Significance of the Battle of Midway (1 Viewer)

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Defeating the US and destroying the existing remaining pacific fleet had far reaching consequences - not the least was a greatly lengthened war in the Pacific. The two or three immediate consequences that come to mind are 1.) isolate Wake and starve it out, 2.) complete destruction of the sub bases, 3.) complete elimination of Hawaiian airpower and blockade from re-supply.

Possibly then take Hawaiian Islands.

Immediately after the battle - take New Guinea and expand in SW Pacific, building an airbase net to choke off all military supplies to Australia. The IJN would have a minimum of 18 months breathing space with no interference from USA, USAAF or USN to maneuver in SE Asia, China and India.

Explore the options of taking Madagascar and Ceylon to choke off the Suez Canal and pivot on India - or consider attacking USSR (doubtful). The US, even with vast resources, would take a long time to retake Hawaii and establish a jumping off point - and it would take a very long time to neutralize a Japanese air base net in SWP to move to support Australia.

I doubt that Hawaii could be taken even if IJN fleet prevailed but that would be the key choke point on US initiatives in PTO.
 
The aim of the japanese in the war was never to defeat the US outright. they were smart enough to realize they couldnt do that. what they needed to do was firstly to obtain access to the strategic raw materials that they needed to continue their war in China. They achieved that, ahead of schedule and at a fraction of the cost they had anticipated.

The Japanese knew that the Allies would not willingly accept the Japanese conquests in SE Asia. They hoped however, that if they could inflict a series of decisive defeats on the US and her allies, that these nations would tire of the war and its costs and seek peace terms with the japanese.

Failing that they were confident that hte Germans would force the Russians to the peace table, and then the allies would face a two front maritime war that they would be hard pressed to counter. at the very least they expected a defeat of Russia would lead to the release of the manchurian garrisons, and an intensification of naval operations in the Atlantic. this they hoped would dilute US counterattacks.

Failing all of those, the japanese aimed to inflict a massive defeat on the US as a direct result of Midway. thus weakened, the US would not be in a position to launch any effective counterattacks and thereby Japan would gain time to fortify and reinforce her pacific outposts.

As it turned out, none of these assumptions worked. germany was defeated in the week that the japanese declared war, they completely miscalculated US anger over Pearl, and they never achieved the decisive victory they were looking for. Midway, of itself was not the vital turning point, but it was part of the events that were critical to turning the tide and gaining the initiative over Japan . japans assumptions relating to Midway were themselves badly flawed and far too optimistic. Therein lies the basic reasons for Japans defeat.
 
My observation (and it's an observation only) regarding the loss of the leeward islands and Midway/Hawaii, would be that the U.S. would be slowed down in it's ability to bring the fight to the Japanese, but not forced to the table.

However, losing possesion of the Panama Canal would have been disasterous, as it would have seriously hampered the U.S. Navy's ability to bring fresh assets to the Pacific to rebuild the PacFleet. Of course, it would not have stopped the new arrivals, but delayed their arrival considerably as they have to make the trip 'round the horn...

If the Japanese just bombed the canal, damaging the locks like the Mira Flores, etc. that would have been fixable over a period of time but I have seen it suggested eslewhere that the Japanese could have tried to take possesion of the canal and I don't think that the folks suggesting that took into consideration that there were several south and central American nations that would have been more than capable of over-running Japanese forces there at the Panama canal had the Japanese attempted something like this.
 
The other difficulty the Japanese would have faced in attempting to take the Canal Zone or even mounting a relatively sustained bombing effort against the locks (it's a bit optimistic that they woud succeed on the very first strike given the defenses they'd face) is just getting there. This would be outside the range and endurance of most Japanese carriers and capital ships, requiring a large support train to accompany the fleet on its way. As opposed to the Hawaii Operation, which was mounted in peacetime through seas not regularly patrolled by the USN, this would be an operation in American-controlled waters, in face of extensive long range aerial and submarine recon activity. It's also not a stretch that the USA would be expecting such an operation, since they gamed that repeatedly in the 1930s. I suspect the likelihood is high that the Japanese strike forces would be discovered, forcing Yamamato (or whoever) to decide whether or not to continue or abort the operation.

I've always wondered what would have been the long range effect on WW2 if Japan did not attack the US fleet at Pearl Harbor but instead opened hostilities with a massive attack on the Canal Zone. In this situation, the undamaged US fleet would sortie west to releive the Phillipines as part of Plan Orange and be engaged at sea by the numerically inferior, but in naval aviation assets, superior, IJN. Since this would be 1941-42, the US could go into the action overconfident and the ships would not be bristling with AAA. I think its almost inevitable that the Japanese would sink a number of US capital ships or carriers by air attack and these vessels would not settle into the muck of Pearl Harbor to be raised and repaired, but sink forever. Couple that with a long closure of the Canal Zone, this might give the Japanese a greater advantage long term than they obtained by the Pearl Harbor attack.
 
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I know that this is treading very deep into the "what if" waters, but if the plan for the attack at Pearl (7 December) had included a coordinated attack on Panama instead of assaulting the Aleutians, this would have seriously upset the boat for the U.S.

As it stands, the Aleutian campaign delivered little in the way of strategic value, it was always a constant thorn in the Allies' side, but not much more.

As far as the depth of the attack, I'm not sure to what extent the Japanese could have gone...but a surprise attack with bombers and even torpedo attacks (a torpedo would do some serious damage to the lock gates themselves) on the canal infrastructure would certainly be a major setback. Now the question would be, should they be content with simply bombing the hell out of it and withdrawing the strike fleet to other points in the Pacific or should they consider landing forces there to secure the area (like they did in the Aleutians)

The Japanese did have plans to use their I-400 class subs to launch an attack on the canal, though it never happened.

At least this is an interesting point to ponder.
 
There's a fascinating litte book written in 1925 called the "Great Pacific War" by the British naval journalist Hector Bywater that is a "future history" of a US-Japanese war in the mid 1930's. It starts with a Japanese "sneak attack" on the Panama Canal, but instead of airplanes and bombs, the weapon is a Japanese-manned merchant ship packed with explosives that detonates itself in the canal, destroys a key lock, and also results in a landslide that closes the canal for months. Great read if you can find it.
 
drgondog said:
I doubt that Hawaii could be taken even if IJN fleet prevailed but that would be the key choke point on US initiatives in PTO.
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For sure. You know, you think about it, this would have been their big opportunity. It's the start of the war. Our carriers are coming out of a big battle. They certainly didn't expect the Yorktown at Midway. Heck, by many accounts, they thought it was gone. How much closer are they going to get? Midway was at least water and a oil reserves and a little bit of farming land. I'm not saying that's all it represented, don't get the wrong idea, but, strike while the iron's hot. This was the time for Pearl, they wanted it. They've got a main force of battleships, there. If they got through Midway, as planned, they could even have brought in reinforcements, have thrown everything they had at it, that "choke point." They're not going to get another chance like that. They've got the advantage in the air and on the sea. I don't think I'm ruling out having gone for Pearl, had things gone differently, had they gone their way.
 
If the Japanese were going to be successful in taking Hawaii, they should have done it straight from the start. Instead of splitting their forces, sending an invasion/occupation force to the Aleutians, they should have rolled the dice and followed the planned attacks on 7 December with an invasion force supported by the Battleships and Cruisers once the U.S. Army/Navy complexes on Oahu were neutralized. There were several other auxillary fields and stations elsewhere on Oahu and a few other islands, but Pearl was the big prize.

Seizing Pearl Harbor would have been far more productive for the IJN than taking Midway and had the Japanese taken Hawaii, then the rest of the leewrd islands could have been taken peicemeal.
 
In 1927 IJN bought an airship from Italy, that was disassembled, sent by ship to Japan and assembled again there.
Ing. Felice Trojani, that was one of her designers and superintended to the works in Japan, in his memories "La coda di Minosse", recalls that he was amazed when he was clearly and candidly told by the Japanese Officers that the Airship was intended for sea recce in order to find the USN gathered together, to blow a definitive strike.
"I wasn't amazed" Ing. Trojani says "when I heard about the Pearl harbour strike. My Japanese friends were preparing all the things from long years".
 
I know. I always wondered at that, too. All I can think is they may initially have just underestimated its significance.
 
I think on of the biggest issues with the IJN philosophy was their obsession with 1 great battle to knock the US out of the war which guided their strategy. I do not believe they wanted to conquer the US, they just wanted them out of the war. With a large Japanese and Japanese-American population, I think Japan would have had a chance to invade and take over Hawaii right after the attack when panic was setting in and the Navy and Air Force smoldering on the ground.
 
I'm late coming to this party, and this may already been addressed, but what would have been the impacts to the battles in the south Pacific such as Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, Port Moresby, Austrailia, if Midway had been a disaster, say three US carriers sunk to one Japanese. It seems to me that a counter invasion on Guadalcanal could not have happened until Japan had finished its airfield and reenforced its garrison. I don't think another carrier would be available until very late '42, first part of '43.

I don't think Japan ever had any ideas of taking Pearl Harbor, certainly not by Midway. It would have been much harder to take than Singapore and I am not sure Japan had the sea lift capability to transport and land a sufficiently large invasion force at one go, which would have been required. By end of June, 1942, the US had 106,000 ground troops and 16,000 air troops (Chapter VIII: The Hawaiian Defenses After Pearl Harbor) in Hawaii.
 
Invading Hawaii on or about 7 December would have most likely been their only opportunity to take the Islands.

Hit Pearl with all planned waves as originally planned, land forces at strategic locations across Oahu driving towards Pearl, maintain readiness for the eventaul counter-strike(s) from the U.S. carriers in the area. Omce Oahu was secured, sweep Hawaii, Maui and the other islands. Then worry about the leeward islands.

Then the U.S. might be driven to the table for discussions (I seriously doubt it, though)

However, like I said, this would only be possible if the invasion was bundled in with the strike at Pearl on 7 December. Because, once the smoke settled, their window of opportunity closed.
 
Shortround6 said:
Given the total Japanese resources if they do invade Hawaii on Dec 7/8 what else does not get attacked?

Malaysia? The Philippines?

How many troops and transports would be needed for a Dec 7th attack?
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More than they could afford. Yamamoto was in favour of a direct attack from before the war, but he was constantly overruled. Finally, in the planning stages for Midway, it was the army who gave the Japanese one of the few reality checks in their high command. They calculated, that they would need 45000 troops for the invasion (a gross underestimate) and 70 trtansports per month just to keep the garrison supplied. This goes far beyond any logistic capability ever possessed.

As the midway operation progressed, the Japanese came to see the blockade and starvation of Hawaii as possible bargaining chip at the expected peace talks. We have this notion that the Japanese were not prepared to use their submarines and ships in anti shipping roles. this is incorrect. They were quite prepared to use them, but they gave them other priorities as well. In the aftermath of midway, once the USN had been removed from the equation, the Japanese intended to apply a tight blockade of the HI. Faced with starvation for a sizable chink of their population, the Japanese expected the US to sue for peace fairly quickly.

I think these appraisals are totally unrealistic. I dont think the US would give up nearly so easily. If Midway had gone the Japanese way it would have taken longer for the US, but the result can hardly be in doubt.
 
Considering the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor first, then employed a series of attacks on U.S. territories in the days and months following, after the U.S. had ramped up it's wartime footing.

Had the Japanese adopted a form of "Island Hopping" like the U.S. did during the PTO, then perhaps things may have taken a different course. I know that the Aleutian Campaign was considered a strategic one, because both sides held the idea that this "northern route" was an effective path to North America's west coast and/or Japan's northern islands.

However, an attack and invasion of the Hawaiian Islands along with an attack on the Panama Canal would have been a serious blow. As had been mentioned earlier in this thread, Midway was not yet a large staging area at this early stage and could be effictively bypassed (along with Wake) and picked off at their leisure. Pearl was and would have served as a valuable asset to the IJN in forming a noose around U.S. Pacific territories. Assuming the invasion of Hawaii was successful along with the destruction of the Canal, Japan would have bought them some serious time to either negotiate a deal with Washington or build up their strenght for the next step (Phillipines, Malaysia, etc)
 
Hi and welcome all, finally registered :]

I love these "what if" scenarios as they sharpen your mind and imagination. So lets dig into a short story.

Few weeks before the real encounter happened, Japanese asked themselves: "The risks are too great, if we plan a conventional attack. We must think of something that might be of value to get those 2 small atolls.". They drank and drank, sang songs and played games. Most of the commanders liked shogi, thus it was only a matter of time before they started a game. While drunk, they ignored some rules, yet it was a young assistant, who gave them an incredible idea.

How could those 2 atolls make USA see red, so they would throw away reasoning and hopefully make grieve errors? Think, what is the first rule of assassination? Strike where it's least expected. The Doolittle's Raid proved that. But is there a place, where it would hurt all US citizens the hardest? Think again.

With the Midway, Japan could realistically bomb US cities. And with suicidal bombers, they might go as far as Washington or New York. Not for the ordinance that would hit the ground, but for pure fear factor. And since Washington would have been in range, where it would hurt the most than to destroy White House in the first strike?

-------------------

This of course is only a far fetched imagination, however with modified Tachikawa Ki-77 and sneaky tactics, it might have even worked. (Sneaked tactics: usage of US markings and camo and try to cross US during night...).

/// I personally wouldn't do it, since I'm "Buddhist" (we are all going to die, so why sped up the process with pointless wars over who has a bigger willy, who is cleaner...). But I love letting my imagination roam wild, to see what it will bring out .
 
Yes, I'd think so. To those who would hasten to point out, "easier said than done," that's hardly full of news. Hawaii and the Canal would have hurt the U.S. the most, more than anything, and that's, I'd think, just a fact. The Japanese, it seems, didn't understand it that sharply. As Hawaii and the Canal kept the U.S. in the war, that's when the idea started to get across. By that time, sayonara. Too late, not enough.
 
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