Note (e) on Page 79 states:
(e) The F6F appears to have had considerable advantage over the F4U when flown under the same
conditions. Receiving about the same number of hits per sortie in comparable operations, the
F6F had a far lower rate of loss per plane hit.
If we assumed that the Corsairs were flown primarily by daring, committed, "skin in the game" Marines and the Hellcats by the Navy, one would expect those less brave/daring/comitted Navy pilots to escape in their Hellcats with far fewer hits per sortie under the same conditions in comparable operations. No?
Let's take the Marines out of it entirely and focus just on those less brave/daring/comitted men in the Navy. Let's also disregard same time period, flying from the same ships and flying missions under the "same conditions" in "comparable operations" where the two aircraft received "about the same number of hits per sortie" too as that's just a bunch of malarky designed to confuse us and lead us astray from Corsair worship.
For the entire war, in all operations, Navy carrier pilots lost Hellcats to AA fire at a rate of 1 per 116 sorties.
For the entire war, in all operations, Navy carrier pilots lost Corsairs to AA fire at a rate of 1 per 70 sorties. 66% higher loss rate for Corsair.
For the entire war, in all operations, Navy land based pilots lost Hellcats to AA fire at a rate of 1 per 309 sorties.
For the entire war, in all operations, Navy land based pilots lost Corsairs to AA fire at a rate of 1 per 254 sorties. 22% higher loss rate for Corsair.
Perhaps the less brave/daring/comitted men in the Navy just felt more like Marines when flying Corsairs and pressed their attacks in close in order to achieve more accuracy. Or, maybe there really was very large disparity in survivability between the Hellcat and Corsair, as the authors of the report have pointed out, that may have been related to an oil cooler design that is very different than the Hellcat and Thunderbolt. Maybe the authors of the report, who had access to the data, understood it as well as how and under what circumstances it was collected and obviously knew of the tough, brave reputation of the Marines got it right. The authors took note of the very large disparity between Hellcat and Corsair loss rates under apples to apples circumstances and chalked it up to the Hellcat's greater ability to survive combat damage.
I see no mention of the facts now entered into evidence by Renrich to attack the Report's conclusions and there are many areas in the report where it comments on facts that account for disparities in the data that on their face, may seem odd.
For instance, on the reasons why carrier borne fighters were far more successful in air combat than ground based aircraft:
"The ruling factor here was the mobility of the carrier forces, their
ability to penetrate deep into enemy territory, concentrating. overwhelming force in surprise
strokes against large sectors of the enemy's secondary air defenses. Land-based aircraft, on
the other hand, were seldom within reach of main concentrations of enemy air strength, except
for a time at Rabaul, where the heavy defenses precluded successful attack on grounded aircraft."
And the report didn't shy away from heaping praise on the Marines either:
"The Marine dive and torpedo bonber force, building up from small beginnings to a substantial
striking power, was the backbone of the anti-shipping and tactical striking force in
the Solomons, contributed greatly to the reduction of the Jap bases in the Marshalls, and later
contributed the bulk of its strength to give tactical air support in the reconquest of Luzon
and the southern Philippines. During late 1942 and early 1943 its few planes were devoted mainly
to stopping Jap naval and transport vessels from reinforcing Guadalcanal. Later it carried
its anti-shipping strikes to Bougainville, and in early 1944 cleaned the last Jap ships out of
Rabaul. Meanwhile as its force expanded it built up its attacks on nearby airfields (Munda and
Vila), gave heavy direct support in the New Georgia and Bougainville campaigns, and made the most
accurate and effective attacks in the campaign for destruction of the Jap base at Rabaul. In
March and April 1944 it was a major factor in turning back the Jap counter attacks on Bougainville,
doubling its previous volume of activity, then returned to neutralization of the entire Bismarck
area. In late 1944 the Marine SBDS were largely withdrawn from the Bismarcks area for transfer
to Luzon, where they began their biggest, though not their most important, job of the war."