Mossie vs Ju88

Excellent document Erich.

Interesting mystery there, Erich. The report seems like it was pretty clear though.

evangilder said:

Interesting mystery there, Erich. The report seems like it was pretty clear though.

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That is what it looks like, that it was shot down, still an interesting mystery as you say Eric. Very interesting stuff Erich.

after further discussion this morning.....

Yes, you've got it right, though I don't see mention made of a hill - Weigel
apparently crashed after clipping a tree. He believed he was being followed
by a Mossie - apparently gunfire was heard, but the offiicial cause of the
crash was "Bodenberuehrung", contact with the ground.

I've not found a report from any other 406 Sqn (or any other squadron, for
that matter) which might indicate which mossie if any chased Weigel. See my
other notes for comments re: locations, however from MacFadyen's description
it doesn't seem he shot down Weigel's aircraft.

please note the last sentance. so with availble info or at least what there is the search continues. Research is fun eh ?

more aon the strangeness of relatiosnships between kills and actually areas of downings. macFayden shot down a different Ju 88G-6 and not Weigel

The information for MacFadyen's claim is as below. Initial comments (re
archives) again from (?). There's some info. on Hptm Weigel, however it doesn't look like he was attacked by
MacFadyen. I've not found any info. regarding whether there was another 406
Sqn aircraft which chased Weigel. In any case:

Based on original archive documents, not simply the books from Balss
etc. - The Ju 88 G-6 2Z+BV Werknr. 621077 of 11./NJG6 L54936 was destroyed
at Brünnstadtin, near Geroldshofen when it struck the ground. Pilot Hptm.
Kurt Heinz Weigel, Radar Operator Ofw. Herbert Milord, Radio Operator Fw.
Johannes Antoni, Observer/Gunner Uffz. Johannes Graf all KIA, initially
buried in Geroldshofen, then removed to Gemünden. Earlier, Hptm Kurt Weigel returned
to Germany in 1943 from Britain in a prisoner exchange after having feigned
madness. The 1945 cause of the crash was an incorrect estimation of the height
above ground, and the aircraft crashed directly into the ground. I have some
pictures of the crew. There was an investigation of the crash, with the
threat of a court martial, as the Weigel's aircraft was apparently followed
in the pattern by a British nightfighter. In addition, his wife (fiancee?)
was at the airfield. Weigel radioed the field to inform them and desperately
asked for help. However, the runway lighting was then switched off and
Weigel crashed after coming into contact with trees. Apparently the sound of
gunfire was heard. In the end, it did not come to a court martial, and the
matter was suppressed.


However, according to other loss records, Ju 88 G-6, 620187, of I./NJG 5 was
destroyed in combat north of Kitzingen. Note that Brünnstad is about 3 km
west of Gerolzhofen. F/L MacFadyen's report details that at 23.10,
Gerolzhofen was lit, with red signals fired west of the aerodrome. A contact
was obtained at 3 1/2 miles at 1,200 feet altitude, crossing starboard to
port and slightly above. The Mosquito followed in a port orbit over the
aerodrome, the e/a firing flares as it went, answered by a green from the
ground, then by numerous amber flares from the ground, which MacFadyen took
to be intruder warnings. E/A then turned starboard out of the orbit, heading
to Kitzingen and weaving a bit. Mosquito closed to 100 feet, and below at
altitude of 1,200 feet, and visually identified e/a as a Ju 88 G. Mosquito
dropped back to 150 yards and fired a five-second burst. Strikes were seen
all over the fuselage, and the starboard engine caught fire. E/A went slowly
into a port spiral and crashed into the first bend in the river Main, north
of Kitzingen. This matches the location given for 620187, whereas 621077's
loss location, confirmed by the airfield records at Gerolzhofen, is about
15km away from this bend in the river. The puzzle is continuing ..........

Wow that has to suck..... I think I would almost rather get shot down then go down because I clipped a tree.

Richtig ! like my cousins Bf 110G-4 having an engine fire spreading to the wing, ordered his other two crew members to bail out which they did and the a/c flipped over taking my cousin flying the a/c down like a rock smashing into the ground just outside his airfield. what royally sucks this was not due to any operational action

To me that would be the worst way to go, a mechanical failure.

I agree....

So do I.

I actually try not and think about it.

prost Neujahr !

another rare colour shot of a Stab I./NJG 2 bird after war. Nice welle pattern camo over RLM 76 blue-white/grey

let the research continue

Nice shot Erich, nice too see a colour picture.

EXCELLENT PIC ERICH!! Very nice...

In the night we came with 88 G-6 from below (Naxos radar) and shooting with Schräge Musik in the fuel-tanks when we saw the shadow of the 4-engine plane, distance depending on night-sight between 200 and 70 meters. Not closer, otherwise you were hit by debris like my freind Gerd Friedrich when lancaster and J 88 were both at ground same spot.

the forward firing 2cm weapons of the 88G-6 were adjusted to 100m. their lines of fire were parallel with a rise o approx. 100cm in that distance. _______________________________________________________________

the first part a quote to me from a night fighter ace-friend just recently. Gerd by the way was a Ritterkreuz winner in NJG 6 and got to close with his Ju 88G-6 and crew, fired with his 2cm weapons and the Lancaster bomb load exploded taking the Ju 88G-6/crew out as well in one huge, violent explosion

the Lancaster bomb load exploded taking the Ju 88G-6/crew out as well in one huge, violent explosion

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Not the first time thats happened, but damn all the same...

you guys might be interested in this from a German night fighter pilot and a response in addition from my good friend Rod M.

The night 13.-14.01.1945 shows indeed (as you explained))that the night-war in the air was already lost like the day-war in the air the year before.(KTB NJG 6 page 220)

In the last months of 1944 the voice-traffic was jammed so heavy by RAF that our radio-operators worked on Gruppen- and Divisions-frequenz with old-fashioned Morse code (Tastverkehr). When sitting in our planes (Sitzbereitschaft) the radio-operator recieved the order that we should assemble after take-off at FuF Otto (radio-beacon Otto). At Otto the radio-operator told us follow the bomber-stream in direction of Fuf Dachs-Mitte. Gruppe IV/NJG 6 could not get this message because Gruppen - and Divisions-tranmitter were jammed.

The RAF was clever to use nights where weatherwise in England was a cold-front and Germany had a warm-front with bad visibility and low overcast 300 meters. That was also the reason "Spitzenbesatzungen", pilots with experience, took off only during this night. The weather and ground-vivibility was so bad that the group-commander Schulte crashed during taxiing with another Ju 88 and II/NJG 6 could not take off. And I/NJG 6 was sent to FuF Möve instead without getting enemy-contct. With 17 nightfighters NJG 6 against a stream of several hundred 4-eng planes protected by how many mosquitos (check the RAF-files), no successes, two Ju 88 destroyed at the ground.

Did you know that the helpless LW-command did use the strong broadcasting radio stations over Cologne and Berlin f.e. to give us nightfighters the position of the bomberstream? Cologne played then carnival-musik and Berlin march-musik and -you will laugh to-day if it would not be so very sad- that over Vienna they played waltz-musik.

simplification: the German night fighter defences were jammed before they even could get air-borne plus the fact the RAF knew where all the air basese were located and even strengths that they would meet in the air, Rod's response in addition: RAF 100th group being very effective......

the British (100 Group)reported that the following jamming was carried out:

-14 out of 15 high-frequency wireless control channels with 'Drumstick' transmitters in the UK (the 15th channel wasn't deemed important enough to jam),

-commentary broadcast on 8 active radio beacons with airborne- and ground-based 'Fidget',

-early warning ground radar with both airborne- and ground-based 'Mandrel' (Saarbrücken attack),

-AI radar with 'Piperack'-equipped aircraft accompanying the bomber streams,

-6 high-frequency and 9 medium-frequency radio transmissions and 1 high-frequency wireless transmission with 'Corona', 'Special Tinsel' and 'Jostle'


And from the end of January it could only get worse. As effective as the jamming may have been, 100 Group were aware that devices such as 'Fidget', broadcast from the UK using very powerful BBC transmitters, were only effective up to a certain range and in certain prevailing atmospheric conditions (they tested their systems using signals investigation aircraft that would check the strength of jamming over certain beacons etc while the night attacks were occurring). But the end of January saw the beginning of large scale use of land-based jamming on the coninent (i.e. almost in the Nachtjagd's back yard) by No. 80 Group, thereby effectively increasing the range of both monitoring and jamming. Obviously, as the Allies advanced, these ground units also moved forward.... However, as is obvious, it didn't stop the Nachtjagd having occasional successes during Feb and Mar 45 that cost Bomber Command heavily.

As an aside, Peter, you may be interested to know that the British "Y" service was well aware of the airborne movements of NJG6, in fact, more so than any other Nachtjagd unit during Jan-Mar 45. Here is a summary of movements deduced by the "Y" service from radio transmissions on the night of the 14/15 Jan 45, as published in a 100 Group Sigint Report prepared only a few days after the night in question (you will see that they compare surprisingly well with the info in the KTB:

(On this night the RAF mounted two successive raids on Merseburg)

19.11 IV./NJG 6 ordered to Koblenz area
19.32 II./NJG 6 ordered to FuF Otto
19.40 Bombs reported dropping on Mannheim (diversion attack)
19.42 II./NJG 6 ordered to Mannheim
19.45 IV./NJG 6 ordered to Mannheim
20.24 I./NJG 6 ordered to land
20.26 II./NJG 6 ordered to FuF Dora (when controllers realised real bomber force was heading to Merseburg)
20.35 IV./NJG 6 ordered to FuF Dora
20.55 Bombs reported dropping on Merseburg
20.58 II./NJG 6 ordered to Merseburg
21.27 II./NJG 6 ordered to land
21.31 IV./NJG 6 ordered to land


22.00+ I. IV./NJG 6 airborne and sent to FuF Otto
23.03 I. IV./NJG 6 ordered to Weimar area
23.16 I. IV./NJG 6 ordered to FuF Dora
23.41 I./NJG 6 advised target was Merseburg
00.08 IV./NJG 6 ordered to land

Great stuff Erich, really interesting. I didn't know that the allied jamming was so effective, I would have thought that the Germans would have found ways around it similar to what they did with "window".

very interesting...thanks Erich