SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I know. Just being pedantic.
P-61 alternatives
- Thread starter pinehilljoe
- Start date
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In regards to my what if Me 264 attacking the US East Coast (all the way to Florida)
- The Me 264 V1 flew in December 1942 on basic 1350hp Jumo 211F engines. It could easily have flown earlier, 6 months I assert, and earlier with far more powerful BMW 801D2 engines (1700hp) since these had been thoroughly mature since the beginning of that year. (The 1450hp Jumo 213J was capable of the mission at 13000km instead of 14000km)
- Its known the program was starved of resources: engineers, draftsman, hanger space etc which slowed the program down. Messerschmitt was suffering from the impact of the problems with the Me 210, the whole bomber program was suffering from the non-performance of the He 177 and the failure of the Ju 288 program. Had some of these programs been sensibly rescheduled and re-specified or cancelled none of this wastage would have occurred and the Me 264 program would be properly resourced. Erhard Milch told Will Messerschmitt to concentrate on the Me 262 Jet instead and sarcastically remarked about structural problems in the Me 109F0 (turned out to be engine-flutter interaction fatique.)
- A Mission from Occupied Europe to the East Coast USA does not require flight refuelling. Nevertheless in flight refuelling would extend range and warlord considerably and quite deep into the US.
- Refuelling could be carried out 1/3rd of the way to target by transferring fuel from a buddy aircraft. It would not require rendezvous as the aircraft could leave together in formation. This would require minimal radio communication.
- Alternatively, the aircraft can take of with 70% fuel load and be topped up within 500km/300miles of the European coast within escort range of the Fw 190. It only takes 100 miles of flying to complete a refuelling.
- Schwann-See radio marker buoys were dropped by Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft ahead of Allied convoys to help u-boats home in. They were also dropped by Ju 88S1 pathfinders in the ocean as way points for bombing raids against Britain, for instance to find a way through radar gaps and as markers for V1 launches. This is how He 111 launched V1 missiles over the ocean. There were Schwann-Luft (parachute) and Schwann-Land (land) versions of this interesting radio marker.
- I am suggesting radio transmitters such as these might be carried on the bombers and refuelling aircraft. Radio Silence would be observed as much as possible.
- Assuming a first flight in Mid 1942 on BMW 801D2 engines its not unreasonable to expect a few dozen aircraft ready to attack the US East Coast by Late 1943.
- US airborne defences would struggle. The Me 264 should be able to achieve 340-350mph and would easily outrun the P70 and the P-61A/B would hardly be any better.
- I see the main missions to be reconnaissance, helping u-boats find targets, providing weather information and helping u-boats avoid interception.
- Mining operations into US shipping lanes, some ports and harbours would be very disruptive.
- Im impressed by the efficiency of the Me 264, the US needed the B-36 to do this job.
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I'm not a fan of these utopians. When the North Sea began to be an ocean? Have you any idea how inaccurate those air-launched V-1s were, they had difficulties even to hit England, speaking nothing on their intended targets. Using the radio beacons to mark convoys to u-boats is different thing than marking turning points for bombers. In the former, the navigation error of the recon plane did not matter, in the latter it did. It is well known that the positions given by LW recon planes were often way off. And knowing how inaccurate LW bombing raids against the GB were in 1944, I doubt that those beacons dropped by Ju 88s were always on the correct position. And flying at full throttle has its effect on ones fuel reserves. And we don,t know the performance of a fully equipped Me 264 because V1 and V2 were not fully equipped and V3 was not completed.
Messerschmitt Me 264 V1 Flight Tests
DateTest PilotAirfieldResults
December 23, 1942Karl BaurAugsburgAfter extensive taxiing trials, the Me 264 made its maiden flight. The duration of this first flight was 22 minutes, and for safety reasons the landing gear was left down. On landing, the airframe was damaged in the area of the flap mounts when the aircraft rolled over the end of the runway due to the failure of the brake system.
January 20, 1943Karl BaurAugsburgThe second test flight was made. Karl Baur complained that the forces on the controls were too high, about the poor placement of the instruments and of exhaust fumes penetrating into the cockpit.
January 22, 1943Karl BaurAugsburgThe Me 264 was transferred to Lechfeld.
January - February, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldOn the fifth test flight, the underside of the fuselage was damaged when it accidentally contacted the ground. Also, the hydraulic system of the landing gear failed, making it impossible to retract the gear.
February, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldBaur reported some problems with the inner flaps and a defective nose wheel. Despite some changes to the control surfaces, the forces against them were still too high and the changes had displaced the center of gravity. The nose wheel problems were fixed, and now the retraction functioned properly. Also, some minor defects were found in the electrical cables of the intercom system.
February, 1943Gerhard CaroliLechfeldCaroli also found that the forces against the control surfaces were still too high, especially at high speed. Small defects were still present in the radio system and landing gear.
February, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldDuring two flights by Baur, a speed of 600 km/h (373 mph) was reached. The faulty trimming and controls revealed that an eventual change in the entire control system would be inevitably needed. Flights with two or three engines were found to be satisfactory, but in flights with the automatic controls it was found that the servos were too low powered to control such a heavy aircraft.
March 2, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldStability tests were continued.
March 4, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldA test of the polare system was cut short when after 15 minutes of flying time, the third engine began to smoke and had to be cut out. At this time, 11 test flights had been made totaling 12 hours flight time.
March 23, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldAfter the faulty engine was changed, the critical altitude tests were made. Several other test flights were made this day, mainly to check the longitudinal stability. Also, the first measures to improve the rudder effect was made.
March 23, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldDuring landing, the left oleo leg broke, which was probably not fully locked down, causing some damage.
March 23 - May 21, 1943 LechfeldDuring repairs, a new steering column, a reinforced wing skin, a modified nosewheel drive and a complete radio were added. Also, a new emergency tail skid was added, a changed tailplane and four new Jumo 211J engines were installed.
May 22 - June 5, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldContinued high forces against the ailerons and rudder surfaces were found. Six flights were made totaling 12 hour 16 minutes.
June 2, 1943Flight Capt. WendelLechfeldSerious problems arose when the nosewheel jammed during retraction.
June 10, 1943FBM BöttcherLechfeldReported that the cockpit excessively heated up in the summer sun.
August 11, 1943 LechfeldThe Me 264 V1 was taken out of service, and re-equipped with BMW 801 twin row radial engines.
March 18, 1944 LechfeldThe Me 264 V1 was slightly damaged in an air raid, and was quickly repaired.
April 14, 1944 LechfeldDuring the first test roll with the new engines, the brake shoes tore off.
Messerschmitt Me 264 Luft '46 Entry
April 16, 1944 LechfeldThe Me 264 V1 was transferred to Memmingen.April, 1944 MemmingenDuring the 38th test flight, the emergency skid was torn out after a rough landing. When the rudders were fitted with balances, the excessive vibrations almost ceased.
late April, 1944FBM ScheibeLechfeldScheibe, from the Rechlin Trial Establishment, complained about the canopy reflections during his test flight. He also indicated that the excessive airframe vibrations were the number one problem to fix.
late April, 1944Colonel BarsewichMemmingenBarsewich, from the Chief Reconnaissance Department, judged the Me 264 V1 too slow for combat missions, even though the aircraft was about 10% faster than with the Jumo 211J engines.
early May, 1944Lt. Colonel KnemeyerMemmingenAfter an uneventful flight, Knemeyer was completely enthusiastic about the Me 264, in his opinion all problems could be overcome in the further testing and refinement of the aircraft.
April 17 - May 17, 1944Karl BaurMemmingenFlight testing was performed for tailplane flutter and the emergency tail skid. The rear of the plane was found to be too heavy.
April 26 - May 3, 1944Captain NebelMemmingenThree test flights were made by Capt. Nebel of the Rechlin Test Establishment to finally redress the tail vibrations. To avoid building an entire new tail, balance weights were added to get the vibration problems under control. Since the problem was not solved, a larger tail plane seemed inevitable.
June 5, 1944Karl BaurMemmingenMore stability tests were made, with a small improvement. However, the flights were complicated by the continuous problems with the Patin system.
June 6, 1944Karl BaurMemmingenExtreme rudder fluttering was found in the 380 - 450 km/h (236 - 280 mph) range. Also criticized were the too soft automatic controls, which had to be adjusted again.
June 26, 1944Karl PatinMemmingenA climb flight with combat performances was prematurely cut short when the fuel pressure of both inner engines fell to zero. After checking the fuel pumps, several defects were found. Also, the failure of the Patin, radio and electrical systems caused intensive repairs.
July 18, 1944 MemmingenThe Me 264 (RE+EN, work number 264000001) was damaged during an air raid. The extent of the damages was too severe for the damage to be repaired.
DateTest PilotAirfieldResults
December 23, 1942Karl BaurAugsburgAfter extensive taxiing trials, the Me 264 made its maiden flight. The duration of this first flight was 22 minutes, and for safety reasons the landing gear was left down. On landing, the airframe was damaged in the area of the flap mounts when the aircraft rolled over the end of the runway due to the failure of the brake system.
January 20, 1943Karl BaurAugsburgThe second test flight was made. Karl Baur complained that the forces on the controls were too high, about the poor placement of the instruments and of exhaust fumes penetrating into the cockpit.
January 22, 1943Karl BaurAugsburgThe Me 264 was transferred to Lechfeld.
January - February, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldOn the fifth test flight, the underside of the fuselage was damaged when it accidentally contacted the ground. Also, the hydraulic system of the landing gear failed, making it impossible to retract the gear.
February, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldBaur reported some problems with the inner flaps and a defective nose wheel. Despite some changes to the control surfaces, the forces against them were still too high and the changes had displaced the center of gravity. The nose wheel problems were fixed, and now the retraction functioned properly. Also, some minor defects were found in the electrical cables of the intercom system.
February, 1943Gerhard CaroliLechfeldCaroli also found that the forces against the control surfaces were still too high, especially at high speed. Small defects were still present in the radio system and landing gear.
February, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldDuring two flights by Baur, a speed of 600 km/h (373 mph) was reached. The faulty trimming and controls revealed that an eventual change in the entire control system would be inevitably needed. Flights with two or three engines were found to be satisfactory, but in flights with the automatic controls it was found that the servos were too low powered to control such a heavy aircraft.
March 2, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldStability tests were continued.
March 4, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldA test of the polare system was cut short when after 15 minutes of flying time, the third engine began to smoke and had to be cut out. At this time, 11 test flights had been made totaling 12 hours flight time.
March 23, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldAfter the faulty engine was changed, the critical altitude tests were made. Several other test flights were made this day, mainly to check the longitudinal stability. Also, the first measures to improve the rudder effect was made.
March 23, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldDuring landing, the left oleo leg broke, which was probably not fully locked down, causing some damage.
March 23 - May 21, 1943 LechfeldDuring repairs, a new steering column, a reinforced wing skin, a modified nosewheel drive and a complete radio were added. Also, a new emergency tail skid was added, a changed tailplane and four new Jumo 211J engines were installed.
May 22 - June 5, 1943Karl BaurLechfeldContinued high forces against the ailerons and rudder surfaces were found. Six flights were made totaling 12 hour 16 minutes.
June 2, 1943Flight Capt. WendelLechfeldSerious problems arose when the nosewheel jammed during retraction.
June 10, 1943FBM BöttcherLechfeldReported that the cockpit excessively heated up in the summer sun.
August 11, 1943 LechfeldThe Me 264 V1 was taken out of service, and re-equipped with BMW 801 twin row radial engines.
March 18, 1944 LechfeldThe Me 264 V1 was slightly damaged in an air raid, and was quickly repaired.
April 14, 1944 LechfeldDuring the first test roll with the new engines, the brake shoes tore off.
Messerschmitt Me 264 Luft '46 Entry
April 16, 1944 LechfeldThe Me 264 V1 was transferred to Memmingen.April, 1944 MemmingenDuring the 38th test flight, the emergency skid was torn out after a rough landing. When the rudders were fitted with balances, the excessive vibrations almost ceased.
late April, 1944FBM ScheibeLechfeldScheibe, from the Rechlin Trial Establishment, complained about the canopy reflections during his test flight. He also indicated that the excessive airframe vibrations were the number one problem to fix.
late April, 1944Colonel BarsewichMemmingenBarsewich, from the Chief Reconnaissance Department, judged the Me 264 V1 too slow for combat missions, even though the aircraft was about 10% faster than with the Jumo 211J engines.
early May, 1944Lt. Colonel KnemeyerMemmingenAfter an uneventful flight, Knemeyer was completely enthusiastic about the Me 264, in his opinion all problems could be overcome in the further testing and refinement of the aircraft.
April 17 - May 17, 1944Karl BaurMemmingenFlight testing was performed for tailplane flutter and the emergency tail skid. The rear of the plane was found to be too heavy.
April 26 - May 3, 1944Captain NebelMemmingenThree test flights were made by Capt. Nebel of the Rechlin Test Establishment to finally redress the tail vibrations. To avoid building an entire new tail, balance weights were added to get the vibration problems under control. Since the problem was not solved, a larger tail plane seemed inevitable.
June 5, 1944Karl BaurMemmingenMore stability tests were made, with a small improvement. However, the flights were complicated by the continuous problems with the Patin system.
June 6, 1944Karl BaurMemmingenExtreme rudder fluttering was found in the 380 - 450 km/h (236 - 280 mph) range. Also criticized were the too soft automatic controls, which had to be adjusted again.
June 26, 1944Karl PatinMemmingenA climb flight with combat performances was prematurely cut short when the fuel pressure of both inner engines fell to zero. After checking the fuel pumps, several defects were found. Also, the failure of the Patin, radio and electrical systems caused intensive repairs.
July 18, 1944 MemmingenThe Me 264 (RE+EN, work number 264000001) was damaged during an air raid. The extent of the damages was too severe for the damage to be repaired.
Could never happen.
The thousands of B-19Bs and B-36As would bomb the Me-264 factories out of existence, and the 433 heavy aircraft carriers stationed along those routes would shoot them down with the thousands of F7Fs they launched. The two day flight time would give the P-89s plenty of time to zoom in on any survivors.
All part of a normal flight test campaign. Many of the above issues from the test pilot, Diplom Ingineur Karl Bauer's, flight logs were dealt with. Like a good engineer he had a punch list. Some of them were rather pedestrian, such as a failure in an standard Patin autopilot. Flutter issues come out of many causes. You can rebalance the ailerons with weights to change the resonant frequency or adjust the springs in the servo-tabls. Worst case is adjustment of angle of incidence to change down wash.
The lessons learned were passed into the Me 264 V3. You'll note that the Aircraft didn't receive BMW801D2 engines until August 1943. The BMW801D2 had been in service with the Focke-Wulf 190A3 since about Feb 1942. The earlier BMW 801C of about 1560hp running of B4 fuel had been flying on prototype Do 217 since mid 1940.
This is why I was saying to make the Me 264 a reality capable of attacking the US East Coast before 1943 is out what is need is a properly resourced program and phased production of 3-4 prototypes so all of the above niggles can be ironed out. Unlike the He 177 and Ju 288 the Me 264 didn't need any weird engines.
It would be interesting to see the reliability of any recip engine after sorties of 40-48 hours. Plus a max power run at the 20 something hour point. There is doing things on paper, and there is doing them for real. I'm not saying it was impossible, just it was going to a bit of a stretch with minimum margins for safety.
Cheers,
Biff
Cheers,
Biff
Luftwaffe navigation aids had been allowed to degrade such that they only could handle guiding a small number of aircraft simultaneously ie pathfinders. I don't know what the issue was with air launched V1 accuracy but I suspect the problem wasn't with homing on to the Schwann-See radio marker buoys but their placement to begin with and other inaccuracies within the V1 itself.
Radio Navigation systems the Luftwaffe had were:
1 EGON I (Erstling-Gemse Offensive Navigation) which adapted the standard German IFF system (Erstling the transponder, Gemse the interrogator) to guide a bomb drop, similar to Oboe but using only a single radar. Range accuracy was very good but the angular accuracy was dependant on the angular resolution of the radar, about 0.2 degrees. The EGON system was not locked into a circular route and used a free form approach coded in tables.
I suspect the above system was used to place the Schwann-See buoys at times and that would add a +/- 1 to 2 km at long range angular error (but only +/-100 distance. U-boats could place them as well.
2 EGON II. Was similar to EGON-I but used two interrogators like Oboe and its cat and mouse system and so was much more accurate.
3 Zyklops was a beam riding system that used a pair of small trailers to set up antenna about 300m apart. It was very accurate along the beam, less than 20 meters. It used the Erstling-Gemse transponder for distance. Seems to have been used mainly for tactical purposes on the eastern front, even from a Fw 190F or G. This is how Ar 234 attacked the Bridge and Remagen at night.
4 Nachtfee was a coded communication link for the above. It couldn't bee spoofed or misled. Initially voice links had been used and these were prone to interference.
5 Neuling was the new IFF system that was replacing Erstling on Luftwaffe aircraft. It incorporated blind bombing capability as standard, I think 5 aircraft could be guided simultaneously. It could also work with Airborne radar.
I dont think the Schwann-See buoys were inaccurate but rather the inaccuracy of airborne V1 launches related to their placement and other sources of error.
The EGON-II system was quite accurate but was little used due to the limited transmission stations in the final stages of the war.
As far as navigation to find targets in the USA there are a couple of possibilities:
1 Celestial Navigation from the aircraft combined with use of moonlight to identify features. It needs an experienced navigator to do this to within a 4-5km
2 Schwann-See radio marker buoys deposited by u-boats as way points and triangulation out to sea. A U-boat could probably deposit these to within 1km using celestial navigation.
3 The German copy of H2S known as FuG 224 was flying within a few months of its capture on a Fw 200 and latter He 177. Generally too big for the smaller German aircraft it was miniaturised to the point it was smaller and more compact than H2S. Priority for microwave radar production seems to have been FLAK radars, Airborne Radars and German Navy.
A radio homing warhead "Raddischen" (Raddish) had been designed to home into allied radar and navigation beacons. It was to be used from BV246 glide bombs (range about 150km) and Fritz-X bombs. It would make allied picket ships and radar a target. There was also a passive microwave homing radar called MAX-P that came out of the Wasserfall Surface to Air missile (targeting allied H2S/H2X and night fighter radar)
I suppose the radio marker buoys could have transonders added to provide a navigation and glide bomb guidance system limited only by accuracy of the buoy placement.
There was a plan to attack British Blast furnaces using Fritz-X and infrared homming.
German a/c engine production, 43-45_1.jpg (1535×900) (enginehistory.org)
Gordon Gollubs (or was it Peterson's) report on the Fw 190A evaluates the BMW801 as a good engine that would require a year or more to reach maturity. He said it should be used with caution over the sea and in the tropics. It was certainly regarded with reserve on the Fw 190A1/A2. I think it was reliable enough by the end of 1942. The Jumo 211 was mature enough.
While Americans may find being bombed and outrage its important to note that the Luftwaffe leadership in part avoided developing these weapons not only because the cost benefit was very poor but because they didn't want to provoke Americans. Me 264 was a reconnaissance aircraft and courier.
Nevertheless having the capacity to attack the USA I believe should have been a priority since US entry into war was inevitable and it would tie up significant US resources and the development of the Me 264/6m (with 6 jumo 211) resolves many problems. The US was already developing aircraft such as the B19 and B36 to do this before any German efforts.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The Me264 was to be a strategic bomber from the start. The RLM's interest in it being an "Amerika bomber" came about in '42 with the idea of having it built with six engines.
The long-range recon role came about when the Kreigsmarine considered the 264 as a replacement for the Fw200.
The B-36 had a 10,000 mile range cruising at 230mph, its six R-4360s running for over 43 hours. The B-36 also had provisions for a 'relief crew,' unlike the Me-264. The R-4360 was a generation advanced over the BMW-801.
Shortround6
Major General
The Germans did have a number of indigenous navigation aids, none of which were any good on the western side of the atlantic unless deployed on buoys or ships.
The Germans did have a number of smart bombs and guidance systems. Only a few of which made it into service in any numbers or at a time when they could have been used against the US (before late 1944 or 1945).
Most or all of the smart bombs/missiles required outside stowage (to big to fit in bomb bay) which plays havoc with cruise speeds and range.
The US was already using up a fair amount of resources in defence of the coast, like shore batteries, AA guns, coastal patrol by both ships and planes. It is possible for a U-Boat to place a radio navigation buoy of the coast of the US, it is also possible for the US defences to sink such a U-boat.
Is the U-boat better employed attacking shipping or trying to place radio navigation buoys?
How long will a radio Navigation buoy last? and how accurate is it's location? Coastal waters off the US coast can be a lot deeper than the North sea (or the same depth, depends on location) but hundreds of feet of anchor line can mean some drift as currant/winds change. Not to mention the US might take a dim view of a radio beacon and send planes/ships to investigate and eliminate it. How many days/ missions is each buoy good for?
Celestial navigation for buoy placement only works on clear nights. Unless buoy is placed on clear night and only activated upon radio signal from approaching aircraft to begin transmitting several days later?
Sounds like the Germans would be tying up a considerable amount of resources too. Americans weren't totally stupid, they knew where the likely targets were and the likely approaches.
The Germans did have a number of smart bombs and guidance systems. Only a few of which made it into service in any numbers or at a time when they could have been used against the US (before late 1944 or 1945).
Most or all of the smart bombs/missiles required outside stowage (to big to fit in bomb bay) which plays havoc with cruise speeds and range.
The US was already using up a fair amount of resources in defence of the coast, like shore batteries, AA guns, coastal patrol by both ships and planes. It is possible for a U-Boat to place a radio navigation buoy of the coast of the US, it is also possible for the US defences to sink such a U-boat.
Is the U-boat better employed attacking shipping or trying to place radio navigation buoys?
How long will a radio Navigation buoy last? and how accurate is it's location? Coastal waters off the US coast can be a lot deeper than the North sea (or the same depth, depends on location) but hundreds of feet of anchor line can mean some drift as currant/winds change. Not to mention the US might take a dim view of a radio beacon and send planes/ships to investigate and eliminate it. How many days/ missions is each buoy good for?
Celestial navigation for buoy placement only works on clear nights. Unless buoy is placed on clear night and only activated upon radio signal from approaching aircraft to begin transmitting several days later?
Sounds like the Germans would be tying up a considerable amount of resources too. Americans weren't totally stupid, they knew where the likely targets were and the likely approaches.
IIRC EGONs were range limited same way as Oboe, so not much help for putting buoys in right places in the middle of the Atlantic. And the Atlantic is very deep and besides winds it has strong currents, how to keep the buoys in the right place? U-boats could place then fairly accurately but when? If they got their orders when leaving their harbours, there was a great risk that timing would have gone wrong, weather, technical difficulties, Allies bombing raids might well disturb the attack timetable and so the buoys would have drifted away from their right positions. U-boats could of course sent the signals themselves, but that would be risky. If they were given the release time for the buoys by radio, IMHO the probably way, there is a possibility that Enigma would give away the attack times of the follow-up raids. At the first time British would probably have been puzzled but after the first raid guessed the connection and so the next orders might well have been early warnings of impending attacks.
So none of these weapon systems were ready for use when red flags were raised over the Reichstag, less so for 1944 attacks against US. And as I wrote earlier, we don't know the real performance and handling of a fully equipped and armed Me 264. IIRC RLM thought that Messerschmitt tended to give over-optimistic performance estimates and that those of Focke-Wulf were usually more realistic.
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jmcalli2,
Yes, and those 4360s were starting production in 1944 (according to wiki) and had growing pains. And this from PW who had been engineering and producing large numbers of radials. While the 801 is a good engine, doing 40-48 hour sorties in 1943 is another. Also, where were the divert fields, how much drag penalty is there on having 1, 2 or 3 engines out. Lose an engine, continue, lose another may result in not having enough gas to get back (battle damage as well). Do you put U-Boats along the route, in listening mode for a Mayday calls? How many assets do you throw at something of questionable return?
This came up before, and I think the US would have contained it in a 6-12 month period between radar (picket ships or other) to offer GCI for fighters or P-61 type aircraft. Scenario, a city on the East coast gets hit. Scramble fighters and you may or may not get a successful intercept. Install radar (ship borne or otherwise), and you now have the ability to intercept them on the inbound and or the outbound leg. The end result is few if any now make a successful RTB. You can also make fighters optimized for bomber intercept over the US & Coastal waters. Less armor, optimized weapons, etc.
Use enigma and other spy systems to determine where they are launching from and destroy them on the ground. Yes, it would use resources that otherwise would have been for offensive devices but I think in the big scheme of things it would be almost negligible.
Cheers,
Biff
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GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
We should also keep in mind that the USN had active carriers in the Atlantic, especially in the convoy lanes.
So the chance of intercept does not only lie within range of the North American coastline.
So the chance of intercept does not only lie within range of the North American coastline.
ThomasP
Senior Master Sergeant
Early Warning escort carrier line. Interesting.
Maybe the US Atlantic Barrier and Texas Tower Network start 10-15 years earlier.
Maybe the US Atlantic Barrier and Texas Tower Network start 10-15 years earlier.
