Most successful Allied fighter in the MTO (1 Viewer)

[DonL]

Edward H.Sims "claimed"/affirmed in his book, that he had done research on official lost lists of the Desert Airforce and confirmed all of Marseille's claims for this day.
Also he wrote that Marseille's claims are very accurate the whole time from lost lists. The last time I have looked he was an english cititzen.

A while ago it was Hartman who was the target in this forum, now it is Marseille, seems to me as a new religion here.

Only poor operational use (the Luftwaffe's experten culture) meant that the 109s (by far the superior fighter until the Spits arrived) didn't have a major strategic impact on the North African campaign. If they had wanted they could have crippled the DAF's bombing abilities. Fortunately Marseille and the other experten were too busy showing off shooting down obsolete fighters (and taking care of their 'throat ache') to actually waste their valuable time helping out the endlessly bombed DAK on the ground (or guard their own bombers). You know he only claimed 3 or 4 (that I can see) bombers out of his claimed 158, what a prima donna.

Do you have ever heard, that different pilots had different duties/tasks in a Schwarm, when they are flying together?
Something like high cover for the fellows, who attacked the Bomber?

 

[tyrodtom]

I don't think anyone took that post seriously.

 

[drgondog]

The more I think about this, the more I conclude that the P-38 must be the 'most successful'. If someone finds the final Spit air victory total it may nudge the P-38 in that category - but -

The P-38 was there at the beginning of the NA campaign, and served as heavy and medium bomber escort, long range sweeps, dive bombing, interceptor - and had high performance and long range. Like the Mustang it was more or less equal over German targets, whereas the Spit was superior in Defense and air superiority in modest range

 

[OldSkeptic]

I don't think anyone took that post seriously.

Actually that conclusion is just a paraphrase from Stephen Bungey's book 'Alamein' (He also did "Most Dangerous Enemy").
It is a fair conclusion of why the Luftwaffe had so little effect on the DAF's bomber operations,which was so critical to the (final) success of the British.
Fundamentally it was organisational cultural problem.

That experten culture meant that they set the tone of operations, the rest of the pilots were there to support them.
The organisation reinforced that behaviour, because it made good headlines, rewarding them, instead of kicking some people to actually go out and do something about the PBI getting bombed to bits.

Plus it was easier and safer. Marseille was a superb pilot and shot. In a vastly superior plane. He could (and did) pick his targets with very little risk to himself.
Going after bombers, even with the limited guns of the British bombers of the time, ran the risk of the laws of chance catching up with you and you taking some bullets in your engine ... and not getting back. Plus the risk of flak. After all German bombers shot down lot of Spits and Hurricanes in the BoB.

So he (and the others like him) had very little incentive to go chasing over the battlefront, to protect their people on the ground and every incentive (heavily reinforced by the organisation) to sit much further back, taking out attacking fighter/bombers that were acting offensively and picking the optimum (for them) targets.

Essentially the organisation fostered and encouraged poor tactical decisions.

 

[Glider]

The P-38 was there at the beginning of the NA campaign, and served as heavy and medium bomber escort, long range sweeps, dive bombing, interceptor - and had high performance and long range. Like the Mustang it was more or less equal over German targets, whereas the Spit was superior in Defense and air superiority in modest range

I think it's true to say that the NA campaign was around before the P38

 

[altsym]

That experten culture meant that they set the tone of operations, the rest of the pilots were there to support them.
The organisation reinforced that behaviour, because it made good headlines, rewarding them, instead of kicking some people to actually go out and do something about the PBI getting bombed to bits

Really. I think your misguided here friend. With the amount of Allied fighters in Nord Afrika, the 109's had there hands full. And yes it did make for good headlines.

Plus it was easier and safer. Marseille was a superb pilot and shot. In a vastly superior plane. He could (and did) pick his targets with very little risk to himself.

Safer then what? Having six .50's on your butt? Just as dangerous I would think.

So he (and the others like him) had very little incentive to go chasing over the battlefront, to protect their people on the ground and every incentive (heavily reinforced by the organisation) to sit much further back, taking out attacking fighter/bombers that were acting offensively and picking the optimum (for them) targets.

The 109's as said had there hands full. BF 110's FW 190's had what roll in N.Afrika?

 

[DonL]

Actually that conclusion is just a paraphrase from Stephen Bungey's book 'Alamein' (He also did "Most Dangerous Enemy").
It is a fair conclusion of why the Luftwaffe had so little effect on the DAF's bomber operations,which was so critical to the (final) success of the British.
Fundamentally it was organisational cultural problem.

That experten culture meant that they set the tone of operations, the rest of the pilots were there to support them.
The organisation reinforced that behaviour, because it made good headlines, rewarding them, instead of kicking some people to actually go out and do something about the PBI getting bombed to bits.

Plus it was easier and safer. Marseille was a superb pilot and shot. In a vastly superior plane. He could (and did) pick his targets with very little risk to himself.
Going after bombers, even with the limited guns of the British bombers of the time, ran the risk of the laws of chance catching up with you and you taking some bullets in your engine ... and not getting back. Plus the risk of flak. After all German bombers shot down lot of Spits and Hurricanes in the BoB.

So he (and the others like him) had very little incentive to go chasing over the battlefront, to protect their people on the ground and every incentive (heavily reinforced by the organisation) to sit much further back, taking out attacking fighter/bombers that were acting offensively and picking the optimum (for them) targets.

Essentially the organisation fostered and encouraged poor tactical decisions.

I haven't read so much bogus in one post and it is the first time I hear that the "organisational cultural" of the Luftwaffe had any impact on their tasks!

1. At Alamein end of September 1942 the LW (JG 27) had 112 a/c's only 65 were operational against 800 of the Allied side. How much impact can they do on a rational point?
2. After all from primary german sources the impact of the german bombers at BoB is estimated to 1%-4% of all fighter losses of the RAF, what is near nil to nothing. You should look of the impact of the much heavier armed B17 and B24 Bombers of USAF before the Mustang arrived. Nothing that had any impact on the LW and the defending of the Reich.

Mr. Stephen Bungey's should do better researches and perhaps thinking about his biases.

 

[Juha]

I read in Flypast recently that Marseille's claims were exaggerated, according to the article he could not have shot down 8 P40's in a single sortie as is popularly believed because eye witness accounts and RAF loss records for that day prove otherwise. Before anyone writes an angry reply defending Marseille I'm not trying to use this article to undermine his reputation because I believe his reputation as a fighter pilot was deserved.

Has the writer of the article taken into account SAAF P-40 losses? Forgetting that RAF wasn't the only Alleid operator around has been common error amongst those who doubt Marseille's records. Surely also Marseille overclaimed but so did almost all other claimers too, in all air forces. Overclaiming was the norm, the level of overclaiming varied and IIRC Marseille's claim record was more accurate than the average

Juha

 

[Juha]

I haven't read so much bogus in one post and it is the first time I hear that the "organisational cultural" of the Luftwaffe had any impact on their tasks!

1. At Alamein end of September 1942 the LW (JG 27) had 112 a/c's only 65 were operational against 800 of the Allied side. How much impact can they do on a rational point?
2. After all from primary german sources the impact of the german bombers at BoB is estimated to 1%-4% of all fighter losses of the RAF, what is near nil to nothing. You should look of the impact of the much heavier armed B17 and B24 Bombers of USAF before the Mustang arrived. Nothing that had any impact on the LW and the defending of the Reich.

Mr. Stephen Bungey's should do better researches and perhaps thinking about his biases.

1. There were Italians as well
2. I really doubt that, I can from the top of my head name 2 combat were LW bomber air gunners shot down 3 + 2 FC fighters, that made 5 which means over .5% of FC Cat. 3 air combat losses during the BoB.

Juha

 

[DonL]

1. There were Italians as well
2. I really doubt that, I can from the top of my head name 2 combat were LW bomber air gunners shot down 3 + 2 FC fighters, that made 5 which means over .5% of FC Cat. 3 air combat losses during the BoB.

Juha

And how many Italians were there? Perhaps an other 60-70 a/c's?
The claim of OldSkeptic and Mr. Bungey' is simply bogus, at Alamein the axis supply was near zero, that you can read in any good book and numeric advantage of the Allieds at ground and in the air decisive. To claim it was the "organisational cultural" of the LW is ridiculous.

If my calculation is right, something about 1000 RAF aircrafts were lost through air to air combat and the Bombers were credited between 10-40 a/c's from the after combat report of the BoB. Also the after combat report mentioned that the german bombers had a much to less armament for daylight bomber raids.
All german bombers get heavier armament after BoB.
If the defending of the Bombers would have been that good why the heavier armament and an explicit analyse?

 

[RCAFson]

I read in Flypast recently that Marseille's claims were exaggerated, according to the article he could not have shot down 8 P40's in a single sortie as is popularly believed because eye witness accounts and RAF loss records for that day prove otherwise. Before anyone writes an angry reply defending Marseille I'm not trying to use this article to undermine his reputation because I believe his reputation as a fighter pilot was deserved.

On Sept 09 1941 Marseille claimed 2 Hurricanes while 3 other 109 pilots claimed 1 each. The Commonwealth AFs lost 3 Hurricanes that day.

On Sept 24 1941 Marseille claimed a Martin 167 and 4 Hurricanes, and two other 109 pilots claimed one HH each and another claimed a P-40. The Commonwealth AFs lost 3 Hurricanes that day and a Tomahawk. So Marseile claimed 5 but could only have scored 3 maximum, and probably got 1 or 2. (data from Shores).

 

[altsym]

On Sept 24 1941 Marseille claimed a Martin 167 and 4 Hurricanes, and two other 109 pilots claimed one HH each and another claimed a P-40. The RAF lost 3 Hurricanes that day and a Tomahawk. So Marseile claimed 5 but could only have scored 3 maximum, and probably got 1 or 2. (data from Shores).

Did you check losses from 3 Squadron, RAAF, the Nine Hurricanes from 1 Squadron, SAAF?
BTW, Oberleutnant Homuth shot down the Tomahawk.

 

[Glider]

The P40 was from 3 sqdn RAAF and the 3 Hurricanes were from 1 sqdn SAAF. The RAF didn't lose anything that day

 

[Juha]

And how many Italians were there? Perhaps an other 60-70 a/c's?

400, but if you are counting only fighters you guess is fairly accurate, but IMHO at the beginning of the 2nd el Alamein there were some 750 Axis planes vs 750 Allied planes but Allied had some 50 more serviceable planes and some 2.5 times more fighters and bigger reserves.

If my calculation is right, something about 1000 RAF aircrafts were lost through air to air combat and the Bombers were credited between 10-40 a/c's from the after combat report of the BoB. Also the after combat report mentioned that the german bombers had a much to less armament for daylight bomber raids.
All german bombers get heavier armament after BoB.
If the defending of the Bombers would have been that good why the heavier armament and an explicit analyse?

You can find the 2 combats I mentioned here: Air gunners - Juhan Sotahistoriasivut
I have great difficulties to believe that the thousands other encounters produced only 5 more FC fighter losses, in fact I know several other FC losses to bomber air gunners, so the 1% is definitely too low figure.

 

[RCAFson]

Did you check losses from 3 Squadron, RAAF, the Nine Hurricanes from 1 Squadron, SAAF?
BTW, Oberleutnant Homuth shot down the Tomahawk.

I edited my post to state Commonwealth rather than RAF. I listed all Commonwealth losses.

 

[altsym]

That experten culture meant that they set the tone of operations,..

I did find this quote from Marseille:

Marseille said that "there is nothing better than the freie Jagd. 'Fighter pilots should be allowed to operate in their assigned
areas as they see fit. When they spot an enemy, then they attack and shoot him down. Everything else is nonsense.'

IF that's the 'experten culture', then those EXPERTEN are 100% correct.

 

[DonL]

On Sept 09 1941 Marseille claimed 2 Hurricanes while 3 other 109 pilots claimed 1 each. The Commonwealth AFs lost 3 Hurricanes that day.

On Sept 24 1941 Marseille claimed a Martin 167 and 4 Hurricanes, and two other 109 pilots claimed one HH each and another claimed a P-40. The Commonwealth AFs lost 3 Hurricanes that day and a Tomahawk. So Marseile claimed 5 but could only have scored 3 maximum, and probably got 1 or 2. (data from Shores).

Are this only claims from Marseille or were this claims confirmed officialy from the LW and standing in his record?

 

[OldSkeptic]

I did find this quote from Marseille:

Marseille said that "there is nothing better than the freie Jagd. 'Fighter pilots should be allowed to operate in their assigned
areas as they see fit. When they spot an enemy, then they attack and shoot him down. Everything else is nonsense.'

IF that's the 'experten culture', then those EXPERTEN are 100% correct.

Nope. They have to be a part of an overall strategic direction and tactical plan. Otherwise they will swan around doing nothing useful (as they did).

Take a properly managed operation, the BoB. There were clear strategic directions and the tactical plans conformed to that.
There were several key strategic issues, but concentrating on the offensive side, it was to kill bombers. Not fighters.
Enemy fighters got in the way and as such had to be taken out (the job, wherever possible, of the Spitfires), or distracted, whatever. But the reason for that was to enable the RAF to destroy the bombers.
Therefore the tactical planning and management was to deal with them as cheaply as possible, while maintaining focus on the bombers.
Park, for example, set a directive out to stop the practice of RAF pilots lining up to shoot down a crippled bomber. His order was clear, find another one and hammer it.

They never lost that focus. Park ignored fighter sweeps, ordered pilots not to attack pure fighter groups and to find and hammer bombers. And in that he was 100% correct.

Now these 'experten' in North Africa needed to do 2 things to play their part of their side's fighting capability.
(1) Take out the DAF bombers attacking the front line and behind the line.
(2) Protect their own offensive bombers (inc Stukas).

If in doing that they shot down DAF fighters, then all and good, but killing fighters was part of a path to achieving a goal, not a thing in itself. A methodology.
And that is where they went wrong, the methodology became the aim. The path became the goal.

As Galland said (though he didn't always personally follow it) "war in the exists to facilitate war from the air" (or stop the other side's "war from the air" of course). In itself "war in the air" is meaningless.

 

[RCAFson]

Are this only claims from Marseille or were this claims confirmed officialy from the LW and standing in his record?

The text states that they are "claims" but on Sept 24 it states that his "claims" were forwarded to higher command and intercepted by ULTRA.

 

[DonL]

Nope. They have to be a part of an overall strategic direction and tactical plan. Otherwise they will swan around doing nothing useful (as they did).

Take a properly managed operation, the BoB. There were clear strategic directions and the tactical plans conformed to that.
There were several key strategic issues, but concentrating on the offensive side, it was to kill bombers. Not fighters.
Enemy fighters got in the way and as such had to be taken out (the job, wherever possible, of the Spitfires), or distracted, whatever. But the reason for that was to enable the RAF to destroy the bombers.
Therefore the tactical planning and management was to deal with them as cheaply as possible, while maintaining focus on the bombers.
Park, for example, set a directive out to stop the practice of RAF pilots lining up to shoot down a crippled bomber. His order was clear, find another one and hammer it.

They never lost that focus. Park ignored fighter sweeps, ordered pilots not to attack pure fighter groups and to find and hammer bombers. And in that he was 100% correct.

Now these 'experten' in North Africa needed to do 2 things to play their part of their side's fighting capability.
(1) Take out the DAF bombers attacking the front line and behind the line.
(2) Protect their own offensive bombers (inc Stukas).

If in doing that they shot down DAF fighters, then all and good, but killing fighters was part of a path to achieving a goal, not a thing in itself. A methodology.
And that is where they went wrong, the methodology became the aim. The path became the goal.

As Galland said (though he didn't always personally follow it) "war in the exists to facilitate war from the air" (or stop the other side's "war from the air" of course). In itself "war in the air" is meaningless.

About what you are talking?

The Axis were attacking till Alamein! Do you understand attacking not defending!

As you look at USAF Bomber attacks to germany from 1943-45 all US fighters were flying freie Jagd and the german fighters (defending) were only concentrating on the Bombers (to my opinion too much on the Bombers), because nobody was attacking the escort fighters other then the RAF at BoB (Spitfires have attacked the escort fighters)

Anyway coming back to to NA and Alamein, as the Axis were sqeezed to the defending role, their supply was zero, they had by no way enough fighters and material to organize a strategic defence plan, their strenghts were exhausted from the attacking and the deficient supply.

You can't change to a sudden defencive role, if have not the supply and material to this.

Yours and Mr. Mr. Bungey's analyse is simply wrong, from the historical facts and numbers around Alamein.