Most Overrated aircraft of WWII.....?

The most over-rated aircraft of WW2


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Very good illustration example. Conversely look at the relatively Small increase in LW losses between Period Jan-June 1943, and Jul-Dec 1943, when the P-47C/D force dramatically increased and the P-38 was re-introduced to ETO
Just a thought. What portion of that sudden increase do you think was due to the intoduction of the Zemke fan tactic iin dec 43. This was basically allowing the fighters to fan out ahead of the bombers instead of having to stick close by the bomber formations where they were vulnerable to being bounced as well. The tactic was conceived by and lobied for by Hub Zemke of the 56th hence the name. I once read a quote by a p38 pilot from the Pacific theater comenting on the 8th air forces previous tactic of teathering the escorts to the bombers " if we had used tactics like that the Japanese would have mopped the floor with us" if its true that 80% of planes shot down in ww2 were shot down in a bounce or never saw there assailant, ive seen it frased both ways, and not in a dog fight ,then it would seem that once you have aircraft capable of the speed and altitude requirements ie at least as fast as the opponents and at least as high of ceiling then 80% of the outcome would be determined, outside of luck of course, and assuming equal pilot skill for this exercise, by tactics. There may by holes in my thought process here( wouldn't be the first time) but thats how it looks to me. Thoughts anyone?
 
I would like to add to my previous post on the Zemke fan and posible impact thereof, this postulation of mine, the 80% result being determined by tactics once basic speed and altitude requirements are met(for more detail please see previous post) would fit perfectly with the disparity in kill ratios between the p51 and p47 from spring44 on ie about 7 to 1 p47, 9 to1 p51( I have read everything from 7 to1 all the way up to 11 to 1 for the p51 so im just taking the median here). That is to say in the p47 we have a plane much less capable of high speed maneuver than the p51 but capable of the speed and altitude requirements achieving approx 80% of the results once effective tactics were implemented. Again may be holes in my thinking here but it seems to make sense. I will now head into my bunker and prepare for the incoming rounds.
 
I don't mean to m dimiss a 20% difference in kill ratios as un important. In a war of attrition thats huge. Just an, at least to me, interesting way of looking at these numbers which may or may not be the correct way.
 

Michael - Zemke planned and executed the Fan after May 8, 1944 and its first success was while performing a sweep in Frankfurt to Marburg area May 12. Note that Marburg to Brunswick was nearly to 56FG limit of endurance pre D-Day. So, simple answer is 'the Zemke Fan had zero to do with the 'increase'.

As to P-38 Comment of tethering escort to bombers, yes Monk hunter, CO of 8th FC, did promote that tactic but his replacement Kepner and Eaker's replacement Doolittle killed that in late January 1944. That period is approximately the beginning of the end of the LW ability to inflict unacceptable losses by forming up out of range of US fighter escort.
 
Interesting, I thought I had read the Zemke fan was a dec/ jan thing but I was just recalling from memory so I'm sure you right. Or perhaps I confused the dates with the un teathering of fighters from thee bombers by Dollittle in January. So asside from the fact i used the wrong term for the unteathering in January, the rest of my thoesis remains unchanged. My bad for not knowing the proper name to go with the date of the change in tactics but other than that the reasoning still seams sound. Although I'm certainly prepared for it to be shown to be not so sound if that is the case.
 

Didn't Doolittle change the role of the escort fighters from the defensive (ie protect the bombers) to offensive (ie to destroy the Luftwaffe), in effect making the bombers the bait?
 
Didn't Doolittle change the role of the escort fighters from the defensive (ie protect the bombers) to offensive (ie to destroy the Luftwaffe), in effect making the bombers the bait?
I have read that was the thinking but regardless of the motivation it seems the net result of that tactic would be the same.
 
Didn't Doolittle change the role of the escort fighters from the defensive (ie protect the bombers) to offensive (ie to destroy the Luftwaffe), in effect making the bombers the bait?

Not in so many words, but yes. Go Deep, incite reaction - kill 'em in the air and pursue all
the way to the deck.

What Doolittle reacted to was one of his commanders stating that the role of the fighter was to 'protect' whereas Doolittle believed the role of fighter aviation was to destroy - and he had just received intelligence reports that LW was building strength in alarming numbers (January, 1944) and posed a serious threat to OVERLORD.
 
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April 29, 1944
Mission 327: 679 bombers and 814 fighters are dispatched to bomb Berlin, concentrating on railway facilities; they claim 95-33-48 Luftwaffe aircraft; 63 bombers and 13 fighters are lost:

1. 210 of 228 B-17s bomb Berlin; 10 B-17s are lost and 150 damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 7 WIA and 100 MIA.

2. 218 B-17s are dispatched to Berlin; 158 hit the primary, 24 hit Magdeburg, 10 hit Brandenburg and 4 hit targets of opportunity; 28 B-17s are lost and 161 damaged; 4 airmen are KIA, 20 WIA and 260 MIA.

3. 212 of 233 B-24s bomb Berlin; 25 B-24s are lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 121 damaged; 13 airmen are KIA, 11 WIA and 246 MIA. Escort is provided by 117 P-38s, 463 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 234 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; 3 P-38s and 10 P-51s are lost; 1 P-47 is damaged beyond repair; 7 P-38s, 16 P-47s and 7 P-51s are damaged; 1 pilot is WIA and 12 MIA.


March 6, 1944
Mission 250: 504 B-17s and 226 B-24s are dispatched to hit industrial areas in the suburbs of Berlin; fierce fighter opposition claims 69 bombers (the highest number lost by the Eighth Air Force in a single day) and 11 fighters; the bombers claim 97-28-60 Luftwaffe fighters; details are:

1. 248 B-17s hit secondary targets in the Berlin area; 18 B-17s are lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 172 damaged; casualties are 2 KIA, 8 WIA and 184 MIA.

2. 226 B-17s hit targets of opportunity at Templin, Verden, Kalkeberge, Potsdam, Oranienburg and Wittenberg; 35 B-17s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 121 damaged; casualties are 15 WIA and 354 MIA.

3. 198 B-24s hit the primary target (Genshagen industrial area), secondary targets in the Berlin area and targets of opportunity at Potsdam; 16 B-24s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 54 damaged; casualties are 15 KIA, 8 WIA and 148 MIA.

Escort is provided by 86 P-38s, 615 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 100 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; results are:

1. P-38s claim 3-0-1 Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 P-38 is lost, the pilot is MIA.

2. P-47s claim 36-7-12 Luftwaffe aircraft; 5 P-47s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 4 damaged; casualties are 2 WIA and 5 MIA.

3. P-51s claim 43-1-20 Luftwaffe aircraft; 5 P-51s are lost and 2 damaged; casualties are 5 MIA. The fighters also claim 1-0-12 Luftwaffe aircraft on the ground. Mission 251: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 250 bundles of leaflets on Nantes, Cambrai, Lille, Chateauroux and Lorient, France at 2029-2130 hours without loss.

CARPETBAGGER missions are also flown.

A detachment of 22d Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron, 7th Photographic Group (Reconnaissance), ceases operating from Attlebridge and returns to base at Mount Farm, England with F-5s.

March 8, 1944
Mission 252: The primary target is the ball bearing plant at Erkner, a suburb of Berlin; enemy opposition is fierce and 37 bombers and 16 fighters are lost; 320 of 414 B-17s and 150 of 209 B-24s dispatched hit the primary; 36 B-17s hit Wildau and targets of opportunity; 33 B-24s hit Berlin and targets of opportunity; the bombers claim 63-17-19 Luftwaffe aircraft; 28 B-17s and 9 B-24s are lost, 1 B-17 and 2 B-24s are damaged beyond repair; casualties are 4 KIA, 14 WIA and 364 MIA. Escort is provided by 104 P-38s, 613 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s and 174 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s; claims/losses are:
1. P-38s claim 9-2-5 Luftwaffe aircraft; 3 P-38s are lost, 1 is damaged beyond repair and 2 damaged; casualties are 1 KIA and 4 MIA.

2. P-47s claim 49-6-18 Luftwaffe aircraft; 10 P-47s are lost, 13 damaged beyond repair and 4 damaged; casualties are 2 KIA, 2 WIA and 10 MIA.

3. P-51s claim 29-4-9 Luftwaffe aircraft; 5 P-51s are lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 1 damaged; casualties are 4 MIA. An additional 8-4-7 Luftwaffe aircraft are claimed on the ground.

786th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 466th Bombardment Group (Heavy), arrives at Attlebridge, England from the US with B-24s; first mission is 22 Mar.


I think March 6 and 8 were inside the period that it was claimed the Luftwaffe was destroyed, so that is why you didn't include them in your list of dates.
 
Everyone has their own angle and point of view. I think you made a mistake initially in presenting the common view of the P-51 as being the common view here on the forum. I didn't see any "f" words and you are entitled to complain to moderation about it. My interest is not in the detail of any particular aircraft,

I am not the advocate of any particular aircraft, I enjoy reading about what was done. What was done by the allies as far as the combined offensive was close to a miracle of engineering and logistics. When the P-51 first arrived in UK it was not fitted with the rear fuselage tank, it was not even initially assigned for bomber escort. The plane itself had various mods like the rear tank and increasingly large external fuel tanks, fillets on the tail plane and other "stuff".

At the same time the P-47 and P-38 also had everything done that could be done. While the US forces were building strength in UK, there were airfields built, pilots trained and bombers and fighters modified as quickly as reasonable and safely possible. This is a huge undertaking when the factories are thousands of miles from the place of use. It is easy to discuss a new larger fuel tank, it takes much time to get into production and 800 escort fighters need 1,600 of them.

On this, time is of the essence, it is and was vital. A B-52 or a thousand B-52s would not affect the war if they appeared in December 1945. Over time the various types of the US escort forces had their range and effectiveness increased, along with the effectiveness of its pilots, it bombers and its aerial recon and met recon. To me it is of no interest what the last versions of a P-47 or P-38 could do in the dog days of the war if they could get to Berlin or not is of no importance. The only things of importance were to wipe out the Luftwaffe as an effective force prior to D-Day and to then wipe out the Nazi systems means to produce fuel This was achieved, an all concerned should be proud that it was achieved, it was a team effort the prize doesn't go to one "winner".
 

Bill, shouldn't that be 1944?
 
It's all good brother. I went back and looked not because i want to complain but just to make sure i wasnt imagining it and the " word" is still there. Hey no big deal. Im not gonna complain to the moderator. Thats not how I roll as they say. I respect your view. Mine may be a little different( but really not that much ) and lets just leave it at that. Peace.
 

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