Prior 1942: ideal fighters for USAAC

[renrich]

According to Dean, the first flight of the F4F4 with power folding wings and six guns takes place in April, 1941. British Martlets which I believe had four guns shot down several FW200s in 1941. When Grumman revised the F4F4 with folding wings and four guns the weight loss was 500 pounds.

 

[tomo pauk]

Seems that Holy book has arrived il

Until I lay my greedy fingers at it, P-66 airframe + V-1710. Performance hopefully closer to P-39 than to P-40, 4 HMG, good range (even for historical P-66). P-51 can have it's Packard Merlins

 

[davparlr]

Seems that Holy book has arrived il

Until I lay my greedy fingers at it, P-66 airframe + V-1710. Performance hopefully closer to P-39 than to P-40, 4 HMG, good range (even for historical P-66). P-51 can have it's Packard Merlins

The P-66 with an allison? I like it. It should outperform the P-40, I think. But I still prefer the P-51/A. It was a great low altitude performer, probably the best in '42, and had potential for being a great fighter. Put those allisons in the P-51 airframe!

 

[tomo pauk]

Do not worry - your P-51s will still have it's Allisons (still named P-51A), augmented with other P-51s (let's call them P-51B) with V-1650s as soon they're available.
So we can deploy P-43s (and P-38s) in high altitude, P-51As and P-66s* under 15K, with P-51Bs in between. But that's second half of 1942 we talk about.

*P-66 with better version of Twin Wasp would be cool, too.

 

[parsifal]

advocating less firepower with pilots not able to hold target for long is a mistake, whether that be USN or RN. The only time that reducing armament makes sense is if you are confident that your pilots and their machines are superior to those of the enemy.

notwithstanding the comments by Lundstrom, or by thach, or anybody else for that matter, it would be a brave advocate to try and argue the USN was superior to its adversaries in any category, including the much vaunted (and totally unproven) claims about their prowess in deflection shootiong at the outbreak of the war. There is no evidence of any such superiority that I have seen.

On the other hand, the problems confronting the FAA at this time are very self evident. Seldom called on to mix it with enemy fighters, always with limited nubers on board, and needing to shoot down or disable a large number of strike aircraft in a short space of time, it made sense to pack as much firepower into fewer airframes. By concentrating the firepower in this way, greater fleet protection was afforded to the RN, which was THE mission. Reducing the number of guns, so as to achieve a higher performance only made sense if the mission was air superiority and a need to engage enemy fighters on an even basisl. Later, as british carriers engaged in such operations, this did tend to be a consideration, but by that stage the axis pilot quality and numbers had reduced, and the allied pilot quality and numbers had increased.

if the foremost USN pilot was advocating decreased firepower in preference to better peformance at a time when the pilot numbers airframe performance were down, and the enmy pilot numbers, and airframe quality were higher, then thach was making a mistake in solving the fleet problem, which is not to engage and defeat the enmy fighters, or even to shoot down large numbers of enemy aircraft. Primary objective of the fighters in the CAG under those conditions is the survival of key assets (the carriers), and you do this with firepower, not with fancy flying.

The british were right to specify firepower and survivability in the martlet II specification over flying performance for their fleet air arm. In this regard their doctrine was ahead of that allegedly being proposed by the Americans in this early war period. later on, thach's ideas were greatly benficial, but it was absolutely the wrong doctrine to pursue when you were outnumbered, outgunned and outflown by the enemy

 

[gjs238]

As usually, a what-if

So you are mover shaker in USAAC, and you want to have best hardware, in good numbers, for your service country. What 2 types would you choose to build, with main parts to be Made in USA? So no DB 601s, no Hispano 20mm etc.
The two types would be a kind of hi-low mix, one featuring the best combo US companies had to offer, and second featuring more 'common' parts, so your government can sell stuff abroad more easily economically.
As stated, you need a good force of fighter planes before 1942. Choice is not restricted to the types historically available, so you can mix match parts.

EDIT: Since I agree with our Shortround6 that P-38 P-40 were good choices, I'd like to alter the thread so that it covers only SINGLE engined jobs. Still 2 types (hi-tech off-the-shelf) required

The P-43, or varients thereof, are interesting options to consider.
Interesting are the R-2180-1 Twin Hornet powered P-44 Rocket and the suggestion of a V-1710 powered P-43.
I seem to remember there being reliability issues with the turbocharger and wet wings, but I wonder if resolving those issues were given low priority in favor of other projects. If so, then the P-43 or a P-43 varient could have been a contender for the context of this thread.

The P-51 is also tempting to consider.
The V-1710 powered version would fit the bill for this thread. The V-1650 powered version could still have evolved later.
Similar to the priority/interest issues with the P-43, I wonder how much more early war potential the P-51 could have had with earlier and greater American interest.

The P-40 is also worthwhile.
Like with the previous two planes, earlier and greater interest in performance improvements could have made a world of difference.
For example, were P-40 airframes built to the acceleration standard of 8.33 g (82 m/s²)? What if they were reduced to the British standard of 5.33 g (52 m/s²)?

 

[renrich]

So, if Lundstrom's research is valid and the USN was the only air force in the world which extensively trained their pilots for FULL deflection gunnery runs prior to and early during WW2 and if his research indicated that one reason for that lack of training in full deflection shooting was poor visibility over the nose, that still does not constitute any proof of superior gunnery skills by USN trained pilots. Hmmmmm! I agree that if Lundstrom is full of hooey and his research is incomplete or incorrect and I see proof of that, then he is wrong. However, since I have seen no one on this forum post any proof that he is wrong in that area and since he is a highly respected historian and since his books appear to be extremely well researched with lots of back up. I have no choice but to believe him. I believe that anyone who thoroughly reads his books would be convinced also without substantial proof to the contrary.

The mission of the fighting squadrons in the USN in 1941-42 was to protect the fleet and enable the striking power of the carriers to decimate the enemy. If carrying four guns with more ammunition made the fighters more lethal because of longer firing times and better performance because of less weight then the USN and Thach were correct. The Wildcat which was all they had in 1941-42 was already performance challenged and if carrying more guns for a momentary increase of firepower resulted in a fighter which would have even more difficulty in getting into position to begin using it's firepower, that was a mistake. The USN realised that which was why some F4Fs and all later FMs reverted to the four guns with increased ammunition. That situation is made abundantly clear in "The First Team."

 

[Shortround6]

The P-43?
P-W had pretty much decided the R-2180 was a dead end. Think of it as a 14 cylinder R-2800. Bigger and heaver than the R-1830 with only 200-250 more HP on offer at the time. Higher grade fuels and water injection come later. The R-2800 offers About 28% more power for the same frontal area. The R-2180 is only going to give a small increase in performance and then have to be replaced anyway. The reliability issues are pretty much the same ones as all US turboed aircraft had at the time. A poor turbo control used at the insistence of the US army. Changing from the wet wing to a normal wing and tank structure may have required redesigning the area of the wing in question and retooling. Not a good use of effort if the pane was't going to be made in quantity.

P-51 with Allison?
More use could have been made of it by US forces but it doesn't solve the problem the US forces had at the time. Lack of fighter that could operate at 15,000-25,000ft.

Flimsy P-40?
Even if you lighten up the structure by several hundred pounds the plane is still Heavier than a Spitfire or 109 with the same power. Speed will be nearly the same, climb and turn will both be better but will they be enough better? It won't take battle damage as well or rough handling on bad airfields.

 

[gjs238]

Flimsy P-40?
Even if you lighten up the structure by several hundred pounds the plane is still Heavier than a Spitfire or 109 with the same power. Speed will be nearly the same, climb and turn will both be better but will they be enough better? It won't take battle damage as well or rough handling on bad airfields.

Does that argument apply to the P-51H as well?

 

[gjs238]

The P-43?
P-W had pretty much decided the R-2180 was a dead end. Think of it as a 14 cylinder R-2800.

R-2800 isn't available yet, so when considering P-43 what does that leave one with?

 

[gjs238]

P-51 with Allison?
More use could have been made of it by US forces but it doesn't solve the problem the US forces had at the time. Lack of fighter that could operate at 15,000-25,000ft.

Yup! May very well have been superior to P-40; P-39; Hurricane; and at low altitude, several others. The range endurance would have been very useful.

 

[Shortround6]

Does that argument apply to the P-51H as well?

Check with Drgondog but I don't think the P-51H was stressed quite as low as 5.33 "G"s.

With issuing of "G" suits that would mean an awful lot of bent airplanes even with
G" meters.

 

[Shortround6]

"R-2800 isn't available yet, so when considering P-43 what does that leave one with?"

It leaves one with the Historical choice. wait a few months for the R-2800 rather than build hundreds of in-between fighters that are going to be nothing but expensive trainers by 1943.
By the time you redesign the front of the P-43 to take the R-2180 (let alone wait for P-W to tool up for it, with a total of 30 built I doubt there was ever any "production tooling" ) rebalanced the airframe, extend fuselage or enlarge the tail for the extra power (not a big deal maybe just another sq ft or two) and redesign the wing or redo fuselage to put fuel tank in the fuselage like the P-47 you have lost a number of months of production from the P-43 and are that much closer to the real P-47 coming on line. The point is you are just not going to shove the R-2180 into the P-43 without several months of real design work (not sketches and estimates) and the manufacture of new tooling, jigs and fixtures, most of which will just be thrown away or modified when production of the P-47 starts. How many hundreds of thousands of dollars and thousands of engineering/draftsman manhours do you spend on what you know is an "interim" airplane.

 

[parsifal]

So, if Lundstrom's research is valid and the USN was the only air force in the world which extensively trained their pilots for FULL deflection gunnery runs prior to and early during WW2 and if his research indicated that one reason for that lack of training in full deflection shooting was poor visibility over the nose, that still does not constitute any proof of superior gunnery skills by USN trained pilots. Hmmmmm! I agree that if Lundstrom is full of hooey and his research is incomplete or incorrect and I see proof of that, then he is wrong. However, since I have seen no one on this forum post any proof that he is wrong in that area and since he is a highly respected historian and since his books appear to be extremely well researched with lots of back up. I have no choice but to believe him. I believe that anyone who thoroughly reads his books would be convinced also without substantial proof to the contrary.

The mission of the fighting squadrons in the USN in 1941-42 was to protect the fleet and enable the striking power of the carriers to decimate the enemy. If carrying four guns with more ammunition made the fighters more lethal because of longer firing times and better performance because of less weight then the USN and Thach were correct. The Wildcat which was all they had in 1941-42 was already performance challenged and if carrying more guns for a momentary increase of firepower resulted in a fighter which would have even more difficulty in getting into position to begin using it's firepower, that was a mistake. The USN realised that which was why some F4Fs and all later FMs reverted to the four guns with increased ammunition. That situation is made abundantly clear in "The First Team."

Lundstrom is a good source, and Thach was a good tactician and pilot. Dont misread what I am saying. But what is missing is evidence that US naval avaition was markedly better than other air arms. One would expect that in that first six months of combat, up to Midway, that if this training in deflection shooting was such a marked advantage, and the f4f-3 such a great improvement over the F4F-4/MartletII, then there would a significant loss rate amongst the USNs opponents, in air to air combat. I dont think there is any such evidence. In fact I am guessing that in some respects it may even be a little less successful, but that is not part of my submission.

Compare that to the RNs experience. In the period 1940-41, they basically had five main types of fighter: the Skua, the Gladiator, the Fulmar, the Sea Hurricane and the martlet I. Gladiator was the least well armed, followed by the Skua, followed by Martlet I, followed by both the Fulmar and Hurricane on an equal basis. Gladiator was actually a better performer than the Skua, and was at least comparable to the Fulmar. Yet it was not very effective compared to either of these types, because it lacked the firepower to be an effective bomber destroyer. Fulmars were very effective at this, or at least in breaking up axis attacks provided there were no enemy fighters to contend with. even when there were, they still managed to do their job. The British knew what was needed to keep the bombers away from their carriers. Firepower, or perhaps more accurately described as the number of guns. If the gladiator could have retained its performance and carried an eight gun broadside it would have been as effective as its erstwhile replacements. And because at this time Axis attackers like the SM-79 were unarmoured, it didnt matter if the guns were 7.7 or 12.7mm, they both would do about the same level of damage. This was the logic that drove the brits to require a minimum 6 gun broadside in the martlet II. It should have been the same in the USN, but it met resistance, rooted i believe in the mahanist theories (transferred to an airborne context) of achieving the decisive battle at the earliest opportunity. In the context of 1940-42 this was absolutely the wrong strategy to be pursuing.

 

[Glider]

Compare that to the RNs experience. In the period 1940-41, they basically had five main types of fighter: the Skua, the Gladiator, the Fulmar, the Sea Hurricane and the martlet I. Gladiator was the least well armed, followed by the Skua, followed by Martlet I, followed by both the Fulmar and Hurricane on an equal basis.

In order of Firepower I thought the order should be
1) Sea Hurricane IIC plus the odd IC = 4 x 20mm cannon
2) Martlet 4 x 0.5 (this was the view of the pilots who flew them who considered the 4 x 0.5 to be far better than 8 x LMG)
3) Sea Hurricane 8 x LMG
4) Gladiator and Skua both with 4 x LMG

Gladiator was actually a better performer than the Skua, and was at least comparable to the Fulmar. Yet it was not very effective compared to either of these types, because it lacked the firepower to be an effective bomber destroyer. Fulmars were very effective at this, or at least in breaking up axis attacks provided there were no enemy fighters to contend with. even when there were, they still managed to do their job. The British knew what was needed to keep the bombers away from their carriers. Firepower, or perhaps more accurately described as the number of guns.

I agree with most of the above until the words or perhaps more accuractely described as the number of guns.Firepower Yes, number of guns No. Skuas and Gladiators did pretty well in Norway as armour and self sealing tanks were as rare as hens teeth and 4 x LMG could do the job. Roll on to the Med and the situation changes and 8 x LMG is a bare minimum whilst 4 x LMG doesn't cut it. Its worth remembering that the RN squadron leader on Sicily wanted more Buffalos to replace his Fulmars dure to their poor performance. He wasn't worried about having 4 x HMG instead of 8 x LMG.

If the gladiator could have retained its performance and carried an eight gun broadside it would have been as effective as its erstwhile replacements. And because at this time Axis attackers like the SM-79 were unarmoured, it didnt matter if the guns were 7.7 or 12.7mm, they both would do about the same level of damage.

4 x HMG will always do more damage than 4 x LMG if only because of the extra penetration, energy and effective range. The SM79 may not have been armoured but the Ju87, He111 and Ju88 were.

This was the logic that drove the brits to require a minimum 6 gun broadside in the martlet II. It should have been the same in the USN, but it met resistance, rooted i believe in the mahanist theories (transferred to an airborne context) of achieving the decisive battle at the earliest opportunity. In the context of 1940-42 this was absolutely the wrong strategy to be pursuing.

I knonw this has been said a number of times but I still cannot believe that the RN should get the blame for the 6 guns on the Martlet II. If they were 6 x LMG then I could understand it, (I believe it was the French who asked for that) but if the RN were happy with 4 x HMG why would they insist on 6?

 

[gjs238]

"R-2800 isn't available yet, so when considering P-43 what does that leave one with?"

It leaves one with the Historical choice. wait a few months for the R-2800 rather than build hundreds of in-between fighters that are going to be nothing but expensive trainers by 1943.
By the time you redesign the front of the P-43 to take the R-2180 (let alone wait for P-W to tool up for it, with a total of 30 built I doubt there was ever any "production tooling" ) rebalanced the airframe, extend fuselage or enlarge the tail for the extra power (not a big deal maybe just another sq ft or two) and redesign the wing or redo fuselage to put fuel tank in the fuselage like the P-47 you have lost a number of months of production from the P-43 and are that much closer to the real P-47 coming on line. The point is you are just not going to shove the R-2180 into the P-43 without several months of real design work (not sketches and estimates) and the manufacture of new tooling, jigs and fixtures, most of which will just be thrown away or modified when production of the P-47 starts. How many hundreds of thousands of dollars and thousands of engineering/draftsman manhours do you spend on what you know is an "interim" airplane.

The context of this thread is prior-1942, so waiting for the R-2800 and the P-47 isn't a viable solution, unless there is another what-if scenario to dramatically speed their development.

 

[parsifal]

hi glider

I doubt that Ju87s in 1940-41 were armoured. I think that came later. i believe ju-88s were armoured, and he 111s maybe, but again more likley in 1942.

if so, then having moree guns firing is abetter outcome than having heavier guns. in terms of weight of shell, the 50s have it, but in an unarmoured target i think its the amount of lead bits flying around in the cockpit, not the amount of damage each shell does. perhaps not, but in any case, having six heavies over 4 heavies is abetter bomber destroyer than having 4 x heavies. you dont need a lot of performance for abomber destroyer, infact its a bit of a handicap if you have overperforming fighters.

lastly, I thought Sea hurricanes (at least the first ones) had LMGs as main armment. are you sure they were carrying 20mm cannon in the Sea hurri. if so, you are dead right about their firepower

 

[tomo pauk]

In th context of P-39, and it's allegedly cramped interior prohibiting installation of a more potent supercharger set:
The picture attached shows plenty of space between engine/embedded supercharger and oil tank elongated bottle, item 14 here). The small bottle (item no. 13 here is coolant expansion bottle) could've been easily removed eg. under pilot's seat. The possible position of air intake for supercharger is here depicted in orange (the 'tube' running under exhaust pipes); the location of neccesarry inter/after cooler is above the space provided for supercharger set.

 

[Glider]

hi glider

I doubt that Ju87s in 1940-41 were armoured. I think that came later. i believe ju-88s were armoured, and he 111s maybe, but again more likley in 1942.

if so, then having moree guns firing is abetter outcome than having heavier guns. in terms of weight of shell, the 50s have it, but in an unarmoured target i think its the amount of lead bits flying around in the cockpit, not the amount of damage each shell does. perhaps not, but in any case, having six heavies over 4 heavies is abetter bomber destroyer than having 4 x heavies. you dont need a lot of performance for abomber destroyer, infact its a bit of a handicap if you have overperforming fighters.

lastly, I thought Sea hurricanes (at least the first ones) had LMGs as main armment. are you sure they were carrying 20mm cannon in the Sea hurri. if so, you are dead right about their firepower

I admit that I don't know about the protection of the Ju87B but my guess is that it would have been retrofitted for the BOB. 109's He 111 and Ju88's were and I don't see why they would have been left out of the upgrade. However by the time of the Med battles I am sure they would have been. If I remember correctly the Ju87D was often used in the Med and that had protection.
By this time all German aircraft were protected and the advantage of more 303's vs fewer very effective 0.50 had gone. Its been mentioned on other threads that the British test fired 92 303 rounds at an Me109F aimed at the pilot/engine area from the rear and only two of them caused what was termed as potentially fatal damage. By this time the 303 as an effective weapon for air to air combat was gone. If and its a big if, you could get 92 hits with 8 x 303 this would be approx 30 hits with 4 x 0.5 and of those 30 hits I am confident more than 2 would be fatal.

You are correct when you say that the early Sea hurricanes had 8 x 303 which is why they were third on my list, but some carried 4 x 20 and clearly were first.

 

[drgondog]

No, SR is correct - the P-51H was designed to 11G Ultimate/7.32 Limit @ 8,000 pounds.. the primary difference was landing G load allowable which decreased from 6.5 G to 4.5G for extreme landing load.

For all practical reasons the distinction from the P-51H 7.3 G Limit load to the P-51D 8G limit load, after both a/c were loaded to combat weights, was negligible because the H airframe started out 500 pounds less than the D... with a full internal load the H weighed ~ 600 pounds less than the D