I hope to go aboard the HMS Victory someday. Thankfully it survived WW2.
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Napoleonic Wars navies....
- Thread starter Lucky13
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renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Re materials for Constitution, the futtocks were live oak coming from an island off the coast of Georgia. I can't remember how close they were spaced but they were very close together and were sheathed in white oak which was quite thick also so it is no wonder she was called "Old Ironsides"
Hi Plan D,
>The numbers show us that the French design wasn't as supreme as some histories like to point out. The abilities of a navy as a whole do not rest in ship design, especially not in the 18th Century, you are right.
I'd guess the French would not have ruled the seas with British ships either, so who did does not reflect ship quality with sufficient accuracy :-/
>The French also studied hydrodynamics and hydrostatics; the hydrodynamic studies ignored skin friction as I said before making the studies useless.
Hm, I know that windmills were studied by scientists for centuries without any understanding of aerodynamics, but they got results from using simplified calculations with correction factors for effects they didn't understand. I'm not sure you'd have to fail for ignoring a single factor ...
>I must correct an earlier statement, the initial maths designed ships were actually inadequate because of the stability calculations made.
That sounds more serious
Is it possible to date the "initial" phase?
>I did mention a France spying mission also; Blaise Ollivier the master shipwright of Brest.
I couldn't comment on that as I didn't knew the date
>Amsterdam (It was not Holland, don't make that mistake)
It wasn't? Not that I was aware of that before I looked it up, but I have now gained the impression that Amsterdam in 1727 was part of the province of Holland in the Republiek der Zeven Verenigde Provinciën, a country that commonly appears to have been called "Holland" for its most influential province even in the 18th century. But that's "shaky" knowledge, I might have misinterpreted what I read.
>1727 and Spain 1748 were just examples.
I see. Perhaps I over-estimated the effect of development over time because I'm mostly reading about 20th century history, where a couple of years could bring great changes in the technological balance.
>You must be aware that once the Royal Navy acquired its prizes it completely changed them to British standards. They were re-fitted and strengthed so essentially were no longer French ships.
Ah, that would of course change the significance of the prizes! Still, if the hull shape was preserved, this still might be interpreted as an appreciation of French hydrodynamics
(Wouldn't strenghtening them to British standards increase the weight considerably? Hm, maybe it just reduced the useful load, which probaly was not that much of a concern of a ship of the line.)
>I wouldn't be surprised if it was simple misinterpretation of British admirals prefering to fight under a French prize simply because of the 'victory' status.
Hehe, very good point
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>The numbers show us that the French design wasn't as supreme as some histories like to point out. The abilities of a navy as a whole do not rest in ship design, especially not in the 18th Century, you are right.
I'd guess the French would not have ruled the seas with British ships either, so who did does not reflect ship quality with sufficient accuracy :-/
>The French also studied hydrodynamics and hydrostatics; the hydrodynamic studies ignored skin friction as I said before making the studies useless.
Hm, I know that windmills were studied by scientists for centuries without any understanding of aerodynamics, but they got results from using simplified calculations with correction factors for effects they didn't understand. I'm not sure you'd have to fail for ignoring a single factor ...
>I must correct an earlier statement, the initial maths designed ships were actually inadequate because of the stability calculations made.
That sounds more serious
Is it possible to date the "initial" phase?>I did mention a France spying mission also; Blaise Ollivier the master shipwright of Brest.
I couldn't comment on that as I didn't knew the date
>Amsterdam (It was not Holland, don't make that mistake)
It wasn't? Not that I was aware of that before I looked it up, but I have now gained the impression that Amsterdam in 1727 was part of the province of Holland in the Republiek der Zeven Verenigde Provinciën, a country that commonly appears to have been called "Holland" for its most influential province even in the 18th century. But that's "shaky" knowledge, I might have misinterpreted what I read.
>1727 and Spain 1748 were just examples.
I see. Perhaps I over-estimated the effect of development over time because I'm mostly reading about 20th century history, where a couple of years could bring great changes in the technological balance.
>You must be aware that once the Royal Navy acquired its prizes it completely changed them to British standards. They were re-fitted and strengthed so essentially were no longer French ships.
Ah, that would of course change the significance of the prizes! Still, if the hull shape was preserved, this still might be interpreted as an appreciation of French hydrodynamics
(Wouldn't strenghtening them to British standards increase the weight considerably? Hm, maybe it just reduced the useful load, which probaly was not that much of a concern of a ship of the line.)
>I wouldn't be surprised if it was simple misinterpretation of British admirals prefering to fight under a French prize simply because of the 'victory' status.
Hehe, very good point
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
Hi Plan D,
>added to the fact that the Ordnance Board no longer issued dismantling shot which would have been vital in a long-range gunnery match. The US Navy still used dismantling shot to great effect.
Dismantling shot is chain shot, I'd guess?
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>added to the fact that the Ordnance Board no longer issued dismantling shot which would have been vital in a long-range gunnery match. The US Navy still used dismantling shot to great effect.
Dismantling shot is chain shot, I'd guess?
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
fer-de-lance
Airman
- 64
- Jun 12, 2007
Check the records and you will find that the razée HMS Majestic never got within range of USS President - even though the US frigate had a bent keel from a grounding the night before. When the wind picked up, the President showed the Majestic a clear pair of heels. The Majestic never really got into the fight after that.
Razées had a major disadvantage, being "cut down" from ships-of-the-line, their lowest tire of gun ports sit lower ~1.93m from the water-line, compared to 2.44m on the Constitutions.
That meant that the Constitutions can keep their lower gun ports safely open in higher sea states than the razées. If you can't open your gun ports, it wouldn't matter if you have 36 pdr and the other guy has 24 pdr ...
It was HMS Endymion a 40-gun 24 pdr frigate and two 38-gun 18 pdr frigates HMS Pomone and HMS Tenedos that finally caught up with the American frigate. The Endymion did most of the damage but Capt. Decateur of the President was able to to disable her with dismantling shot. Most of the Endymion's sails were torn from her masts and she lost the top of her foremast. Unable to maneuvre the Endymion was at the mercy of the President. Decateur could have positioned the President to rake the Endymion at will until she struck. Problem was, the Pomone and Tenedos were pressing close behind and Decateur had to leave in a hurry.
Later that night, the two 38's caught up with the President and Decateur hoisted a light to signal he was surrendering. Some, including Teddy Roosevelt had criticized Decateur for giving in too tamely. What these critics often forgot was that the President's crew must have been exhausted after having worked feverishly first to free their ship after she was aground (in a snow storm), dumped stores to lighten their ship, then fought one enemy after another ... all in the cold of January.
The President was too damaged to be kept in service after her capture. The Royal Navy had an exact copy made, gave her the same name and deployed her on the America Station ... No doubt, to taunt the Yankees.
The Royal Navy did start construction of five 24 pdr frigates based on the design of the Endymion (herself a copy of a French prize) when war appeared imminent with the U.S. However, to get they into service quickly, softwoods were used in construction. Two were built using fir (density 530g/m^3) and three using pitch pine (density 520g/m^3). Experience showed that these softwoods did not stand up to heavy shot as well as oak - tending to shatter with disastrous results for the crew.
The other two 1,500t, 50 gun 24 pdr "super frigates", HMS Newcastle and HMS Leander, were also constructed from pitch pine. Both of these "super frigates" were involved in the pursuit of USS Constitution after the American had captured HMS Cyane and Levant. The Consitution out-paced both to make good her escape - only the former HMS Levant was re-captured ... even then the RN squadron had to violate Portuguese neutrality to do it ...
So you'd have to forgive me for not agreeing with your assessment about the Constitution class compared to contemporary British frigates. Yes, the RN had the right strategy to counter quality with numbers (served them well also in WWII) but no, their frigate designs were not on par with those designed by the great Joshua Humphreys.
I will have to find my pics. I went aboard her on my visit to Portsmouth back in 1997.
"To out-gun contemporary 18 pdr gun frigates, the Constitution mounted 24 pdr. Her hull was built to ship of the line specifications but had the hull lines (length-to-beam ratio) of a fast frigate. But, there were serious technical challenges to overcome in order make such a design work."
This idea that U.S frigates were superior to British ones all comes from the early one-on-one conflicts. It's easy to use these victories as a point of superiority but the fact of the matter is the U.S frigates simply out-gunned the British in these early conflicts.
"Length of the hull for ships of the period was limited by the longitudinal strength of the keel. Ships-of-the-line have beamier hulls and multiple decks that increases strength, thus reducing the tendency for the keel to bend and cause "hogging". However, beamier hull adds drag and extra decks add weight - all conspiring against a higher sailing speed.
Humphreys borrowed an idea from the barn roof designs of the Pennsylvania Dutch to spread the loads along the keel. (Takes a keen eye and prepared mind to notice the similarities between the long roof and ship's hull ... ) That led to the "diagonal riders" fitted to the keel of the Constitution class which played a significant role in making their keels strong enough to do what it needed to do."
When exactly did Humphreys 'borrow' this idea? I'm sure you've heard of Gabriel Snodgrass, Robert Seppings and John Brent all well known due to diagonal riders and iron fittings. The British warships were getting strengthened with diagonal riders around 1795.
This idea that U.S frigates were superior to British ones all comes from the early one-on-one conflicts. It's easy to use these victories as a point of superiority but the fact of the matter is the U.S frigates simply out-gunned the British in these early conflicts.
"Length of the hull for ships of the period was limited by the longitudinal strength of the keel. Ships-of-the-line have beamier hulls and multiple decks that increases strength, thus reducing the tendency for the keel to bend and cause "hogging". However, beamier hull adds drag and extra decks add weight - all conspiring against a higher sailing speed.
Humphreys borrowed an idea from the barn roof designs of the Pennsylvania Dutch to spread the loads along the keel. (Takes a keen eye and prepared mind to notice the similarities between the long roof and ship's hull ... ) That led to the "diagonal riders" fitted to the keel of the Constitution class which played a significant role in making their keels strong enough to do what it needed to do."
When exactly did Humphreys 'borrow' this idea? I'm sure you've heard of Gabriel Snodgrass, Robert Seppings and John Brent all well known due to diagonal riders and iron fittings. The British warships were getting strengthened with diagonal riders around 1795.
"I'd guess the French would not have ruled the seas with British ships either, so who did does not reflect ship quality with sufficient accuracy."
The French were never aiming to rule the seas; British ship designs would have not been useful for their needs. The French would have needed to change the structure of their navy, their training, orginisation and discipline.
I don't believe I used the British victories as an explanation for the French inferiority.
"That sounds more serious Is it possible to date the "initial" phase?"
I'm sure it is, somewhere, but I haven't got it.
"It wasn't? Not that I was aware of that before I looked it up, but I have now gained the impression that Amsterdam in 1727 was part of the province of Holland in the Republiek der Zeven Verenigde Provinciën, a country that commonly appears to have been called "Holland" for its most influential province even in the 18th century. But that's "shaky" knowledge, I might have misinterpreted what I read."
I thought you meant Holland, as in todays English sense of Holland as a nation. As back then it was the Dutch Republic with Zealand, Rotterdam, Holland etc. Rotterdam and Zealand did not follow Amsterdams examples. The modern Netherlands (Holland) was, really, created by Britain after the Great Wars.
"Ah, that would of course change the significance of the prizes! Still, if the hull shape was preserved, this still might be interpreted as an appreciation of French hydrodynamics"
I don't see how you can get that idea. Britain used as many prizes as it could get its hands on. The hull shape of the French ships made them no faster than the British coppered and clean vessels. French hydrodynamic studies were all wrong and in any case not all French ships were designed using pure mathematics.
"Wouldn't strenghtening them to British standards increase the weight considerably? Hm, maybe it just reduced the useful load, which probaly was not that much of a concern of a ship of the line."
Strengthening would have made them heavier - Britain liked to over-load their ships. But it stopped them falling apart.
The French were never aiming to rule the seas; British ship designs would have not been useful for their needs. The French would have needed to change the structure of their navy, their training, orginisation and discipline.
I don't believe I used the British victories as an explanation for the French inferiority.
"That sounds more serious Is it possible to date the "initial" phase?"
I'm sure it is, somewhere, but I haven't got it.
"It wasn't? Not that I was aware of that before I looked it up, but I have now gained the impression that Amsterdam in 1727 was part of the province of Holland in the Republiek der Zeven Verenigde Provinciën, a country that commonly appears to have been called "Holland" for its most influential province even in the 18th century. But that's "shaky" knowledge, I might have misinterpreted what I read."
I thought you meant Holland, as in todays English sense of Holland as a nation. As back then it was the Dutch Republic with Zealand, Rotterdam, Holland etc. Rotterdam and Zealand did not follow Amsterdams examples. The modern Netherlands (Holland) was, really, created by Britain after the Great Wars.
"Ah, that would of course change the significance of the prizes! Still, if the hull shape was preserved, this still might be interpreted as an appreciation of French hydrodynamics"
I don't see how you can get that idea. Britain used as many prizes as it could get its hands on. The hull shape of the French ships made them no faster than the British coppered and clean vessels. French hydrodynamic studies were all wrong and in any case not all French ships were designed using pure mathematics.
"Wouldn't strenghtening them to British standards increase the weight considerably? Hm, maybe it just reduced the useful load, which probaly was not that much of a concern of a ship of the line."
Strengthening would have made them heavier - Britain liked to over-load their ships. But it stopped them falling apart.
"Check the records and you will find that the razée HMS Majestic never got within range of USS President - even though the US frigate had a bent keel from a grounding the night before. When the wind picked up, the President showed the Majestic a clear pair of heels. The Majestic never really got into the fight after that."
Excuse the mistake; the Majestic was the initial leader of the pursuit but the Endymion over-took you are right.
"So you'd have to forgive me for not agreeing with your assessment about the Constitution class compared to contemporary British frigates. Yes, the RN had the right strategy to counter quality with numbers (served them well also in WWII) but no, their frigate designs were not on par with those designed by the great Joshua Humphreys."
I don't quite understand; you say the US ships were superior and seem to be basing it all on one-on-one combats. As you know combat between similar ships is all down to individual skill and luck.
The US designs as a whole were only good captial ships for a small navy. They were able to create shocks when out-gunning smaller vessels, but generally France and Britain had no need for a slow cruising ship that cost almost as much as a ship-of-the-line. The design of a ship is only good if it fits its purpose.
The hastily built 'super-frigates' were easily comparable to the U.S designs; they were simply built out of the wrong material. And the British were too busy with the French Navy to send out 1st and 2nd rate ships to deal with the US frigates. The US 24-pdrs were good ships, but they weren't for the same job as the British 18-pdrs.
Excuse the mistake; the Majestic was the initial leader of the pursuit but the Endymion over-took you are right.
"So you'd have to forgive me for not agreeing with your assessment about the Constitution class compared to contemporary British frigates. Yes, the RN had the right strategy to counter quality with numbers (served them well also in WWII) but no, their frigate designs were not on par with those designed by the great Joshua Humphreys."
I don't quite understand; you say the US ships were superior and seem to be basing it all on one-on-one combats. As you know combat between similar ships is all down to individual skill and luck.
The US designs as a whole were only good captial ships for a small navy. They were able to create shocks when out-gunning smaller vessels, but generally France and Britain had no need for a slow cruising ship that cost almost as much as a ship-of-the-line. The design of a ship is only good if it fits its purpose.
The hastily built 'super-frigates' were easily comparable to the U.S designs; they were simply built out of the wrong material. And the British were too busy with the French Navy to send out 1st and 2nd rate ships to deal with the US frigates. The US 24-pdrs were good ships, but they weren't for the same job as the British 18-pdrs.
Hi Plan D,
>>"Ah, that would of course change the significance of the prizes! Still, if the hull shape was preserved, this still might be interpreted as an appreciation of French hydrodynamics"
>I don't see how you can get that idea. Britain used as many prizes as it could get its hands on.
Hm, retrospectively, I don't see it either. I guess I implied the British used prize ships only if they were of high quality, which seems to be incorrect.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>>"Ah, that would of course change the significance of the prizes! Still, if the hull shape was preserved, this still might be interpreted as an appreciation of French hydrodynamics"
>I don't see how you can get that idea. Britain used as many prizes as it could get its hands on.
Hm, retrospectively, I don't see it either. I guess I implied the British used prize ships only if they were of high quality, which seems to be incorrect.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
Hi Fer-de-lance,
>The Royal Navy did start construction of five 24 pdr frigates based on the design of the Endymion (herself a copy of a French prize)
Hm, would you say this speaks for the quality of the French design? (I could also imagine it simply was the quickest way to get a 24-pounder frigate into service.)
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>The Royal Navy did start construction of five 24 pdr frigates based on the design of the Endymion (herself a copy of a French prize)
Hm, would you say this speaks for the quality of the French design? (I could also imagine it simply was the quickest way to get a 24-pounder frigate into service.)
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
Hi Plan D,
>No nation at that time made exact copies; I don't know the ins and outs of the Endymion I have to admit, but it wouldn't have been an exact copy of a French prize. There would have been some ideas taken from the prize.
Makes sense - if they modified prizes as standard procedure, they wouldn't have copied them unmodified either.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>No nation at that time made exact copies; I don't know the ins and outs of the Endymion I have to admit, but it wouldn't have been an exact copy of a French prize. There would have been some ideas taken from the prize.
Makes sense - if they modified prizes as standard procedure, they wouldn't have copied them unmodified either.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
fer-de-lance
Airman
- 64
- Jun 12, 2007
That is no doubt that skill and luck were important. But the basis of my argument was that the Consitution class was not "similar" to the contemporary RN frigates. They were superior. You said yourself that they out-gunned any 18 pdr frigate ... but they could also maneuvre well enough to keep up with them.
The only contest where an 18 pdr frigate came close to coming out ahead was when expert handling by Lambert put HMS Java in position to rake the USS Consitution from astern. Nevertheless, the Constitution withstood the pounding and got her (behind) out of the way (even though her wheel was shot away). After that, better American gunnery decided the issue. (Shooting away the Java's bowsprit and jib pretty much decided the issue as it denied the British frigate the ability to match and counter the maneuvres of the American frigate). What it boiled down to was that even good ship handling by Lambert could not compensate for the technological superiority of the USS Constitution. (The Constitution did have a more experienced crew).
We've already discussed how the Constitution class were also "superior" in speed to the bigger and better armed RN ships such as the razée (HMS Majestic, Saturn and Goliath) as well as the large 1,500t HMS Leander and Newcastle.
The RN took the right approach by going after the big American frigates with whole squadrons. However, the tying down of RN patrol resources almost certainly resulted in the US privateers having amuch easier time. Compared to US Navy warships, US privateers captured many more British merchant ships during the War of 1812.
Yes, I have heard of Seppings et al - I hope to visit HMS Unicorn at Dundee and HMS Tricomalee at Hartlepool and see the ironmongery ... one of these days.
However, if you get the chance to see the USS Constitution at Charlestown, you will see that Humphreys' "diagonal rider" were very different from the British bracing:
BTW, construction of the Constitution class was authorized in 1794.
"The only contest where an 18 pdr frigate came close to coming out ahead was when expert handling by Lambert put HMS Java in position to rake the USS Consitution from astern. Nevertheless, the Constitution withstood the pounding and got her (behind) out of the way (even though her wheel was shot away). After that, better American gunnery decided the issue. (Shooting away the Java's bowsprit and jib pretty much decided the issue as it denied the British frigate the ability to match and counter the maneuvres of the American frigate). What it boiled down to was that even good ship handling by Lambert could not compensate for the technological superiority of the USS Constitution. (The Constitution did have a more experienced crew)."
I'm sorry, but American gunnery did not decide the issue in that battle - as it wasn't so obviously superior, as you claim. The British tactic of leaving fire until close and obliterating the enemy worked well against all European navies. Lambert made a mistake when he chose this tactic against the Constitution. The 42-pdr frigate was obviously going to gain an advantage in the slugging match that Lambert aimed for.
The shots were close in the Java vs. Constitution combat so American gunnery was found to be no more superior than British gunnery. The only actions in which British gunnery was brought to question was the long-range duels, where British training had almost ceased to exist. The Shannon captain made good that downfall with practice in all areas of gunnery for his crew.
The jib-boom, mizzenmast and bowspirit collapsed when the Java attempted to board the Constitution. The American gunnery had only damaged them all.
Constitution won against Java simply because of the disparity of force. The Macedonian made the right (and Royal Navy approved) choice of shooting high at long-range to make good her escape against a more powerful enemy - it's only sensible. Because of a lack of training and no dismantling shot, the Macedonian tactic was left with no back-up from its crew and gun power.
The US big-three were the capital ships of the U.S Navy - hardly comparable to the capital ships of the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy 18-pdrs were not meant to open combat against larger ships, but patrol, raid and recon.
"The RN took the right approach by going after the big American frigates with whole squadrons. However, the tying down of RN patrol resources almost certainly resulted in the US privateers having amuch easier time. Compared to US Navy warships, US privateers captured many more British merchant ships during the War of 1812."
Warren did not have the ships to block all the northern U.S ports; that's the only reason U.S privateers made it out into the ocean; and this was only in 1812. In the entirety of the war it's estimated 1,175 merchantmen were captured and 373 were recaptured. The British insurance rates in the West Indies rose by 30%, with a third rebate for convoy. Overall, however, British marine insurance rates in 1813-1814 were no different than those in 1810-1811.
By the summer of 1813 the U.S Navy had no chance. The Royal Navy had closed and almost water-tight seal around the North American ports. The last U.S warship of any size at sea was the Essex which hunted whalers.
The big-three of the USN were an irritant more than anything, as was the whole War of 1812 for Britain. The real war was against Napoleon, even with that the Royal Navy reduced U.S exports from $45 million in 1811 to $7 million in 1814, and increase Boston insurance rates to 75%.
"BTW, construction of the Constitution class was authorized in 1794."
East India Merchantmen were fitted before then, but British being British it took the military a while to realise its potential.
I'm sorry, but American gunnery did not decide the issue in that battle - as it wasn't so obviously superior, as you claim. The British tactic of leaving fire until close and obliterating the enemy worked well against all European navies. Lambert made a mistake when he chose this tactic against the Constitution. The 42-pdr frigate was obviously going to gain an advantage in the slugging match that Lambert aimed for.
The shots were close in the Java vs. Constitution combat so American gunnery was found to be no more superior than British gunnery. The only actions in which British gunnery was brought to question was the long-range duels, where British training had almost ceased to exist. The Shannon captain made good that downfall with practice in all areas of gunnery for his crew.
The jib-boom, mizzenmast and bowspirit collapsed when the Java attempted to board the Constitution. The American gunnery had only damaged them all.
Constitution won against Java simply because of the disparity of force. The Macedonian made the right (and Royal Navy approved) choice of shooting high at long-range to make good her escape against a more powerful enemy - it's only sensible. Because of a lack of training and no dismantling shot, the Macedonian tactic was left with no back-up from its crew and gun power.
The US big-three were the capital ships of the U.S Navy - hardly comparable to the capital ships of the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy 18-pdrs were not meant to open combat against larger ships, but patrol, raid and recon.
"The RN took the right approach by going after the big American frigates with whole squadrons. However, the tying down of RN patrol resources almost certainly resulted in the US privateers having amuch easier time. Compared to US Navy warships, US privateers captured many more British merchant ships during the War of 1812."
Warren did not have the ships to block all the northern U.S ports; that's the only reason U.S privateers made it out into the ocean; and this was only in 1812. In the entirety of the war it's estimated 1,175 merchantmen were captured and 373 were recaptured. The British insurance rates in the West Indies rose by 30%, with a third rebate for convoy. Overall, however, British marine insurance rates in 1813-1814 were no different than those in 1810-1811.
By the summer of 1813 the U.S Navy had no chance. The Royal Navy had closed and almost water-tight seal around the North American ports. The last U.S warship of any size at sea was the Essex which hunted whalers.
The big-three of the USN were an irritant more than anything, as was the whole War of 1812 for Britain. The real war was against Napoleon, even with that the Royal Navy reduced U.S exports from $45 million in 1811 to $7 million in 1814, and increase Boston insurance rates to 75%.
"BTW, construction of the Constitution class was authorized in 1794."
East India Merchantmen were fitted before then, but British being British it took the military a while to realise its potential.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Plan D, It looks as if you referred to the "Constitution" as a "42 lbr" frigate. The "Constitution" never mounted any 42 lbrs. She was armed with 32 lb carronades on the spar deck and 24 lbdrs on the gun deck. Someone earlier stated that the British no longer carried dismantling shot which was a disadvantage at long range. A study of ballistics tells me that dismantling shot would mainly be a short range weapon. Standard cannon balls would have a much longer range than chain shot used for damaging rigging. Standard tactics during the Napoleonic wars were that the French fired on the up roll to damage the rigging where the British were more likely to batter the hull with their gunfire.
fer-de-lance
Airman
- 64
- Jun 12, 2007
Plan D, regarding superiority in gunnery, it is a matter of definitions. The Constitution vs Java engagement was decided by "weight of fire" but that wasn't simply a function of the size of long guns and carronades. Given the rudimentary nature of gun aiming in the period, it wasn't really practical to achieve "superiority" through being able to hit your opponent more frequently at long range. Rather it was achieving higher rate of fire and being able to fire at the correct moment for the appropriate ammunition (dismantling shot for rigging vs round shot for the hull).
The obvious Napoleonic War parallel was the undisputed "superiority" of British line infantry musketry compared to the French. With smooth bore muskets, "superiority" was not achieved with individual marksmenship. Rather, it was achieved through higher "weight" of fire by:
1. using two rank formation (thin red line) compared to three by the French and
2. achieving a higher rate of fire (better training, frequent musketry drill).
Daily gun drills were held on the Constitution. The use of lead cartridges also improved the rate of fire. In contrast, prior to the action with the Constitution, Lambert was only able to have his gun crews fire six salvos during one firing drill.
The Constitution was able to keep up a superior rate of fire during the action against the Java - even before the British frigate suffered damage to its guns. She was also hitting the target where it mattered. As mentioned earlier, one of the critical blows was delivered when the Constitution shot away the bowsprit and jib of the Java, severely curtailing her ability to maneuvre. This was done using dismantling shot, fired at the right moment in the roll to ensure they went up rather than down into the hull.
I think we all agree that, Broke's attention to gunnery training and tactics (assigning division of guns to shoot at the wheel and jib) played an important role in the victory of HMS Shannon over USS Chesapeake. The greater number of shots landed (54 18pdr and 32pdr round shots vs 25; 306 grape shot vs 119 plus 14 bar) and where they landed (shot away the jib and decimated those manning the wheel) could be considered "superiority" in gunnery.
In particular, deliberately targeting the jib and shooting it away using mainly grape shot took superior skill. Broke and the gun crews of the HMS Shannon deserve credit for this superior performance. On the same token, shouldn't Bainbridge's gun crews deserve the same credit for superior performance in shooting away the jib on the Java with dismantling shot ... ?
It would be inaccurate to characterize the blockade after 1812 as being effective in keeping US privateers from getting to sea and taking a substantial toll on British merchant ships. According to "Sea Power and Its Relations to the War of 1812" Mahan, 639 British vessels were captured between September, 1813 and September, 1814. The vast majority by privateers. In contrast, the Niles Register quoted by Mahan listed 411 captures of British ships (including warships) from the beginning of the War until May 1813.
Actually, some of the most famous US privateer actions occurred in 1814 and 1815.
The Prince of Neufchâtel from New York made her successful raids on the English Channel shipping in 1814 capturing or sinking 20 merchant ships. (She rounded out her successful European voyage in September, 1814 by repulsing boarding attempts by the crew of HMS Endymion in boats. One boat was sunk, another captured and the XO of the Endymion was amongst the 28 killed. To add insult to injury, 28 others were taken prisoner.)
The Kemp and Chasseur from Baltimore also had successful commerce raiding cruises in late 1814 and 1815 - the period not covered by the figures quotes by Mahan. The Kemp took 4 merchant ships laden with coffee and sugar from a convoy in the West Indies and got them back to port (after giving a frigate the slip). the Chasseur took 18 prizes in British waters and then captured HM Schooner St Lawrence of Havana well after the Treaty of Ghent had been ratified.
There was also the action of the General Armstrong in the Azores in September, 1814. Her crew held off two attempts by boarding parties from HMS Plantagenet, Rota and Carnation to capture her. The action caused numerous British casualties and delayed the ships in joining the flotilla supporting the attack on New Orleans.
Interesting note about the insurance rates - and the rebate for convoy.
Well, Stewart got the Constitution out to sea twice. Once in early 1814, taking only 4 prizes but causing much consternation (and, no doubt, additional expense) in the West Indies as evidenced by captured dispatches. During a second sortie beginning in December, 1814, Stewart fought a brillant action capturing both HMS Cyane and Levant in February 1815.
$45 million seems high, can you give a reference to that figure.
The obvious Napoleonic War parallel was the undisputed "superiority" of British line infantry musketry compared to the French. With smooth bore muskets, "superiority" was not achieved with individual marksmenship. Rather, it was achieved through higher "weight" of fire by:
1. using two rank formation (thin red line) compared to three by the French and
2. achieving a higher rate of fire (better training, frequent musketry drill).
Daily gun drills were held on the Constitution. The use of lead cartridges also improved the rate of fire. In contrast, prior to the action with the Constitution, Lambert was only able to have his gun crews fire six salvos during one firing drill.
The Constitution was able to keep up a superior rate of fire during the action against the Java - even before the British frigate suffered damage to its guns. She was also hitting the target where it mattered. As mentioned earlier, one of the critical blows was delivered when the Constitution shot away the bowsprit and jib of the Java, severely curtailing her ability to maneuvre. This was done using dismantling shot, fired at the right moment in the roll to ensure they went up rather than down into the hull.
I think we all agree that, Broke's attention to gunnery training and tactics (assigning division of guns to shoot at the wheel and jib) played an important role in the victory of HMS Shannon over USS Chesapeake. The greater number of shots landed (54 18pdr and 32pdr round shots vs 25; 306 grape shot vs 119 plus 14 bar) and where they landed (shot away the jib and decimated those manning the wheel) could be considered "superiority" in gunnery.
In particular, deliberately targeting the jib and shooting it away using mainly grape shot took superior skill. Broke and the gun crews of the HMS Shannon deserve credit for this superior performance. On the same token, shouldn't Bainbridge's gun crews deserve the same credit for superior performance in shooting away the jib on the Java with dismantling shot ... ?
It would be inaccurate to characterize the blockade after 1812 as being effective in keeping US privateers from getting to sea and taking a substantial toll on British merchant ships. According to "Sea Power and Its Relations to the War of 1812" Mahan, 639 British vessels were captured between September, 1813 and September, 1814. The vast majority by privateers. In contrast, the Niles Register quoted by Mahan listed 411 captures of British ships (including warships) from the beginning of the War until May 1813.
Actually, some of the most famous US privateer actions occurred in 1814 and 1815.
The Prince of Neufchâtel from New York made her successful raids on the English Channel shipping in 1814 capturing or sinking 20 merchant ships. (She rounded out her successful European voyage in September, 1814 by repulsing boarding attempts by the crew of HMS Endymion in boats. One boat was sunk, another captured and the XO of the Endymion was amongst the 28 killed. To add insult to injury, 28 others were taken prisoner.)
The Kemp and Chasseur from Baltimore also had successful commerce raiding cruises in late 1814 and 1815 - the period not covered by the figures quotes by Mahan. The Kemp took 4 merchant ships laden with coffee and sugar from a convoy in the West Indies and got them back to port (after giving a frigate the slip). the Chasseur took 18 prizes in British waters and then captured HM Schooner St Lawrence of Havana well after the Treaty of Ghent had been ratified.
There was also the action of the General Armstrong in the Azores in September, 1814. Her crew held off two attempts by boarding parties from HMS Plantagenet, Rota and Carnation to capture her. The action caused numerous British casualties and delayed the ships in joining the flotilla supporting the attack on New Orleans.
Interesting note about the insurance rates - and the rebate for convoy.
Well, Stewart got the Constitution out to sea twice. Once in early 1814, taking only 4 prizes but causing much consternation (and, no doubt, additional expense) in the West Indies as evidenced by captured dispatches. During a second sortie beginning in December, 1814, Stewart fought a brillant action capturing both HMS Cyane and Levant in February 1815.
$45 million seems high, can you give a reference to that figure.
"Plan D, It looks as if you referred to the "Constitution" as a "42 lbr" frigate. The "Constitution" never mounted any 42 lbrs. She was armed with 32 lb carronades on the spar deck and 24 lbdrs on the gun deck."
I apologise, mistake of typing or my brain went numb.
"Someone earlier stated that the British no longer carried dismantling shot which was a disadvantage at long range. A study of ballistics tells me that dismantling shot would mainly be a short range weapon."
The British tactic against stronger ships was to fire high and destroy the enemies ability to give chase, then escape. The lack of dismantling shot made this tactic difficult, at best. The disadvantage British gunners had at long range was the lack of training in long range gunnery.
"Standard tactics during the Napoleonic wars were that the French fired on the up roll to damage the rigging where the British were more likely to batter the hull with their gunfire."
That was the standard tactic for the British, to get close and batter the hull. But as I've said, in the case of being out-gunned Royal Navy captains were told to evade or fire upon the rigging and then evade.
"Plan D, regarding superiority in gunnery, it is a matter of definitions. The Constitution vs Java engagement was decided by "weight of fire" but that wasn't simply a function of the size of long guns and carronades. Given the rudimentary nature of gun aiming in the period, it wasn't really practical to achieve "superiority" through being able to hit your opponent more frequently at long range. Rather it was achieving higher rate of fire and being able to fire at the correct moment for the appropriate ammunition (dismantling shot for rigging vs round shot for the hull)."
I think largely the disparity of force led to the defeat of the Java. The British gunners kept a high rate of fire but there was no option for the correct ammo; as I've said Royal Navy vessels were no longer issued dismantling shot.
"The Constitution was able to keep up a superior rate of fire during the action against the Java - even before the British frigate suffered damage to its guns. She was also hitting the target where it mattered. As mentioned earlier, one of the critical blows was delivered when the Constitution shot away the bowsprit and jib of the Java, severely curtailing her ability to maneuvre. This was done using dismantling shot, fired at the right moment in the roll to ensure they went up rather than down into the hull."
The Java shooting away the wheel of the Constitution would say something about accurate fire. But the fact of the matter is, in those days it was all about weight of fire in one general area.
I have read the Java action and it's my understanding that the jib and bowspirit were not shot away by the Constitution - they were damaged. The jib only collapsed when the Java attempted to board and made contact.
With the dismantling shot, I can only say the Royal Navy weren't issued it anymore. I assume some still may have had stocks left over. The USN used it to great effect, it's a fault of the Ordnance Board rather a success of the USN.
Don't get me wrong, the Constitution crew was experienced and well trained. But I would credit the victory as a fault of the Java for closing and the weight of the Constitution broadside compared to the Java.
"It would be inaccurate to characterize the blockade after 1812 as being effective in keeping US privateers from getting to sea and taking a substantial toll on British merchant ships. According to "Sea Power and Its Relations to the War of 1812" Mahan, 639 British vessels were captured between September, 1813 and September, 1814. The vast majority by privateers. In contrast, the Niles Register quoted by Mahan listed 411 captures of British ships (including warships) from the beginning of the War until May 1813."
Obviously the British blockade couldn't stop everything, and many were out to sea before the British blockade closed. I would rather say the US ability to impede the British fell off after the summer of 1813. The privateers were the largest problem, and always had been in European wars. But British trade kept rising during the War of 1812, so overall, American privateering while an irritant had no real effect.
More British vessels were sailing through American waters, the waters were richer for U.S privateers - but they had less impact. Plus the high losses of U.S privateers during the war says something about the risks they ran.
"Well, Stewart got the Constitution out to sea twice. Once in early 1814, taking only 4 prizes but causing much consternation (and, no doubt, additional expense) in the West Indies as evidenced by captured dispatches. During a second sortie beginning in December, 1814, Stewart fought a brillant action capturing both HMS Cyane and Levant in February 1815."
I forgot about the capture of the Cyane and Levant. Well, the Constitution was the last warship of any size at sea! As the others had all gone, with the Essex being caught by Phoebe, President being captured when triyng to run blockade and United States held up by Royal Navy blockade until the end of the war.
"$45 million seems high, can you give a reference to that figure."
I can. The Command of the Ocean - pg.571 - N.A.M Rodger. He refers to Faye Kerts Fortunes of War.
I apologise, mistake of typing or my brain went numb.
"Someone earlier stated that the British no longer carried dismantling shot which was a disadvantage at long range. A study of ballistics tells me that dismantling shot would mainly be a short range weapon."
The British tactic against stronger ships was to fire high and destroy the enemies ability to give chase, then escape. The lack of dismantling shot made this tactic difficult, at best. The disadvantage British gunners had at long range was the lack of training in long range gunnery.
"Standard tactics during the Napoleonic wars were that the French fired on the up roll to damage the rigging where the British were more likely to batter the hull with their gunfire."
That was the standard tactic for the British, to get close and batter the hull. But as I've said, in the case of being out-gunned Royal Navy captains were told to evade or fire upon the rigging and then evade.
"Plan D, regarding superiority in gunnery, it is a matter of definitions. The Constitution vs Java engagement was decided by "weight of fire" but that wasn't simply a function of the size of long guns and carronades. Given the rudimentary nature of gun aiming in the period, it wasn't really practical to achieve "superiority" through being able to hit your opponent more frequently at long range. Rather it was achieving higher rate of fire and being able to fire at the correct moment for the appropriate ammunition (dismantling shot for rigging vs round shot for the hull)."
I think largely the disparity of force led to the defeat of the Java. The British gunners kept a high rate of fire but there was no option for the correct ammo; as I've said Royal Navy vessels were no longer issued dismantling shot.
"The Constitution was able to keep up a superior rate of fire during the action against the Java - even before the British frigate suffered damage to its guns. She was also hitting the target where it mattered. As mentioned earlier, one of the critical blows was delivered when the Constitution shot away the bowsprit and jib of the Java, severely curtailing her ability to maneuvre. This was done using dismantling shot, fired at the right moment in the roll to ensure they went up rather than down into the hull."
The Java shooting away the wheel of the Constitution would say something about accurate fire. But the fact of the matter is, in those days it was all about weight of fire in one general area.
I have read the Java action and it's my understanding that the jib and bowspirit were not shot away by the Constitution - they were damaged. The jib only collapsed when the Java attempted to board and made contact.
With the dismantling shot, I can only say the Royal Navy weren't issued it anymore. I assume some still may have had stocks left over. The USN used it to great effect, it's a fault of the Ordnance Board rather a success of the USN.
Don't get me wrong, the Constitution crew was experienced and well trained. But I would credit the victory as a fault of the Java for closing and the weight of the Constitution broadside compared to the Java.
"It would be inaccurate to characterize the blockade after 1812 as being effective in keeping US privateers from getting to sea and taking a substantial toll on British merchant ships. According to "Sea Power and Its Relations to the War of 1812" Mahan, 639 British vessels were captured between September, 1813 and September, 1814. The vast majority by privateers. In contrast, the Niles Register quoted by Mahan listed 411 captures of British ships (including warships) from the beginning of the War until May 1813."
Obviously the British blockade couldn't stop everything, and many were out to sea before the British blockade closed. I would rather say the US ability to impede the British fell off after the summer of 1813. The privateers were the largest problem, and always had been in European wars. But British trade kept rising during the War of 1812, so overall, American privateering while an irritant had no real effect.
More British vessels were sailing through American waters, the waters were richer for U.S privateers - but they had less impact. Plus the high losses of U.S privateers during the war says something about the risks they ran.
"Well, Stewart got the Constitution out to sea twice. Once in early 1814, taking only 4 prizes but causing much consternation (and, no doubt, additional expense) in the West Indies as evidenced by captured dispatches. During a second sortie beginning in December, 1814, Stewart fought a brillant action capturing both HMS Cyane and Levant in February 1815."
I forgot about the capture of the Cyane and Levant. Well, the Constitution was the last warship of any size at sea! As the others had all gone, with the Essex being caught by Phoebe, President being captured when triyng to run blockade and United States held up by Royal Navy blockade until the end of the war.
"$45 million seems high, can you give a reference to that figure."
I can. The Command of the Ocean - pg.571 - N.A.M Rodger. He refers to Faye Kerts Fortunes of War.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Plan D, Much of my "knowledge" about ships and tactics of the navies during the Napoleonic Wars come from reading every one of C S Forester's Hornblower books, some more than once. Lovely books. One of my favorites though was about WW2, "The Ship" which I believe was taken from the Battle of Sirte. Wish I could find it and read it again.
fer-de-lance
Airman
- 64
- Jun 12, 2007
USS Constitution was largest but not the only US Navy ship at sea in 1815. The sloops of war USS Peacock and Hornet, along with US Schooner Tom Bowline also had successful cruises .
USS Hornet captured HMS Penguin in March, 1815 and then, in what must be the most monumental ship identification error, attacked HMS Cornwallis, a 74, thinking she was a large merchantman! The Hornet got away by jettisoning boats, guns, stores etc.
USS Peacock captured the East India Company cruiser Nautilus in the final naval action of the War of 1812 near Selat Sunda. The British brig had gotten word that the war was over but the Americans hadn't. (Hunting was good in those waters, Peacock only took three prizes but they were big ones with valuable cargos).
USS Constitution and USS United States were by no means the only large US Navy ships remaining. There were also USS Constellation 38 blockaded at Norfolk, and USS Macedonian. The former RN frigate was holed up with her erstwhile captor, the USS United States, in the Thames ... the one in Connecticut.
Far from being a spent force, the US Navy actually had a very active construction program underway with plans to break the blockade when the War of 1812 ended. New warships were under construction in Portsmouth, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore. Furthest along was USS Guerrière 44, launched in 1814 and fitting out in Philadelphia in 1815.
What was needed to overcome the blockading force were battleships. USS Independence 74 was launched at Charlestown in 1814. Although not yet ready to sail, she had received her 32pdr long guns and shared harbor defense duties with USS Constitution.
Like their smaller cousins, the US 74's were more powerful than their Rate. Records are not precise but they may have been based on a 1799 design by none other than Joshua Humphreys. They were over 190ft long (longer than a Second Rate) and carried 30 32-pdr long guns in their lower gun deck, 32 medium 32-pdr in the middle gun deck and 20+ 42-pdr carronades on the upper deck. (Had to be said that the Independence had some problems due to ill-advised modifications that Commodore Bainbridge insisted on making during her construction).
USS Washington 74, was also launched in 1814 ... at Portsmouth Navy Yard (that's in NEW Hampshire). Had the war dragged on into the winter of 1815, there could have been simultaneous break out attempts by two US battleships, possibly during bad weather. Once at sea, the two supported by USS Constitution from Boston, would likely have forced the RN blockading force off their stations. That would, in turn, spring loose others including the new USS Guerrière in Philadelphia, USS Java from Baltimore, USS United States and Macdeonian from up the Thames, as well as possibly USS Constellation from Norfolk.
With all these big US frigates out at sea in a pack, even the large convoys escorted by RN frigates would be at risk.
The third 74 (out of 4 authorized by Congress in 1813), USS Franklin, wasn't quite ready in late 1815.
The War of 1812 taught the US the folly of neglect by the Jefferson Administration and the importance of battleships. More 74's were authorized in 1816 and the US Navy was on its way to becoming a Sea Power.
Oh, BTW, HMS President has been described in UK accounts as a "precise copy" of the captured US frigate. As was pointed out earlier, almost all other copies of the period were merely adaptations based on the lines of the captured ship. (That would include HMS Endymion, "copied" based on the French Pomone) . However, HMS President was an exception and ... sincerest form of flattery to the American Master; Joshua Humphreys.
USS Hornet captured HMS Penguin in March, 1815 and then, in what must be the most monumental ship identification error, attacked HMS Cornwallis, a 74, thinking she was a large merchantman! The Hornet got away by jettisoning boats, guns, stores etc.
USS Peacock captured the East India Company cruiser Nautilus in the final naval action of the War of 1812 near Selat Sunda. The British brig had gotten word that the war was over but the Americans hadn't. (Hunting was good in those waters, Peacock only took three prizes but they were big ones with valuable cargos).
USS Constitution and USS United States were by no means the only large US Navy ships remaining. There were also USS Constellation 38 blockaded at Norfolk, and USS Macedonian. The former RN frigate was holed up with her erstwhile captor, the USS United States, in the Thames ... the one in Connecticut.
Far from being a spent force, the US Navy actually had a very active construction program underway with plans to break the blockade when the War of 1812 ended. New warships were under construction in Portsmouth, Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore. Furthest along was USS Guerrière 44, launched in 1814 and fitting out in Philadelphia in 1815.
What was needed to overcome the blockading force were battleships. USS Independence 74 was launched at Charlestown in 1814. Although not yet ready to sail, she had received her 32pdr long guns and shared harbor defense duties with USS Constitution.
Like their smaller cousins, the US 74's were more powerful than their Rate. Records are not precise but they may have been based on a 1799 design by none other than Joshua Humphreys. They were over 190ft long (longer than a Second Rate) and carried 30 32-pdr long guns in their lower gun deck, 32 medium 32-pdr in the middle gun deck and 20+ 42-pdr carronades on the upper deck. (Had to be said that the Independence had some problems due to ill-advised modifications that Commodore Bainbridge insisted on making during her construction).
USS Washington 74, was also launched in 1814 ... at Portsmouth Navy Yard (that's in NEW Hampshire). Had the war dragged on into the winter of 1815, there could have been simultaneous break out attempts by two US battleships, possibly during bad weather. Once at sea, the two supported by USS Constitution from Boston, would likely have forced the RN blockading force off their stations. That would, in turn, spring loose others including the new USS Guerrière in Philadelphia, USS Java from Baltimore, USS United States and Macdeonian from up the Thames, as well as possibly USS Constellation from Norfolk.
With all these big US frigates out at sea in a pack, even the large convoys escorted by RN frigates would be at risk.
The third 74 (out of 4 authorized by Congress in 1813), USS Franklin, wasn't quite ready in late 1815.
The War of 1812 taught the US the folly of neglect by the Jefferson Administration and the importance of battleships. More 74's were authorized in 1816 and the US Navy was on its way to becoming a Sea Power.
Oh, BTW, HMS President has been described in UK accounts as a "precise copy" of the captured US frigate. As was pointed out earlier, almost all other copies of the period were merely adaptations based on the lines of the captured ship. (That would include HMS Endymion, "copied" based on the French Pomone) . However, HMS President was an exception and ... sincerest form of flattery to the American Master; Joshua Humphreys.
