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OK, would you take a 15k ton cruiser killer armed with 9.2" guns? Also, forbidden in treaties from '21 to '39. Cruisers needed to be 8" or smaller guns/10k tons std or less; Battleship between 17.5k and 35k tons and 10" to 14" guns with some grandfathering.
Malaya should have been turned over to the Australians to defend, with a Gurkha Regiment for good measure. Send the Indians to North Africa and and all the Australians to Malaya. AIUI in 1941 Australia had five combat infantry divisions, plus four militia/reserve/training division.
I know even less - but regards our lack of financial assistance to the Singapore 'fortress'- was it because we were actually trying to build our navy?
I think he was just taking the piss.Australia doesn't need battleships of 72,000 t displacement; waaay out of context... Dunno why that was even mentioned!
Do a Japan like the Mogamis et al and put 6" turrets on the mega cruiser and then when the treaties expire swap in the ready made 9.2" guns.I was pickingbiggestheaviest ship in WWII.
OK, would you take a 15k ton cruiser killer armed with 9.2" guns? Also, forbidden in treaties from '21 to '39. Cruisers needed to be 8" or smaller guns/10k tons std or less; Battleship between 17.5k and 35k tons and 10" to 14" guns with some grandfathering.
After a combined 120,000 dead fighting for Britain in France and Gallipoli under shoddy leadership, I'm surprised the Canadians and Australians didn't tell Britain in 1935 to shove it, you don't speak for us anymore. Then Australia follows Portugal's example and in 1935 approaches the Italians to buy four Calvi-class submarines. Alternatively the Dutch may offer to sell some subs. As for naval aviation, Australia needs to find a source for carriers or seaplane carriers.If it wasn't brought up, in 1935 the UK was a signatory to the London Treaty, and included in their quota was the Commonwealth. A carrier for Australia would apply to the RN tonnage allocation.
After a combined 120,000 dead fighting for Britain in France and Gallipoli under shoddy leadership, I'm surprised the Canadians and Australians didn't tell Britain in 1935 to shove it, you don't speak for us anymore. Then Australia follows Portugal's example and in 1935 approaches the Italians to buy four Calvi-class submarines. Alternatively the Dutch may offer to sell some subs. As for naval aviation, Australia needs to find a source for carriers or seaplane carriers.
Gallipoli was a result of the Australian officers and other ranks ignoring their orders to make sure the secured the high ground immediately after landing. Instead they stayed on the beach until the Turks had time to move hundreds of troops and secure the high ground thus enabling them to successfully defend themselves.After a combined 120,000 dead fighting for Britain in France and Gallipoli under shoddy leadership, I'm surprised the Canadians and Australians didn't tell Britain in 1935 to shove it, you don't speak for us anymore. Then Australia follows Portugal's example and in 1935 approaches the Italians to buy four Calvi-class submarines. Alternatively the Dutch may offer to sell some subs. As for naval aviation, Australia needs to find a source for carriers or seaplane carriers.
Therer is plenty of blame to go round . The idea of forcing the straights by naval power alone was an extremely poor. The history of ships vs forts has generally ended in the forts favor. All it did was give the Turks time to prepare for the land assault. A combined assault at the very beginning would likely have succeeded.Gallipoli was a result of the Australian officers and other ranks ignoring their orders to make sure the secured the high ground immediately after landing. Instead they stayed on the beach until the Turks had time to move hundreds of troops and secure the high ground thus enabling them to successfully defend themselves.
Excellent points.My sense is that Australia as a country didn't feel its oats until after the nation fought with distinction in North Africa, providing some of the best troops there, holding Tobruk for what, nine months? That's when they felt like they could talk back to the mother country, I think. They'd earned sweat equity at that point.
Excellent points.
Imagine if five Australian divisions, supported by an expanded RAN and RAAF instead led the CW and Imperial troops in holding Malaya. Historians would be marvelling at that even today.
Even Eisenhower and Montgomery would have done little better in Malaysia*.I have no doubt the Japanese would have gotten one hell of a surprise, even if the Diggers didn't have air support. Everything I've read indicates they were fighters par excellence who didn't shy away from a scrap.
Even Eisenhower and Montgomery would have done little better in Malaysia*.
The problem isn't the ability of the troops to fight the problem is getting materiel to the troops to fight with.
The port of Singapore had the ability to transport ~10k tons/day of supplies off the docks. The civilian population needed about 2k of that, the 60,000 troops needed about 500 tons per 10k troops prewar (docks didn't run 24 hours/day at capacity). The rail lines out of Singapore have the ability to transport ~5k tons to Kuala Lumpur or about a 1/4 of that to Penang or Kelantan (inverse squared relationship double distance, 1/4, triple, 1/9th etc). Of that over 1k tons is committed to supplying the RAF. There are only a couple single lane paved road running the length on the peninsula and they are going to be clogged with refugees making them next to useless for transporting materiel.
A division (10k troops) needs 750 tons of materiel daily when in combat, roops in SAP had nothing like Red Ball Express. For reference Red Ball Express needed a truck for every 2.5 tons of materiel delivered 300 km from Cherbourg to Chartres. Singapore to Penang or Kelantan is over 700km. Solve the logistics and you stand a hope of saving Malaysia.
Sending additional troops from India/Australia had the effect of tying Percival even tighter to Singapore - he couldn't get the supplies to feed the troops/civilians he had. How do you get more supplies off the ships - Australians weren't sent to Singapore to be longshoremen; Indian troops reset being asked to lift and toke for the "white men". But British troops are the only ones listening to what high command wants them to in the field.
Percival sent his best troops up the peninsula, but he knew he could barely support a battalion (1k troops), no hope of a brigade (5k troops). Yes, the troops on the ground saw it as a failure of high command, but they always see the failure of logistics that way.
p.s. If you put the diggers in beside the historic India troops in '40-41, the Japanese might be seen as liberators. Unfortunately, neither set of Commonwealth troops were known for their tolerance and tact when dealing with the other (especially without a 3rd party opponent).
*Ike and Monty might have done better because they could tell Australia and India to keep additional troops out of Malaysia. Ike had the advantage on Europe that his unruly commander was in same army as he was so there was no politics involved.
Hard to blame Dominions: India and especially Australia wanted fighting to happen in Malaysia having seen the damage done to France in WWI.
I figured I owed the Admiral an apology for derailing his RAN CV thread.Thanks for taking the time to compose that post, Don. That's a lot to chew on, and I'm appreciative.
No worries, I love a good tangential yet-relevant chat, all good stuff.I figured I owed the Admiral an apology for derailing his RAN CV thread.
I have had the opportunity through work to visit Singapore and Penang, so have put 1st hand "boots on the ground".
I would want Australia to build coastal craft - maybe up to Steam Gun Boats and Sverige class defense ship - make Japanese supply lines as long as Allied by preventing landing all down the coast and the enemy now has a logistic problem (and its probably greater).
Which, from a RAAF perspective bothers me, since there were several airfields in PNG and the Solomons that could have been made into RAAF forward bases.As I posted before Australian governments did nothing towards strategic defence in the interwar years which came home to roost in WWII.
Which, from a RAAF perspective bothers me, since there were several airfields in PNG and the Solomons that could have been made into RAAF forward bases.
Probably, but an airfield isn't a fortification, even though it can be teaming with combat aircraft.Would the non-fortification of Pacific holdings have applied to the Aussies (under the rubric of the Brits)? I think Britain was limited by the non-fortification clause as well, but that's a hazy memory and nothing more.