Most Overrated aircraft of WWII.....?

The most over-rated aircraft of WW2


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"Gotta rocket in your pocket - stay cooly-cool, boy...
Breeze it, buzz it, easy does it - stay cooly-cool, boy!"
Let's all keep our cool, gentlemen, pompous asses or not. We all could use a little slow burning fuse here.
 
So what are we arguing about? Mr. Vasco threw up a table comparing claims vs losses. In this table the Bf 110 edges out the Spitfire and Bf 109 based on the proportion of claims vs losses. It is a single point of comparison. From the table, one can see that the Hurricane fairs worst, the Sputfire and Bf 109 are statistically tied and the Bf 110 has a slight edge. What it doesn't show is loss to sortie rate, or loss to replacement rate. These are far more important to determining if you can sustain an air campaign. Correct me if I'm wrong.
 
So what are we arguing about? Mr. Vasco threw up a table comparing claims vs losses. In this table the Bf 110 edges out the Spitfire and Bf 109 based on the proportion of claims vs losses. It is a single point of comparison. From the table, one can see that the Hurricane fairs worst, the Sputfire and Bf 109 are statistically tied and the Bf 110 has a slight edge. What it doesn't show is loss to sortie rate, or loss to replacement rate. These are far more important to determining if you can sustain an air campaign. Correct me if I'm wrong.
You're correct - and all I said that sorties need to be considered as well. You seen the response.
 
Oops. I think you questioned the wrong answer.
Indeed. But the question still stands.

Goering's instructions of 19 August were quite clear.

"Only a part of the fighter escort will be provided to the bombers as close escort. The goal must be to employ as many free ranging fighters (Freijagd) as possible, so that they can simultaneously protect the bombers and intercept enemy fighters under favourable conditions. For such operations there can be no rigid plan, their execution depends on both enemy tactics and weather."

Kesselring did request that his fighters escort the bombers more closely, about a month later, on 18 September much to the dismay of the fighter commanders. Hannes Trautloft wrote in his diary,

"We received a hail of abuse. Kesselring now requires us to fly even closer to the bombers during our close escort missions."

This was because as an artillery officer Kesselring imagined this would stem the unsustainable losses of bombers. Goering, on August 19th, had made it clear that the majority of his fighters should not be hobbled in this way. British reports of the period still record most of the escorts stacked up at various altitudes, some more than 10,000 feet above the bombers, some ranging miles ahead (and to be ignored if possible).

It's also worth mentioning that on several occasions the so called close escort inflicted heavy casualties on Fighter Command aircraft that had evaded or fought their way through the wider fighter screen.

An account of the September 3 raids on North Weald (and Debden and Hornchurch) shows the damage that Bf 110s could inflict on their would be interceptors. 21 British fighters were shot down, at least 6 by the Bf 110s of III./ZG 26, which was flying top cover while ZG 2 remained closer to the bombers.

I tell you who did not underestimate the Bf 110; the pilots who flew against it.
 
An account of the September 3 raids on North Weald (and Debden and Hornchurch) shows the damage that Bf 110s could inflict on their would be interceptors. 21 British fighters were shot down, at least 6 by the Bf 110s of III./ZG 26, which was flying top cover while ZG 2 remained closer to the bombers.

I tell you who did not underestimate the Bf 110; the pilots who flew against it.
Hi
'Fighter Command Losses' Volume 1, by Norman Franks, pages 72-73 has 16 fighters 'lost' on that day not all during those raids or to enemy action. Two appear to be confirmed definitely due to Me 110s; No. 17 Sqn. Hurricane P3673 over Essex at 1030, pilot Sgt. D Fopp baled out wounded, and 310 Sqn. Hurricane P8811, written off after being brought down at 1000, pilot Sgt. J Kopriva safe.

Mike
 
Would it be too much to ask that the moderators behave, you know, moderately?
I don't see Mr. Vasco being out of line at all. But I have noticed a tendency for some individuals to lose their cool when their sacred cow is being challenged. Threatening to cancel someone because you don't accept their argument is so uncool.

Where did I threaten to cancel anyone?

I simply said there is no need for an attitude.
 
Hi
'Fighter Command Losses' Volume 1, by Norman Franks, pages 72-73 has 16 fighters 'lost' on that day not all during those raids or to enemy action. Two appear to be confirmed definitely due to Me 110s; No. 17 Sqn. Hurricane P3673 over Essex at 1030, pilot Sgt. D Fopp baled out wounded, and 310 Sqn. Hurricane P8811, written off after being brought down at 1000, pilot Sgt. J Kopriva safe.

Mike
I wrote shot down, not destroyed. That includes all those that made forced landings, 9 of which would eventually be repaired. This one of the great advantages of fighting over home ground.

No.17 Squadron had four of its Hurricanes shot down, all by Bf 110s.

No.257 had two of its Hurricanes shot down and two damaged by Bf 110s.

No.310 had a Hurricane shot down by a Bf 110.

There were other losses, notably No. 603 Squadron's two Spitfires, which fell to Bf 109s.

The overall total of 21 meant that 1 in in 6 of the British fighters that were engaged this day were shot down.
 
Thump: Yes. It was only the Bf 110 Ds of I. Gruppe, Zerstörergeschwader 76 that escorted the bombers in the early afternoon raid of 15th August 1940 against the north-east coast of England that had the Dackelbauch fitment. The Bf 110 units based in France flew Bf 110s with the standard fuel capacity, as their range was sufficient for escort against the airfields, and later, the bombing raids against London from 7th September 1940. Not a problem. The problem was for the Bf 109s, who had a shorter range, and the trip to London and back (without any auxiliary fuel tank) meant combat over London was severely limited.


Thanks for the reply and info, JV.

Without the funny tank, how did the bombers under their escort fare, if you know?
 
I'm not the one being closed minded here, I am open to your statistics but putting I'm in what I believe is a major consideration when comparing claims to loss ratios. We'll agree to disagree and I advise you to curtail your attitude if you want to continue to play in the sandbox!
I will answer your point about sorties with some examples. And why I therefore consider sorties to not always be an accurate rider with regard to combat, claims, and losses.

On 30th August 1940 303 Squadron, on a training flight, encountered a German raid. Although all were up, only one engaged in combat, claiming a Bf 110 of II./ZG 76. This was actually a half-claim, as Wicks of 56 Squadron was also involved in the shooting down of the Bf 110

1st September: 54 Squadron Intelligence report: '...Nine a/c of 54 Squadron took off from Rochford at 10:45 to intercept an enemy raid approaching Hornchurch. The attack seems to have been diverted due to intense A.A. fire in the Kent area and the squadron had little contact with the enemy. P/O Gray intercepted two vics of three of Heinkel bombers with an escort of Me109 fighters...' Of the 9 that took off, only Gray made an interception. (cf: Battle of Britain Combat Archive, Volume 9, page 8).

2nd September: Attacks on Eastchurch and Detling. '... Again Fighter Command reacted by scrambling eleven squadrons, six of which remained over the airfields and did not engage the enemy...' (cf: Battle of Britain Combat Archive, Volume 9, page 47).

So you can see by the three examples above, taking off on a sortie did not necessarily mean that the enemy was engaged. There are numerous other examples of this. This was the case also for Luftwaffe fighter units when, on occasions, they took off for a mission but did not engage the enemy. The most famous example of this was elements of JG 52 who were tasked to escort the fighter-bombers of Erprobungsgruppe 210 on the early evening raid against Kenley on 15th August (Erprobungsgruppe 210 actually attacked Croydon in error). Part-way to the target, JG 52 turned back and returned to their airfield, the reason for which has never been ascertained.

So that is why sorties are not an accurate rider to events. That is all.
 
I will answer your point about sorties with some examples. And why I therefore consider sorties to not always be an accurate rider with regard to combat, claims, and losses.

On 30th August 1940 303 Squadron, on a training flight, encountered a German raid. Although all were up, only one engaged in combat, claiming a Bf 110 of II./ZG 76. This was actually a half-claim, as Wicks of 56 Squadron was also involved in the shooting down of the Bf 110

1st September: 54 Squadron Intelligence report: '...Nine a/c of 54 Squadron took off from Rochford at 10:45 to intercept an enemy raid approaching Hornchurch. The attack seems to have been diverted due to intense A.A. fire in the Kent area and the squadron had little contact with the enemy. P/O Gray intercepted two vics of three of Heinkel bombers with an escort of Me109 fighters...' Of the 9 that took off, only Gray made an interception. (cf: Battle of Britain Combat Archive, Volume 9, page 8).

2nd September: Attacks on Eastchurch and Detling. '... Again Fighter Command reacted by scrambling eleven squadrons, six of which remained over the airfields and did not engage the enemy...' (cf: Battle of Britain Combat Archive, Volume 9, page 47).

So you can see by the three examples above, taking off on a sortie did not necessarily mean that the enemy was engaged. There are numerous other examples of this. This was the case also for Luftwaffe fighter units when, on occasions, they took off for a mission but did not engage the enemy. The most famous example of this was elements of JG 52 who were tasked to escort the fighter-bombers of Erprobungsgruppe 210 on the early evening raid against Kenley on 15th August (Erprobungsgruppe 210 actually attacked Croydon in error). Part-way to the target, JG 52 turned back and returned to their airfield, the reason for which has never been ascertained.

So that is why sorties are not an accurate rider to events. That is all.
And thank you for the extremely detailed and leveled response!
 
And thank you for the extremely detailed and leveled response!
I think part of my problem is that I have so much information available, that I try to condense it to a manageable/reasonable size. Perhaps I should expand my posts so that I can provide more information. Like Hans-Ulrich Kettling telling me and Peter Cornwell that the Bf 110 'Dackelbauch' was 'a pig to fly!' - his words.
 
I think part of my problem is that I have so much information available, that I try to condense it to a manageable/reasonable size. Perhaps I should expand my posts so that I can provide more information. Like Hans-Ulrich Kettling telling me and Peter Cornwell that the Bf 110 'Dackelbauch' was 'a pig to fly!' - his words.
Good to know!!!!

I briefly worked with the USAF as a contractor where we would include "completed" mission sorties into our statistics and bounce that data against mission hours, that's why I felt that sortie count should be included, but as you pointed out there were many times during this period where that would be extremely difficult if not impossible to do.
 

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