slower accelerating plane which is a sitting duck for the enemy fighter that flies up to help his wingman. Or to the aircraft you were originally fighting which performs like a gazelle at lower speeds, especially compared to yours. It took a while to adjust to this.
 
One of the issues with using speed to counter 'maneuverability' is that it meant forgoing a lot of opportunities to attack enemy aircraft. Instead of going after every target you see, you have to bide your time and wait for the optimal advantageous situation. That was hard for a lot of fighter pilots to adjust to.

And I think situational awareness had a lot to do with this as well. Did either side have good reliable radios? What kind of windscreen did they have?

Japanese aircraft had an advantage initially in that most of them (Ki-27, Ki-43, A6M) had quite good visibility, which meant that they could more often see enemy fighters coming to attack them. Pilots of maneuverable fighters often noted that if they could see the enemy aircraft coming, they could evade attack. This may or may not translate into actual disengagement, (many times it didn't). But it could make the difference between survival and destruction many times.

On the other hand, radios were pretty rare for the earlier Japanese fighters. I think the Allies had some problems with radios they did have initially but eventually that worked itself out. That could help a lot with early warning from other pilots, if everything was working right, and also sometimes much more sophisticated coordination. Maybe this is why some Allied units seemed to be doing better with the same planes (Wildcats, P-40s) in 1943 than they had in 1942.

When using turns to evade attacks, it also mattered how 'peppy' the aircraft was, because if you took advantage of turning ability to evade attack, that might leave you waffling along trying to build up speed while another enemy fighter swoops up behind you. I don't know the engineering as well as some of you here do, but from reading accounts it appears that some planes (for example Ki-27) could turn hard to evade an attack and then accelerate or climb or dive without losing so much speed as others, and / or they could accelerate fast enough to keep their energy up, while others seemed to bleed off speed so badly from just a few turns that they were quickly getting down near stall speed and very vulnerable.

This was a function of both power to weight ratio and also drag. And climb and dive acceleration. I think low drag and an ability to turn a lot without losing too much E was also a characteristic of the quite small Soviet fighters. At least once they had production issues somewhat sorted out so they didn't have pieces sticking out in the slipstream.
 
Where is the 30 mph advantage? At 20,000 ft? At 10,000? At Sea Level? At what altitude is the combat usually taking place?
At ~16000 ft is probably 40 mph deficit, A6M2 vs. Spit I, and probably ~20 mph under 12000 ft. With 100 oct fuel, Spitfire I and II will be faster by ~40 mph between S/L and 12000 ft.

Does the 30 mph advantage hold when aircraft are kitted out for war, with antennas, bomb racks, external fuel tanks, etc.?
Clean, fitted for war.

We often get a bit confused by stated top speeds, which don't always reflect the reality.

No, we are not.
Unless trying to muddle the water by comparing Japanese best of 1941 with British best of 1939.

On paper, the P-39 (sorry) looks like it should be much faster than any A6M. But in practice it apparently turned out not to be.

It does not look that way.
As with A6M, the different P-39s were making different top speed figures.
 
At ~16000 ft is probably 40 mph deficit, A6M2 vs. Spit I, and probably ~20 mph under 12000 ft. With 100 oct fuel, Spitfire I and II will be faster by ~40 mph between S/L and 12000 ft.


Clean, fitted for war.



No, we are not.
Unless trying to muddle the water by comparing Japanese best of 1941 with British best of 1939.

If you are suggesting that I tried to 'muddy the water' in any of my posts, I'd say look in the mirror. I never said anything about Spit MK 1 vs A6M. We do know about Spit Mk V vs A6M, which is a different story.
 
One of the issues with using speed to counter 'maneuverability' is that it meant forgoing a lot of opportunities to attack enemy aircraft. Instead of going after every target you see, you have to bide your time and wait for the optimal advantageous situation. That was hard for a lot of fighter pilots to adjust to.


(As Tomo says on a regular basis, 'do you have a source for that'? ;) )

It was the maxim of all of the best fighter pilots to do *exactly that* though, bide your time if they could - always seeking to attack with an advantage. And if they didn't have it, wait until they did. Which, I guessing its no coincidence, why the designers and manufactures gave them aircraft in which ever higher top speed was a if not the critical thing to allow them to do that.

The exceptions were either brilliant pilots like Marmaduke Pattle in obsolete aircraft, those fighting at a significant tactical disadvantage, and/or those who quickly became a kill.

Breathlessly I watched the 109 in between the breaks in the clouds as I dove. At 12,000 feet I leveled off and watched him up ahead. In diving I had picked up speed, and now had hit 550 miles an hour. I was about 500 feet below him and closing fast. Quick now, I've got time. I checked all around, in back and above me, to ensure that no other [Germans] were doing the same to me. My speed was slacking off now, but I still had enough to pick up that extra 500 feet and position myself 200 yards dead astern. The 109 flew as straight as an arrow, with no weaving. As his plane filled my gunsight, I pressed the [trigger] - John T Godfrey

[On Erich Hartman] But by firing at the very last moment, he basically never missed. It is just impossible to miss when the target is that close. Also, the adversary would have no time to react. 'After attacking, he wouldn't stick around and dogfight like how pilots in movies do. He would flee the scene and attack again once the enemy lost him or lowered their guard. The Soviet airplanes and pilot training was particularly deficient to counter this.' Hascaryo concludes; 'It's basically aerial hit-and-run, a tactic as old as humanity and is still nonetheless devastating in the modern era. It also doesn't require the pilot to be exceptionally good at any one thing (like shooting or flying); an average pilot with above-average understanding of their machine and good planning could pull it off. Hartmann

Sailor Milan's Ten Rules of Air Fighting:

  1. Wait until you see the whites of his eyes. Fire short bursts of 1 to 2 seconds and only when your sights are definitely 'ON'.
  2. Whilst shooting think of nothing else, brace the whole of the body, have both hands on the stick, concentrate on your ring sight.
  3. Always keep a sharp lookout. "Keep your finger out"!
  4. Height [and speed] gives You the initiative.
  5. Always turn and face the attack.
  6. Make your decisions promptly. It is better to act quickly even though your tactics are not the best.
  7. Never fly straight and level for more than 30 seconds in the combat area.
  8. When diving to attack always leave a proportion of your formation above to act as top guard.
  9. INITIATIVE, AGGRESSION, AIR DISCIPLINE, and TEAM WORK are the words that MEAN something in Air Fighting.
  10. Go in quickly – Punch hard – Get out!
[On the Dicta Boelke]
If followed assiduously, the Dicta tactics often led to an unseen approach for a surprise attack. As historical study has shown, thus getting in the first shot in an engagement guarantees a successful attack over 80% of the time.
Head, R. G. (2016). Oswald Boelcke: Germany's First Fighter Ace and Father of Air Combat.

You dont dogfight someone into an unseen approach for a surprise attack.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back