Significance of the Battle of Midway

buffnut453 · Apr 14, 2014

Depends how you define "experienced". Given the extensive experience of many USN aviators that participated, I don't think the qualitative margin was much different between the 2 sides.

buffnut453 · Apr 14, 2014

parsifal said:
It was never intended to develop midway for japanese bombers. however they did intend to base long range seaplane recon aircraft and maintain survellance of Pearl more or less continuously

Even that would have been challenging. The Japanese aircraft would have to stay away from Hawaii itself - USN and USMC fighters would prevent their approach too close to Pearl. Thus the IJN seaplanes would have to operate/monitor over a pretty broad area which is very expensive on airframes and personnel. Even had they accomplished it, by the 3rd quarter of 1942 the main focus would have shifted away from Pearl and towards Guadalcanal which brings back the challenge of keeping a large seaplane base at Midway resupplied.

oldcrowcv63 · Apr 14, 2014

VBF-13 said:
Here's an interesting question. To what degree did Midway show inexperienced pilots can accomplish their objectives against experienced pilots?

My vote would be not at all. The US pilots and organizations doing the most damage were the most experienced… just as you might expect. Hornet and her air group performed exactly how one might expect for a collection of rookies. Slow and uncertain in virtually every measure. From a practical standpoint, Hornet's greatest contribution on June 4 may have been simply as an alternate airfield. Hornet's VT-8 was the only unit that saw combat over the IJN fleet with disastrous consequences as it's protective escort got itself lost and ended up ditching en mass.
Even that seems thin gruel. A/C attrition of VB and VF and especially VT in all three CAGs were partially restored by Yorktown refugees. Of course all that deck space was made largely possible by the heavy sacrifice of all the VT as well as CAG 6 VB attrition.

The CAG 8 learning curve was steep and by June 6, they were apparently beginning to gel somewhat. Against the slow-moving, collisionally maimed cruisers Mogami and Mikuma, VS VB-8's SBDs did pretty well scoring 6 or seven hits for 26 drops, one of which surprisingly included an escorting destroyer. Hornet's performance does seem to validate the notion of even one combat operation doing much to 'season' a unit.

oldcrowcv63 · Apr 14, 2014

buffnut453 said:
Depends how you define "experienced". Given the extensive experience of many USN aviators that participated, I don't think the qualitative margin was much different between the 2 sides.

I agree Buff. I think CAG 5 and 6 basic 'skills' compared fairly well with their veteran IJN counterparts even though the IJN had from somewhat to a lot more combat operational experience.

VBF-13 · Apr 14, 2014

buffnut453 said:
Depends how you define "experienced". Given the extensive experience of many USN aviators that participated, I don't think the qualitative margin was much different between the 2 sides.

The Japanese pilots, compared to the U.S. pilots, were at the top of their game, buff, both in training and combat experience, that's what I was referring to. The devastation to that fleet was a product of the correct aircraft ultimately having been brought to the job, notwithstanding that imbalance, that's the way I see that battle.

oldcrowcv63 · Apr 14, 2014

VBF-13 said:
The Japanese pilots, compared to the U.S. pilots, were at the top of their game, buff, both in training and combat experience, that's what I was referring to. The devastation to that fleet was a product of the correct aircraft ultimately having been brought to the job, notwithstanding that imbalance, that's the way I see that battle.

VB, I don't think that's quite correct. The USN aviators were quite good and (excepting the Hornet's CAG) certainly couldn't be objectively characterized as 'inexperienced.' No one had the experience of the IJN crews but the USN chaps were good and experienced enough to get the job done with the SBDs. The F4F jockeys of Yorktown acquitted themselves reasonably well in the battle in both cap and escort role and even the CAG 5 6 VT did a bit better than the rookies with 6 TBD's returning to their ships out of a total of 26 launched.

VBF-13 · Apr 14, 2014

"Inexperienced" was stretching it, Crow, I'll agree. The advantage in experience couldn't hold off the dive-bombers, though, that's what I was getting at. Add to it, it didn't explain the slaughter of the torpedo-planes.

oldcrowcv63 · Apr 14, 2014

VB, you may have opened up a door to the seemingly never ending (yet always civil) discussion of the relative obsolescence of the TBD!

Arguably the most experienced CAG was Yorktown's perhaps based on the early raids, their March Lae and Salamua raid with the Lex and the subsequent experience at Coral Sea. It's worth noting that only the Yortown's VT went in accompanied by their 6 escorting F4Fs and 5 of 12 survived the initial attack with three being subsequently lost according to some sources, by an attempt to achieve a more favorable engagement geometry on a different target. Hornet's 10 escorts got lost entirely and the Enterprise 10 found the enemy but lost its TBDs. Its hard to imagine contemporary IJN pilots imitating that record yet they evidently came close to doing just that. Hiryu's VB escorts got distracted in the initial attack and the Vals they were supposed to protect were savaged by the Yorktown's CAP which dispatched a dozen or so of the original 18.

Garyt · Apr 14, 2014

The Japanese pilots, compared to the U.S. pilots, were at the top of their game, buff, both in training and combat experience, that's what I was referring to. The devastation to that fleet was a product of the correct aircraft ultimately having been brought to the job, notwithstanding that imbalance, that's the way I see that battle.

I don't think the Japanese pilots were "out performed". The Hiryu did a pretty good job knocking out a carrier with a rather small force, against CAP that knew they were coming. and without having the armed and arming planes on the hangar or main decks. I think Midway, instead of illustrating the worth of a nations combat pilots illustrated this -

1) The great advantage that functional early warning radar gives you
2) The importance of having a secure code for transmissions, or breaking the enemies code, and how this allows one to ambush the opposing forces
3) How vulnerable to bombs carriers which have armed and/or arming planes of hangar/main deck are

The Japanese combat air pilots did not have much of a chance to show what they could do. It was like a great offense and football that you never let have the ball because you are able to keep them on the sidelines.

EDIT - Forgot to add
4) How the Japanese damage control was not on par with that of the US, even looking at rather simple things such as the open hangar US carrier design vs. the closed hangar Japanese design, or the redundancy of things like water mains vs. a single main on the Akagi.

VBF-13 · Apr 14, 2014

They didn't have enough escort, Crow, flying into that big carrier fleet. They couldn't get off a level shot, that was the problem. They were ditching their torpedoes well before that, just to try to stay alive. Those were going straight to the floor. The planes that did manage to get in reasonably low were tore up by the carriers' guns they were flying head-first into. There may be other accounts. That's the account I heard.

oldcrowcv63 · Apr 14, 2014

VBF-13 said:
They didn't have enough escort,

Amen! Thach wanted 8 a/c to execute the weave most effectively but was overruled and had to settle for 6. I doubt that even the planned 10 Escorts for VT-6 -8 would have changed the results substantially except for perhaps allowing more survivors unless of course they could have executed simultaneous attacks but the IJN was doctrinally a lot better at that than the USN.

parsifal · Apr 14, 2014

VBF-13 said:
The Japanese pilots, compared to the U.S. pilots, were at the top of their game, buff, both in training and combat experience, that's what I was referring to. The devastation to that fleet was a product of the correct aircraft ultimately having been brought to the job, notwithstanding that imbalance, that's the way I see that battle.

not all the japaqnese aviators were super experienced. Some were positive green horns. In preparation for the war, Japan had stripped out her training schools, to the point that the output of replacements was lacking in both numbers and experience. Even experienced air groups, when used as intensively as the japanerse had used their carriers suffer quite heavy attrition....between 7 and 10% each and every month (even over Pearl, losses had been heavier than in an entire year over China).

Facts were that the IJN was suffering losses in her air groups at an unsustainable rate, even before Midway.

What is surprising, however, is that despite the losses of ships, the losses in aircrew were actually quite modest. There was not a single loss of aircrew on or over the carriers, but over Midway, losses were again quite concernig. overall, only a small proportion of air leaders were lost.

The new Japanese carriers, and the Light Carriers were not in the same league as the four fleet carriers. Destruction of the four fleet carriers, enabled the Japanese to normalise the training levels of their reserve carriers, and restore the airgroups of shokaku and Zuikaku. These carriers fought much better in the next three battles than the fleet carriers had fought at Midway. as far as losses were concerned,. the losses in these battles in the southern seas were much more serious than the losses at midway ever were. but losses to the USN were also not light. The difference by the latter part of 1942 was in the powers of recovery of the two navies. the USN could take heavy punishment and get up and fighht again, the IJN could not. its as simple as that.

Garyt · Apr 14, 2014

the USN could take heavy punishment and get up and fighht again, the IJN could not. its as simple as that.

Coupled with the fact US AA was more effective than the Japanese AA, and that Japanese planes in general were less survivable than their US counterparts and you have a death spiral for the Japanese aviators that became inevitable.

Japan could sink as many US ships as they would want to - but I think the losses in pilots would eventually catch up with them. They would really need that "decisive battle" they would always shoot for, and they would have had to have an overwhelming victory where their surface fleet and carriers would destroy most of the US Navy, with little losses for themselves. Unfortunately for them, they based their theory for victory on 1920's-30's technology and engagment methods, looking for another Tsushima.

Gixxerman · Apr 14, 2014

Given that Japan had radar too it has always surprised me that they didn't seem to make use of it as early warning detection for their major ships, it might have made all the difference to them at Midway.

oldcrowcv63 · Apr 14, 2014

Gixxerman said:
Given that Japan had radar too it has always surprised me that they didn't seem to make use of it as early warning detection for their major ships, it might have made all the difference to them at Midway.

They had a form of home defense radar chain early in the war but the Japanese didn't have ship mounted pulse radar until September 1942. At the Santa Cruz Island carrier battle in October 1942, a radar mounted on the Shokaku provided the first radar alert of an impending attack which apparently alerted the maintenance crews to suspend fueling and purge the lines. However in that battle and apparently subsequent battles they didn't didn't develop a system of Radar directed fighter control. The IJN didn't have the benefit of the British RN experience in fighter direction made available to the USN.

Garyt · Apr 14, 2014

At the Santa Cruz Island carrier battle in October 1942, a radar mounted on the Shokaku provided the first radar alert of an impending attack which apparently alerted the maintenance crews to suspend fueling and purge the lines.

Made a huge difference in the surviveability of the Shokaku. It took 3-6 1000lb bomb hits and survived, Compared to 1-5 hits which sunk the first 3 Japanese carriers at Midway.

oldcrowcv63 · Apr 14, 2014

yep… I had always wondered how it survived that pounding. That class was well built.

Garyt · Apr 14, 2014

The Shokaku class was indeed built better than the older carriers of Kido Butai. While Kaga/Akagi had about 3 inches of hangar deck armor, and Soryu/Hiryu about 2, the Shokaku class had about 6" of deck armor protecting the engineering and magazine areas.

Plus newer ships in general were just built better to withstand damage. Shokaku's still had that closed hangar construction that helped cause the Avgas fumes buildup when she was struck by torpedoes in the Marianas battle, which led to an explosion that pretty well destroyed the ship then and there.

parsifal · Apr 14, 2014

It is not valid to compare the losses at Midway to those in the later battles. Japan implemented a number of changes that made huge differnces to the survivability of their carriers. Radar di allow them to strike down aircraft, remove bombs, but most importantly close up the fire doors and watertight compartmentation. additionally they were able to fill the Avgas lines with Co2. Greater effort was put into damage control (unfortinately this appears to have been lost by the time of phil Sea....the performance of DC in the taiho in particular was attrocious...I suspect crew shortages and the overall drop in training even in the fleet itself, as well as the volatile fuels being used). By comparison, the carriers at Midway sucumbed overwhelmingly to the ucontrolled fires that wracked all of the ships after being hit. Moreso, the bomb hits cooked off many of the bombs that were laying around on the decks of the japanese carriers at midway. This never again happened to the japanese, and it shows in the losses they sustained.

Akagi, with the same levels of passive defence, and not mishandled as she was, was at least as well protected as the Shokaku. one problem facing all the Japanese carriers was the overall lack of horizontal protection, and the horizontal protection is what they most needed, given the lethality of the SBD. It wasnt until Taiho that they possessed a ship that should have been able to withstand a 1000 lb bomb dropped at 5000'. Its significant that Taiho was sunk by a torp, and not a bomb.

Garyt · Apr 14, 2014

Akagi, with the same levels of passive defence, and not mishandled as she was, was at least as well protected as the Shokaku.

Well for all the Akagi's original design as a battle cruiser it was not armored better than the Shokaku. It's armored belt was a fair amount thicker in spots, but it's deck armor was lacking compared to the Shokaku, about 3.5" for the Akagi, 5.5-6" for the Shokaku.

And a carriers real fear, at least when facing the US was from Dive Bombers. And anyway the Belt is not great protection against torpedoes - it's the anti-torpedo bulge, blister or whatever you want to call it, and I think both had similar anti torpedo armor.

Its significant that Taiho was sunk by a torp, and not a bomb.

Taiho was sunk IMO by inadequate damage control. One problem that seemed to plague Japanese carriers in particular, although the same thing helped seal the Lexington's fate - Having Avgas storage tanks that were ruptured too easily. I've read they used integral hull tanks for this, which was not the practice of US or UK carriers. A Gas vapor explosion sunk the Shokaku and Taiho. For some reason, gas vapor issues seemed to be the problem with torpedo hits, not bombs. Perhaps due to the fact that the Avgas was stored low in the hull?

Significance of the Battle of Midway

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