operation Market garden

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Njaco said:
flyboy, I don't think that would have worked. Anyhow Eisenhower liked attacks across broad fronts most of the time.
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well think had allied bombers or fighter bombers attack the occupied areas more and the forces evened out it might have worked better
 
Thanks for the link, it's interesting to see both sides. Funny thing is that what this site calls "ein Ruhmesblatt reicher geworden" is called by the Dutch side a "verpletterende nederlaag" You can see how point of view blurres the historians vision on both sides
Anyway, the two books I mentioned are standard works here in the NL, so I expect them to be reliable.
About the losses
Quote from "Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de tweede wereldoorlog" Deel 3, blz.128 - Dr. L De Jong (1970):

From "De oorlog in mei '40" E.H. Brongers(1963):


Quote from "Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de tweede wereldoorlog" Deel 3, blz.462 - Dr. L De Jong (1970):
Bij de verliezen moeten de 1200 krijgsgevangenen geteld worden die via Ijmuiden weggevoerd waren
On top of the losses came the 1200 POW that were transported away from Ijmuiden
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You're right, I remembered a too high number, 1200 were transported to the UK, not all 1600.


Luchtoorlog 10 mei - J.P Nater(1982)
German a/c losses: 220 Ju52 - 430 deployed = 51%

Valkenburg airfield was definitely lost to the Germans in the evening of May 10th, you should be able to find that from several sources. I think you are confusing the 600 para's in the village of Valkenburg, who held out untill the surrender.

Valkenburg was never used by the Dutch as an airfield in WWII. The grass runway was just created and the field was still too wet and soft to land on, hence the failure of the German landings (as your link confirms). Preventing the Dutch from using it was totally useless.

The negotiations you are mentioning were about the city of Rotterdam, but the Dutch had still another line of defence between Rotterdam an Den Haag. The situation was critical, but (not yet) lost. I agree on the fact that the 7th flieger division did their job admirably, but I don't think they had any influence on the fighting at the Grebbelinie. But it would have been a matter of time, I agree. Without help, the Dutch would have lost after few more days/weeks of fighting.

Dutch Government and general staff always stated that the total surrender of the armed forces was because of the inability to defend themselves against air attacks like Rotterdam.

I still think the Germans would have easily won in short time without the use of the airborn troops. The high losses of especially the 22nd and the Ju52 staffeln (including crew) was too big compared to the little advantage gained by it.

The Dutch biggest enemy were their own government. Had they not cut budget like they did in 1936-1938 and had they not neglected self defence. The Dutch would have had better arms and having had to fight with only 40 fighters, 11 bombers and guns from 1870.
 

The funny and confusing part is actually, that this site is a Dutch site and it refers to Bongers - did you click on the Dutch link?

Regards
Kruska
 
I hadn't paid enough attention, probably sleeping . The site mentions the German losses as well:
Totale verliezen van parachutisten en luchtlandingstroepen in de Vesting Holland: (bron Historic DE)

1.

Aufklärungs Abteilung 22, Major Von Boddien, 10 gefallen, 12 verwundet, 13 vermisst = 35.
2.

Artillerie Regiment 22, Oberstleutnant De Boer, 6 gefallen, 13 verwundet, 1 vermisst = 20.
3.

Flak Bataillon 22, Hptm Kohlhaas, 4 gefallen, 9 verwundet, 4 vermisst = 17.
4.

Infanterie Regiment 16, Oberst Hans Kreysing, 38 gefallen, 106 verwundet, 17 vermisst = 161.
5.

Infanterie Regiment 47, Oberst Heyser, 74 gefallen, 130 verwundet, 61 vermisst = 265.
6.

Infanterie Regiment 65, Oberst Friemel, 97 gefallen, 89 verwundet, 217 vermisst = 402.
7.

Stab 22. Infanterie-Division Generalleutnant Hans Graf von Sponeck, 7 gefallen, 14 verwundet, 4 vermisst = 26.
8.

Nachrichten Abteilung 22, Major Lorenz, 21 gefallen, 28 verwundet, 23 vermisst = 72.
9.

Pionier Bataillon 22, Hauptmann Burger, 21 gefallen, 25 verwundet, 39 vermisst = 85.

Gevallenen 278, Gewonden 435, Vermist 379, afgevoerde krijgsgevangenen 1600.
Totaal uitgeschakelde Duitsers : 2692
 
Hello Marcel,

uitgeschakelde , oh man I love this word, uitgeschakelde

Thanks for the figures.

However I still remain sceptical regarding these 1600 POW's being brought to England. Let's see what I can find about this issue.

Regards
Kruska
 
yes,ike did like to attack on a broad front.i believe his a.d.c.once said during the normandy campaign...ike cant understand why everyone is not just attacking,everywhere...sounds a bit like the french marshal in 1917,who ordererd that tactic,and then had a mutiny on his hands.ooops,wrong thread,sorry.any way,i believe units of xxx corps..household cavalry,and the 4th dorsetshire regt battle group,129bde,43rd wessex inf div,did reach arnhem.imho,people blame monty,but he was an a/g c.o,he was genuinlly looking for a quick end to the war.most of the pplanning for market was done in england,and garden in belgium,all in only a few days.you have to keep up the pressure on a defeated enemy,this is why a broad front would never win in 44.starling.imo.
 
I agree, I think dr. De Jong's 1200 is more accurate. I do believe 1600 POW were taken, but some of them were liberated after the Dutch surrender. 400 would be a believable number.
 
i think ikes strategy was all wrong.montys northern thrust would have finished jerry in 44.1st can army on the left,next,2nd british army,aimed at antwerp,brussels.next,u.s 1st army,aimed at charloa and carry on in that general direction.next u.s 3rd army,aimed n/w above the ardennes.
one of the armies would definately find a soft spot.according to de-guigand,montys chief of staff,monty offered to serve under bradley,for political reasons.
if the allied armies advanced n/w together,the suppply situation would have been lessened,instead of the red ball express driving all over france,the supply trucks etc,would all be headed in the same direction.yours,starling.
 
Hi there - I've only just come across your site and have spent an hour or so looking around. I actually arrived looking for info about Bombers and came across this post!

My dad was actually there at the time, in the Nijmegen/Arnhem area, he was closer to Remagen. He actually landed in Normandy on D-Day +4 (June 10). He was an engineer with the tanks and was attached to the Canadian forces (even though he and his friend were Scottish and had been called up together, they ended up in an English regiment). He never spoke much about his time in northern Europe between June 1944 and when he was demobbed in 1946, but did remark that mostly the failure was down to poor communication, lack of intelligence and appreciation of how many German troops were in the area, and political in-fighting between the generals on the ground. He and his pals all felt that they'd been let down by the planners more than anything.

Liz
 
does anyone have the plans for xxxcorps,after a succesful crossing at arnhem?.ike,brererton,monty,dempsey must have made plans for this,not just a right turn into/or around the rhur?.i understand the 52nd div was to be landed somewhere?,ive never seen maps though?,any one know where there are some good sites,orr info,cheers.
 
i remember reading that part of XXXCORPS was to turn west,clearing the north bank of the rhine,thus trapping german 15TH army.i cant find the damned book,and i been all over the web searching;can anyone help out please,cheers.
 
From what I recall, I think it was in Cornelius Ryan's book, this very situation had been studied by the Dutch at their war colleges, and the scenario was always put to the individual classes. Those students who chose to do the spearhead thrust up the single highway always failed. Those who chose to go up the highway, then send forces in a right-hook across the ferry at _____ (dang, I'm bad with names), and continue up the other side of the river to Arnhem and take the bridge from BOTH sides at once, they succeeded. Too many possible failure points along a single narrow route of advance, especially if you ignore the solid intel coming from the underground, who are on the scene with eyeballs glued to the bogeys of the tanks rumbling by. And the Germans were not quite as demoralized and defeated as the Allies thought. Monty took waaaaay too long capturing the port at Antwerp, allowing some small amount of resupply/reinforcement/reorganization amongst the Germans.

The "what if" where Patton gets the M-G resources would make for an excellent thread...
 
Correct. Antwerp was taken in August (23rd ?), but extremely stiff resistance along the Scheldt estuary, plus mines etc, and the strong-point on Walcheren island continued to delay all things.; The island was eventually taken by a commando-type raid, and the first supplies arrived in the port (of Antwerp) in early-mid November (when weather started to affect all operations).
The Operation (Market-Garden) covered only the advance to the bridge at Arnhem - any subsequent operation(s) would have been under a different code name (choose any one of around six!), and would have included the 'swing' into Germany proper, and the Rhine crossing, which, of course, eventually happened with 'Operation Varsity'.
Bottom line = any advance into Germany was not under the auspices of Market-Garden.
 
starling said:
I thought antewerp was taken intact,do you mean the schelt?.cheers.
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I think he might have meant Arnhem, not Antwerp.

Vassili Zaitzev said:
Starling, I might be wrong, but while Antwerp was taken fairly quickly during the breakout, it was was uselss until the island of Walcheren was occupied. I believe that it wasn't taken(Walcheren) until November.
Click to expand...

correct.


They scenarios that you mentioned usually START with the inept airdrop operational plans of Brereton Browning.
A properly executed airdrop operation would have guaranteed Allied success.

Monty's plans for Market Garden were good, it was Allied Airborne command that screwed it up.
The strategic basis for the operation were also correct, which is why it needed to be done (rather than advance on patton's sector)

1.) A successful M-G allows the Allied armies to bypass the Westwall, and the casualties delays that they ran into. (Hurtigen Forest, Aachen etc)

2.) It would also allow for a left hook to isolate Holland, meaning that the (unsupplied) 15th Army could be captured more quickly, and prevent the Dutch winter famine.

3.) It would also capture the areas on the Dutch coast which had the V-1 V-2 launch sites
 
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