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I certainly like the ideas you're coming up with. I've been thinking about all this too although I've come up with some slightly different ideas. Perhaps we need a new thread to explore them.Instead of wasting money on building the Singapore naval base, perhaps smaller bases for both naval and RAF could be built in Penang, and across British Pacific territories. Just look at how many islands Britain controlled, but with little investment in their defence or use as a barrier to defend Australia, etc.
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The mostly USA (plus ANZ) forces that re-took the Solomons (for the British) suffered 10,600 killed. Retaking PNG cost the USA 13,000 dead (plus >7K ANZ/CW forces). I know the First World War took much of Britain's treasure, but to neglect your empire's defences like this is nuts. Look at the investment the USA put into retaking Britain's territory in the Gilbert Islands at the Battles of Tarawa and Makin. I wonder what the Americans and locals in the Gilbert Islands territory thought when the British governor, Henry Evans Maude arrived to take command in 1946. He didn't waste anytime setting up a new British administration.
These small islands should have been submarine bases, akin to the secret RN base on Diega Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
How about cross decking at Coral Sea, with USN Wildcats operating from the RN carriers? Any flat top is welcome I imagine.Lots of interesting thoughts being tossed around, makes for good reading.
Again, not well versed in the British carriers we're discussing but one thing that struck me was when talking about using them at Coral Sea. I doubt they can operate with Lexington and Yorktown but what about as nighttime search forces? Did not Swordfish and Albacores have radar capability for ship search? I'll wager the problem would be that getting out of harms way come daylight might be problematic (for both ships and planes) but perhaps (a big perhaps) they could manage to ferret out the IJN forces during the night hours and give the USN a leg up on location of the Japanese carriers?
What the Swordfish, Albacore, Fulmar and Skua had was a special technical ability to operate at night or bad weather and still find their carrier to return even if it had changed course whilst they were in the air. They still had to find their target though.Lots of interesting thoughts being tossed around, makes for good reading.
Again, not well versed in the British carriers we're discussing but one thing that struck me was when talking about using them at Coral Sea. I doubt they can operate with Lexington and Yorktown but what about as nighttime search forces? Did not Swordfish and Albacores have radar capability for ship search? I'll wager the problem would be that getting out of harms way come daylight might be problematic (for both ships and planes) but perhaps (a big perhaps) they could manage to ferret out the IJN forces during the night hours and give the USN a leg up on location of the Japanese carriers?
Lack of aircraft and the risk of depleting Yorktown and Saratoga's CAG is one reason. But if Nimitz can get some extra Wildcats I'm sure the RN would welcome them wholeheartedly.The Victorious operate4d with the USN fleet for a short while and carried 60 (I think) Wildcats so there is no reason why this shouldn't happen.
Lack of aircraft and the risk of depleting Yorktown and Saratoga's CAG is one reason. But if Nimitz can get some extra Wildcats I'm sure the RN would welcome them wholeheartedly.
*SNIP*
I'm trying to find the link, but I recall two pilots tried to land their Seafires on a USN fast fleet CV and both pranged, with one aircraft being taken back to the US as a museum piece. The FAA pilots blamed the arrestor set up, saying it was set at too heavy a weight for the light Seafire, but IDK. Seafires certainly operated from US-build CVEs.
Agreed. They should have delayed HMS Anson and Howe and focused on getting Implacable and Indefatigable completed faster. Different yards, so not materially interchangeable, but if funds are limited, put them to the carriers.^^^ Yeah man, those British carriers, they may have been rather cramped and uncomfortable what with no air conditioning and bad ventilation but they were TOUGH.
The Seafire isn't ready for combat until June 1942.If you can land a Seafire on a CVE, you can land it on a fleet carrier. An RN fleet carrier would always be of assistance even if the same number of aircraft were spread around. An extra target for the IJN to deal with and one that was both capable of taking damage, having up to date radars and AA guns, plus an experienced crew isn't an offer to be turned down lightly.
Agreed. They should have delayed HMS Anson and Howe and focused on getting Implacable and Indefatigable completed faster. Different yards, so not materially interchangeable, but if funds are limited, put them to the carriers.
As a comparison.
With Courageous, Glorious, Ark Royal, Hermes and Eagle sunk by summer 1942, the RN needed carriers, not more battleships.
- HMS Illustrious - Laid down 27 April 1937, Completed 25 May 1940. Three years and one month.
- HMS Indefatigable - Laid down 21 March 1939, Completed 28 Aug 1944. Five years and five months.
All good points, and perhaps I focused too much on the two final KGV ships. My question should have been, what WAS expedited to thus directly result in the five year build time for the Indefatigable class?Trouble is you can't change hull types or construction that quickly. Anson and Howe were laid down in July and June of 1937 respectively and had over two years worth of work already done before the war started, this includes guns and "turrets" ordered and being built. The Howe took 5 years to build compared to the 3 years and 9 months of the KGV.
Once you hit Sept of 1939 the question of funds is pretty much out the window. It is a question of labor (dockyard workers) and work to be done, like repairs on existing ships.
The different yards have little to do with the materials. It is more like the plates (and framing materials and such) being delivered and stockpiled are sized to the application and in some cases are pre-made to fit certain parts of the specific hull. delaying the Anson and Howe by a couple of years also means their guns and turrets are either sitting on the dock next to the ship or sitting in a depot somewhere. Not a good use of material.
Construction was put on hold by the government, otherwise they would have been in service in 1942.All good points, and perhaps I focused too much on the two final KGV ships. My question should have been, what WAS expedited to thus directly result in the five year build time for the Indefatigable class?
HMS Implacable, Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. February 1939 - August 1944
HMS Indefatigable, John Brown & Co. November 1939 - May 1944
I'll look up what else these yards were working on. Fairfield was already building HMS Howe and about to complete the cruiser HMS Liverpool when Indefatigable was laid down two years later. In January 1943, Fairfield laid down the carrier HMS Theseus, completed in less than two years. Other than Howe and Theseus, I can't find what the Fairfield yard was doing to take so long with Indefatigable.
Of course, no one else but government could put large military procurement projects on hold.Construction was put on hold by the government, otherwise they would have been in service in 1942.
Priorities IIRC. ASW ships and carriers were more critical. Unicorn was affected too delaying it by 18 months.Of course, no one else but government could put large military procurement projects on hold.
But perhaps it's my fault for being unclear. It's not who put the Indefatigables on hold, but why? Yes, the simple answer is money or perhaps labour and materials, but what was the money et al needed to complete the carriers in a timely manner otherwise allocated to?