buffnut453
Captain
I don't think Japan had the ability to achieve anything substantive with the uranium and certainly lacked a means of delivering a weapon. Therefore impact is minimal, IMHO.
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parsifal
Colonel
There was zero possibility (no pun intended) of Japan acquiring the bomb, even with all the processed uranium in the world.
However I dont agree that they lacked the delivery systems. A nuclear carrying suicide aircraft would have the ability to destroy an entire fleet, even if it missed. What sort of effect would that have on the USN offensive capability???
You have got hold of the wrong end of the stick here I'm afraid. I wasn't suggesting that the Japanese would have been able to produce atomic weapons if they had received the uranium shipment, what I was referring to was that the U.S. needed the uranium for it's own use.
parsifal
Colonel
ah, I understand. Even so, now that you have very kindly clarified, it gets down to how impportant the bomb was to extracting the Japanese unconditional surrender. Conventional theory is that it was critical. Modern revisioniust histories are that it was less important to the Soviet invasion. Japanese records as to why unconditional surrender was accepted are unclear.
My view is that the bomb hastened their acceptance, but with or without the bomb, the Japanese were going to surrender anyway. The bomb was a political weapon more than anything....expectations were that in the postwar environment it would act as a great leveller....cancelling the advatages of the huge red army presence in Central and eastern Europe. In reality it acted to achieve an uneasy equilibrium for 45 years
My view is that the bomb hastened their acceptance, but with or without the bomb, the Japanese were going to surrender anyway. The bomb was a political weapon more than anything....expectations were that in the postwar environment it would act as a great leveller....cancelling the advatages of the huge red army presence in Central and eastern Europe. In reality it acted to achieve an uneasy equilibrium for 45 years
razor1uk
Staff Sergeant
As far as I am led to believe, the Japanese had and tested a bomb in what would be North Korean East Coast. As to weither or not they had enough material for a 2nd, or a partially finished 'dirty' one is debatable since the Soviets stripped anything manmade and useful out of anywhere their forces went then.
The unconditional surrender was apparently instigated by Hirohito to break the deadlock between the politicians and the control clique of the militaries, although its just as likely or unlikely that if Gensai Bakudan was used, that it was noticed and that was a factor in surrender negotiation - to stop the control clique (military fundamentalists) revolting and if resourceful enough, in using spreading their collective war knowledge for paramilitary insurrection against the invasion/garrisoning, 'allied' Japanese forces especially against government departments, staffs officials; something that wasn't new to them at all.
Definitely after the destruction of the Imperial Russian Eastern Fleet in around Port Arthur 'The Battle of Tsushima' in 1905, the subsequent ceding of that part of the Dalian Peninsular to Japan, and the Soviets view of Japans land based weakness after Khalin Gol/Nomahan, the Soviets after their Western 'Patriotic' battles and losses that hardened them to a edge stronger than the blade of a traditional Japanese sword (in their own eyes, I am hypothesising..) knew they could probably take Manchukuo quickly, and Japan with some difficulty too.
If this a reasonable theory, then its just as reasonable perhaps to think those in the control clique knew this too; hence why for many things they actively covered many failures defeats up and buried their collective heads in the sand.
The unconditional surrender was apparently instigated by Hirohito to break the deadlock between the politicians and the control clique of the militaries, although its just as likely or unlikely that if Gensai Bakudan was used, that it was noticed and that was a factor in surrender negotiation - to stop the control clique (military fundamentalists) revolting and if resourceful enough, in using spreading their collective war knowledge for paramilitary insurrection against the invasion/garrisoning, 'allied' Japanese forces especially against government departments, staffs officials; something that wasn't new to them at all.
Definitely after the destruction of the Imperial Russian Eastern Fleet in around Port Arthur 'The Battle of Tsushima' in 1905, the subsequent ceding of that part of the Dalian Peninsular to Japan, and the Soviets view of Japans land based weakness after Khalin Gol/Nomahan, the Soviets after their Western 'Patriotic' battles and losses that hardened them to a edge stronger than the blade of a traditional Japanese sword (in their own eyes, I am hypothesising..) knew they could probably take Manchukuo quickly, and Japan with some difficulty too.
If this a reasonable theory, then its just as reasonable perhaps to think those in the control clique knew this too; hence why for many things they actively covered many failures defeats up and buried their collective heads in the sand.
What with everything that was happening around them the Japanese must have been able to work out that they had lost the war, and yes any country in it's right mind would much sooner surrender to the Americans than the Russians. But you have to remember that the Japanese didn't know how many atomic bombs the Americans had access to. Until the American capture of the shipment of uranium from Germany the Americans were almost out of the stuff. I don't know any of this for a fact of course as historians argue over how much uranium the Americans had and also whether or not the captured German uranium could be used for making a bomb.
parsifal
Colonel
The majority of the japanese leadership had realised they had lost the war from at least June 1944. Many had realized that much earlier. a few never wanted to go to war with the Americans because they knoew they couldnt win.
Everything From June 1944 to the surrender was about securing better terms of peace. As 1944 drew into 1945 there were several changes in the leadership, and Japanese terms for surrender became less and less. From just before okinawa onward, they really only had two demands for peace....that the person of the empereor, his position, and his family be respected. They got that. The second was that foreign forces remain outside of the home islands. That was not achieved.
Until the Russians acytually attacked, the japanese were hopeful of Soviet sympathies. They, like the Germans before them had hoped for the break up of the grand alliance ranged against them. The Japanese was different to that of the Germans, however....they had not been at war with the Russians since 1939, and actually hoped for the Russians to diplomatically side with them. They certainly did not prefer the Americans as victors over the Russians. they loathed the Americans. They didnt want any nations to occupy Japan, so in that regard there was no preference.
Ive never heard that the US relied on German enriched uranium for their bombs. By September that 6 bombs, byt the end of the year that nearly 20. By the following year they had 150 bombs, so in my opinion the Americans were not at all reliant on captured supplies for their atomic program. Ill concede the point if youve got some evidence to show otherwise, but it just doesnt ring true at all to me.
Well amongst other things we will probably never know for sure how much uranium the Americans had and I don't want to get into a long discussion over it. The Japanese may well have loathed the Americans but the Russians were they're traditional enemies. I don't think there was ever a people (the Japanese included) that would have been gormless enough to choose occupation by Russians over occupation by the Americans or any other English speaking nation for that matter, the Germans certainly didn't. If Japan had of been occupied by the Russians it would have been bled to death and ended up like North Korea or some other socially retarded state, the Japanese would have known that as well as anyone.
buffnut453
Captain
If they managed to get to the very centre of a carrier battle group then maybe. However, to get to that central point, the aircraft would have to traverse 17 miles of surrounding defences. Given the likely number of nuclear weapons that Japan might have been able to produce (bear in mind America's effort just to get 2 weapons ready), I think the odds of success were remote to zero.
parsifal
Colonel
None of that matter to the japanese. For most it was finding a way to protect the empereror, whom the average Japanese soldier thought was a living God. The Japanese had fought the Russians, for sure in the moderen times, but their revulsion of the west was much older and deeper.
These are cultural or matters of psyche. if you want to take a look at this issue from a juxtaposition of strictly western persona (a fundamentally wrong starting point if you want to undertstand the Japanese reactions), the traditional enemy was not Russia at all, it was China. That Japan had gone to war with Russia at all, both in 1905 and 1939, it was to show the Russians that it was they, the Japanese that were in control in China, and that they, the Japanese had the dominant sphere of influence over the region. This was for cultural economic and military reasons... They went to war with the west for the same reasons. In japanese eyes, they were applying a japan centric version of the Monroe doctrine. US free market demands for Open door policy in China were seen as US economic imperialism....something the Japanese were quite willing to risk war over. To the Japanese western dominance in the far east had to be stopped, at all costs. Where they went wrong was that they believed it their rightful destiny to take the leadership role in East Asia...effectively replacing western imperialism with their own. but the fact that they at least partially read the mood of the region correctly can be seen by the more or less imediate ousting of the returning western colonialist powers by the rising nationalist movements in East Asia. That tide was so strong that it forced even the Russians out of the region almost immediately. The Americans were more reluctant to accept that status quo, not really relinquishing their notion that the pacific was a US controled lake until after Vietnam.
Certainly if the Russians had occupied the home islands, they would have raped and pillaged the place the same as eastren europe, That didnt matter to the Japanese....its what they expected the west to do as well. Henry Morgantheu (I think) had wanted to reduce the Axis powers to backward agrarian states......it wasnt until the post war period that US poured money into the reconstruction, mostly with a view to making these countries client econoimic states. Further down the track, Japan, Germany and then eventually in the modern era, China, became and overtook the US as the primary economic centres of the world....rivals and competitirs to the US dominance....the end of the Pax America.
If the Japanese had not viewed China as their area of vital interest, they would have acceded US pre-war ultimatum and avoided the embargoes that drove them to war. There were element of the Kwantung Army that favoured war with Russia, but these guys were never in the majority and Russia was viewed as just another rival, even less significant than the Americans.
These are cultural or matters of psyche. if you want to take a look at this issue from a juxtaposition of strictly western persona (a fundamentally wrong starting point if you want to undertstand the Japanese reactions), the traditional enemy was not Russia at all, it was China. That Japan had gone to war with Russia at all, both in 1905 and 1939, it was to show the Russians that it was they, the Japanese that were in control in China, and that they, the Japanese had the dominant sphere of influence over the region. This was for cultural economic and military reasons... They went to war with the west for the same reasons. In japanese eyes, they were applying a japan centric version of the Monroe doctrine. US free market demands for Open door policy in China were seen as US economic imperialism....something the Japanese were quite willing to risk war over. To the Japanese western dominance in the far east had to be stopped, at all costs. Where they went wrong was that they believed it their rightful destiny to take the leadership role in East Asia...effectively replacing western imperialism with their own. but the fact that they at least partially read the mood of the region correctly can be seen by the more or less imediate ousting of the returning western colonialist powers by the rising nationalist movements in East Asia. That tide was so strong that it forced even the Russians out of the region almost immediately. The Americans were more reluctant to accept that status quo, not really relinquishing their notion that the pacific was a US controled lake until after Vietnam.
Certainly if the Russians had occupied the home islands, they would have raped and pillaged the place the same as eastren europe, That didnt matter to the Japanese....its what they expected the west to do as well. Henry Morgantheu (I think) had wanted to reduce the Axis powers to backward agrarian states......it wasnt until the post war period that US poured money into the reconstruction, mostly with a view to making these countries client econoimic states. Further down the track, Japan, Germany and then eventually in the modern era, China, became and overtook the US as the primary economic centres of the world....rivals and competitirs to the US dominance....the end of the Pax America.
If the Japanese had not viewed China as their area of vital interest, they would have acceded US pre-war ultimatum and avoided the embargoes that drove them to war. There were element of the Kwantung Army that favoured war with Russia, but these guys were never in the majority and Russia was viewed as just another rival, even less significant than the Americans.
parsifal
Colonel
We would need to analyse the number or proportions of suicide attacks that resched the outer rings of a given task force. I forgett how many kamikazes were expended, I know that about 240 ships were sunk or seriously damaged. I keep believing that the success rate was around 40%, for those aircraft that made it to the inner screen. Which would suggest, that of the 2000 or so Kamikazes actually expended, maybe 4-500 got past the CAP. Thats not remote to zero, more like 20-25%.
Put a nuclear device in the hands of an experience pilot, at the centre of your attack group, and you are probably ooking at odds of 60-70% success. a guess, I concede, but certainly not implausible.
We might get a better idea of how effective a nuclear strike on a fleet and how close to the aiming point they needed to get, by looking at the test results of the postwar test at Bikini
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buffnut453
Captain
I was going from the damage radii at Hiroshima which was wider than Nagasaki due to the flatter terrain of the former (which I thought was more applicable to the maritime environment).
I agree that a swarm in which one aircraft was carrying a nuke might be successful but it's a real crap-shoot as to whether the nuke aircraft made it through or not...and even then the spread of vessels in a battle group is still considerable. The weapon might destroy some but I think it highly unlikely that it would neutralize the threat of the battle group...and that would be just one battle group when the USN and, later, the RN had more than one.
I agree that a swarm in which one aircraft was carrying a nuke might be successful but it's a real crap-shoot as to whether the nuke aircraft made it through or not...and even then the spread of vessels in a battle group is still considerable. The weapon might destroy some but I think it highly unlikely that it would neutralize the threat of the battle group...and that would be just one battle group when the USN and, later, the RN had more than one.
And what type of aircraft would have been used for this suicide attack? It would have had to of been a pretty large and therefor slow aircraft to carry an atomic bomb in which case it would have been a sitting duck. I don't see why it would need to be a kamikaze attack either as pin point accuracy was not required.
Glider
Captain
Forget an aircraft, I would put it in a Sub, get as close as possible to a major US city surface and blow it.
N4521U
Colonel
Of course it would be the USS Yorktown, CV-5, because when CV-10 showed up the Japanese thought 5 was brought back from the grave!
buffnut453
Captain
Not only that, we'd need to determine what proportion of those were bombers capable of carrying a nuke. Many of the successful kamikaze missions were flown in fighters or lighter bombers which, presumably, were harder to hit than a large aircraft like the G4M.
parsifal
Colonel
We have to approach this in the understanding that its complete hypothetical. it never happened, neither was it ever going to happen. So, any consideration of this alternative history has to be on that understanding.
But let me try and paint some sort of picture that at least gives this hypothetical some air of plausibility.
Lets say the Japanese are able to achieve one sided victories at Coral Sea and Midway. they capture Port Moresby, Noumea and push onto Fiji, as planned. Midway is captured, and the USN watched closely. There are several inculive battles in 1942-3. Equipment wise the IJN is able to develop a replacement for the Zero, it protects its merchant fleet better, fortifies its outer defences and undertakes some further exapansions and consiolidation of its fleet. Operations in China are somewhat more successful, and the British pushed out of Burma. In summary, the Japanese are successful in their 1942 objectives, and are given maybe 2 year respite to prepre their defences.
Say the Germans develop nuclear weapons, and in typical German style are able to produce more compact, light versions of e bomb for their twin engined bombers. None of that is imlausible. It means the final US drives will be occurring in 1947-8, rather than 1945, against Japanese airforces far more experienced, and far better equipped. I dont think it impausible, for example, for the Japanese to develop the Kikka Jet a/c as a bomber, not dis-similar to the AR-234, or its four engined equivalent. Could the USN 1947 era aircraft cope with such aircraft. Doubtful. In 1949, when the USN went toi war in Korea, its aircraft were hard pressed deaing with the MIG-15. Granted, the US had virtually stopped carrier borne aircraft development post war, but we would likley see Bearcats on t5he carriers, fighting kikka style jet techs....
that would suggest to me that it might be a possibility for the Japanese to get a bomb over a US carrier TF. As I said, a complete hypothetica, no correct answer. im not even claiming this to be a likley outcome...its not, but was there any scenario that might see the japanese getting an atomic device over a USN Task Force. I think so....
But let me try and paint some sort of picture that at least gives this hypothetical some air of plausibility.
Lets say the Japanese are able to achieve one sided victories at Coral Sea and Midway. they capture Port Moresby, Noumea and push onto Fiji, as planned. Midway is captured, and the USN watched closely. There are several inculive battles in 1942-3. Equipment wise the IJN is able to develop a replacement for the Zero, it protects its merchant fleet better, fortifies its outer defences and undertakes some further exapansions and consiolidation of its fleet. Operations in China are somewhat more successful, and the British pushed out of Burma. In summary, the Japanese are successful in their 1942 objectives, and are given maybe 2 year respite to prepre their defences.
Say the Germans develop nuclear weapons, and in typical German style are able to produce more compact, light versions of e bomb for their twin engined bombers. None of that is imlausible. It means the final US drives will be occurring in 1947-8, rather than 1945, against Japanese airforces far more experienced, and far better equipped. I dont think it impausible, for example, for the Japanese to develop the Kikka Jet a/c as a bomber, not dis-similar to the AR-234, or its four engined equivalent. Could the USN 1947 era aircraft cope with such aircraft. Doubtful. In 1949, when the USN went toi war in Korea, its aircraft were hard pressed deaing with the MIG-15. Granted, the US had virtually stopped carrier borne aircraft development post war, but we would likley see Bearcats on t5he carriers, fighting kikka style jet techs....
that would suggest to me that it might be a possibility for the Japanese to get a bomb over a US carrier TF. As I said, a complete hypothetica, no correct answer. im not even claiming this to be a likley outcome...its not, but was there any scenario that might see the japanese getting an atomic device over a USN Task Force. I think so....
For the Japanese to take and occupy Port Moresby, Noumea, Fiji, they would have had to crush the US, British, Austrailian, New Zealand, ect. forces. Historically, look how hard the fighting was at and around Guadalcanal. The US Navy would not just sit back and watch Midway being built up by the Japanese. Not in Hawaii's back yard.
If the German's would have developed the "bomb" and used it, this would have changed the war entirely. The historic push to Berlin would not have mattered. An all out push to destroy Germany's nuclear weapons and a rush to develope them in the US and Russia would be the priority.
But in my opinion, I have no evidence to support this, the Allies were well aware of Germany's nuclear and technical developments. And several key people in Germany; military, industry, government were putting a wrench into the works. Only my opinion.
parsifal
Colonel
More than anything, the battle in the Pacific was a battle of control of the oceans. to control the oceans, the battles in the air had to be won. To win in the air, carriers were the answer to successful operations, either offensive or defensive.
If the given is that the Japanese won hands down victories at both Coral Sea and Midway, the situation would have been very dire for the allies, whatever the fighting capabilities they may think their other forces possessed. It would see, the Japanese with 8 fleet carriers, and 4 Light Carriers, plus 5 escort carriers, versus (I think) 3 US fleet carriers, no light carriers and maybe 2 escort or transport carriers. The Japanese, in that scenario would have been in complete control...They could dictate where they would attack, in what strength, and when. Time would be achieved to retain and replace their losses, restore training standards, isolate areas and reduce the fighting capacities of isolated garrisons. There is nothing the US could do to stem that until and unless they built up their carriers again.
In the same light, if the US had had more carriers in '42-3, they would have ended the war far more early than they actually did, or at least, reduced the Japanese to a point of impotence. Surrender might have taken more time, but the tenets for surrender would have been achieved.
As for Midway, yeah ive read the post war revisionist accounts that discount the Japanese fighting capabilities, but i prefer the US assessments of the time. If Japan had won the naval engagement at Midway, and been in a position to reduce the island defences unchallenged, they would have taken the place easily. Thereafter, ther is nothing (excpt subs), that the US could have done to stem the build up of Midway, without Carriers. Every three months or so, the Japanese would need to send in a re-supply convoy...thats not much opportunity for US subs to have much effect. if the US attempted to build a base closer, the Japanese would simply flatten it with their huge carrier advantage each time the US tried to build up forces to suppress Midway. Its would have been a terrible situation for the US to find itself in. Beatable, eventually, but still a huge advantage to the Japanese if they had won the carrier battles of 1942.
If the given is that the Japanese won hands down victories at both Coral Sea and Midway, the situation would have been very dire for the allies, whatever the fighting capabilities they may think their other forces possessed. It would see, the Japanese with 8 fleet carriers, and 4 Light Carriers, plus 5 escort carriers, versus (I think) 3 US fleet carriers, no light carriers and maybe 2 escort or transport carriers. The Japanese, in that scenario would have been in complete control...They could dictate where they would attack, in what strength, and when. Time would be achieved to retain and replace their losses, restore training standards, isolate areas and reduce the fighting capacities of isolated garrisons. There is nothing the US could do to stem that until and unless they built up their carriers again.
In the same light, if the US had had more carriers in '42-3, they would have ended the war far more early than they actually did, or at least, reduced the Japanese to a point of impotence. Surrender might have taken more time, but the tenets for surrender would have been achieved.
As for Midway, yeah ive read the post war revisionist accounts that discount the Japanese fighting capabilities, but i prefer the US assessments of the time. If Japan had won the naval engagement at Midway, and been in a position to reduce the island defences unchallenged, they would have taken the place easily. Thereafter, ther is nothing (excpt subs), that the US could have done to stem the build up of Midway, without Carriers. Every three months or so, the Japanese would need to send in a re-supply convoy...thats not much opportunity for US subs to have much effect. if the US attempted to build a base closer, the Japanese would simply flatten it with their huge carrier advantage each time the US tried to build up forces to suppress Midway. Its would have been a terrible situation for the US to find itself in. Beatable, eventually, but still a huge advantage to the Japanese if they had won the carrier battles of 1942.
