Mosquito versus the German fighters

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Btw, you say the Ju-388 didn't go operational as a night-fighter, but I understand from reading about it that a few were certainly ready and even went on trial with the LW:

I think he is referring to Operational status. Trials, testing and so forth are not classified as operational.

 

[Soren]

I think he is referring to Operational status. Trials, testing and so forth are not classified as operational.

Yes I know, I just pointed that it was ready and it did see some service with the LW. But no it didn't go fully operational.

 

[Erich]

it was not ready for operations as there were too many problems with the engines and pointed wings. non success in the armament trials and there were plenty of experiments with heavy 3cm Mk 103 cannons and heavier yet. the a/c was out of balance and would not serve a useful purpose for a long pointed wing high altitude twin engine a/c. It was being beaten out by the ever short range Me 262A to engage the Mosquito, the Ju 88G-6 was suitable enough and had proven itself from November 44 onward

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Which means it was not ready....

 

[Erich]

exactly the a/c had continual wing spar failures, it was suppose to have cabin heating which did not work also

 

[Glider]

I think continual spar failures would worry me more than a little.

 

[Simon Addinsell]

Because these are stats that I have and can quote



Interesting and I didn't know this. Did they quote numbers.

Re 105 squadron they received seven Mossie PR 1.
W4065 lasted 6 months
W4066 lasted 26 months
W4068 lasted 6 months
W4069 lasted 6 months
W4070 lasted 9 months
W4071 lasted 10 months
W4072 lasted 8 months
They then moved on to Bomber MkIV. I do not know how many missions they flew but to last a minimum of 6 months in front line action alone on PR misions is quite an achievement.



I doubt that you have ever flown at night, I could be wrong. No it means that 15 were lost but the cause was unknown, by no means the same thing.



I make it 5 squadrons equipped with Bomber Mossies in mid 1943. One month on average for a plane flying deep into enemy areas is very good. As for mission profiles the mid atlantic wasn't the place for Mossies.


Wrong again. The loss ratio's mentioned are for all losses. No doubt some were caused by fighters and flak. However in the entire war for all types and nations flying at night accidents were a major cause of loss.





Thanks I did. I notice the bit where it states that the West was a far more dangerous place to operate than the East. We are of course talking about the West, over Germany, the most heavily defended area in the world, by day and night, hundreds of miles behind German Lines. Not I suggest the same as the East where there were almost no German long range missions of any kind against a weaker opposition.


I think this is the main difficulty between us. You are looking at it as a technical issue. Plane A goes so fast, its faster than plane B, therefore it can shoot it down.
My position is this only happened on very rare occasions. More than 99 times out of a 100 the Mossie completed the mission without being shot down by a fighter. Such was the cruising speed of the Mossie it was very difficult, almost impossible, for the fighter to get into a position to intercept. If it did then there was every chance that it didn't have the fuel for a long tail chase as the mossie had a much longer range. I try to look at what actually happened instead of what could have happened and the actual experience i.e. loss ratio's prove this beyond any doubt.


This has been addressed. Most of the night missions were in support of the Heavy bombers. Weather was a day and night operation, Target Marking a night operation, spoof raids a night operation. Some such as PR were mainly done in daylight plus of course the precision raids.


The Mossies had the same bombload as a B17 to Berlin from the UK. Re the comment about destroying buildings, well that is what the British Heavy bombers did most of the time so the Mossie followed the same pattern. Factories, enginering works, power stations were buildings as were other major economic targets.


Name one plane that flew on a regular basis over Germany in daylight in 1943 let alone 1942 on PR, Recce, Bombing Missions with such a loss ratio. Or if you prefer a German plane over all parts of the UK


Certainly.
If I can quote Erich earlier in the thread
4./NJGr 10 stationed in Holland during 1944 hoped it could catch Mossies en-route to Germany with their Fw 190A-8's ~ they failed every time...

HS 219B was supposed to be a Mossie catcher. The 410 was tried and the TA154 was inspired by the mossie. Re the High Altitude 109's I know they existed but didn't achieve much or even anythng at all.

You list the numbers of 105's first Mossies. [W4065/6/8/9/70/71 4072]My father Ft/Lt Paul Addinsell, flew most of them, but I see from his log book that on 17th Dec 1941 18th April 1942 he flew W4064. He was shot down in W4069 on 16th July [POW]

 

[mhuxt]

Hi Simon,

Do you have any details about your father's last operation? All I have is that his Mossie was brought down by flak near Wilhelmshafen. Did the crew ditch on the water, or did they make it back over land? Did they come down straight away, or were they able to continue for a bit?

I'd be most interested in hearing any details you have.

 

[altsym]

wrong thread

 

[stona]

with the advent of the Me262A-1a of Kommando Welter, it did not matter, the Mossie always lost.
E ~

And how many Mosquitos were actually shot down by that unit?...... I don't mean those claimed!
Steve

 

[OldSkeptic]

One just wonders why it had to operate during the night like the other RAF bombers then... why no regular daylight Mosquito raids on Berlin.

Oh, sorry I forgot, the Mosquito was another 'invincible'.

From Adolf Galland's Book "The First and the Last" (pages 213 and 214):

A special chapter was the fight against the Mosquito, Britain had developed and all purpose aircraft woth so extra ordinary performance, whose activities over Germany caused a lot of trouble. The twin engined De Havilland had a speed which none of our fighter aircraft could approach. By day it flew on reconnaissance at high altitude, but it also performed bombing missions, and had a very precise bombsight called Oboe (which was actually a radio based navigation system). It was also successful, at little cost, in nuisance raids at night.

Until we were able to send up the Me-262 jet fighter we were practically powerless against the Mosquito.

Like their namesake they became a plague to our Command and the population.

Our fighters could only catch them when we dived on them from a much greater height during an attack, temporarily achieving higher speed. But as the Mosquitos already flew at a great height, the manoeuvre could only be performed when the approach of the aircraft was discovered early enough and if it could be passed from one radar station to another.
Here there were difficulties: firstly our radar network by by no means without gaps and, secondly, the Mosquito was built of wood, so the little 'bird' only gave a faint signal on our sets.

These were the facts which one simply had to accept for the time being.

Anyhow, with this aircraft alone the German war industry could not be hit decisively; there was no danger that we might lose the war on account of the Mosquito.
It was for quite different reasons the Goering went mad about out inability to stop these raids.
In daytime they flew without loss and went wherever their mission took them; at night they chased the population out of their beds. The latter, who were justifiably annoyed at this, started to grumble: 'Fatty can't even cope with a few silly Mosquitos.'

Ignoring me, Goering recalled two experienced group leaders from the East and ordered them to clear up this daily nuisance in one way or another.

Two strengthened squadrons were formed specially for this purpose, bombastically called the 25th and 50th fighter groups. These aircraft were 'hotted' up by all sorts of tricks, and special methods of attack were worked out - without avail.

As far as I know, neither of these units ever shot down a Mosquito. They were dissolved in autumn 43, and I was able to use the aircraft in the general defence of the Reich.

Adolf Galland, General der Jagdflieger

 

[OldSkeptic]

Boy that one killed the thread.... hopefully killed the idea that 'more advanced' (until the 262) German planes swept Mossies from the air .. they didn't and couldn't. By day, let alone night.

In the other Mossie thread, I quoted the Banff strike wing which could (and did) fight with 109s and 190s by day (FB VIs with Merlin 25s) ... and come out about even. In actual real dogfights. You took on a F or FB with a lot of concern. Bob Braham (the great night fighter ace) out turned a 190 in a day dog fight and shot it down (then got over confident and tried it with 2 of them, held his own with one, the other shot him down, hence the importance of wing men).

As for the Ju-88 series .. fine plane as it was, well lambs to the slaughter basically. Again in the other thread I quoted the Banff wing coming across a bunch of them ... 2 88's (actually probably 188s) got back and were scrapped. Quoted afterwards (post WW2) was the German commander who told a British RAF person (who served on the Banff wing) about the day 'he lost a wing of 88s".

It could hold its own with the German SE fighters of the time in a fight, or could avoid them mostly and was comprehensibly superior to any of their twins.

 

[OldSkeptic]

The last thing many German twin or single engined plan's pilots ever saw (except at night) :

 

[Kryten]

I have "A separate little war" about the Banff wing, very good book!

Don't think it's realistic to say the Mossie held it's own against the German SE fighters, they certainly weren't totally outclassed, but tactical situation was the deciding factor, I doubt many Mossie pilots tried turn fighting with them, bounce and away with their high speed seems to be order of the day, which was successful on many occasions!
They do seem to have held a considerable superiority over their German twins however, one example is in Separate little war when two Mossies attacked four Me110G2's downing three, they caused the Germans major problems over Biscay too.

Excellent aircraft , but not really a dogfighter in that sense!

 

[Tante Ju]

They do seem to have held a considerable superiority over their German twins however, one example is in Separate little war when two Mossies attacked four Me110G2's downing three, they caused the Germans major problems over Biscay too.

... and then there was this lone Me 110 pilot who was attacked by six(?) Spitfires and he still nailed three of them... so perhaps the RAF should have replaced Spits with Mosquitos for air combat, since the 110 beats the Spit, the Mossie beats the 110? The RAF certainly did not think so this would true for many combats... a few perhaps, yes. But you cannot draw much conclusion from these single combats. 80% of it was/is about who having upper hand in the beginning, who approached enemy without notice for easy shot, who makes mistakes first, who exploits those..

 

[Milosh]

Summary from Mankau/Petrick, "Messerschmidt Bf 110, Me 210, Me 410. Die Messerschmitt-Zerstörer und ihre Konkurrenten"

Timeline:

24.05.1940: GL announces that 1000 DB601N engines are to be produced until 01.01.1940.

31.05.1940: Of the 1000 engines, 350 engines have to be considered reserve engines. Thus, only the series production Me 109F can be equipped with the engine. An introduction into Me 110 production at a later date is to be considered.

07.06.1940: New program shows Me 109 and Me 110 equipped with DB601N.

12.07.1940: Generalstab decides that the existing DB601N engines are for now to be installed in the Me 110 exclusively.

19.07.1940: The currently available DB601N engines are required for conversion of the Me 110 in front-line operations. This means an end to further conversions of the Me 109 (of which so far, one group has been converted). The Me 109F series retains the DB601N engine. New-production Me 110 retain the DB601A as before.

26.07.1940: Generalstab opposes further conversions of Me 110 aircraft to DB601N engines except for the groups currently under conversion.

09.08.1940: For the conversion of a total of 3 groups of Me 110 and the already completed conversion of one group Me 109, a monthly total of 70 engines is required for 30 replacement aircraft Me 110, 10 replacement aircraft Me 109. An additional 30 engines are allocated for the reserve engine pool. As currently 280 engines are used in operations, this equates a 10 % reserve.

30.08.1940: It is requested from LC 3 to built a reserve of 45 engines (September), 35 (October), then 30 engines each month until a total of 180 engines is reached.

27.09.1940: Chef Generalstab decided to sustain 4 groups of Me 110 with N engines. 40 of DB601N engines are ear-marked for the reserve pool for these groups. The remaining engines are to go into the reserve pool (1/3) and into Me 109 (2/3).

18.10.1940: It is impossible at the time to convert more than the one existing Bf 109E group to DB601N, and it's not expected to be possible before 01.12.1940. Currently the DB601N engines go to: 1) new production Friedrichs, 2) new production Me 110 to sustain the existing four groups, 3) into 40 new production Emils to sustain the existing one group, 4) into the reserve engine pool for 1 - 3.

26.10.1940: Until the end of October, 1100 - 1200 DB601N engines were delivered. They are installed in the four existing Me 110 groups and the single existing Me 109 group, some reconnaissance aircraft of the Aufklärungsgruppe Ob. d. L., plus 130 reserve engine pool. The rest of the engines went into Me 109F and Me 110 production. The production of DB601N-engined Me 110s is to be channelled into night fighters, for which a constant strength of 120 is demanded.

06.11.1940: Generalstab requests more Me 109 with DB601N-engines. In order to free the required engines, the Generalstab accepts that two month's worth of Me 110 production are delivered with DB601A exclusively (November and December production). The engines thus freed are to go to 1) remaining Bf 109E production, 2) III./ZG 26 Erprb.Gr 210. II./ZG 26 and II./ZG 76 are given low priority or have to swap their engines for DB601A if required.

22.01.1941: The Leitender Chef-Ingenieur has considered the fuel situation and suggest to possibly convert the Me 110 to DB601A engines. The Generalstab lists the operational aircraft with DB601N engine by 01.01.1940 as follows:

Me 109E-1: 16
Me 109E-3: 1
Me 109E-4: 59
Me 109E-6: 1
Me 109E-7: 34
Me 109E-8: 2
Me 109F-1: 5

Me 110C-1: 4
Me 110C-4: 40
Me 110C-5: 12
Me 110C-7: 14
Me 110D-0: 18
Me 110D-2: 20
Me 110D-3: 8
Me 110E-1: 176
Me 110E-2: 14

He 111P: 8
Do 215: 68

(Apparently, the fuel situation made it difficult to keep the DB601N in operation, and at least Me 110 production was ordered to go back to the DB601A predominantly while the DB601N was phased out in favour of the DB601E.)

The above was done by a poster on another board.

 

[Kryten]

... and then there was this lone Me 110 pilot who was attacked by six(?) Spitfires and he still nailed three of them... so perhaps the RAF should have replaced Spits with Mosquitos for air combat, since the 110 beats the Spit, the Mossie beats the 110? The RAF certainly did not think so this would true for many combats... a few perhaps, yes. But you cannot draw much conclusion from these single combats. 80% of it was/is about who having upper hand in the beginning, who approached enemy without notice for easy shot, who makes mistakes first, who exploits those..

That's a bit silly really,
That was a simply an example from the quoted book, not a one off either, the appearance of the Mosquito in Coastal Command made life considerably more difficult for the Germans over Biscay for instance, it held a considerable speed and firepower advantage over the German twins, being very successful on Intruder and Day Ranger operations over the Continent!

 

[Juha]

... and then there was this lone Me 110 pilot who was attacked by six(?) Spitfires and he still nailed three of them... so perhaps the RAF should have replaced Spits with Mosquitos for air combat, since the 110 beats the Spit, the Mossie beats the 110? The RAF certainly did not think so this would true for many combats... a few perhaps, yes. But you cannot draw much conclusion from these single combats. 80% of it was/is about who having upper hand in the beginning, who approached enemy without notice for easy shot, who makes mistakes first, who exploits those..

Only 2, dear Tante Ju, and then Jabs? craslanded his 110 and ran because he thought that that was his only chance to survive. He guessed that the other Spits would not allow him to use his head-on tactics after they had just seen how good shooter he was. But I agree that 110G wasn't hopeless against Spits, I know a couple examples of that

 

[nincomp]

80% of it was/is about who having upper hand in the beginning, who approached enemy without notice for easy shot, who makes mistakes first, who exploits those..

This pretty much agrees with the "Most pilots shot down did not see the enemy coming" thread. Although it is true that some of the best pilots could achieve unexpected performance from their planes against enemy ones, the preferred tactic for success has almost always been "dive from out of the sun at an unsuspecting enemy."

 

[Juha]

This pretty much agrees with the "Most pilots shot down did not see the enemy coming" thread. Although it is true that some of the best pilots could achieve unexpected performance from their planes against enemy ones, the preferred tactic for success has almost always been "dive from out of the sun at an unsuspecting enemy."

Maybe not fully relevant with heavy fighters, both 110 and 88 had rear gunner to look out the dangerous rear sector and 88 had even a third pair of eyeballs.