Plan D, regarding superiority in gunnery, it is a matter of definitions. The Constitution vs Java engagement was decided by "weight of fire" but that wasn't simply a function of the size of long guns and carronades. Given the rudimentary nature of gun aiming in the period, it wasn't really practical to achieve "superiority" through being able to hit your opponent more frequently at long range. Rather it was achieving higher rate of fire and being able to fire at the correct moment for the appropriate ammunition (dismantling shot for rigging vs round shot for the hull).
The obvious Napoleonic War parallel was the undisputed "superiority" of British line infantry musketry compared to the French. With smooth bore muskets, "superiority" was not achieved with individual marksmenship. Rather, it was achieved through higher "weight" of fire by:
1. using two rank formation (thin red line) compared to three by the French and
2. achieving a higher rate of fire (better training, frequent musketry drill).
Daily gun drills were held on the Constitution. The use of lead cartridges also improved the rate of fire. In contrast, prior to the action with the Constitution, Lambert was only able to have his gun crews fire six salvos during one firing drill.
The Constitution was able to keep up a superior rate of fire during the action against the Java - even before the British frigate suffered damage to its guns. She was also hitting the target where it mattered. As mentioned earlier, one of the critical blows was delivered when the Constitution shot away the bowsprit and jib of the Java, severely curtailing her ability to maneuvre. This was done using dismantling shot, fired at the right moment in the roll to ensure they went up rather than down into the hull.
I think we all agree that, Broke's attention to gunnery training and tactics (assigning division of guns to shoot at the wheel and jib) played an important role in the victory of HMS Shannon over USS Chesapeake. The greater number of shots landed (54 18pdr and 32pdr round shots vs 25; 306 grape shot vs 119 plus 14 bar) and where they landed (shot away the jib and decimated those manning the wheel) could be considered "superiority" in gunnery.
In particular, deliberately targeting the jib and shooting it away using mainly grape shot took superior skill. Broke and the gun crews of the HMS Shannon deserve credit for this superior performance. On the same token, shouldn't Bainbridge's gun crews deserve the same credit for superior performance in shooting away the jib on the Java with dismantling shot ... ?
Warren did not have the ships to block all the northern U.S ports; that's the only reason U.S privateers made it out into the ocean; and this was only in 1812.
It would be inaccurate to characterize the blockade after 1812 as being effective in keeping US privateers from getting to sea and taking a substantial toll on British merchant ships. According to "Sea Power and Its Relations to the War of 1812" Mahan, 639 British vessels were captured between September, 1813 and September, 1814. The vast majority by privateers. In contrast, the Niles Register quoted by Mahan listed 411 captures of British ships (including warships) from the beginning of the War until May 1813.
Actually, some of the most famous US privateer actions occurred in 1814 and 1815.
The Prince of Neufchâtel from New York made her successful raids on the English Channel shipping in 1814 capturing or sinking 20 merchant ships. (She rounded out her successful European voyage in September, 1814 by repulsing boarding attempts by the crew of HMS Endymion in boats. One boat was sunk, another captured and the XO of the Endymion was amongst the 28 killed. To add insult to injury, 28 others were taken prisoner.)
The Kemp and Chasseur from Baltimore also had successful commerce raiding cruises in late 1814 and 1815 - the period not covered by the figures quotes by Mahan. The Kemp took 4 merchant ships laden with coffee and sugar from a convoy in the West Indies and got them back to port (after giving a frigate the slip). the Chasseur took 18 prizes in British waters and then captured HM Schooner St Lawrence of Havana well after the Treaty of Ghent had been ratified.
There was also the action of the General Armstrong in the Azores in September, 1814. Her crew held off two attempts by boarding parties from HMS Plantagenet, Rota and Carnation to capture her. The action caused numerous British casualties and delayed the ships in joining the flotilla supporting the attack on New Orleans.
In the entirety of the war it's estimated 1,175 merchantmen were captured and 373 were recaptured. The British insurance rates in the West Indies rose by 30%, with a third rebate for convoy. Overall, however, British marine insurance rates in 1813-1814 were no different than those in 1810-1811.
Interesting note about the insurance rates - and the rebate for convoy.
By the summer of 1813 the U.S Navy had no chance. The Royal Navy had closed and almost water-tight seal around the North American ports. The last U.S warship of any size at sea was the Essex which hunted whalers.
Well, Stewart got the Constitution out to sea twice. Once in early 1814, taking only 4 prizes but causing much consternation (and, no doubt, additional expense) in the West Indies as evidenced by captured dispatches. During a second sortie beginning in December, 1814, Stewart fought a brillant action capturing both HMS Cyane and Levant in February 1815.
... even with that the Royal Navy reduced U.S exports from $45 million in 1811 to $7 million in 1814, and increase Boston insurance rates to 75%.
$45 million seems high, can you give a reference to that figure.