Operation Pike
- Thread starter Jenisch
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
davebender
1st Lieutenant
France signed a military alliance with the Soviet Union during May 1935.
From 1939 onward Britain began negotiations to join the Franco-Russian military alliance. Churchill was one of the major proponents of such an alliance with Stalin.
Under historical circumstances there's no way the governments of Britain and France would allow Operation Pike to be executed. It was simply a contingency plan in case the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact morphed into a military alliance.
If Germany and the Soviet Union did become military allies (however unlikely) Britain and France would have more important things to worry about then the implementation of Operation Pike. The first Soviet operation would probably be an invasion of Iran.
From 1939 onward Britain began negotiations to join the Franco-Russian military alliance. Churchill was one of the major proponents of such an alliance with Stalin.
Under historical circumstances there's no way the governments of Britain and France would allow Operation Pike to be executed. It was simply a contingency plan in case the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact morphed into a military alliance.
If Germany and the Soviet Union did become military allies (however unlikely) Britain and France would have more important things to worry about then the implementation of Operation Pike. The first Soviet operation would probably be an invasion of Iran.
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
I'm sorry, but you'll need to give us lesser mortals a bit more to go on; I've never heard of "Operation Pike," there's no mention of it in any of my encyclopedias, and there's not a single file, on the subject, in our National Archives.
- Thread starter
- #6
Patrick R. Osborn, Operation Pike: Britain Versus the Soviet Union, 1939-1941
This groundbreaking study reveals the extent of British military planning against the Soviet Union during the first two years of the Second World War. These plans, formulated on the widespread belief that Soviet Russia was an active and willing partner in Adolf Hitler's war of conquest, were designed to bring the Soviets to their knees and deprive Nazi Germany of vital raw materials, especially oil. Churchill himself was one of the leading proponents of action that would have led to an Anglo-Soviet conflict even as the war with Germany raged on. Utilizing many never-before published documents, Osborn challenges conventional wisdom that Allied hopes were pinned on a Soviet entry into the war against Germany and proposes instead that, had the Nazis not successfully invaded France in May 1940, the Allies might well have launched their own offensive against the Soviet Union. Anti-Soviet rumblings began shortly after the Red Army seized eastern Poland in September 1939, and became more strident after Joseph Stalin invaded Finland later that year. Truly serious planning did not take place, however, until after Stalin's disastrous war with Finland ended in March 1940. Immediately following the abrupt end of that conflict the Red Army sent substantial reinforcements to the Black Sea region, the area most threatened by Allied attack. In March-April 1940, the British undertook secret reconnaissance flights to obtain photographs of important targets inside the Soviet Union. The swift collapse of France in May 1940 insured that British bombers were not launched against these targets, but suspicion lingered between Britain and the USSR throughout the war, contributing to Stalin's refusal to believe Winston Churchill's warnings that Hitler was preparing to invade the USSR in 1941.
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0313313687/?tag=dcglabs-20
Seems to be an interesting book.
This groundbreaking study reveals the extent of British military planning against the Soviet Union during the first two years of the Second World War. These plans, formulated on the widespread belief that Soviet Russia was an active and willing partner in Adolf Hitler's war of conquest, were designed to bring the Soviets to their knees and deprive Nazi Germany of vital raw materials, especially oil. Churchill himself was one of the leading proponents of action that would have led to an Anglo-Soviet conflict even as the war with Germany raged on. Utilizing many never-before published documents, Osborn challenges conventional wisdom that Allied hopes were pinned on a Soviet entry into the war against Germany and proposes instead that, had the Nazis not successfully invaded France in May 1940, the Allies might well have launched their own offensive against the Soviet Union. Anti-Soviet rumblings began shortly after the Red Army seized eastern Poland in September 1939, and became more strident after Joseph Stalin invaded Finland later that year. Truly serious planning did not take place, however, until after Stalin's disastrous war with Finland ended in March 1940. Immediately following the abrupt end of that conflict the Red Army sent substantial reinforcements to the Black Sea region, the area most threatened by Allied attack. In March-April 1940, the British undertook secret reconnaissance flights to obtain photographs of important targets inside the Soviet Union. The swift collapse of France in May 1940 insured that British bombers were not launched against these targets, but suspicion lingered between Britain and the USSR throughout the war, contributing to Stalin's refusal to believe Winston Churchill's warnings that Hitler was preparing to invade the USSR in 1941.
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0313313687/?tag=dcglabs-20
Seems to be an interesting book.
Last edited:
As an Amazon Associate we earn from qualifying purchases.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
1939 Britain made a pledge to defend Poland from attack. If they had any intention to fight the Soviet Union Britain would have honored that pledge by declaring war on the Soviet Union during September 1939.
There was a secret protocol in the Anglo-Polish treaty that if Poland was attacked by a European power , that power was understood to be Germany.
That protocol was so secret the Polish ambassador in London evidently wasn't let in on that secret even. It should be noted Poland never declared war on the USSR for the invasion, and instructed it's troops on the eastern borders to retreat, and not fire on them.
The Polish ambassador, Raczyniski. was wanting the British to declare war on the USSR, when his own country wouldn't.
That protocol was so secret the Polish ambassador in London evidently wasn't let in on that secret even. It should be noted Poland never declared war on the USSR for the invasion, and instructed it's troops on the eastern borders to retreat, and not fire on them.
The Polish ambassador, Raczyniski. was wanting the British to declare war on the USSR, when his own country wouldn't.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
The USSR invaded Poland Sep 17, 1939. By then it was obvious Britain had welshed on the assistance pledge. Under such circumstances Poland had nothing to gain by declaring war on the Soviet Union.
If Britain had assisted France to invade Germany during September 1939 rather then urging France to call off the Saar invasion perhaps Poland might have decided differently.
If Britain had assisted France to invade Germany during September 1939 rather then urging France to call off the Saar invasion perhaps Poland might have decided differently.
Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
Some odd logic here.
Britain "welshed" on its assistance pledge? How? Between 01-Sep-1939 and 17-Sep-1939, Britain declared war on Germany, sent better than 40,000 men across the Channel and a dozen bomber squadrons, commenced leaflet raids against Hamburg, Bremen and The Ruhr and bombing against the German fleet in Wilhelmshaven and Brunsbuttel and lost a bloody aircraft carrier!
As it was French troops committed to the Saar offensive, it was a French decision to call off the offensive. The French military posture at the time was defensive in nature, a strategy that suited the British as the BEF wouldn't finish deploying into France until late September.
- Thread starter
- #11
Yeah, but they betrayed the Poles in doing so.
In fact the French and the British were still in mobilization, and as Op. Pike shows, they also feared a Soviet agression. Perhaps this was a major reason in the mobilization delay?
davebender
1st Lieutenant
26 Aug 1939. French Army partial mobilization.
1 Sep 1939. French Army complete mobilization.
3 Sep 1939. France declares war on Germany.
7 Sep 1939. 11 French division (i.e. a complete field army) invade Germany along a 20 mile front.
Looks pretty aggressive to me.
1 Sep 1939. French Army complete mobilization.
3 Sep 1939. France declares war on Germany.
7 Sep 1939. 11 French division (i.e. a complete field army) invade Germany along a 20 mile front.
Looks pretty aggressive to me.
What else could Britain do, but what they did ?
Could they load their army on Royal Navy ships, battle their way thru to the Baltic sea, to Poland?? Sounds like a recipe for a disaster to me.
The threat of a war with Britain, it's empire, and France you think would be enough to hold Hitler. But he thought he could gobble up another country like he did Czechoslovakia, everybody would talk rough, but do nothing.
Probably nobody was as surprized as Hitler when he realized he had pushed things just a little too far.
Could they load their army on Royal Navy ships, battle their way thru to the Baltic sea, to Poland?? Sounds like a recipe for a disaster to me.
The threat of a war with Britain, it's empire, and France you think would be enough to hold Hitler. But he thought he could gobble up another country like he did Czechoslovakia, everybody would talk rough, but do nothing.
Probably nobody was as surprized as Hitler when he realized he had pushed things just a little too far.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Summer 1939.
Aldershot Command, British Army, 03.09.1939
Move the army corps from Aldershot training area to France so it can participate in a French invasion of Germany.
.....1st Infantry Division.
.....2nd Infantry Division.
.....1st Armored Brigade.
Move Number 11 Fighter Group from Uxbridge, Middlesex to France so it can support the BEF.
Now people will take the British assistance pledge (to Poland) seriously. It's entirely possible this deployment would deter invasion of Poland during September 1939. But if it doesn't Britain would be ready to back up their assistance pledge with military support.
Aldershot Command, British Army, 03.09.1939
Move the army corps from Aldershot training area to France so it can participate in a French invasion of Germany.
.....1st Infantry Division.
.....2nd Infantry Division.
.....1st Armored Brigade.
Move Number 11 Fighter Group from Uxbridge, Middlesex to France so it can support the BEF.
Now people will take the British assistance pledge (to Poland) seriously. It's entirely possible this deployment would deter invasion of Poland during September 1939. But if it doesn't Britain would be ready to back up their assistance pledge with military support.
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
In a time of peace (however fragile) it can't be done, without the invitation of the host country, otherwise the British become an invading force. 11 Group was an area, not a force, so its 1939 job was to defend Britain, not go on the attack.
The idea of going to Poland's aid, directly, is also a non-starter; only a fool would try to send troops (how, with no troopships or transport aircraft?) and insert them between allies, leaving the possibility of having to fight on two fronts, with food and ammunition replenishments almost impossible to arrange.
The idea of going to Poland's aid, directly, is also a non-starter; only a fool would try to send troops (how, with no troopships or transport aircraft?) and insert them between allies, leaving the possibility of having to fight on two fronts, with food and ammunition replenishments almost impossible to arrange.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
If Britain pledges military support they must take steps to send troops. Otherwise British diplomatic promises are worthless.
Better not to make such a promise then to make a promise and then break it.
Better not to make such a promise then to make a promise and then break it.
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
You keep saying this, but you don't say how, or, more importantly, where.
1-9-39 Germany invades, and are given until 3-9-39 to pack it in, and return home; 3-9-39 Britain and France declare war; 5-9-39 the Polish corridor (aka the "Danzig Corridor") is overrun, leaving no port available to land troops.
No country, even if it were not lacking sufficient numbers of troop ammunition ships, could get a complete army, plus materiel (plus sufficient aircraft to make any sort of difference) round the top of Scandinavia in two days, so you're asking for the impossible.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Britain used the promise as a casus beli to declare war on Germany. That's not the same thing as Britain providing all possible support to Poland in accordance with the British Government statement.
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
Wrong again, Chamberlain was desperate not to go to war; it was a revolt by the Members of Parliament, on September 2nd., that forced his hand, and made him send the ultimatum, without waiting for the French to stop dithering, and show a common front. Also, the British statement says "lend the Polish Government all support in their power." With the Poles completely surrounded, that "power" was non-existent.
