Most successful Allied fighter in the MTO (1 Viewer)

[mhuxt]

The text states that they are "claims" but on Sept 24 it states that his "claims" were forwarded to higher command and intercepted by ULTRA.

They certainly appear as quoted in this thread in the records of the "Chef für Ausz. und Dizsiplin Luftwaffen-Personalamt L.P. (A) V" microfilms which Tony Woods transcribed.

for example the extract for 9 September 1941:

9. September 1941
Fliegerführer Afrika

09.09.41 Ltn. Hans-Joachim Marseille: 15 3./JG 27 Hurricane I S.E. Bardia 17.12 Film C. 2036/II Nr.69258/41
09.09.41 Ltn. Friedrich Hoffmann: 6 3./JG 27 Hurricane I 50 km. E.S.E. Sidi Barrani 17.12 Film C. 2036/II Nr.88771/42
09.09.41 Oblt. Ludwig Franzisket: 23 Stab I./JG 27 Hurricane 30 km. E. Sidi Barrani 17.15 Film C. 2036/II Nr.88771/41
09.09.41 Fw.Dr. Peter Werfft: 5 1./JG 27 Hurricane Būcht von Sollūm 17.17 Film C. 2036/II Nr.88771/42
09.09.41 Ltn. Hans-Joachim Marseille: 16 3./JG 27 Hurricane I S.E. Bardia 17.18 Film C. 2036/II Nr.69258/41


(Please don't shoot me, I'm just the messenger)

 

[pattle]

I wish I still had this copy of Flypast but it looks like I threw it out. Just had a quick look on the net and it was from what I can gather in fact SAAF Tomahawks that were involved in this controversial dogfight with Marseille, it seems they were attacking Stukas before being bounced by Marseille and friends. There is a very good interview on you tube regarding this encounter with Cecil Golding who was one of the SAAF Tomahawk pilots flying that day.
Cecil points out that even with the best of intentions claims made by fighter pilots were unreliable due to the fog of war.
I think the Flypast article may have been based on a recently researched and published book about Marseille, perhaps called the star of the desert?

 

[altsym]

Star of Africa, also I suggest reading the official 1 Squadron, SAAF report of what took place on 24.11.41.

 

[mhuxt]

Marseille himself appears in this Wochenschau clip - even has a close up of the victory bars on his aircraft's tail and its serial number:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3qsvoRj1GFQ

According to this site, Wochenschau 615 was from 18 June, 1942, so I suppose the footage was shot not long before then.

Neuschwabenland-Archiv/Filme/Deutsche-Wochenschauen/

 

[mhuxt]

Alternatively, the 1 Sqn SAAF Operations Record Books are free to download from the U.K. National Archives site:

Squadron Number: 1 SAAF (South African Air force) Summary of Events: Y | The National Archives
Squadron Number: 1 SAAF (South African Air force). Summary of Events: Y.
Air Ministry and successors: Operations Record Books, Squadrons. NO. 1 SQUADRON S.A.A.F. Operations Record Books. Squadron Number: 1 SAAF (South African Air force). Summary of Events: Y.

Collection: Records created or inherited by the Air Ministry, the Royal Air Force, and related bodiesDate range: 01 September 1941 - 31 December 1942 Reference:AIR 27/9/6Subjects:Air Force, Armed Forces (General)


Some of the SAAF squadron records are rather higgledy-piggledy, however there is a directory document, which I have on a separate HD, which provides a more accurate and full listing. If the above link doesn't prove satisfactory, let me know and I'll try to dig it out.


Edit - You can also browse from here: http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/browse/C2109?v=r

 

[RCAFson]

Actually, I meant to post this here:

Compared with the claims recorded in 11,400 traceable air to air combat reports (form 1151), covering all RAF fighter pilots' claims, 55% were by Hurricane pilots, 33% by Spitfire pilots and 12% by pilots of other fighters.

Mason, Hawker Hurricane, p211.

The Hurricane was probably the most successful Allied fighter in the MTO.

 

[riacrato]

Funny how the conclusion now is that the LW should've concentrated more on bombers in NA, the same directive that led to her quick demise over France and Germany a few years later. Of course whenever that scenario is discussed everyone is quick to point out how stupid Goering was by concentrating on attacking the bombers. But it doesn't matter, the goal seems to be more in line with "if Marseille wasn't a liar he was at least an arrogant prick with no regards for the life of his comrades on the ground".

 

[Glider]

(Please don't shoot me, I'm just the messenger)

Just remember they used to execute messengers that brought bad news

 

[OldSkeptic]

Funny how the conclusion now is that the LW should've concentrated more on bombers in NA, the same directive that led to her quick demise over France and Germany a few years later. Of course whenever that scenario is discussed everyone is quick to point out how stupid Goering was by concentrating on attacking the bombers. But it doesn't matter, the goal seems to be more in line with "if Marseille wasn't a liar he was at least an arrogant prick with no regards for the life of his comrades on the ground".

Oh concentrating on bombers is the correct strategy. Bombers cost more resources, have larger crews and damage people on the ground. If you sacrifice 1 fighter for 1 bomber then you will win if you productive capacities are similar. Since the US's was so much larger they needed somewhere between 3-5:1, which they achieved easily in '43.

In mid-late 43 the Luftwaffe won the battles with both the USAAF and the RAF, scoring strategic wins. The 8th pulled back to within escorted range and only re-attacked when they had long range escorts. BC pulled back too.

But, the Luftwaffe's successful tactical doctrine was very vulnerable to ecort fighters. They depended on heavy twins (110s and 88s) with rockets and heavy cannons to break up formations, then the single engined fighters could take out the stragglers and the now less well protected groups.

But those twins were far too slow to exists in daylight in contested airspace. Once the ranges of the US fighters grew, they were taken out of the equation. This is where all those poor decisions made prior about single engined fighters came to haunt them. Firstly they didn't have enough. The 190s altitude performance was poor, made poorer if heavier cannons and/or rockets were fitted.
The 109 had the high altitude performance, but not if you loaded it up with 30mm cannons and the like.

And without those they didn't have the firepower to quickly take the US bombers down (estimated it took 20 x 20mm shells on average, vs 3-5 30mm ones).

Now if they had enough fighters, they could have done both, with lighter ones for combat against the escorts, while the up-gunned one slipped through to hit the bombers. But they didn't have enough to do both successfully.
So when the '47s and 38s upped their range they hammered the twins, the Mustangs were the coup de gras and finished the job on the singles.

The lack of numbers killed any chance of applying many obvious tactics, like squadron sized intercepts of the rendezvousing fighters, well before they linked up, to force them to drop their external tanks and hence not being able to complete their escorting.

So the bad decisions made in 41 and 42 on fighter types and production numbers (and pilot training) meant they were unable to respond. Their lack of a fast twin meant that they had nothing that could survive in daylight in contested airspace and the loss of that meant crippling the single engined fighters performance to carry the guns necessary.

 

[OldSkeptic]

About what you are talking?

The Axis were attacking till Alamein! Do you understand attacking not defending!

They attacked and defended prior to then. And while the German ground forces were attacking the DAF was hammering them and their supply lines and their supply bases, etc, etc.

Just prior to and at what is now called 1st Alamein, the DAF was largely considered to being the single biggest reason why Rommel didn't totally beat them then.
With constant bombing and strafing attacks enabling the 8th Army to get to and hold the defensible Alamein ground.

No one but no one doubts the tremendous contribution (on both defence and attack) that the DAF achieved.
The DAF also, despite their totally inferior fighters, kept German bombers and Stukas off the backs of the 8th Army (mostly). They did their job properly. The DAF bombers were also hitting well behind the lines, at ports and so on constantly.

Rommel had endless fights with the Luftwaffe to actually get them some cover to stop his supply lines being hit, and anywhere they stopped and dug in.
They did not act as well as they did in France by any means, with close coordination to overall strategic and tactical plans.

The average German (and Italian) soldier mostly never saw a friendly aircraft above them, even when the numbers on both sides were close (or on the Axis's side).

They had more than enough 109s (and the skilled pilots) to slaughter the DAF's bombers. The performance advantage over the P-40s and Hurricanes was huge and they had effectively zero ability to escort the bombers successfully. If you look at what the Luftwaffe did in 1939 and 40 against unescorted RAF bombers, they murdered them. 50% bomber losses were on a good day .. a good day for the RAF that was.

But no they ran around shooting down much more replaceable P-40s and Hurricanes which came to their side of the lines, or in other words whether or not the ground forces were on the attack or the defence, the Luftwaffe fighters played a defensive role purely against the DAF's fighters.

 

[Tante Ju]

Rommel had endless fights with the Luftwaffe to actually get them some cover to stop his supply lines being hit, and anywhere they stopped and dug in.
They did not act as well as they did in France by any means, with close coordination to overall strategic and tactical plans.

Obviously did better in France - they had the whole Luftwaffe in support. The DAF did not have to fight the whole Luftwaffe in Afrika..

In Afrika, Germans had a handful of fighter and bomber Gruppen only for support. Its unfair to criticize them IMHO for not being able to be everywhere all at once. All of the memoirs on the German side explains how they tried to "comb" the desert in even pair of fighter just to give some air coverage with limited numbers. that placed them in a tactical position where prolonged air combat was impossible tactically (suicidal) so what remained option was to use hit and run tactics employing superior performance of the fighter machines.

The average German (and Italian) soldier mostly never saw a friendly aircraft above them, even when the numbers on both sides were close (or on the Axis's side).

But were the numbers ever close..? Rommel had a tiny, well equipped German corps and about double of that of poorly equipped Italians. Ditto for the air forces.The English had far greater forces in the desert, and its a smaller wonder how Rommel actually managed to get to El Alamein at all. "point defence" (circling above the troops) is rather ineffective air defense tactic anyway.

 

[Juha]

But were the numbers ever close..?

Tended to be, especially the 1st line strenght but British tended to have somewhat better serviceability rate and bigger reserves.

Juha

 

[stona]

The Marseilles thing has been gone over time and time again for the last twenty years to my certain knowledge and I'm not going over it again.

All experts and aces on all sides over claimed. It is in the nature of aerial combat that this was inevitable. Most did so in perfectly good faith, a minority did not, demonstrably so. The so called "experten schwarm" of 4./JG 27 (Vogel, Sawallisch, Bendert and Stigler) were busted by their own side, strafing empty sand dunes before returning to make claims. Anyone who believes that they are a unique example is being naïve.

Try tying Kurt Welter's numerous Mosquito claims to actual losses. Some were made when no RAF aircraft, let alone Mosquitos, were within 150 miles of him. He is not unique either.

This is not about bashing long dead aces it's about being realistic about WW2 claims from all sides in general.

It is arguable that the problem of fraudulent claiming was exacerbated in the Luftwaffe by the way the system worked. Much was made of individual experten by the Nazi propaganda machinery. Certain awards were more or less directly linked to certain scores. The system encouraged fraud in some unscrupulous individuals. I still believe that despite this, these men were a small minority and that most claimed in good faith.

In western allied air forces, particularly the RAF, much more emphasis was placed on a team effort rather than individual brilliance. Nonetheless over claiming remained a problem for intelligence officers throughout the war.

Cheers

Steve

 

[DonL]

Hello Stona,

I don't disagree in general with you, but we should discuss this sentences:

Much was made of individual experten by the Nazi propaganda machinery.

In western allied air forces, particularly the RAF, much more emphasis was placed on a team effort rather than individual brilliance.

At the LW was from beginning the Rotte (two fighters) as team and cover. From what I have read very often skilled pilots took "noobies" as Rotten fellow for learning and support.
Especially at Tollivers book over Hartmann, Hartmann describes how important his Rotten fellows were at the beginning for his later success and also as he was the skilled pilot, as he has supported and defended his Rotten fellows. Hartmann never losses a Rotten fellow as ace.

Also at Tolliver was described as Hartmanns Schwarm flew over Ploiești and Hartmanns Rotte flew always high cover to protect the other fellows, which attacked the bombers.

I think many depends on the character of the Schwarm and JG leader, how they are leading/training and educating their pilots.

I wouldn't in general say the LW didn't do teamwork.

 

[altsym]

@ OldSkeptic, again, you seem to fail to understand the role of the 109 at this time period, but suffice to say, JG 27 did plenty of escort missions as well.

@ Stona, as DonL said, there was plenty of teamwork. Strafing of sand/sand dunes was common, usually practicing deflection shooting by trying to hit there own planes shadow. The dunes provided a more 'vertical' target then the flat sand.

 

[stona]

I wouldn't in general say the LW didn't do teamwork.

Nor would (or did) I. I think that there was more emphasis on this in other air forces and less tendency to exalt the individual. Air fighting in WW2 was always a team effort.

Could you imagine the Luftwaffe coming up with something like the "Thach weave" ? It's not impossible but this sort of cooperative tactic was far more ingrained in the ethos of USN/USAAF fighter tactics and training than in that of the Luftwaffe.

In the case of some "experten" cooperation seems to have amounted to someone watching their back whilst they did the business, not at all the same thing.

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

Strafing of sand/sand dunes was common, usually practicing deflection shooting by trying to hit there own planes shadow.

But not then returning to claim fraudulent aerial victories. This is about blatant fraudulent claiming in the summer of 1942, outright lying, there is no nicer way to express it. You seem to be wilfully missing the point.

The case I cited is well documented. The officer who reported them was the highly respected Hans-Arnold "Fifi" Stahlschmidt who at the time of his death (7 Sept 42) was the Luftwaffe pilot with the most combat mission in North Africa. Other officers (Ernst Boerngen and Rudolph Sinner, men not to be taken lightly, to name two) had expressed doubts about their claims. The Gruppenkommandeur, Gustav Roedel, broke up the group but JG 27 was very short of pilots and they avoided a court martial. Then came the British offensive of October '42 leading to a headlong retreat across Libya and the whole affair was glossed over.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Tante Ju]

It is arguable that the problem of fraudulent claiming was exacerbated in the Luftwaffe by the way the system worked. Much was made of individual experten by the Nazi propaganda machinery. Certain awards were more or less directly linked to certain scores. The system encouraged fraud in some unscrupulous individuals. I still believe that despite this, these men were a small minority and that most claimed in good faith.

In western allied air forces, particularly the RAF, much more emphasis was placed on a team effort rather than individual brilliance. Nonetheless over claiming remained a problem for intelligence officers throughout the war.

Cheers

Steve

Sorry but this is very very wrong. Its just how Western airforces, particularly the RAF, tries to explain their "Experten envy". Why did our aces did not do so good, they ask. First excuse was: they scored so high because they were on the Russian front, fighting inferior Russian! (no explanation for Pokrishkin, Kozhedub etc. scores though...). Second excuse was: They only scored so high because they flew until they died. But so did everyone else, except the Americans, who could afford the luxury. Never heard of the same excuse for Johnnie Johnson. Third and latest excuse: It was only because of the supposedly existing "star mentaility" of experten... never explained then why the RAF, that supposedly put so much emphasis of team tactics, copied German fighter teamwork tactics of the Rotte and Schwarm... because until so far, the RAF was rigidly flying after the leader in close, rigid formation.

Oddly enough, the explanation that highly motivated, well trained individuals employing proper and well developed tactics forged in battle experience of Spain, and equipped with generally very high standard equipment never comes to mind in those explanations. Never. They also NEVER question the claims made by Western, particularly the RAF Aces...

 

[stona]

They also NEVER question the claims made by Western, particularly the RAF Aces...

You haven't bothered to read all my posts.

It is not an attempt to explain anything. The cultures of different military organisations are different, what's wrong with that? The Luftwaffe award system is just one obvious example of this. There are many reasons why some Luftwaffe pilots achieved such high totals and I have not entered into any discussion on that at all.

I said in my original post and repeated at least once that all pilots in all air forces over claimed. It is almost inevitable given the nature of air fighting. Some cheated. There is nothing new or controversial in that.

What's your opinion of the well documented case of JG 27's "experten schwarm" ?

As for my other cited example, where are Welter's Mosquitos?

I could cite many more. I could show you examples of "cluster claiming" around landmark numbers. One night fighter expert claimed six on one night to get to one such number. I'm not naming him or giving the number because that would seem to be ace bashing and that is not the point I'm trying to make.

On the allied side for every 100 tanks claimed destroyed by the RAF's 2nd TAF only 1 could be confirmed on the ground. Now that's over claiming on a spectacular scale.

Steve

 

[altsym]

But not then returning to claim fraudulent aerial victories. This is about blatant fraudulent claiming in the summer of 1942, outright lying, there is no nicer way to express it. You seem to be wilfully missing the point.

I never said there wasn't over claiming, be it intentional or unintentional. You mentioned strafing sands dunes, and I told you one reason why they did that.