Questions about B-29 operational range, VVS, VVS intercept capability if Operation Unthinkable happen.

Said it before and I'll say it again, I love this place. In a thread about the B-29 and it's ability to whack soviet russia and the vvs' ability to intercept said Superforts, look where we are in the discussion.

Heck of a great discussion boys, keep it up.

bf109xxl said:

This is a deployment under the guise of a military exercise, not a command staff exercise ( military games)

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A Military Game is the same as a Military Exercise.

The only real difference is that a Military Game does not have a predictable outcome, where a Military Exercise is aimed more at training within or between branches and/or coordination between militaries.

But either still involves massed men and equipment regardless of the label applied, no?

GrauGeist said:

A Military Game is the same as a Military Exercise.
The only real difference is that a Military Game does not have a predictable outcome, where a Military Exercise is aimed more at training within or between branches and/or coordination between militaries.
But either still involves massed men and equipment regardless of the label applied, no?

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I apologize for the inaccurate wording - I am not fluent enough in English military terminology, but I did make it clear that these were staff exercises - war games on maps, not actual troop excersises.
The Soviets used hidden mobilization under the guise of exercises for reservists in 1939. There were also planned exercises for reservists in 1941, but they were not part of hidden mobilization - and the timing, scale, and conditions were radically different from 1939.
The devil is in the details. You have to read Soviet documents carefully to understand exactly what they are talking about. I follow this discussion for almost 25 years - not as a specialist, just out of curiosity. But I try not to miss serious publications on the subject.

Dimlee said:

My Dad graduated from the Naval College in 1945. Their study program was abruptly changed just months before graduation and cadets were sent to train as marines and to practice landings on the beaches of the Caspian Sea. They learned to drive lend leased Jeeps, fired machine guns etc. Then they were back to their studies and exams. It has never been explained.

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In 1945 the US trans continental rail links could not handle the volume of material required for operations Olympic/Coronet, meaning ships were loaded on the US east coast and sent through the Panama Canal. The trans Siberia link had much less capacity. The USSR therefore expected to make full use of Lend Lease materials shipped direct to the far east as it mounted a series of amphibious operations to take the islands north of the Japanese main islands before any attacks further south.

Dimlee said:

In 2010-2012, several Genshtab documents with maps were discovered in central archives. Military games of 1940-1941 and invasion plans. Mark Solonin has covered this subject extensively in his last books and articles.

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What country war games or plans on an assumption an enemy army will penetrate deeply into the country?

Dimlee said:

Just let me state the facts: after years of ridiculing Suvorov's theory, a number of his critics in the Russian historical community after they got access to archives in the late 1990s-2000s have (silently) agreed that the USSR did plan to strike first. And discussion moved on - to the possible dates, areas of operations, etc. Mikhail Meltukhov was one of the most reputable names on that list.

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If they are silent how does anyone know they changed their minds? Strike first in 1941 or 1942 or later? That the USSR had plans for an attack on Nazi Germany is unremarkable, that they did not intend to do so in mid 1941 is shown by dispositions and supplies. I note from the Wiki article Meltyukhov decides the USSR was always being provoked by Poland, nothing the other way, and the Red Army was on a peacekeeping mission in Poland, this is consistent with believing the Red Army was better than it was in 1941, not short of all sorts of equipment, supplies, trained troops and competent commanders, caught by surprise, but unlucky enough to be hit when the ready to go ready to win offensive dispositions were at their most vulnerable to counter attacks. Bad luck, accident of timing, could happen to anyone.

The French military would be a lot better in 1941, including better trained reserve troops manning the expected quiet sector along the Meuse, their forces being largely on the borders, like Red Army in 1941, were obviously heading for Germany as soon as the shooting started. Bad luck, accident of timing, could happen to anyone.

To repeat OKH and OKW did not detect signs of a Red Army offensive in mid 1941, the build up of the supplies required to launch an attack with millions of troops is very hard to hide. There were plenty of Red Army troops on the borders, mostly in the south, digging in, consistent with the idea, like most countries, including Poland and France, of stopping the enemy from entering the country, think WWI rates of advance against opposition. In Stalin's USSR creating defensive plans could be considered defeatist, rather like what happened to the Heer commanders later in the war, worthy of punishment, best to assume the army would indeed stop the enemy at the borders, followed by the victorious offensive.

The areas Stalin took in 1939/1940 were done after Germany signed a treaty that largely allowed Stalin to take those areas.

20 August 1939, Red Army counter attack on Japanese forces in Mongolia begins.
31 August, Japanese forces on the USSR's idea of Mongolian territory have been destroyed.
1 September 1939, Germany attacks Poland
16 September USSR Japan cease fire in Mongolia comes into effect
17 September, Red Army enters Poland
19 September, Red and German armies meet at Brest-Litovsk
29 September, revision of Nazi-Soviet pact, Lithuania to USSR, demarcation line in Poland moved east to the Narew-Bug-San rivers. USSR Estonia "mutual assistance" pact signed.
5 October USSR Latvia "mutual assistance" pact signed.
10 October USSR Lithuania "mutual assistance" pact signed, parts of pre war Poland, including Vilna (annexed by Poland in 1922), are moved to Lithuania.
12 October the USSR Finland negotiations start. The USSR wants a territory swap, but has little interest in real negotiations.
30 November the USSR invades Finland.
12 March 1940 the USSR Finland treaty is signed.
10 May German attack in the west.
9 June USSR Japan border agreement.
14 and 15 June USSR ultimatums to Baltic states followed by occupation.
22 June French Armistice is signed.
25 June French Armistice comes into effect.
26 June USSR ultimatum to Romania, Hitler urges acceptance.

28 June USSR occupies Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Bessarabia was covered in the Nazi-Soviet agreement, Bukovina was not, and that upset Hitler who felt he had no choice and then became officially worried about the Romanian oil fields. This is despite it was losing Bessarabia that put Ploesti at greater risk, basically halving the distance between it and the Soviet border, yet Meltyukhov believes it is only then Hitler figured out the threat. Later in 1941 the Soviets protested but otherwise did nothing as large numbers of German troops were sent to Romania. Hitler's ideas for lebensraum in the east and the destruction of the USSR date to the 1920's.

German divisions were transferred east after the fall of France due mostly to army suspicion about the USSR

13 July OKH gets word of Hitler's idea Britain is hoping for USSR intervention, and moves to flesh out plans to invade the USSR.
21 July Hitler announces his intention to attack the USSR to Wehrmacht commanders.
31 July Hitler noted a decisive defeat of Britain was required but that might be done by eliminating the USSR.
The Baltic countries are formally annexed to the USSR in July and August 1940.
27 September Tripartite Pact signed.
23 October Hitler meets Franco
24 October Hitler meets Petain.
28 October Hitler meets Mussolini. Italy attacks Greece, Britain now has friendly airfields in theoretical range of Ploesti.
12 November Molotov arrives in Berlin, talks do not go well.
20 November Hungary joins the tripartite pact
23 November Romania joins the tripartite pact
5 December invasion plan put to Hitler who disagrees Moscow should be the main objective, despite it being a unanimous conclusion of the OKH and the independent studies of staff from three army groups

21 December Hitler directive 21, Barbarossa plan
17 March 1941, Hitler alters the plans so Army Group South will only do one thrust, not two, as clearing the Baltic coast was a major objective, but also the Norwegian garrison should be reinforced, diluting strength in Finland.

In mid 1941 the Red Army allocated large numbers of vehicles away from combat units to construction ones to enable the digging of fortifications. In the final weeks before Barbarossa forward Red Army commanders could tell what was happening on the other side of the border and repeatedly requested to be allowed to move to better defensive positions.

Early April 1941 Red Army frontier troops are becoming aware of the German troops on the borders.

6 April Germany invades Yugoslavia
13 April USSR Japanese neutrality pact.
28 April allied troops leave Greece.
15 May Zhukov is worried enough he proposes a pre emptive strike, given the weather meant the mud season had not ended in the north and the rivers were running high, how far an attack by either side would have gone is a good question.

Apparently the Red Army was so much better than the Heer, no detection of all the supplies moving, despite the Germans having air reconnaissance and the Red Army none, no detection by German troops on the border of preparations for an attack, with Red Army mechanised units apparently able to complete quick route marches from deeper in the USSR arriving in fighting order ready to enter combat without being detected by the Luftwaffe. Also as of 12 June the German army in the east is supposed to be disorganised enough there was a good chance a Red Army attack would have succeeded, despite the Barbarossa planning deadline of mid May and the well known delays due to late rains, but the troops sent to the Balkans largely came from Army Group South and operations out of Romania did not start for about another week. Where was the invasion of Romania on 23 June?

Barbarossa competes for the title the biggest mistake Hitler made, as a result since probably the 1940's the haters of communism, the admirers of German forces and the followers of the wrong side lost WWII in Europe crowd began circulating ideas that Stalin was coming in 1941, so not a Hitler mistake but a good move, now we have people trying to paint the Red Army as so ready for a major offensive it fell to pieces in the north when attacked and was unable to carry out offensive operations in the south, including on the undisturbed Romanian front.

In 1944 the Germans had been accustomed to attacks by the Ukraine fronts and kept careful watch on key offensive armies, meantime in the north the Red Army added a few more units, less than those in the south, but brought all units up to (rare) full strength, on the strategic map counting units it was obvious the Red Army was going to attack in the south, on the ground the northern forces were now 2 or 3 or more times more powerful than earlier in the year. Operation Bagration, the destruction of Army Group Centre followed. Bad luck, accident of timing, could happen to anyone. Given the 1941 ideas that lots of troops near the front without relevant transport and supplies equals preparing for offensive action, Army Group Centre was clearly ready to launch attacks towards Moscow.

Try Stalin knew the Germans were desperate to avoid a two front war, were in great need of the supplies the USSR was sending and wanted more, needed 1941 to finish off the British, summer in particular to attack Britain directly, the Red Army was not ready, since Stalin did not want a 1941 war so did Hitler but Britain at least did want the two to fight, letting the Luftwaffe see the Red Army dispositions was a good way to minimise accidents, strangely enough the people around Stalin agreed, at least in public, and the repressive system Stalin commanded made sure people followed Stalin's wishes.

One of the Red Air Force problems in 1941 was the need for better airfields for the next generation of aircraft, concrete runways for example, limiting their deployments. Also the reported 1941 offensive has the Red Air Force smothering the Luftwaffe bases to a depth of hundreds of km, like the allies did later in the west, not like the Red Air Force in 1941-45 of largely ignoring the enemy air force bases.

Geoffrey Sinclair said:

If they are silent how does anyone know they changed their minds? Strike first in 1941 or 1942 or later? That the USSR had plans for an attack on Nazi Germany is unremarkable, that they did not intend to do so in mid 1941 is shown by dispositions and supplies. I note from the Wiki article Meltyukhov decides the USSR was always being provoked by Poland, nothing the other way, and the Red Army was on a peacekeeping mission in Poland, this is consistent with believing the Red Army was better than it was in 1941, not short of all sorts of equipment, supplies, trained troops and competent commanders, caught by surprise, but unlucky enough to be hit when the ready to go ready to win offensive dispositions were at their most vulnerable to counter attacks. Bad luck, accident of timing, could happen to anyone.

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This is an inexhaustible topic worthy of a separate thread. But, to be honest, I have not heard anything new from proponents of the "preventive war" version in the last 15 years. Usually they are those who were charmed by quite impressive propaganda by Rezun (Suvorov) or Solonin, but who have not personally read any document. Since some time I became lazy to participate in such discussions, as I did not learn anything new in them. And here I showed weakness, which I reproach myself for.

bf109xxl said:

It has nothing to do with the planning of the aggression in Europe.

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USSR needs the bases in the Turkish Straits and control over Iran for certain reasons. Those reasons remain unknown and we are free to speculate.

bf109xxl said:

The explanation may be not so complicated: the Soviets were informed about the plans of the Operation Unthinkable in May 1945.

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Young cadets who were supposed to become Navy officers have been hastily trained in the landings on the beaches and handling vehicles and infantry arms. And no, it was before the Unthinkable. As far as I know, no historian has ever mentioned those strange trainings, so - again - we can only speculate.

bf109xxl said:

Which exactly documents with invasion plans? Military games cannot be recognized as invasion plans.

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Of course, they cannot. I wrote: "and plans". As for the contents of the documents, I could refer to the works of Solonin who was the first to publish them. But you consider him as "not serious", so we reached a dead end.

bf109xxl said:

Solonin does not follow a scientific approach and is not a serious historian. He is very biased and manipulates facts. Despite his education as an aeronautical engineer, even in this field he reveals dilettantism.

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He is biased as much as most if not all, historians in the USSR. Like it or not, most of us who were born and raised in the USSR are biased. On the spectrum of anti-Soviet to pro-Soviet, we tend to stick to the ends.
As for the "seriousness" - agree to disagree.

bf109xxl said:

That's not true.

Some of Meltyukhov's theses were not supported by documents or facts. I have read his books, and in some places he makes rather strange assumptions and suppositions, which are not justified. But he is undoubtedly a researcher, which means you can debate with him.

V.B.Rezun's ideas have been rejected in the scientific community - at least in Europe, in Russia, as I know, too.

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As said, no holy wars for me. Not again, after 25+ years.
But please refrain from declarations as "not true". We are all mature adults here.

Dimlee said:

USSR needs the bases in the Turkish Straits and control over Iran for certain reasons. Those reasons remain unknown and we are free to speculate.

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Russia and then USSR always wanted to control the Straits - nothing new.

Dimlee said:

And no, it was before the Unthinkable. As far as I know, no historian has ever mentioned those strange trainings, so - again - we can only speculate.

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When exactly? In April? Cadets may have been needed for skilled work on supply lines to increase throughput, for example.

Dimlee said:

Of course, they cannot. I wrote: "and plans". As for the contents of the documents, I could refer to the works of Solonin who was the first to publish them. But you consider him as "not serious", so we reached a dead end.

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Solonin is pure propagandist. But if he refers any documents, we can discuss them.

Dimlee said:

He is biased as much as most if not all, historians in the USSR.

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That's not true. Moreover, don't forget that the most historians in Europe denies this hypothesis - and first of all, German historians. And they had the opportunity to have a completely unbiased discussion.

Dimlee said:

Like it or not, most of us who were born and raised in the USSR are biased. On the spectrum of anti-Soviet to pro-Soviet, we tend to stick to the ends.
As for the "seriousness" - agree to disagree.

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I consider myself rather anti-Soviet, but I have an extremely negative attitude to the "preventive war" hypothesis. I am ready to agree with anything, but only with a solid argumentation within the scope of a scientific approach. After many years of work in science, I can quite clearly distinguish between a scientific approach and an unscientific one.

Dimlee said:

As said, no holy wars for me. Not again, after 25+ years.
But please refrain from declarations as "not true". We are all mature adults here.

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Mature adults operate with references to documents, not emotions. If you propose a thesis, you must provide evidence. References to modern journalistic materials are not that.

Geoffrey Sinclair said:

In 1945 the US trans continental rail links could not handle the volume of material required for operations Olympic/Coronet, meaning ships were loaded on the US east coast and sent through the Panama Canal. The trans Siberia link had much less capacity. The USSR therefore expected to make full use of Lend Lease materials shipped direct to the far east as it mounted a series of amphibious operations to take the islands north of the Japanese main islands before any attacks further south.

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If you mean that the cadets in Baku were prepared for the landings in Kurils or Korea, I can consider it as a plausible scenario - one of several. However, there was no lack of Soviet manpower in the Far East in 1945. Maybe they did it "just in case". But why involve the future Navy officers in the infantry/marine ops? There was the precedent in 1942 when hundreds of cadets (some were 15 y.o.) were sent to the frontlines from the same college. But it was a desperate move due to the situation in the Caucasus and even then, most of them were returned to their studies - allegedly after Kuznetsov complained to Stalin.

Geoffrey Sinclair said:

If they are silent how does anyone know they changed their minds? Strike first in 1941 or 1942 or later? That the USSR had plans for an attack on Nazi Germany is unremarkable, that they did not intend to do so in mid 1941 is shown by dispositions and supplies.

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What I mean is that the Russian-language (in ex-USSR) historical community agreed with the thesis of the Soviet offensive plans against Germany. Once more work in the archives was done, it has become a common knowledge. As for the dates, the debate was and probably is still ongoing.

About the rest of your commentary. Thank you for taking your time and sharing your knowledge. The subject of the Red Army catastrophe and plans in 1941 is a complicated subject and is off-topic here.
My apologies if my short remark caused the off-topic.

bf109xxl said:

I consider myself rather anti-Soviet, but I have an extremely negative attitude to the "preventive war" hypothesis

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I didn't mention the "preventive war" at all.

bf109xxl said:

If you propose a thesis, you must provide evidence

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Sorry, I'm lost here and I don't understand what you want from me. If you need the evidence of the Genshtab papers, they are in the archives. If you need numbers/pages/other details, they are in the works of historians who studied those papers.

Overall, I'm surprised that my short remark about documents from 2010-2012 was blown out of proportion.
Thanks for the conversation. I stop here.

Dimlee said:

What I mean is that the Russian-language (in ex-USSR) historical community agreed with the thesis of the Soviet offensive plans against Germany. Once more work in the archives was done, it has become a common knowledge. As for the dates, the debate was and probably is still ongoing.

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Are you sure you can speak for the entire Russian-speaking historical community? I'm sure of the opposite. And I believe that this statement does not correspond to reality in the smallest degree. Moreover, by the mid-2010s these ideas were already little discussed in the historical community, as most of those fascinated by Rezun (Suvorov) have grown up and read more than one book on the subject.

Dimlee said:

I didn't mention the "preventive war" at all.

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It's just another name for the thesis, better known in Europe.

Dimlee said:

Sorry, I'm lost here and I don't understand what you want from me. If you need the evidence of the Genshtab papers, they are in the archives.

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You mean Solonin doesn't operate with documents? Then why do you consider him a historian?

Dimlee said:

If you need numbers/pages/other details, they are in the works of historians who studied those papers.

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I'd like to see references - either to documents or scientific publications.

bf109xxl said:

Are you sure you can speak for the entire Russian-speaking historical community? I'm sure of the opposite.

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I believe Dimlee is much better qualified to speak about Russian/Soviet topics than the rest of us, here.

GrauGeist said:

I believe Dimlee is much better qualified to speak about Russian/Soviet topics than the rest of us, here.

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But not me. All I'm saying is that I know the Russian-speaking historical community quite well and have followed its evolution over the last 25 years. I agree with my opponent that many Russian-speaking historians are biased, but not all. There are historians whom I can't stand as individuals, we have completely different political views, but when they operate with documents and facts within the scope of a scientific approach, I don't reject their arguments.

PS. I don't dislike Mark Solonin as a person, our political views are close, but .... Anyone who is on the light side of the Force must be holier than the Pope. Therefore, I am completely intolerant to unscientific approach.

bf109xxl said:

Mature adults operate with references to documents, not emotions. If you propose a thesis, you must provide evidence. References to modern journalistic materials are not that.

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On the other hand, this is a friend based community. It will shine you star a bit more just being a tad more friendly in discussing in this thread.
Now i do not shy away from any discussion nor for asking if i do not understand or do not agree.

A bit more polite will not undermine what you are asking or saying.

Reading your posts here and elsewhere on this board ( yes i do) i know you are not a novice by a length.
So may i ask to be just a little more polite even when you do not agree.
It fouls up a good thread wich i find a pitty.

Thank you.

Snautzer01 said:

On the other hand, this is a friend based community. It will shine you star a bit more just being a tad more friendly in discussing in this thread.
Now i do not shy away from any discussion nor for asking if i do not understand or do not agree.

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You're right. And I have to apologize again.

Dimlee said:

If you mean that the cadets in Baku were prepared for the landings in Kurils or Korea, I can consider it as a plausible scenario - one of several. However, there was no lack of Soviet manpower in the Far East in 1945. Maybe they did it "just in case". But why involve the future Navy officers in the infantry/marine ops?

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The Red Army shifted hundreds of thousands of troops plus their equipment plus supplies to the far east May to August 1945 which indicates the high command thought differently. After all there was China and Korea to liberate and Japan to occupy, Hokkaido had about 2 million people, it would have strong defences, then onto Honshu meeting the Americans and creating North and South Japan in 1946. The first date hinting such a scenario might not play out was 16 July 1945, Trinity, and then only to Stalin and maybe a few others.

Dimlee said:

What I mean is that the Russian-language (in ex-USSR) historical community agreed with the thesis of the Soviet offensive plans against Germany. Once more work in the archives was done, it has become a common knowledge. As for the dates, the debate was and probably is still ongoing.

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My understanding is access to Russian archives has become steadily worse and asking for the "wrong" document can result in punishment, even ones from WWII as that history is being looked at as part of the new Russian history Putin encourages. Certainly anyone working in Russia needs to ensure their publications meet government approval. Everyone agrees, even people in 1939, that long term Nazi Germany and the USSR were not going to stay at peace with each other. That is a non issue, the trouble comes from the ideas a Red Army attack was only days to weeks away as of 21 June 1941.

You can rule out mid 1941 and probably all 1941. And you do so by looking at the state of the army reports, the boring stuff that is rarely altered to fit a version of history. It is about time, it takes weeks to months to assemble the forces and their supplies, assault units need to create start lines and initial axis of movements, to do so they need to be familiar with the terrain, things like that alerts the enemy over and above the obvious build up. For months before Barbarossa the USSR was receiving plenty of information about what was going on, all the way from front line units to foreign governments. Nothing the other way about Red Army attacks, so we are expected to believe the Red Army could do in weeks what the Heer took months in order to attack in July, along with turning shell mobile formations into real ones and provide supply lift to support an offensive.

The Red Army in mid 1941 was not disposed for offensive operations, units were dispersed for training and others stationed well away from the borders. It was trying to defend every part of the USSR border with Europe, a similar posture to what Poland and France had done, overestimating the power of the defence, and was not set up to start the war by offensive action.

If you want the Red Army to attack in say mid July 1941 you need to compress into 3 weeks most of what the Germans took 3 or more months to do, assemble the combat forces at the front in working order including moving 4 or 5 armies in the north alone from roughly on the old border to the new one, distribute the detailed plans for each unit, do rehearsals, stock the forward supply dumps with enough to sustain heavy fighting given the known German concentrations, equip and deploy enough supply units with thousands of trucks. This is for each branch, then come up with the combined Army/Air/Navy plans, and go through the same process. Some air reconnaissance would be nice as well, even just from inside the border looking at the other side. If someone in the USSR expected a July 1941 offensive to open the Nazi-Soviet war all that proves is they comprehensively failed at logistics, staff college and own forces situational awareness.

The 12 May 1942 Red Army attack towards Kharkov ran into the German forces days away from attacking the Red Army starting position and others assembling for the summer offensive, the Germans were pushed back but counter attacked on 17 May resulting in the Izyum pocket, the Red Army supposedly similarly concentrated for an attack in June 1941 just makes them more vulnerable and leads to catastrophe.

From the date of its inception the Red Army would have had plans and run exercises on invading countries on its borders, such plans would have been updated in 1940 and into 1941 as the borders changed and more countries joined the Tripartite pact. The January 1941 map exercises were about conflict north of the Pripets, saying there are plans and exercises is not enough. Doctrine of "deep battle" was overturned by the purges and the perceived results of tank supported infantry in Spain, returning in mid 1940 but that meant creating the equivalent of Panzer Corps largely from scratch. As the Germans discovered it required lots of supporting equipment, particularly trucks.

In a dictatorship the army often represents the biggest threat to the leadership, a competent disciplined force which will follow its leaders in a revolt against the dictator. Much better to have an incompetent force with weak leadership, politically safer. The longer the dictator is in power the more incompetent the state tends to become. Stalin tolerated known corrupt underlings, it made them easy to dispose of when required.

Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine based on the assumption it would be about as much trouble as Crimea, more a traffic problem, add many years of dictatorship and parts of the invasion defeated itself. Now Putin uses Verdun as a tactical template. In 1941 the Germans expected to win but understood it was an invasion.

It is human nature to come up with good reasons for a good person's actions and bad reasons for a bad person's actions, at least initially, benefit of doubt goes to the good ones, the opposite to the bad ones. Once your opinion is polarised it is very hard to move away from all good or all bad yet everyone does a mixture of good and bad, governments are lots of people, ensuring governments are always doing good and bad every day. Election material is about convincing you which candidates and policies will do the most good, but the flip side and often what you end up deciding is which combination will do the least bad. One major tool is convince people the alternative will rape, loot and murder, so you understand why the good guys need to lie, cheat and steal, the lesser of two evils, even though they are lying to, stealing from and cheating on you. Also defeating such a horrible enemy forces requires the good guys to have first class travel, accommodation, food, clothing etc. in order to be at their necessary best all the time to fight the good fight for you. Hatred can make leadership easier, short term anyway.

Or to put another way all of us devote part of our effort to our own needs, the more powerful the more resources are available, pork barrel being one expression of this, decisions made on what is best for the decision maker. Also the more powerful you are the more people tell you what you want to hear and the longer you are in power the more you expect it along with deference. Stalin in 1941 had ensured as he looked around all he saw were mirrors reflecting him, while his statements and actions showed he was convinced no war in 1941. Or if you want speculation his grand 1939 plan the Fascists and Capitalists would fight each other to exhaustion leaving the USSR as the world power was crashing into ruins with the USSR facing the Fascists effectively alone and even if Japan did not directly attack the USSR it was going to weaken the British, enabling more European Fascist forces in the USSR. Go into denial about making such a colossal blunder, with no one allowed to contradict the theme Stalin is always right and must be obeyed.

Geoffrey Sinclair said:

The Red Army shifted hundreds of thousands of troops plus their equipment plus supplies to the far east May to August 1945 which indicates the high command thought differently.

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Yes! Some 3,889 aircraft were in the far east as of 9 August 1945, and 1,577,725 personnel from all branches. ( Voenno Istoricheskiy Zhurnal 1975, vol. 8, p.18)

Geoffrey Sinclair said:

My understanding is access to Russian archives has become steadily worse and asking for the "wrong" document can result in punishment, even ones from WWII as that history is being looked at as part of the new Russian history Putin encourages. Certainly anyone working in Russia needs to ensure their publications meet government approval.

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? Maybe, but from what I have experienced people have been able to get what they want from the archives as long as it is declassified. Heck, when I had a third party pull documents from the file I wanted, the file was declassified but did not have the stamp yet; the third party had the privilege of stamping the declassified stamp onto each page under supervision of the archivist. I have not heard of any punishment or reprimanding beyond if an individual pulls out a camera without authorization to take photographs (you need to pay a fee per page). This is standard archival procedure, standard in the West as well ... and to be fair prices in say TNA are much higher!

bf109xxl said:

I agree with my opponent that many Russian-speaking historians are biased, but not all.

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Hmmm.