Was going to difficult to get the Me 264 into service before the end of 1941, since development only started around that 1940-41 time frame.
Well, then I guess the whole idea is kinda' a non-starter then ain't it?
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Was going to difficult to get the Me 264 into service before the end of 1941, since development only started around that 1940-41 time frame.
Also IIRC, the operational losses to the B-29s in the bombing campaign vs Japan (before the US had emergency landing bases closer to Japan than the TO locations) were horrendous - as high or higher than in the ETO.
I don't think you realize just how many escort carriers the U. S. Navy had, 40 +/- Bogue class and 19 Casablanca class in commission (out of 122 total all escort carrier classes) by the end of 1943 alone.
Also, where do you get the idea that they'd be "withdrawn into a defensive posture..."?
I'm sorry, the Navy is many things, stupid is not one of them. I'd wager they'd station escort carriers and their groups along known flight paths leading to the North American continent.
Didn't some of the convoy routes pass under some of the proposed bomber routes? Another sets of eyes, and ears, to spot the bombers.
re "The energy wasted in the ME 210, Ju 288 and He 177 program could have funded the Me 264 1.5 times over."
My apologies, but I am a bit confused about the actual timeline possibilities vs (hopefully somewhat realistic) potential timeline relative to the Me 264 family. If I am understanding Koopernic's argument correctly, it is that the Me 264 could have been developed into at least a nuisance level threat to the US east coast, thereby rerouting resources used against the Germans or Japanese to the defense of the continental US.
I agree that the Germans had the technical ability to develop the Me 264 into an inter-continental bomber. My question is what would be the timeline if this had taken place. I realize we are assuming that the war did not progress exactly as it did in reality, but I would still be interested in getting a better grasp on a potential timeline relative to the successful development of the Me 264 family.
Not sure if this is particularly clear. Obviously - if the Germans could have developed reliable engines early enough, solved the aerodynamic problems early enough, and been able to allocate the resources necessary to develop/manufacture early enough - then the Me 264 would have had some significant effect on the US approach to fighting the war.
An example is the statement that the Germans intentionally did not provoke the US (any more than necessary via the U-boat campaign) in order to delay/prevent the entry of the US into the war. However, once the US entered the war I am quite sure that Hitler etal would very much have preferred to have the option of bombing the US.
Another question I have is the potential for generating more than a nuisance threat, assuming that the war went better for the Germans than it did in reality? Examples being success in the air war of the BoB and a subsequent cease fire of some sort (not an invasion of the UK as that was basically unrealistic) resulting in no bases for 8th AF, and/or spectacular success of Operation Barbarossa along the lines hoped for before it went sideways.
My input into the discussion is that even during the height of the Cold War (late-1950s-mid-1960s) the SAC estimate for a successful round trip of a B-52 (that did not encounter the Soviet air defense system) was less than 40%. Admittedly, the ranges were longer for the US attack against the missile fields and heartland cities in the SU, but navigation technology and reliability of (jet) engines were greatly improved over that in WWII.
Also IIRC, the operational losses to the B-29s in the bombing campaign vs Japan (before the US had emergency landing bases closer to Japan than the TO locations) were horrendous - as high or higher than in the ETO.
I really doubt "their [the carriers'] positions would be known." First, as posted by Mr Gunn, the USN wasn't collectively stupid; they were quite capable of, I don't know, spoofing their own signatures, so "carriers " would be in a lot more locations than the USN had carriers. Second, oceans are big.
The US had the potential to deal with this sort of attack; that it never needed to do so just proves it never needed to, not that it couldn't. The Me264 is still an unescorted bomber with a level of performance inadequate to survive without escort.
What of the Allied resources?
What would the US need to do differently? They were already on the way to building 100,000 fighters of various types.
How many fighters would they need to hold back to deal with the threat of a handful of Me 264s? A squadron of P-47s ought to be enough.
When are all these wonder engines to be available?
Will they have enough fuel to fly to the US? The Jumo 222E/F "scheduled for production in late 1944" would be available after the Oil Plan had significantly reduced the Luftwaffe's supply of aviation fuel.
The fuel situation was so dire that they even had a program to develop an aviation steam turbine for use in the Me 264, which would run on 70% pulverised coal/30% aviation fuel.
Hey Koopernic,
Am I misunderstanding the discussion re the Me 264, from my post#128: "Obviously - if the Germans could have developed reliable engines early enough, solved the aerodynamic problems early enough, and been able to allocate the resources necessary to develop/manufacture early enough - then the Me 264 would have had some significant effect on the US approach to fighting the war."
Is there any question that the Germans, in the real timeline, did not have the time or resources needed to develop the Me 264 into a serious threat?
If the Me-264 had been flying and operational in 1940-41? It would have been a great way to hit the Navy Yard in NYC, along with the Grumman and Republic plants on Long Island with nuisance raids. The 264 was a tactical dead end after mid-1942 when the combination of radar and the 56th equipped with the P-47B (Which would have been fine over Long Island Sound.)
(Edit: Let's not forget the Shipyards further up the coast as well.)
Was going to difficult to get the Me 264 into service before the end of 1941, since development only started around that 1940-41 time frame.
Those are some tremendous flights, all in a single engine plane!
Aaand they wouldn't be facing F6F Hellcats because?What is a bunch of Avengers and Wildcats going to do to an Me 264 that can do 339mph at 21,000ft and manage 350mph at 28,000ft for 40 minutes with the 600L of Nitrous Oxide it carries? Its probably faster than a B-29 at 20,000ft.
I don't think you realize just how many escort carriers the U. S. Navy had, 40 +/- Bogue class and 19 Casablanca class in commission (out of 122 total all escort carrier classes) by the end of 1943 alone.
Also, where do you get the idea that they'd be "withdrawn into a defensive posture..."?
I'm sorry, the Navy is many things, stupid is not one of them. I'd wager they'd station escort carriers and their groups along known flight paths leading to the North American continent.
The Me 264 was only fitted with Jumo 211s and then BMW801 because there weren't any of the intended 2400hp DB 603s available at that time. They started to become available in 1944.
The BMW 801 was available at 1700p, probably 1850hp by end 1943 and close to 2000hp by end 1944. Jumo 213 and DB603 were becoming available from the second half of 1944 but probably not of the requisite power till early 1945.
So a raid is possible with Jumo 211 engines (likely with RATO) and as the engines improve range and armament go up.,
Here is a film of an interview with the pilots:
Only if equipped with P-39s. But with radios moved aft. Or forward... Let me read that other thread again.Could the US spare a few of those Midways for the defense of Malaya?
Only if equipped with P-39s. But with radios moved aft. Or forward... Let me read that other thread again.
Production versions
DB 603A, rated altitude of 5.7 km, B4 fuel
Power (take-off): 1750 PS (1726 hp, 1287 kW) at 2700 rpm at sea level
Combat power: 1580 PS (1558 hp, 1162 kW) at 2500 rpm at sea level
DB 603AA DB 603A with an improved supercharger, rated altitude of 7.3 km, B4 fuel
Power (take-off): 1670 PS (1647 hp, 1228 kW) at 2700 rpm at sea level
Combat power: 1580 PS (1558 hp, 1162 kW) at 2500 rpm at sea level
DB 603E rated altitude of 7.0 km, B4 fuel
Power (take-off): 1800 PS (1775 hp, 1324 kW) at 2700 rpm at sea level
Combat power: 1575 PS (1553 hp, 1158 kW) at 2500 rpm at sea level
Aaand they wouldn't be facing F6F Hellcats because?
You can't have your cake and eat it too, If the Germans manage to get their long range bomber working, the U.S. doesn't get the same benefit for a response?
Also why do the Germans get a free pass? Are all the Lightnings and Thunderbolts taking siesta's on the east coast?
The Me 264 was designed around the DB 603 of 1,750hp. Don't think that 2,400hp versions were even under development in 1940/1941.
One of the reasons the B-29 didn't fly combat missions from the UK was runway length - contemporary Brit runways were too short for fully laden Superforts. I would suspect that any aircraft capable of carrying a transAtlantic bomb load would also need a very long runway. The US Strategic Air Forces in Europe would certainly bomb the dickens out of any extended German runways - and if you can't takeoff in the first place, you certainly can't reach New York, let alone require the attention of of US forces in Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland, Iceland, the UK, or the mid-Atlantic.
Cheers,
Dana
Also, the entire "if" of this thread allows me to put 437 Midway Class aircraft carriers in the Atlantic, each flying F7F day and night fighters and assorted ASW aircraft. In addition, the US is defended by P-89s armed with nuclear tipped rockets.
Offensively the 12,000 B-36Bs would crater every runway in Europe from 50,000 ft within a week.
I can do this because it makes as much sense as having the Me-264 fully developed and deployed in significant numbers in 1940. Fair is fair.
No apologies necessary my friend, I was not sure whether or not you were aware of the loss situation for the B-29 and figured I'd put up some data (in a cordial way (I hope)).My apologies, by "horrendous" I mean the ratio of losses due to all things other than combat relative to combat losses. (Am I using the term "operational losses" incorrectly?) If I am reading the chart that Milosh references above correctly, then the PTO (XX and XXI Bomber Command) B-29 non-combat losses were somewhere around 2x the losses due to combat.
If that's the case, then see you next spring...*SNIP*
Let me read that other thread again.