In regards to Coral Sea losses, operational aircraft is a different number to losses. Aircraft often would return , be declared non-operational, repaired overnight and ready the next day.
At battle's end heading back to Japan (via Rabaul then Truk), Zuikaku has operational 13 dive-bombers, 8 torpedo planes, and 24 fighters. Non-operational were 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 2 attack planes. Thus in the two days, Zujikaku had lost 1 fighter, 8 dive-bombers, and 14 attack planes. Of these, the crew had been lost from 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 9 attack planes. Aircrew losses for Zuikaku amounted to 23 airframes and 14 aircrews. There is some doubt as to whether 9 Zekes were flown in after the battle, from Inouyes command at Rabaul, but I find that difficult to reconcile. There is no record of such transfer from Rabauls daily situation reports of any such transfer, neither is there any record of such a transfer from Truk. maybe they were transferred from the Shokaku survivors, but I tend to think this is a bogus claim.
Aircraft listed as shot down in Coral Sea, frequently turn up as having made it back to the carriers. Clearly they are not shot down, just damaged. Some are damaged beyond repair, as the 23 lost airframes for Zuikaku clearly show, but also clearly, the claims made for aircraft shot down by the USN for the Coral Sea are pretty clearly not correct.
Though operational and battle loss figures vary slightly among the sources for Coral Sea, fortunately they all agree in the detail of most interest to historians: how many aircraft remained to Zuikaku on 9 May. . This is the important factor for examining the question of why she was omitted in the Midway Operation. Though Shokaku apparently had 2 dive-bombers and 3 attack planes still aboard after her bomb damage, the Japanese were loath to transfer away from the Shokau which had suffered far more heavily. in terms of airframe losses. Thus officially, both carrier's air groups were considered damaged and lacking after Coral Sea and were besides scheduled to be further diluted. Zuikakus air group was needed to reconstitiute Shakaus and also establish Hiyos air group .
Note that the pre-Coral Sea plans to transfers aviators of CarDiv 5 to other bases or carriers coupled with the lack of adequate ready replacement aircraft for Coral Sea losses was the main reason CarDiv 5 was not pressed to participate in the Midway Operation. No doubt this sentiment to proceed with the scheduled transfers was strengthened by the May 14 message sent to Combined Fleet that CarDiv 5's losses and that Zuikaku had lost 40% of her airframes precluded that carrier's ready use. 40% of 63 is 25 aircraft, incidentally. At the time it was apparently felt that the addition of Zuikaku as a "one division ship" with weakened air complement was redundant and would raise more logistical and tactical problems than it would solve. Only hindsight makes it seem obviously a wrong decision.(The Japanese apparently did not think so even in hindsight, for well after Midway. When a similar situation obtained after the Santa Cruz battle, the same choice was made and an opportunity to reinforce Zuikaku's weakened air group with Hiyo's was not taken and she was instead sent home on November 4, 1942 two days after Shokaku, thus missing the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November.) As it was, Zuikaku was on May 25 allocated to the latter June phase of the projected Aluetians Operations should she be required.
For the Shokaku, losses are more obscure, and records incomplete, but she is known to have retained at least 9 aircraft on her decks at the conclusion of the battle. I think there were more. In regard to the losses in the night strike, this is again something misreported in American sources. 1430 CarDiv 5 launched to make a bold and risky nightfall attack on the reported American carriers. Admirals Takagi and Hara had made the decision in an effort to regain initiative, and selected their most night flying skilled pilots to participate. Sacrificing fighter cover (the Zeros aboard were not suited for night-flying escort) the 12 dive-bombers and 15 torpedo planes gamely fly to the very limits of their operational radius and well after twilight, only to find nothing and have to start back. Ironically, they had overflown TF 17, and ran into its CAP. Several are shot down, and even more amazingly, about six come within minutes of actually landing by mistake on YORKTOWN, only to spooked by gunfire at the last moment. To aid their return, Admiral Hara courageously orders CarDiv 5's searchlights switched on to give the planes a chance to land safely. But some are running out of fuel even then, and eleven crash on or near the deck or are damaged while landing. Only six of the strike lands intact and remain operational. however, this does not mean that 21 were shot down as is often reported. Losses as near as I ascertain if the landing accidents are excluded amount to about 6 aircraft. 4 were believed lost in the return flight. That might mean as few as 2 are destroyed over the US carriers
I dont know enouigh about the Midway operation to make any similar conclusions , and though i cant prove it, im willing to bet the farm that many of the so called losses over the US Task Force are in fact damaged aborts. the problem we have here is that many of the logs and records for the Japanese ships including, I believe the Hiryus, were simply lost, even before the japanese final report could be made. all we have in the main are the unsubstantiated claims by the US pilots themelves, and these simply are not accurate, as the Coral Sea stuff does show.
Whilst this may look or appear as contradicting what Im saying about the japanese being absolutely enslaved to thir loss rates, in fact it is very consistent with it. people are apt to accept the claimed losses as gospel, and therefore proof that the heart was ripped out of the Kido Butai by these horrendous losses. whilst i agree that the heart was ripped out, it didnt take near the losses that are claimed to do that. People simply dont realize how few replacements were being received, and just how sensitive to losses the japanese airgroups actually were.